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公司治理机制:主动监督(激励)与退出威胁的选择
引用本文:田素霞. 公司治理机制:主动监督(激励)与退出威胁的选择[J]. 山东行政学院学报, 2005, 0(4): 54-56
作者姓名:田素霞
作者单位:山东省经济管理干部学院,山东,济南,250014
摘    要:公司治理机制可分为两类:一类是委托人的主动监督(激励),一类是出资者的退出威胁.当主动监督方式由公有资产代理人执行时,由于产权残缺的影响,最好利用退出威胁,让市场这支"看不见的手"来约束内部人.对私人企业来说,由于私人产权的完整性可以施加有效的激励与约束,并且对经营者的主动监督是不可或缺的,因此由私人股东运用主动监督(激励)机制是必要且有效的.

关 键 词:控制实体  表外交易  交易披露
文章编号:1008-3154(2005)04-0054-03
修稿时间:2005-05-02

The Management Mechanism of Company: The Choice between Initiative Supervision (Prompting) and Withdrawal Menace
TIAN Su-xia. The Management Mechanism of Company: The Choice between Initiative Supervision (Prompting) and Withdrawal Menace[J]. Journal of Shandong Administrative College and Shandong Economic Management Personnel College, 2005, 0(4): 54-56
Authors:TIAN Su-xia
Abstract:The management mechanism of company can be classified into two parts: One is initiative supervision(prompting) of the client, another is the withdrawal menace of the investor. When the initiative supervision is performed by the capital agent ,which makes the property right absent ,the best management mechanism that can be chosen is the withdrawal menace so that the staff can be restricted by the market-a invisible hand. For the personal company, the prompting and restrict can be put on effectively because of the integrality of personal property right ,moreover, it is indispensable to supervise the manager actively. Therefore, it is necessary and effective for the personal stockholder manager to administer the mechanism of personal property right.
Keywords:Management Mechanism of Company  Outside Transaction  Transaction Revealment
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