| Abstract: | This article examines the reasons behind the dramatic decline in military budgets in Argentina under democratic rule. These trends were unexpected, given the, political power the armed forces of that country have wielded in the past. Here it is argued that within the democratic state, there were institutional arrangements that enabled civilian decision makers to trim defense expenditures, despite opposition from the military. The two key institutional traits were found to be the concentration of authority and the autonomy of decision-makers from outside pressures. Because budgetmaking was centered within a well-insulated civilian-run ministry, fiscal planners working at the behest of the president were able to design and implement budgets they wanted, over and above the objections of military officers, and without interference from other branches of government. David Pion-Berlin is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside. He is the author of several books, includingThrough Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina (Penn State University Press, 1997), and numerous articles on the subjects of Latin American civil-military relations, military regimes, political economy, and political repression. |
