共同市场支配地位的理论基础与规则构造

为解决寡头市场中的垄断问题,我国《反垄断法》提供了"滥用共同市场支配地位"的路径,但法律规定有缺陷并导致实践中难以适用或错误适用。以美国、欧盟为代表的理论和法律实践均表明这种认定思路是行之有效的,但其难点在于如何通过间接证据证明市场寡头不具合理性的一致性行为不是由于客观市场结构造成的,而是基于主观意图,因此具有可责性。分析美国、欧盟的执法、司法案例,通过各自演进过程论证其内在逻辑,发现两种路径殊途同归。我国反垄断执法认定共同市场支配地位时应该将结构、行为因素并举。

The Theoretical Basis and Rule Construction of the Collective Dominance

In order to regulate the monopolistic problem in the oligopolistic markets, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law provides a path of ‘abuse of the collective dominance.’ However, in practice, this path tends to be either inapplicable or misused due to the deficiencies in the relevant law and regulations. The theory and legal practice represented by the United States and the European Union all reveal that this identification path is effective, but the core problem is how to prove by indirect evidence that the oligopolies’ unreasonable concerted behavior is caused by subjective intent instead of the objective market structure and to establish the accountability further. In this regard, this paper analyzes the administrative and judicial cases of the United States and the European Union in detail. It demonstrates its internal logic through their respective development processes, arguing that the two paths have the same goal. Finally, the paper puts forward the specific factors, including structural factors and behavioral factors, in determining collective dominance.