Fiscal dynamics of local elected officials |
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Authors: | D K Bhattacharyya Robert W Wassmer |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Leicester, LE1 7R4, Leicester 2. Department of Economics, Wayne State University, 48202, Detroit, MI
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Abstract: | The fiscal behavior of local elected officials is examined in a dynamic model where officials maximize an intertemporal objective function in two stages. Officials first decide upon an optimal mix of revenue and expenditure and then minimize loss and adjustment-cost functions. The model is tested using data from the 20 most populated U.S. cities whose mayor was elected on a four-year cycle. The empirical results support the model. Fiscal behavior differs between cities and local fiscal decisions made by elected officials are in part dependent on the timing of elections. |
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