State transformation and resource politics: Australia and the regional political economy

Abstract

Although the 1994 Agreed Framework offers a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, many problems may prevent its successful implementation. Should the Agreed Framework break down, the United States and South Korea have indicated that they will ask Japan to join them in a trilateral economic sanctions regime.

Japanese participation would include the severance of trade and financial flows, including money sent to North Korea from Japan's ethnic Korean community. In this paper I examine this financial flow, and, finding it a valuable linkage to the North Korean economy, conclude that Japanese participation is vital for a successful sanctions regime against North Korea.

Given this, I examine whether or not Tokyo's cooperation will be forthcoming. Japan would be inclined to participate given that it has a strong interest in eliminating a regional nuclear threat. Furthermore, Japan would also feel pressure from its allies to display diplomatic leadership in the Asia‐Pacific region, as befits a country of its economic importance.

Despite these international reasons for Japanese participation, domestic factors will be likely to prevent Tokyo from joining a sanctions regime: constitutional questions, the possibility of terrorist reprisals, interest in Pyongyang's regime maintenance, concerns for the rights of Japan's ethnic Korean community, and political ties between North Korean and Japanese politicians. I find that these domestic factors will outweigh international pressures for Japanese participation, and thus conclude that in the event of a breakdown in the Agreed Framework, alternatives to a trilateral sanctions strategy against North Korea must be considered.     

Following in China's footsteps? The political economy of North Korean reform

Since the coming to power of Kim Jong Un in 2012, the North Korean government has recently announced, and to some degree has implemented, a new set of economic management policies known as the June 28th measures in 2012 and the May 30th measures in 2014. Both of these sets of measures seek to build upon the abandoned reforms of the early 2000s through restructuring North Korea's highly inefficient collective farm and state-owned enterprise management system. In addition, the government has intensified ongoing efforts at building special economic zones for the purpose of attracting foreign investment. As such, the country is attempting to emulate the reforms adopted by China in the late 1970s. Although the success of these efforts is by no means guaranteed, they do serve to question mainstream analyses that suggest that Juche Self-Reliance or S?n'gun Military First Politics ideologies will inhibit any genuine attempt at economic reform in North Korea. We argue, in contrast, that ongoing changes to North Korean state and society mean that, a cyclical stop and start rhythm to the reforms notwithstanding, such attempts at economic reform are likely to continue. However, we also argue that while the contemporary reform drive resembles and may indeed reproduce some of the successes of the Chinese experience, North Korea faces significantly greater challenges, including the greater decline of North Korean industry, local resistance to reform, and the dangers of inflation. Furthermore, North Korea faces a highly challenging external security environment that undermines the ability of the regime to attract investment and by extension the political standing of reformist elements within the country. Given this contrast with the international environment surrounding China's own reform experience, our analysis emphasises the importance of geopolitical context in shaping experiences of economic reform and of development more broadly.     

Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010

Abstract

This study is based upon two premises: (1) the available literature, though voluminous, fails to provide systematic understandings of the complex and evolving relations between China and North Korea; and (2) China and North Korea had been short of being trusted allies bound in blood and belief even before the launch of post-Mao reforms and the normalization of Beijing–Seoul relations. This article dissects this curious relationship into four questions: (1) What does history inform us about China's relations with (North) Korea? (2) Has China communicated effectively with North Korea? (3) Have China and North Korea been ‘trusted allies’? (4) How effective has China been in inducing North Korea to comply with its demands over the years? The authors argue that, geo-strategically, China can hardly afford to put North Korea in an adversarial position. Furthermore, residues of the Factional Incident of 1956 and North Korea's deep-rooted suspicion of China still linger on. These have been the sources of Beijing's dilemma in consistently opting for ‘soft’ measures despite that North Korea's provocative acts and nuclear weapons programs have negatively affected China's interests. From the outset, China and North Korea had been more uncertain allies who had to cooperate with each other under the ideological and geopolitical imperatives of the difficult times. The authors also suggest that it would be misleading to put Sino–North Korean dynamics in a usual category of big power–small nation relations where power asymmetry generally works against the latter. North Korea has undoubtedly been an atypical ‘small nation’. It is due to these limitations that China's pressurizing has not been always effective and that Beijing's reactions have been continuously cyclical. This cyclical trend is not likely to be broken since the upcoming drama of Sino–American rivalry is bound to close the window of such opportunities for China, which will nevertheless regard North Korea increasingly as a liability, if not uncomfortable neighbor.     

Framing and dominant metaphors in the coverage of North Korea in the Australian media

Through the selective allocation of attention, framing and metaphors in covering foreign affairs and countries, media narratives often act to delegitimise, marginalise and demonise international actors. Focusing on Australian reportage of North Korea in The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald and from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2012, this paper explicates how the framing mechanisms utilised in media point to media complicity in reinforcing a negative, adversarial orientation towards North Korea. It also discusses implications for how Australians view the North Korean people, Australian–North Korean relations, and policy pertaining to Northeast Asia more broadly.     

Liberal Nationalism and Responsible Citizenship in South Korea

This essay explores how South Koreans have creatively acculturated the meaning of citizenship using Confucianism-originated familial affectionate sentiments (ch?ng), while resisting a liberal individualistic conception of citizenship, by investigating contemporary nationalist politics in South Korea. Its central claim is that the ch?ng-induced politico-cultural practice of collective moral responsibility (uri-responsibility), which transcends the binary of individualism and collectivism and of liberalism and nationalism, represents the essence of Korean national citizenship. In other words, this essay attempts to make a Korean case of “liberal nationalism” in its post-Confucian context.     

The North Korean abduction issue: emotions,securitisation and the reconstruction of Japanese identity from ‘aggressor’ to ‘victim’ and from ‘pacifist’ to ‘normal’

Abstract

After Kim Jong-il's confession in 2002 that North Korean agents had abducted thirteen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea has become the most detested country in Japan, and the normalisation of bilateral relations has been put on the back burner. The abduction issue has taken precedence in Japan even over North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. It has also grossly overshadowed the atrocities for which Imperial Japan was responsible in the 20th century. Why has there been such strong emphasis on an issue that could be disregarded as comparatively ‘less important’? This article understands the ascendency of the abduction issue as the epitome of an identity shift under way in Japan – from the identity of a curiously ‘peaceful’ and inherently ‘abnormal’ state, to that of a more ‘normal’ one. The differentiation of North Korea as ‘abnormal’ emphasises Japan's own (claim to) ‘normality’. Indeed, by incarnating the perils of Japan's own ‘pacifist’ ‘abnormality’, which has been so central to the collective sense of Japanese ‘Self’ in the post-war period, the abduction issue has become a very emotional argument for Japan's ‘normalisation’ in security and defence terms. The transformation from ‘abnormal’ to ‘normal’ is further enabled by Japan trading places with North Korea in the discourse, so that Japan is defined as ‘victim’ (rather than former aggressor) and North Korea as ‘aggressor’ (rather than former victim). What is at stake here is the question whether Japan is ‘normalising’ or ‘remilitarising’, and the role of the abduction issue discourse in enabling such foreign and security policy change.     

Japanese policy and the North Korean ‘soft landing’

Abstract

The nature of security on the Korean Peninsula has undergone fundamental change in the post‐Cold War period, characterized by the growing recognition on the part of the major regional powers that there is a need for economic as well as military approaches to security and conflict avoidance. The chief manifestation of this trend is the emergence of the US Department of State's ‘soft landing’ and other engagement policies as attempts to resolve North Korean security threats. Some commentators have seen the soft‐landing policy as an opportunity for Japan to use its economic power to contribute to regional and international security. This article examines the evolution and rationale of the soft‐landing policy, how Japanese policy‐makers evaluate its potential as a solution to the North Korean security problem and the current extent of Japan's contribution to it. The article also points out the‐limitations of Japanese support for the soft landing due to international restrictions on the Japanese government's room for diplomatic manoeuvre, domestic political obstacles to engaging North Korea and the general lack of Japanese private business interest in the North. Finally the conclusion shows that, despite the recognition of the need to engage North Korea economically, Japanese policy‐makers have devoted their energies principally to the redefinition of the US‐Japan military alliance based on the legitimacy of the North Korean threat.     

Defection of North Korea's ideologist a sign of regime crisis

Abstract

The defection of Hwang Jang‐yop, one of North Korea's major ideological authorities and a senior member of the leadership, is a clear indication of regime crisis in Pyongyang. Hwang's assessment of the nature of the Kim Jong‐il regime, which he regards as incapable of reform and committed to war with South Korea, will strengthen those in Seoul who argue for a tough approach to be taken in negotiations on security issues with North Korea. At the same time, his remarks on the extent of communist influence in South Korean politics may influence the outcome of the 1997 presidential elections.     

Why is there no securitisation theory in the Korean nuclear crisis?

Despite the fact that the Korean nuclear crisis is one of the most protracted security issues in the world, the research analysing the crisis from the perspective of securitisation theory is curiously absent. This article attempts to pin down some distinguishing features of South Korea’s securitisation of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, thereby investigating why one rarely sees the implications of securitisation theory in the way that the Copenhagen School theorists would suggest. Borrowing the key components of securitisation theory—existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures—this article suggests three elusive characteristics of the South Korean actors’ speech acts as sources highlighting the dilemma. To make the article’s arguments clearer, I hold Floyd’s classification of securitisation theory, which separated the securitisation process into two different stages: securitising move and security practice. While acknowledging the importance of the differences between illocution and perlocution in a securitisation process, this article takes this logic one step further by suggesting the limits of the perlocutionary effect in making the securitisation process complete.     

Scar Literature reconsidered: Yan Geling's novels The Criminal Lu Yanshi and A Woman's Epic

This paper reconsiders the political dynamics, social disorder, and personal traumas endured during China's socialist revolutionary times by examining the Chinese American writer Yan Geling's (b. 1958) two Scar Literature novels, The Criminal Lu Yanshi (Lufan Yanshi, 2011) and A Woman's Epic (Yige nuren de shishi, 2006). Employing Hannah Arendt's theory on totalitarianism, this paper investigates how Mao's authoritarian rule transmutes Chinese society into an atomized and individualized society. It will reveal how this totalitarian rule over the Chinese intellectuals, by the brutal use of the re-education system, succeeded in isolating them, which then led to intense feelings of solitude. The objective of this paper is to undo and rectify the historical and cultural “memory loss” caused by the current trend of depoliticizing, commercializing, and sensualizing the socialist revolutionary memories as demonstrated by the televisual postmodern repackaging of the Maoist past to be found in the mediasphere of present-day China, which forgets the horrors of the Cultural Revolution as crimes against the Chinese people.     

Colouring Philosophy: Appel,Lyotard and Art's Work

Abstract

Colour plays a fundamental role in the philosophical treatment of painting. Colour while it is an essential part of the work of art cannot be divorced from the account of painting within which it is articulated. This paper begins with a discussion of the role of colour in Schelling's conception of art. Nonetheless its primary concern is to develop a critical encounter with Jean-François Lyotard's analysis of the Dutch painter Karel Appel. The limits of Lyotard's writings on painting, which this paper will attribute in part to Lyotard's "empiricism", becomes most apparent in his treatment of colour.     

Constructing a Rogue State: American Post-Cold War Security Discourse and North Korean Drug Trafficking*

Through an analysis of government reports, political testimony, influential periodicals and interviews, this paper holds that claims of North Korean drug trafficking and producing are greatly exaggerated. An assessment of the 1999 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 North Korea Advisory Group Report, 2000 International Crime Threat Assessment, and 2004 United Nations Report on World Drugs, among other sources, reveals only inconclusive and anecdotal support for the contention that North Korea is a drug state. This lack of reliable intelligence allows American security analysts to construct North Korea as a drug sponsoring country, making the “truth” about North Korea's relationship to drugs come from endless repetition rather than sustained analysis. As a result, US approaches towards security and drug policy in the region need to be reexamined and contextualized.

The dominant definition of a problem acquires, by repetition, and by the weight and credibility of those who propose and subscribe it, the warrant of “common sense.” (Stuart Hall1 ^?1 Stuart Hall, Culture, Society, and the Media (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 82. )     

Japan and the Gulf crisis: Still searching for a role

Neither the major assumptions of developmental statist theories nor their revised arguments (e.g. network and internal organization theories) can persuasively elucidate the South Korean state's strong autonomy vis‐à‐vis the capitalist group in establishing and implementing economic/ industrial policies. A more relevant elucidation can be made by attending to the following three points: 1) one can more clearly show the former's autonomy in relation to the latter by examining discordant rather than amicable aspects of the relationship between them; 2) the strength of the East Asian state's autonomy lies not in its inherent, absolute cohesiveness but in its ‘political integrating power'; 3) in interpreting the state's strong autonomy vis‐à‐vis society, more research on political and administrative factors (rather than economic ones) need to be conducted. Also important are the behaviour of political and administrative agents who operate institutions and various interactions among them. To enforce these points, this article analyzes the political aspects of the state‐capital relationship while the South Korean government established anti‐chaebôl policies to restrict economic concentration via big businesses.     

Sudpolitik: the political economy of Taiwan's trade with Southeast Asia

Abstract

In December 1993 the Taiwan government adopted a policy called nanjin zhengce or sudpolitik, a policy aimed at diverting part of Taiwan's trade and investment flows from China to Southeast Asia. This paper addresses the following questions: what is sudpolitik? why adopt such a policy? what are the economic, political, and strategic considerations in the pursuit of this policy? which countries are its specific targets? how do the countries directly affected by this policy respond to it? The paper also discusses the issue of Taiwan's aid in connection with sudpolitik. While the effectiveness of the policy is far from clear at present, the paper concludes with four observations: Taiwan's trade and aid are beginning to intertwine; Taiwan's diplomacy is largely economically or commercially led; Taiwan has achieved some positive results in improving its relations with Southeast Asian countries; and, Taiwan has reached a new stage in its economic development whereby it needs to invest overseas in order to sustain its economic growth. Overall, sudpolitik represents a novel step in Taiwan's diplomatic practice.     

BOOK REVIEWS

Books reviewed in this issue. Britain's four political traditions Britain since 1918: The Strange Career of British Democracy, by David Marquand. The darker side of nudging Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein. The almost‐forgotten Korean War The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, by David Halberstam. Reasoning about risk Global Catastrophes and Trends: The Next Fifty Years, by Vaclav Smil. The great war on terror Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty‐first Century, by Philip Bobbitt. From terrorism to pop cultural icons? Baader‐Meinhof Returns: History and Cultural Memory of German Left‐wing Terrorism, edited by Gerrit‐Jan Berendse and Ingo Cornils. An incoherent critique of New Labour? The End of Politics: New Labour and the Folly of Managerialism, by Chris Dillow. Top of the paps Born Yesterday: The News as a Novel, by Gordon Burn. The slight hand of history Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, by Jonathan Powell. Israel–Palestine: insiders and outsiders Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, by Saree Makdisi.     

North Korea's Internet strategy and its political implications

Abstract

During recent years, the role of information technology in shaping politics and social movements in the digital age is drawing increasing scholarly attention. There is, however, little such literature on North Korea as the country remains almost completely cut off from the Internet. Since the mid-1990s, the DPRK government has strategically developed its information and communication technology and has subsequently built a domestic intranet. Although North Korea keeps a minimal presence on the web, there are signs that the country is taking small and cautious steps to allow some social elites to take advantage of the Internet in order to leapfrog its economic development. Indeed, a high-profile defector indicated that North Korea will most likely start allowing wider but limited internet access in the near future. This paper examines North Korea's intranet and Internet policies and explores their political implications by drawing upon first-hand data from Korean sources and existing literature as well as by juxtaposing the North Korean case with other communist regimes such as China and Cuba in terms of their attempts to control and manipulate the Internet. It shows that the DPRK government is likely to learn from the Chinese and Cuban experiences and adopt a ‘Mosquito-Net’ model in controlling the Internet in an effort to attract foreign investment while keeping out information deemed threatening by the regime.     

Shimane Prefecture,Tokyo and the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima: regional and national identities in Japan

Abstract

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se.     

Korean foreign direct investment in Europe: The determining forces

Korea's more complete integration into the world economy has been stunted by past government policies aimed at preserving comprehensive control over the domestic economy. This situation has recently changed owing to prevailing structural weaknesses in the Korean economy and the dictates of the global competitive environment. Consequently, the level of Korean overseas investment has escalated, particularly in Europe — the Triad region which has traditionally attracted limited inward FDI from Korea's large chaebol companies. This paper examines the determining forces that lie behind this trend. It is recognized that early Korean investments in the EU were principally driven by reactionary motives when confronted by actual or anticipated policy threats. While it is argued that the pretext for such investment has not significantly diminished, the imperatives of globalization together with emerging economic conditions in both east and west Europe have provided considerable incentives for more proactive FDI strategies to be adopted. The recent announcements by senior chaebol of intended large‐scale investments in Europe suggest that this new pattern is becoming increasingly apparent.     

Global citizenship as a national project: the evolution of segye shimin in South Korean public discourse

The idea of global citizenship in contemporary South Korean public discourse has revolved mainly around a national endeavor to boost the county's stature and competitiveness amid economic globalization. Based on a review of two decades of published media references to segye shimin (‘global citizen’ in the Korean language), this article shows that the specific usages of segye shimin – mainly by elites from government, academia, and journalism – underscore how the ‘developmental citizenship’ that marked South Korea's past authoritarian military regimes has carried on since the transition to civilian-led democracy. In contrast with the burgeoning academic discourse on cosmopolitanism that focuses heavily on moral responsibilities to humanity and the planet, South Korea's discourse of global citizenship has been closely aligned with neoliberalism and filled with exhortations to the domestic population to overcome numerous perceived liabilities seen as impeding the country's advancement. While global citizenship discourse in South Korea has emphasized top-down national strategic imperatives, a bottom-up approach to cosmopolitanism is also emerging as the country gains confidence and the notion of segye shimin gradually gains traction across the wider society.     

Better by design: Korea's neoliberal economy

Abstract

This paper examines the processes of bank and corporate restructuring in South Korea since the 1997–98 economic crisis, and seeks to highlight how the state has intervened in a highly dirigiste manner in order to expedite restructuring in both the commercial bank and corporate sectors. At the same time it demonstrates the clear neoliberal principles that have underpinned the state's attempts to promote restructuring. The state has shown a clear determination to take action against insolvent firms and financial institutions no matter how large or strategically important they may be, to impose hard budget constraints on key economic actors. Furthermore, the state has actively sought to engineer the sale of key domestic firms and banks to foreign investors. We argue that Korea's efforts to create a functioning neoliberal economy have been largely successful and are functional from the perspective of Korean capitalism, if not the perspective of individual Korean firms. Changes in the global economy in the two decades preceding the 1997–98 crisis imposed an increasingly inescapable pressure on the Korean state to effect a neoliberal transformation and Korea's future as a centre of capitalist accumulation has for some time been bound up with the success of the neoliberal project. In conclusion, this paper seeks to draw out the broader implications of this reading of the post-crisis restructuring programme for debates on global economic liberalization and the future of capitalist diversity.