Do donors cooperatively fund foreign aid? |
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Authors: | Raechelle Mascarenhas Todd Sandler |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Whitman College, Maxey Hall, 345 Boyer Avenue, Walla Walla, WA 99362, USA;(2) School of Social Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, 2601 N Floyd Road, Richardson, TX 75083-0688, USA |
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Abstract: | Donor’s demand equations for alternative forms of aid are derived for three allocation processes: noncooperative Nash-Cournot, cooperative Lindahl, and bureaucratic. Based on OECD data for official development assistance for 1970–2001, we apply non-nested tests to distinguish between Nash-Cournot and Lindahl reduced-form equations for 15 major donor nations. Noncooperative Nash-Cournot behavior characterizes many donors, with a few abiding by bureaucratic behavior and none by Lindahl behavior. Joint products are present for multilateral and bilateral giving. Despite the common-pool nature of giving to multilateral organizations, countries derive donor-specific benefits and often view others’ donations as complementary to their own gifts. |
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Keywords: | Foreign aid Multilateral organizations Donor demand Public goods Joint products Lindahl Nash-Cournot |
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