| Abstract: | As the international community re-engages in Afghanistan, there is an opportunity to make good on commitments to the Afghan people in a principled and transparent manner. But Afghanistan comes with a history, and unless this history is understood and taken into account, both the political process and reconstruction are likely to end in failure. This article looks at the legacy of the way in which the donors and aid organisations operated in the past, and the manner in which they dealt with both the Mujaheddin and Taliban administrations. It examines how, in a period characterised by progressive hardening of political positions, accompanied by increasing aid conditionality, efforts to achieve greater coherence between political and aid strategies and to establish 'principled' positions often led to conflict and contradictions and at times seemed to undermine the impartiality of the international community. It then explores the extent to which the present pace and nature of international support for political and reconstruction activities are enabling--or not--the emergence of an administration in Kabul that has domestic legitimacy and can effectively manage reconstruction. |
