监管理论的发展与证券监管制度完善的路径选择

传统监管理论对监管者自身问题的忽视,不仅在理论上留下了缺陷,而且对证券监管制度的发展与完善也产生了不利影响。监管理论的发展总体上是沿着从公共利益理论逐步向私人利益理论的嬗变展开的,并对证券监管制度的构建与实践产生了明显的影响。私人利益理论弥补了传统公共利益理论的缺陷,形成对监管制度不同的理论研究进路。中国的证券监管制度一直以公共利益理论为理论基础,存在突出的制度性缺陷。随着中国证券市场的发展,公共利益理论对于监管制度的解释力明显下降,需要采用比较丰富的私人利益理论解决具体制度的完善问题。

Development of Supervision Theories and Approaches to Improvement of Securities Supervision

Traditional supervision theories ignore supervisors themselves,which results in theoretical defects and brings about adverse effects upon the development and improvement of a securities supervision system.Generally speaking,supervision theories gradually deviate from public interests to private interests,which has exerted prominent influence on the establishment and operation of the securities supervision system.Private interest principles can cover the deficiency of the traditional public interest principles and thus will help forward different studies of a supervision system.In China,the study of a supervision system is consistently based on public interest principles.So it is no wonder that systematic defects can be easily found.Along with the development of China's securities market,the theory of public interests can no longer well argue for a securities supervision system,so the more enriched theory of private interests should be adopted to help argue for specific systematic improvement issues.