Institutional decay and distributional coalitions in developing countries: The argentine riddle reconsidered

This article examines the relationship between political institutions and interest group behavior within the context of developing countries, taking Argentina as an example. More specifically, it tries to explore the relationship between the decay of weak governmental institutions and the development of strong distributional coalitions following Mancur Olson's theory of interest group behavior. While integrating the findings of previous works by political scientists and economists, this article advances an explanation that links institutional weaknesses with the failure of Argentina's main distributional coalitions to develop collective action. Lastly, the study analyzes the recent economic reforms of the Menem administration and their impact on the process of democratic consolidation. Drawing upon the theoretical and empirical discussion presented, the article argues that, contrary to the opinion of many pundits, such reforms are likely to strengthen the socioeconomic power of a select number of distributional coalitions. Thus serious doubts exist about the prospects of institution-building in Argentina in the long-run. Reprinted fromInstitutions, Parties, And Coalitions In Argentine Politics, by Luigi Manzetti, by permission of the University of Pittsburgh Press.