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职工参与公司控制质疑——对“共决制”的理论与制度分析
引用本文:张舫. 职工参与公司控制质疑——对“共决制”的理论与制度分析[J]. 现代法学, 2004, 26(2): 138-143
作者姓名:张舫
作者单位:重庆大学,重庆,400044
摘    要:职工参与公司控制会改变股东控制公司的传统公司治理模式。主张职工参与公司控制的学者认为 ,现代企业的职工不是向企业提供简单劳动 ,而是对公司做出了人力资本投资 ,因此 ,应该给与职工与股东相同的公司控制权。但给与职工控制权可能会增加公司集体决策的成本 ,不利于公司提高经营效率 ,“共决制”本身固有的弱点也可能使其无法达到预期的目标。德国的“共决制”与其公司治理特点有直接关系 ,不考虑我国的实际状况 ,盲目引进“共决制”可能会不利于我国公司的发展

关 键 词:职工参与公司控制  共决制  人力资本投资
文章编号:1001-2397(2004)02-0138-06
修稿时间:2004-02-23

Employee Share Corporate Control--Theoretical and Institutional Analysis of Codetermination
ZHANG Fang. Employee Share Corporate Control--Theoretical and Institutional Analysis of Codetermination[J]. Modern Law Science, 2004, 26(2): 138-143
Authors:ZHANG Fang
Abstract:Employees sharing corporate control will change the conventional shareholder-control model of corporate governance. Scholars who advocate employee-share model recognized that employee's work are not labor but the investment of human capital, so employees should share corporate control with shareholder. But employees sharing corporate control might produce additional determining cost which does harmful to efficiency. Codetermination also has some weaknesses that prevent it from getting its aims. In German, codetermination was established on its special corporate background, and the accepted codetermination in China without caring about Chinese environments would make against Chinese corporation development.
Keywords:employees share corporate control  codetermination  investment of human capital
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