Tools for Anticipating Asylum Denials: An Application to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, 1997-2001

The growing tendency toward non-compliance with internationalobligations to refugees requires UNHCR to make contingency plansfor asylum denials. Making such plans calls for tools, suchas game theory and confrontation analysis, that link non-compliancein refugee asylum with the configuration of interests for asylumand donor countries in a potential crisis. We illustrate suchtools in a case study of Afghan refugees in Pakistan in 1997–2001,which generated asylum denials by Pakistan ranging from briefborder closings to threats of mass refoulement, linked to thewithholding of assistance by the United States and other donors.We also consider the prospects for using these tools to informcontingency planning for an impending crisis.     

“Between Two Communities So Diverse”: Confrontation and Collaboration in Cuba, 1898–1902

In 1898, the United States government took possession of Cuba. Rather than annexation, the William McKinley Administration chose to create a new nation-state. Cuba’s fate therefore was unlike that of the Philippines, waiting until after the Second World War for independence. It leads to a question: when it came to Cuba, why the choice of creating a nation rather than annexation? The short answer is that the Cubans would have resisted annexation by force. The longer—and more interesting—answer is that annexation became unnecessary: Over time, Cuba’s nationalist elite proved willing to co-operate with American interests, and McKinley’s Administration left Cuba in nationalist hands, provided those hands were bound by the Platt Amendment. Historians have argued that Cuban nationalists co-operated because of coercion. Whilst true, Cuba’s nationalists also saw value in a relationship with the United States. Therefore, Cuba’s new leaders resisted American demands in ways not only to preserve the good opinion of Washington, but to prove themselves capable of civilised self-government.     

UNRWA’s First Years, 1949–1951: The Anatomy of Failed Expectations

The birth of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Near East Refugees (UNRWA) in 1949 represented the culmination of two years of international diplomacy to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. The United States, Britain, and the international community not only sought an agency to take charge of refugee relief, but also envisaged a body to facilitate direct programmes for public works to wean the refugees away from aid dependency whilst also contributing to the economic productivity of host Arab nations. It was hoped this would support the refugees on a self-sustaining basis and even lead to their re-settlement and re-integration into the region. This analysis examines how and why Britain, the United States, and international bodies established UNRWA and identifies why UNRWA, by 1951, was unable to fulfil the task for which it was initially conceived.     

The Confluence of Domestic and International Interests: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 1998–2001

This article examines the confluence of forces at work to shape U.S. policy toward Cuba since the late 1990s. Our approach examines four key factors involved in policymaking toward Cuba in this period: (1) the entry of new interest groups into the Cuba policy process and an "entrepreneurial" Congress; (2) the executive's constitutionally based interests; (3) bureaucratic interests; and (4) pressure from outside the United States. We examine U.S.–Cuba policy by describing each determinant in isolation and then by looking at the dynamic interaction among them, showing how they are linked together. In doing so, we argue that an analysis including multiple factors better explains U.S. policy toward Cuba than one that focuses on a single factor such as the power of the Cuban-American community.     

The Limits of Populist Diplomacy: Fidel Castro's April 1959 Trip to North America

This article asks what lessons about diplomacy can be drawn from Fidel Castro's April 1959 trip to the United States and Canada, a trip long neglected by historians as an aberration in US–Cuban relations because of its apparent public relations success. The trip's meaning, rather, lies in the populist style Castro practiced to circumvent normal protocol, and more importantly in the failure of that populism to sway not only US foreign policy makers but also the US public. Based on comprehensive media and archival research and of interviews in Cuba and the United States, this is the first ever article-length treatment of this diplomatic visit. It helps to understand not only the US–Cuba divide that soon followed Castro's trip but also the limited potential of a populist diplomacy.     

What's in a Name? The Nature of the Individual in Refugee Studies

The category of refugee has been problematic for both practitionersand social scientists because it is difficult to define an objectivecategory that satisfactorily brings the real world, ethics,and theory into harmony. In recent years many critiques havebeen made of the assumptions built into the legal refugee frameworkand efforts have been made to refine the concept from multipledisciplinary perspectives. This paper examines several underlyingassumptions of these discussions, including the category offorced migration, through a discussion of the example of Salvadoransin the United States in the 1980s. One assumption has been notedbut insufficiently theorized: the centrality of the individual.The person assumed by both the refugee and human rights regimesof the United Nations is a culturally-specific construct definingthe relationship between the individual and society in a waythat precludes an adequate understanding of refugees.     

古巴社会主义经济建设与发展

1959年古巴革命胜利后,逐步建立了社会主义经济体制.到苏东剧变前的30年间,在面对美国封锁的不利条件下,古巴的社会主义经济建设仍然获得了发展,取得了一些难能可贵的成就.20世纪90年代初苏东剧变后,古巴陷入极端困难的境地,进入"和平时期的特殊阶段".1994年以来,古巴经济状况逐步好转,已经走出苏东剧变导致的极端困难时期.经过50年的经济建设,古巴从中央集权计划经济逐渐转变为古巴特色的社会主艾经济,经济和外贸结构也从单一向多元化方向发展.     

Who Cares about the Weather?: Climate Change and U.S. National Security

Is climate change a national security threat to the United States? This question remains a subject of debate in academia and has received renewed emphasis in the policy community. Even taking a narrow definition of national security, climate change already constitutes a national security threat to the United States, both in terms of direct threats to the country as well as its broader extraterritorial interests. While some of these purported threats—abrupt climate change and sea-level rise—have been overstated by advocates, several concerns, mostly related to the effects of extreme weather events on the United States and its strategic interests overseas, are sufficient enough that they already constitute security threats. That climate change potentially poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland and its overseas interests suggests the subject warrants serious attention.     

The Limits of Populist Diplomacy: Fidel Castro's April 1959 Trip to North America

This article asks what lessons about diplomacy can be drawn from Fidel Castro's April 1959 trip to the United States and Canada, a trip long neglected by historians as an aberration in US-Cuban relations because of its apparent public relations success. The trip's meaning, rather, lies in the populist style Castro practiced to circumvent normal protocol, and more importantly in the failure of that populism to sway not only US foreign policy makers but also the US public. Based on comprehensive media and archival research and of interviews in Cuba and the United States, this is the first ever article-length treatment of this diplomatic visit. It helps to understand not only the US-Cuba divide that soon followed Castro's trip but also the limited potential of a populist diplomacy.     

Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America's "Aggressively Unilateral" Trade Policy

When does America's "aggressively unilateral" trade policy work best to open overseas markets? This paper revisits the determinants and effectiveness of Section 301 of U.S. trade law and develops a modified two-level game model for understanding the conditions under which domestic interests and institutions support the use of aggressive negotiation tactics. It argues that a system-level variable, the structure of trade, systematically affects threat effectiveness by influencing both the level of unity among domestic interest groups and the degree of divided government in the sender of threats (the United States). America's sanction threats will enjoy more unified domestic support and hence be more credible when the dispute involves a country having a competitive trade relationship with the U.S. (such as Japan, Canada, and the European Union) rather than one having a complementary trade relationship with the U.S. (such as China, India, and Brazil). Statistical tests based on the universe of Section 301 cases concluded between 1975 and 1995 yield evidence in support of this contention.     

Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest

American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not particularly fragile and do not require tremendous foresight by either governments or economic actors. We illustrate these mechanisms at work using evidence from every major oil disruption since 1973. We then identify the small subset of disruptive events that would overwhelm these adaptive mechanisms and therefore seriously harm the United States. Finally, we analyze the utility of U.S. foreign military policy tools in addressing these threats. Our findings suggest that the United States can defend its key interests in the Persian Gulf—the world's most important oil-producing region—with a less-intrusive, “over the horizon” posture.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907-20

As the United States was becoming a major power in the early years of the twentieth century, it was confronted by a dilemma in its desire to promote a democratic free-enterprise system among the republics of the Western hemisphere. Should the United States act unilaterally or collectively to pursue its goals? The rise of the Pan American Union as a collective political and economic organization provided the means to deal with such issues as revolution and economic instabiliry in Latin America. Nations such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic provided early opportunities to test US policy approaches. However, the Mexican Revolution of 1910, and subsequent civil war, provided a major testing ground for both the Taft and Wilson administrations. Ultimately Woodrow Wilson chose to pursue unilateral military intervention in Mexico despite the offer from the Pan American Union and its director, John Barrett, to provide collective negotiations to avoid war and establish political stabiliry in Mexico. As we enter the twenry-first century, the United States finds itself still confronted by these choices on a global scale.     

越战后美国对印支难民的安置与其地区分布分析

在印支3国(越南、柬埔寨、老挝)1975年后出现的难民潮中,有大批人移居美国。美国出于现实利益需要和人道主义原则而接纳了他们。最初的难民在经过收容中心后,被安置到全国不同的居留地。他们跟着又与后来的难民分别通过家庭团聚、政府的"疏散政策"以及重择高福利居留地等方式,先后进行"二度移民",从而形成了印支难民在美国地区分布的基本格局。这一分布是高度不平衡的,高集中性的。     

日美贸易摩擦中三大谈判机制的对比研究

"市场导向的个别领域谈判"、"日美结构性障碍协议"、"日美经济框架对话"是战后日美双方缓解贸易摩擦的三大谈判机制。对三大谈判机制及其各自内部子议题的对比研究发现,贸易谈判中外压强度和谈判有效性之间并不存在对称关系。在这些谈判机制中,美国对日外压与日本国内的内压之间形成了动态的双层博弈。内压的结构与价值诉求、利益指向是分析贸易谈判的重要变量。     

Global Threats and American Strategies: From Communism in 1955 to Islamism in 2005

America's current security threats—the insurgency in Iraq, Islamic terrorism, and Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons—seem strange and unprecedented. Parallels can be drawn, however, between the security threats of 2005 and those of fifty years ago. The U.S. foreign policy developed to confront the communist threat offers lessons as we develop strategies to combat today's threat. Two contemporary perspectives on strategic issues—one conservative/realist, one neoconservative/idealist—apply lessons of the Cold War to today's U.S. foreign policy, but each has serious flaws. A third, neorealist perspective, suggests that by leveraging the divisions already present in the Muslim world, the United States can win the global contest against Islamic terrorism. However, this would require a transformation in American strategy that will not be easily achieved.     

Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security

ABSTRACT

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.     

Neville Bolt. The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries.

This article examines key setting events and personal factors that are associated with support for either non-violent activism or violent activism among Somali refugee young adults in the United States. Specifically, this article examines the associations of trauma, stress, symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), posttraumatic growth (PTG), strength of social bonds, and attitudes towards legal and non-violent vs. illegal and violent activism. Structured interviews were conducted with a sample of Somali refugee males ages 18–25 living in the northeastern United States (N = 79). Data were analyzed using multiple linear regressions and path analysis. Greater exposure to personal trauma was associated with greater openness to illegal and violent activism. PTSD symptoms mediated this association. Strong social bonds to both community and society moderated this association, with trauma being more strongly associated with openness to illegal and violent activism among those who reported weaker social bonds. Greater exposure to trauma, PTG, and stronger social bonds were all associated with greater openness to legal non-violent activism.     

The American Role in European Defense Reform

In order to influence the direction and outcomes of defense reforms occurring across Europe, the United States needs to refocus its military-to-military engagement programs with its European allies. Instead of seeking to build partner capacity among the newest NATO members or aspirants, Washington will be better served by maintaining and strengthening interoperability with those allies that are adaptive and innovative, deployable and expeditionary, and capable of full spectrum operations—that is, allies such as France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This finding is based upon what Washington itself sees as the future of conflict and the kinds of coalition partner skills and abilities the United States will need to counter post-International Security Assistance Force International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) threats to U.S. and collective security. Given budget and force structure cuts facing the United States as well, the American military cannot afford to waste its limited security cooperation resources.     

Nuclear Proliferation,the Kargil Conflict,and South Asian Security

The idea that the United States is an empire or should adopt imperial strategies has been widely criticized. One of the most persuasive sets of arguments against imperial enthusiasts is that empire is an obsolete and outdated strategy. Both systemic- and domestic-level changes are said to prevent the United States from successfully implementing an imperial strategy. I maintain that the importance of these barriers—whether technological, economic, or ideational—are greatly overstated. In contrast, I point to a number of developments, such as the rise of nontraditional security threats, the revolution in military affairs, and changing norms of humanitarian intervention, that will encourage greater American overseas adventurism.