The Confidence Game: Madoff and the 17th Floor Ensemble

This is the third in a series of five articles focusing on how Bernard Madoff’s confidence game (con game) worked. This paper looks at more of the activities of the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS) employees who were Madoff’s accomplices. Not surprisingly, deception was rampant at the BLMIS IA (investment advisory) business where criminal activities continued for decades. An examination of other con games shows clearly that pretending, misrepresenting, and dissembling were hardly unique to Madoff’s con.     

The Confidence Game: Of Ropers and Roping

This is the fourth in a series of five articles on the Bernard Madoff con game. This essay is about the arrangements between some ropers, those that solicited money for Madoff and his investment company, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS). Ropers lure victims/marks/clients/investors into a con game. The focus of this essay is on, what began as an accounting firm, Avellino and Bienes (A & B), Madoff’s own roping operation, Cohmad Securities, and Robert M. Jaffe, a well-connected competitive golfer. Madoff’s ropers were generously rewarded for their efforts at bringing in money to keep his con game going.     

The Confidence Game: Roping in a Globalized World

This is the last in a series of five articles focusing on how Bernard Madoff’s confidence game (con game) worked. It examines the international money collecting activities by ropers for Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS). Before globalization, Madoff’s con game brought him millions of dollars; after globalization, it began bringing him billions, making him remarkably successful until his run of luck was brought to a sudden halt by the worldwide economic downturn.     

Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game

Inspection games are 2x2 games in which one playermust decide whether to inspect the other player, who in turnmust decide whether to infringe a norm or a regulation.Inspection games have a single, mixed strategy Nashequilibrium, which has counter-intuitive comparative staticsproperties. This result has been used by Tsebelis (1989) andHoller (1992) to show that the economic approach to lawenforcement is not likely to generate clear-cut predictions.In this paper I discuss a variant of the inspection game inwhich the inspector can act as a Stackelberg leader. I willalso show that this version of the inspection game hascounter-intuitive comparative statics properties. Inparticular, increasing inspector’s incentives to enforce thelaw increases the frequency of law infractions.     

Vote trading: An experimental study

This essay reports the results of ninety 3-person and 5-person bargaining experiments using several alternative vote trading scenarios. These experiments are designed to test: (1) Riker and Brams' controversial hypothesis that vote trading can yield inferior outcomes as against the alternative hypothesis that vote trading induces ‘market-like’ efficiency in voting bodies; (2) the relative adequacy of several game theoretic solution concepts for vote trading games without a Condorcet winner (core); and, (3) the adequacy of the core itself. First, on the basis of eighteen experiments with binding commitments, we find some support for Riker and Brams' hypothesis: in nine trials, subjects first trade to a Pareto dominated outcome. In five of these trials, however, these outcomes are eventually displaced by Pareto efficient ones. Without binding commitments, however, we find little support for the ‘paradox of vote trading’ hypothesis. Specifically, while six of seven trials of a 3-person game yield ‘equitable’ outcomes, seventeen trials of several 5-person games without binding commitments strongly support the competitive solution as a cooperative game solution concept, and suggest that the V-set and M ₁ bargaining set are either redundant or useless. Seven trials each of six 5-person games with a condorcet winner (core), however, suggest that usual static solution concepts may be inadequate for treating games with any interesting degree of strategic complexity.     

Playing the game: corporate social responsibility and the games industry

This paper provides an exploratory review of both the corporate social responsibility (CSR) agendas and achievements being publicly addressed by the world's leading games companies, and offers some wider reflections on the ways these companies are constructing and pursuing CSR strategies. The paper begins with a short discussion of the origins and characteristics of CSR and a thumbnail sketch of games and the games industry. The empirical material for the paper is drawn from the CSR material posted on the Internet by the world's top 10 games companies. The findings reveal that although the majority of the top 10 games companies provide some information on their approach to CSR, only a minority claim to be integrating CSR into their core business activities. Although the companies emphasize their commitment to promoting responsible gaming, they offer little if any commentary on what many critics see as the potentially damaging human consequences of the irresponsible development and playing of games. The majority of the top 10 games companies also address a wide range of impacts within the marketplace, the workplace, the environment and communities in which they operate. Although the leading games companies generally adopt a positive stance towards CSR, the independent external assessment of the reporting process is limited. More generally, the paper offers some critical reflections on the CSR agenda currently being pursued by the games industry. The paper provides an overview and some reflections on the CSR agenda being pursued by some of the world's leading games companies, and as such, it will interest academics in business and management, and information systems and media departments, a range of people working in management positions within the games industry and those professionals who work with the industry. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch

The Colonel Blotto game captures strategic situations in which players attempt to mismatch an opponent’s action. We extend Colonel Blotto to a class of General Blotto games that allow for more general payoffs and externalities between fronts. These extensions make Blotto applicable to a variety of real-world problems. We find that like Colonel Blotto, most General Blotto games do not have pure strategy equilibria. Using a replicator dynamics learning model, we show that General Blotto may have more predictable dynamics than the original Blotto game. Thus, adding realistic structure to Colonel Blotto may, paradoxically, make it less complex.     

A theory of the spoils system

In a spoils system, it is axiomatic that ‘to the winners go the spoils.’ This essay formalizes spoils systems as cooperative games, with winners given by a simple game structure, and represented by a fixed number of political appointments. We analyze the resulting spoils games by means of the non-transferable utility value, and we offer two practical applications of the results.     

Domestic politics and the strategy of international trade

The policymaking problem in international trade is fundamentally strategic, since optimal national policy depends on what other nations choose to do. The game is not between unitary rational actors, however, but rather between players with considerable internal divisions about what policy should be. There is a rich domestic politics to international trade policymaking. Conventional wisdom holds that internal division is a liability in international interactions. This article demonstrates that if countries are divided internally between divergent interests, this will alter the outcome of strategic games between countries in, for example, setting tariffs. In particular, internal division can actually be helpful to a country, since a protectionist faction helps to make a protectionist threat more credible.     

Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games

We investigate the role of payoff asymmetry in laboratory prisoner’s dilemma games. Symmetric and asymmetric games are examined in simultaneous and sequential settings. In the asymmetric sequential games, we study the impact of having payoff advantaged players moving either first or second. Asymmetry reduces the rates of cooperation in simultaneous games. In sequential games, asymmetry interacts with order of play such that the rate of cooperation is highest when payoff disadvantaged players move first.     

Altered Europeanisation of Pension Reform in the Context of the Great Recession: Denmark and Italy Compared

This article analyses the Europeanisation of national pension systems in Denmark and Italy. Through the analytical framework of a ‘two-level’ game, it analyses pension reforms in the two countries, which, in the wake of the crisis, breached EU budgetary requirements, and shortly after reformed their pension systems. The EU affects pension reform in both cases, but in distinct ways. When Denmark’s economy was financially vulnerable, the EU’s excessive deficit procedure affected the decision to reform pensions indirectly, by triggering a rapid political decision to speed up a pension reform. By contrast, the Italian economy’s critical vulnerability and the consequent risk for the whole Eurozone led to a situation whereby the European actors entered the domestic political scene and thereafter more forcefully induced reforms. The findings from the two cases show that the EU’s role in pension reform has been significant during crises, but through interaction with domestic actors. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, the intervening variables – domestic and EMU vulnerability as well as EU and domestic politics – are crucial to understanding the reform decisions through two-level games.     

Persuading Caesar: A new interpretation of Farquharson's problem

Merely because voting takes place in a real-life social decision system, we are not thereby confronted by a ‘voting game’. Often we are confronted by something that looks more like an advising game, in which voting is mainly important as a language by which policymakers render advice to other policymakers (possibly including their own future selves) who will act later. In this brief research note, the foregoing theme is illustrated by re-interpreting the same case from ancient Roman senatorial politics which inspired Robin Farquharson's seminal Theory of Voting. I stress that the contributions of this article lie entirely in the interpretation of allegedly gamelike situations, not in the formal analysis of games proper.     

The Confidence Game: Backstage, the Accomplices

This is the second in a series of five articles focusing on how Bernard Madoff's confidence game (con game) worked. This paper examines the activities of a handful of employees who were engaged backstage, hidden from government regulators and most investors, to further Madoff's crime. Their work revolved around the pretense that securities were being bought and sold. All these fairly well-paid accomplices pled guilty to being involved in criminal activities, although only one acknowledged that he knew he was part of a Ponzi scheme. Regardless of how they describe or label their activities, Madoff's back office had evolved into an organized gang of criminals.     

Gordon Tullock and experimental economics

Gordon Tullock’s research has substantially influenced the development of economic science in general and experimental economics in particular. We present the first comprehensive survey of this significant achievement. We show how Tullock’s research in bioeconomics influenced later developments in neuroeconomics and how his pioneering work on rent-seeking generated a literature of laboratory tests of his hypothesis. We also describe Tullock’s own experiments and draw attention to his early insights on trust games.     

Risk aversion in two-period rent-seeking games

This work analyzes a two-period rent-seeking game, with the aim of studying the effect of risk aversion on the optimal choices made by the rent-seekers. We first prove that the equilibrium in two-period rent-seeking games always is unique. The analysis also shows that more risk aversion reduces the investment in the rent-seeking game in a two-period framework without introducing the additional condition of prudence, required in one-period models. Similarly, the introduction of a risky rent, instead of a given rent, implies, in the two-period framework, a reduction in investment under the condition that the rent-seekers are risk averse. Moreover, with risk aversion, larger first-period wealth increases investment in the rent-seeking game and larger second-period wealth reduces it. When both first-period and second-period wealth increase, investment in the rent-seeking game declines if the rent-seeker is risk averse and imprudent. Lastly, when a risky level of second-period wealth is introduced, the rent-seeker increases (reduces) investment in the rent-seeking game if he is risk averse and prudent (imprudent).

     

Terrorism and systems terror

In this paper we discuss the censorship of political statements sympathetic to terrorism as an instance of what Lyotard calls ‘terror’. Our claim is that the traditional approach to questions of censorship of ‘subversive’ politics only captures part of the story; what is at stake is not merely the censorship but at a deeper level, the withdrawal of the possibility to challenge the censorship. This two-tier logic of silencing is what we explore with the help of Lyotard's earlier and later work, first by relying on his analysis of ‘terror’ in the framework of ‘agonistics’, then of ‘terror’ as différend'.     

毛泽东学习观的价值维度考量——基于“什么是马克思主义,怎样对待马克思主义”的思考

毛泽东学习观是指以毛泽东为主要代表的第一代中国共产党人围绕"为何学习、怎样学习"这一涉及学习本质和规律的一系列思想观点构成的科学理论体系。在毛泽东学习观的科学指导下,第一代中国共产党人坚持把马克思主义同当时的中国实际和时代特征相结合,产生并形成了毛泽东思想,从而第一次比较系统地初步回答了"什么是马克思主义,怎样对待马克思主义"这一中国共产党的全部理论和全部实践所要回答的重大理论和实际问题,实现了中国共产党人学习观的第一次历史飞跃。从理论价值维度考量,毛泽东学习观指导中国共产党人开启了马克思主义中国化的理论篇章;从实践价值维度考量,毛泽东学习观指导中国共产党人奠定了中国特色社会主义的实践基础。     

The Virtual War on Terror: Counterterrorism Narratives in Video Games

Over the past decade, a great deal of research has been done to analyze the ways in which popular media, especially movies and television shows, construct fictional terrorist threats. However, little attention has been given to the extremely popular genre of counterterrorism video games and how they fit into the War on Terror media narrative. Counterterrorism video games reflect many of the themes of other media about terrorism, such as the demonization of terrorist enemies and the exaggeration of terrorist threats. However, video games strengthen these themes to make the threat of terrorism appear more pervasive and imminent. Consequently, counterterrorism games display an intensified vision of the War on Terror narrative, in which the entire world is a war zone. This leads game narratives to simulate and justify more extreme state responses to terrorism.     

The meanings of production(s): showbiz and deep plays in finance and DIYbiology

Drawing on anthropological theories of play, deep play and games, as well as sociological interaction theories of risk, this paper develops a theory of consequential games. This paper suggests that in the United States much expert or entrepreneurial activity can be seen as a competition over creating the rules of games that others must play. In turn, whatever peril lies in these consequential games is the province of the saps that have to play, and whatever reward or prize comes from the game is captured by the expert or entrepreneur. The perspective that this paper advances, in turn, renders domains of life often seen as discrete (say private equity investing and biotechnological tinkering) comparable and in fact similar types of phenomena, all caught up in the crazy apocalyptic vitality that is contemporary capitalism.