The effects of judicial admonitions on hearsay evidence

Using a simulated civil case, this experiment investigated whether mock jurors: (a) are able to disregard hearsay evidence when admonished to do so, (b) experience psychological reactance and "backfire effects" in proportion to the strength of judicial admonition instructing them to disregard hearsay evidence, and (c) are able to recognize and disregard hearsay evidence without judicial instructions. Results indicate that jurors were unable to disregard inadmissible hearsay testimony in some legal decisions regardless of whether there were judicial instructions to do so. Jurors exhibited backfire effects paying more attention to inadmissible hearsay evidence when they were strongly instructed to disregard it. More specifically, juror backfire effects were evident in both their confidence in their liability verdicts and in their punitive damage awards. The legal and policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

The Believability of Hearsay Testimony in a Child Sexual Assault Trial

Two experiments investigated how mock jurors react to hearsay testimony in a case involving child sexual assault. Participants read a fictional criminal trial summary involving the sexual assault of a 4-(Experiment 2 only), 6-, or 14-year-old female. The summaries were presented in one of four conditions: (a) child condition—the alleged victim testified; (b) hearsay condition—the alleged victim did not testify, but an adult hearsay witness did testify; (c) multiple condition (Experiment 1 only)—both the alleged victim and the adult hearsay witness testified; and (d) no-witness condition—neither the alleged victim nor the hearsay witness testified. The hearsay testimony was believed to a considerable degree, and this testimony led to an increase in the perceived guilt of the defendant. Moreover, these results were comparable to those of conditions in which the alleged victim testified. The results are discussed in terms of the psychosocial factors affecting the perception of hearsay testimony in a child sexual assault trial.     

Inducing jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence: A legal explanation does not help

Three experiments investigated mock jurors' ability to disregard inadmissible prior conviction evidence and hearsay. In Experiments 1 and 2, college students listened to an audiotape enacting a theft trial. The critical evidence favored the prosecution and was objected to by the defense. In three different conditions the judge either ruled the evidence admissible, ruled it inadmissible, or ruled it inadmissible and explained the legal basis for the ruling. In a fourth condition no critical evidence was presented. The critical witness' credibility was also manipulated. With prior conviction evidence but not hearsay the legal explanation “backfired.” In addition, the critical witness' credibility did not affect subjects' ability to disregard inadmissible evidence. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that the legal explanation may have affected the use of hearsay and prior conviction evidence differently because of subjects' dissimilar preconceptions of the fairness of using the two evidence items to assess guilt.     

Comparing the effectiveness of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Henderson</Emphasis> instructions and expert testimony: Which safeguard improves jurors’ evaluations of eyewitness evidence?

Objectives

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently determined that jurors may not be able to effectively evaluate eyewitness evidence on their own. As a result, the Court proposed the use of judicial instructions to assist jurors (called Henderson instructions) and suggested the implementation of these instructions would reduce the need for expert testimony. We tested the efficacy of these instructions compared to alternative instructions and expert testimony.

Methods

We utilized a mock trial paradigm, randomly assigning 452 participants to 1 of 20 videotaped trial conditions that varied the quality of eyewitness evidence (both witnessing and identification conditions) and the type of safeguard presented during the mock trial.

Results

Jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions on their own. Jurors were more likely to convict when identification conditions were good and less likely when identification conditions were poor. This relationship was mediated by eyewitness credibility ratings. Expert testimony resulted in skepticism by reducing the likelihood that jurors would convict regardless of the quality of witnessing and identification conditions. No variation of the instructions influenced verdicts.

Conclusions

While jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions on their own, we observed no such effect for the quality of witnessing conditions, even with the aid of instructions and/or expert testimony. Both Henderson instructions and expert testimony may be insufficient for assisting jurors to effectively evaluate problematic witnessing conditions. Future research should examine the use of alternative safeguards.

     

美国行政裁决程序中的传闻证据——一个历史维度的考察

在美国,存在着行政裁决程序和法院审判程序两类不同的程序。传统观点认为,行政裁决程序不受约束法庭事实认定者的审判证据规则的影响,尤其以传闻证据具有可采性为典型。随着美国行政程序的发展,传闻证据排除规则在美国行政程序法中逐渐兴起,使得行政程序证据规则和审判证据规则之间的关系发生了微妙变化。对两类证据规则之间关系的重新解读,将为我国行政程序证据规则的制定提供可借鉴的思路。     

The effects of target discriminability and criterion placement on accuracy rates in sequential and simultaneous target-present lineups

Abstract

Participants attempted to select previously studied faces from lineups that were administered either sequentially (test faces presented one at a time) or simultaneously (test faces presented altogether). Target discriminability was manipulated by varying the number of facial features that could be used to distinguish the study face from the other test faces (foils) or by varying study face exposure duration. In addition, decision criterion level was manipulated via an instruction manipulation. Results indicated that sequential participants adopted a stricter decision standard under high criterion instructions compared to simultaneous participants. Under liberal criterion setting instructions, the rate at which the target was selected was comparable across lineup procedures. Target discriminability affected target selections to a greater extent in simultaneous compared to sequential lineups. We discuss the applied implications that these findings have regarding correct identifications from lineups.     

Educating Jurors about Forensic Evidence: Using an Expert Witness and Judicial Instructions to Mitigate the Impact of Invalid Forensic Science Testimony

Invalid expert witness testimony that overstated the precision and accuracy of forensic science procedures has been highlighted as a common factor in many wrongful conviction cases. This study assessed the ability of an opposing expert witness and judicial instructions to mitigate the impact of invalid forensic science testimony. Participants (N = 155) acted as mock jurors in a sexual assault trial that contained both invalid forensic testimony regarding hair comparison evidence, and countering testimony from either a defense expert witness or judicial instructions. Results showed that the defense expert witness was successful in educating jurors regarding limitations in the initial expert's conclusions, leading to a greater number of not-guilty verdicts. The judicial instructions were shown to have no impact on verdict decisions. These findings suggest that providing opposing expert witnesses may be an effective safeguard against invalid forensic testimony in criminal trials.     

Mock jurors’ perceptions of a child witness: the impact of the presence and/or intervention of a registered intermediary during cross-examination

ABSTRACT

In recent years Registered Intermediaries (RIs) have been involved in facilitating communication in children's investigative interviews and trial proceedings. Their presence and interventions are generally deemed to have a positive impact on child engagement, but their impact on jury appraisal of evidence, during cross-examination is unclear. This study addressed this issue in a more ecologically valid context than that previously used. Adult mock juror participants (N?=?217) watched a video-recording of a mock cross-examination of a child witness in which a RI was present or absent, and in which RI type interventions were either included or omitted. The participants rated the quality of the cross-examination and the child's responses in relation to child credibility, child understanding, legal professional's behaviour, and trial progression. Findings indicated that RI presence or absence, and inclusion or omission of interventions had no effect on mock juror ratings. However, an interaction between these variables demonstrated that mock jurors rated trial progression towards a guilty verdict according to which court professional did, or did, not intervene. The findings also demonstrated that mock jurors based their assessment of trial progression towards a guilty verdict on the evidence presented, and that child understanding per se was irrelevant.     

Expert evidence and hearsay

In upholding the admission of expert evidence, some courts have held that hearsay information conveyed via an expert may be admitted as long as the jury is instructed to ignore the facts asserted in the hearsay statements and to use the information only for determining the weight to attribute to the expert's opinion. Results of a mock juror simulation indicated that although hearsay elements conveyed via an expert were perceived as less likely compared to a condition in which the information was independently admitted at trial, it was not completely ignored by the jurors. Further, the findings tended to suggest that the impact of the hearsay on verdict decisions operated primarily by influencing evaluations regarding the likelihood of the hearsay events as opposed to judgments regarding the expert testimony.     

The entrapment defense

Most American jurisdictions follow either asubjective or anobjective approach to the entrapment defense. In order to test some of the differences between the two approaches, student jurors viewed a videotaped cocaine trial and were presented with either subjective test or objective test instructions. The admission of prior conviction evidence was also varied. The jurors deliberated, returned a verdict, and then completed a questionnaire that measured their understanding of the instructions and trial facts. Results show that, first, juror comprehension of the principal features of the objective test is very poor. It is suggested that an effort be made to simplify instructions describing the objective test. Should simplification not improve comprehension, it is argued that the judge, not the jury, should decide the entrapment defense when the objective test is used. Second, admission of a prior conviction has a significant impact on verdicts in the subjective test condition, but not in the objective test condition. This finding suggests that the subjective test instructions are effective in encouraging jurors to use prior convictions as evidence of guilt. The content of the objective test instruction may also account for part of the difference in impact. Jurors in the objective test condition were instructed not to take the defendant's predisposition into account, and a substantial minority of the jurors under-stood this aspect of the instruction.     

A concept in search of a definition: The effects of reasonable doubt instructions on certainty of guilt standards and jury verdicts

Eighty (6-person) juries heard 1 of the 5 reasonable doubt instructions in a trial that either had strong evidence for guilt or favored acquittal. None of the instructions produced acceptable criteria of self-reported reasonable doubt, although instructions that informed juries to be firmly convinced (FC) elicited the highest standards of proof. The FC instructions yielded verdicts that tended to correspond with the evidence in both versions of the trial. FC juries focused proportionately more on the evidence and less on non-probative issues than juries given other instructions. Juries had lower self-reported standards of proof when the trial evidence was weak for conviction as opposed to when it was strong. The discussion addresses the surprisingly low self-reported standards of proof.     

The effects of stealing thunder in criminal and civil trials

The effectiveness of a persuasion technique referred to asstealing thunder was assessed in two simulated jury trials. Stealing thunder is defined as revealing negative information about oneself (or, in a legal setting, one's client) before it is revealed or elicited by another person. In Study 1, 257 college students read or heard one of three versions of a criminal assault trial in which a damaging piece of evidence about the defendant was absent (no thunder), brought up by the prosecutor (thunder), or brought up by the defense attorney and repeated by the prosecutor (stolen thunder). In Study 2, 148 college students heard a civil negligence trial in which damaging evidence about the key plaintiff's witness was absent (no thunder), brought up by the defendant's attorney (thunder), or brought up by the witness himself (stolen thunder). In both studies, stealing thunder significantly reduced the impact of the negative information. A path analysis of the processes underlying the effect suggested that verdicts were affected because of enhanced credibility.Often a difficult decision in opening statements is whether, and if so how, to volunteer weaknesses. This involves determining your weaknesses and predicting whether your opponent intends to use them at trial. There is obviously no point in volunteering a weakness that would never be raised at trial. Where, however, that weakness is apparent and known to the opponent, you should volunteer it. If you don't, your opponent will, with twice the impact. (Mauet, 1992, pp. 47–48)We would like to thank Michelle Cox, Gim Koay, Dana Koay, and Ralph Mueller for their helpful input. Thanks also to Irv Horowitz and Steve Karau for their comments on earlier drafts.     

Confidence inflation in eyewitnesses: Seeing is not believing

Purpose. Confidence inflation in eyewitnesses obscures a useful cue to identification accuracy and affects evaluations of eyewitnesses (e.g., Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004; Jones, Williams, & Brewer, 2008). We examine whether sensitivity to confidence inflation evidence is enhanced by seeing a videotape of the identification procedure. Methods. Participants (N= 131) watched a videotaped trial in which the witness's original confidence statement was presented as part of a previously recorded videotaped identification procedure or read by the witness at trial. In addition, the witness's identification confidence was either consistently high or low at the time of the identification and high at the trial (i.e., it was inflated). Results. Significant interactions demonstrated that confidence inflation evidence factored into judgments of the eyewitness and defendant guilt more strongly in the videotape condition compared with the read condition. Conclusions. The present results support recommendations to collect immediate confidence reports and videotape identification procedures. Using videotape evidence may help innocent defendants convince jurors that the eyewitness's identification is not accurate.     

Evidence of Atrocities or Atrocious Use of Evidence: The Controversial Use of Atrocity Film at Nuremberg

This article focuses upon the utilisation of film evidence in criminal proceedings. It describes and evaluates the historical deployment of this type of material at War Crimes Trials, with particular emphasis upon the International Military Tribunal established at Nuremberg, in 1945, in the wake of the Second World War. During this Trial, the prosecution placed reliance upon the film, Nazi Concentration Camps, depicting with graphic realism the horrific barbarism of the Nazi regime. However, this was only made possible by the implementation of innovatory evidential procedures, effectively circumventing the hearsay rule. A comparison is drawn between this, and the current position in England and Wales, following the recent relaxation of the traditional embargo upon hearsay evidence. However, film evidence of the type adduced at Nuremberg may be more prejudicial than probative and should such circumstances arise, the interests of justice may not truly be served. Susan Twist is Senior Lecturer in Law at the Lancashire Law School, University of Central Lancashire. smtwist@uclan.ac.uk. The author was assisted in research for this article by the dissertation of Kellie Goggins.     

When crimes are joined at trial

In two experiments, subject-jurors read evidence from actual criminal cases, decided on the guilt of the defendant, and answered several additional questions. The defendant was accused of one charge (murder or rape) or two charges (both murder and rape). In both experiments, the defendant was more likely to be convicted of either crime if the two charges were joined in one trial. Trait ratings indicated that the defendant was perceived in a more negative way when standing trial on two offenses. The order in which the charges were heard had no effect, nor did instructions to subjects to judge the cases separately.Portions of this paper were presented at the American Psychology-Law Society Meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts, October, 1981. The research was supported by a grant from NSF to Elizabeth Loftus.     

困境与抉择：我国引入刑事传闻规则的法理论析

我国当前刑事庭审中存在着诸多弊端，与传闻证据不受限制的使用非常有关，应当引入刑事传闻规则。这不仅有利于发现案件真实，而且有利于保障被告人接受公正审判的权利，特别是对质询问权，实现程序公正，还有助于完善证据制度，实现诉讼的效率。而且，引入刑事传闻规则还具有来自现行制度及法律实践需求的可行性，所谓中国引入传闻规则不可行的观点是站不住脚的。