| Abstract: | Scholars and unionists often claim an “excessive” flexibility and unilateral manager power in the labor relations system of Central Eastern Europe, while others observe “insufficient” flexibility and etatism. Beyond mere political reasoning the article provides an explanation for these contradicting diagnoses by reconstructing the varying influence of three conflicting concepts within the institutionalization process: economic liberalism, etatism and the continental European idea of social partnership. Focusing on Poland and the Czech Republic, it is argued that the varying influence of the three concepts contributed to permissive labor relations that clearly differ from Anglo-Saxon voluntarism: The labor relations are not permissive by formal standards but by deviation. During the 1990s the weakness of actors in regulating interaction and establishing powerful sanctions created a dilemma for liberalization. On the one side strong formal regulation by the state provided little incentives for employers to bargain. On the other side, a further withdrawal of the state from regulation did only ease unilateral decision-making of management as collective bargaining is weak. The impacts of harmonization with the EU regulatory regime are ambiguous. While establishing new minimum standards and regulations in new areas it also provided an opportunity structure for actors to push for the dissolution of the liberalization dilemma without compensating employees with more bargaining strength. |
