信息信义义务理论之批判

“信息信义义务”理论已掀起网络平台监管争论的汹涌波涛,该理论经由杰克·巴尔金(Jack Balkin)教授发展,旨在“一碗水端平”一般用户与搜集、分析、出卖个人信息为业的数据公司之间的关系。在处理医患关系、律师与客户、会计师与客户的关系时,法律课以医生、律师和会计师特殊的注意、保密和忠实义务。巴尔金教授主张,与之相类似,在处理脸书(Facebook)、谷歌(Google)和推特(Twitter)等公司与终端用户的关系时,也应课以公司类似的特殊义务。过去数年里,该论断赢得了广泛的支持,鲜有敌手。但信息信义义务理论存在潜在矛盾和模棱两可之处,其是否有能力解决上述问题使人生疑。故此,本文揭示上述理论缺陷,意在瓦解“信息信义义务”新理论共识。尽管我们同意巴尔金教授“占主导地位的网络平台造成损害,由此呼唤法律的介入管制”的论断,但我们质疑信息信义义务这套理论是否能充分、恰当地回应所谓的信息不安全问题,更勿论一些更为根本的问题——建立于监视渗透基础上的优势市场份额以及与商业模式相关的根本问题。我们也呼吁重视信息信义义务这一理论框架的潜在成本——我们担心,该理论框架会对网络平台的结构性权利产生一种盲目的自满,也过早地放弃了对公共监管的更美愿景。

A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries

The concept of“information fiduciaries”has surged to the forefront of debates on online platform regulation.Developed by Professor Jack Balkin,the concept is meant to rebalance the relationship between ordinary individuals and the digital companies that accumulate,analyze,and sell their personal data for profit.Just as the law imposes special duties of care,confidentiality,and loyalty on doctors,lawyers,and accountants vis-a-vis their patients and clients,Balkin argues,so too should it impose special duties on corporations such as Facebook,Google,and Twitter vis--vis their end users.Over the past several years,this argument has garnered remarkably broad support and essentially zero critical pushback.This article seeks to disrupt the emerging consensus by identifying a number of lurking tensions and ambiguities in the theory of information fiduciaries,as well as a number of reasons to doubt the theory s capacity to resolve them satisfactorily.Although we agree with Balkin that the harms stemming from dominant online platforms call for legal intervention,we question whether the concept of information fiduciaries is an adequate or apt response to the problems of information insecurity that he stresses,much less to more fundamental problems associated with outsized market share and business models built on pervasive surveillance.We also call attention to the potential costs of adopting an information-fiduciary framework—a framework that,we fear,invites an enervating complacency toward online platforms structural power and a premature abandonment of more robust visions of public regulation.