| Abstract: | Disputes involving the boundaries of state versus federal powermake up a substantial portion of the U.S. Supreme Court's docketand have undergone extensive analysis. Yet, the conventionalwisdom regarding the justices’ choices in these casesis that they are highly inconsistent. I argue that this is primarilya function of the failure of scholars to develop a comprehensivemodel of the justices’ federalism decision making. Toremedy this, I introduce an integrated model of the individualjustices’ choices in these cases, which is then subjectedto empirical testing in the Rehnquist Court era (1986–2004).I explore a host of determinants of the justices’ decisionmaking, including attitudinal, institutional, legal, and personalattributes, as well as the role of organized interests in theCourt. The findings reveal that the choices justices make inthese cases are not as discordant as most commentators suggest.Rather, they are relatively predictable through the applicationof an integrated model of judicial choice. |
