Agent permeability, principal delegation and the European Court of Human Rights

A growing body of international relations literature examines the delegation of state authority to international organizations. Delegation is a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent in which the latter is empowered to act on behalf of the former. This paper explores the effect of agent permeability to interested third parties on the efficacy of control mechanisms established by principals. Our central argument is that higher levels of agent permeability are likely to lead to higher levels of agent autonomy. Because of this, principals who face a potentially permeable agent are likely to delegate more cautiously—partially, in stages, or with clear limits. We illustrate our argument with a case study of the European Convention of Human Rights and its two principal institutions, the Commission and the Court. We find that principals (contracting states) historically delegated quite cautiously to the Court, clearly concerned about the Court’s autonomy. Court behavior in its first two decades reassured principals while increasing the Court’s permeability. Over time, that increased permeability increased Court autonomy in conjunction with the Court’s growing visibility and experience.

Darren HawkinsEmail: