中央集权驱动、地方分级响应与政府间合作的机理:基于京津冀的实证阐释

区域性棘手问题和相互依赖的增加凸显政府间合作治理的现实需要。不过,行政分权、财政分权和晋升锦标赛体制意味着地方自主性增长与区域协同发展之间的紧张。深入行政体系内部挖掘区域政府间合作的真实过程和内在机理成为亟待解决的问题。中央政治权威旨在打破地方保护主义的体制藩篱;地方高层通过“政治表态”积极回应中央的战略部署;地方中层因不变的压力型体制和目标责任制依旧关注地方利益和部门利益;地方基层在目标责任体系中存在支撑能力不足问题。结果,地方政府和政府部门主要根据成本收益分级分部门响应。为提升政府间合作的有效性,相关的改革选项包括根据城市功能定位建立差异化的政绩考核和区域财税激励兼容机制,明确将区域协同发展的职责赋予特定政府层级,建立多样性的非正式制度以积累政府间合作的信任资本,充分发挥市场机制和社会力量的作用。

The Centralization Authority Drive,Local Response,and Mechanism of Intergovernmental Cooperation:An Empirical Interpretation Based on Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei

The increasing wicked problems and interdependence indicate the needs for collaborative governance.However,administrative decentralization,fiscal decentralization,and cadre promotion tournament mean that there are tensions between local autonomous growth and regional coordinated development.The real process of intergovernmental cooperation within the multi-level government system worth attention distribution.The central political drive aims to break the local protectionism.Within the bureaucratic system,the top-level government officials actively respond through political statements;the middle-level governments still pay attention to local and departmental interests due to the unchanging target accountability system;the grass-roots level can’t be accountable because of insufficient capacity.In order to enhance the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation,it is necessary to change the cadre performance evaluation and fiscal and tax sharing system,clearly assign the intergovernmental cooperation responsibilities to specific levels of government,enhance trust throughout diversity informal institutions,so as to make the market mechanisms and social forces work.