Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration

Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars.     

The Sturdy Child vs. the Sword of Damocles: Nuclear Weapons and the Expected Cost of War

Abstract

Is the world better off with nuclear weapons or without? Nuclear pessimists point to the potentially devastating costs of a nuclear war. Nuclear optimists argue that nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war and are thus beneficial. This debate is inconclusive in part because it misses an important conceptual point. We should care both about the cost of war and the likelihood of war, as they combine to form the expected cost of war, which is the product of the two. I discuss five implications of focusing on expected costs. Three support the pessimists: (1) nuclear weapons raise the upper limit on how destructive wars can be; (2) there may be a floor on how low the likelihood of war can go; and (3) risk aversion over damage will raise the expected cost of nuclear war. The remaining two support the optimists: (4) strategic models exhibit a declining expected cost of war; and (5) casualty data show that the expected cost of war is declining over its observed range in the past two hundred years.     

A Rising Power & the Coming of a Great War

This article examines the strategic decisions that led to the struggle between Britain and Germany, exploring how a great war involving Europe's leading powers could come to pass. In 1914, there were no forces beyond the control of decision makers pushing them into the grisly war of attrition that destroyed the social and political fabric of nineteenth-century Europe and ushered in the horrors of the twentieth century. Rather, those horrors resulted from poor policy and strategic choices made by the leaders of the great powers. The war's outbreak underscores history's contingent nature, dramatically showing how errors in judgment on the part of political and military leaders can ruin great countries. One stark lesson of the Great War is that no leader sought as an outcome the conflagration produced by their decisions. Today, China's weapons programs and foreign policy assertiveness conjures up fears that Beijing seeks to establish a new international order, much as Germany's rulers tried to do a hundred years ago with such catastrophic consequences. Shaping the internal debate among China's rulers, so that they judge self-restraint in armaments and strategy as being in their best interest, will test the strategic acumen of American leaders in the years ahead.     

An economic model of guerrilla warfare∗

This paper draws on the guerrilla warfare literature so as to synthesize and to describe the dynamics of the initial stages of a guerrilla war against an established government. It combines two classical economic models, the Solow growth model and the Ricardian model of economic rents, with two classic studies of guerrilla warfare by T. E. Lawrence and by Mao Tse‐tung. The transitional stages of the guerrilla warfare are modeled as conflict over control of the real line. Four different Ricardian distribution functions describe the country: the resources the guerrillas can extract from territory under their control; the porosity of the country, indicating the guerrilla's ability to obtain weapons; the government's ability to tax; and the mobility the guerrillas. Depending on initial conditions, the course of the guerrilla war could take one of several paths. One is a direct movement to a stable equilibrium independent of the initial conditions. Another is a situation in which for the guerrillas to make a successful transition to the second stage via the dynamics of the process they have to reach a certain critical level of capability. Finally, the third path involves cyclical motion, with alternating positions of the guerrillas and the government in the evolution of the war. This model, while simple, appears to be consistent with the historical pattern of guerrilla wars, a key parameter in the model being porosity.     

A Long War in the East: Doctrine,Diplomacy, and the Prospects for a Protracted Sino-American Conflict

Increasing diplomatic tension between China and the United States has led to concerns about military conflict, possibly including rapid nuclear escalation. Scholars have spent less time considering the opposite scenario: protracted conventional war. This analysis explains why a combination of politics, geography, and technology may conspire to produce such a war, despite the fact that both sides are planning for a short, high-intensity fight. It shows how the Peloponnesian War, an ancient conflict fought with ancient weapons, nonetheless provides a warning of what might happen in the present. It also describes a grim trade off that American policy-makers will face in the event of war. Washington can take steps to reduce the chance of nuclear escalation, but in so doing will make a long war more likely. The conclusion describes the diplomatic challenge of war termination in a protracted conflict where neither side can compel the other to back down.     

The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy has long been seen as a viable alternative to war by political decision-makers. There is, however, a long line of credible academic and policy critique—stretching back to the Cold War—that asserts the failures of coercion almost always overwhelm its benefits. Our examination of the 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani crisis supports the overall analytical consensus that coercive methods, under certain circumstances, accomplish little. We discover that India's use of coercive diplomacy was severely hobbled because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, strong Pakistani conventional forces, and other geopolitical realities that strongly favored Pakistan. Despite careful attempts by Indian elites to apply the principles of “forceful persuasion” to end the crisis on terms favorable to India (the stronger power in the dispute), the Indian strategy failed to accomplish most of its objectives. Our analysis thereby exposes the limits of coercion and compellance for solving chronic territorial and ideological disputes between enduring rivals.     

Arms Acquisition Patterns and the Dynamics of Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Niger Delta

Arms acquisition is a crucial venture for armed insurgency groups for carrying out their militant activities. I argue that the specific manner in which these groups obtain weapons may have important consequences for the dynamics of violent intrastate conflict. While most previous studies of the relationship between arms acquisition and armed conflict have focused solely on the impact of arms availability, in this article I analyze the impact of two specific aspects of arms acquisition patterns—the methods and the degree of leadership control—on the dynamics and nature of armed conflict in a qualitative case study of the armed conflict in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) between 1995 and 2005. I conclude that the specific arms acquisition method and the degree of leadership control over this process have strongly affected the dynamics of the conflict.     

Ex-combatants as social activists: war,peace and ideology in Burundi

In both academic literature and policy discourse, ex-combatants are at times depicted as a threat to peace rather than agents of positive change. However, many of my ex-combatant interlocutors in Burundi were working actively on conflict resolution and peace-building projects. In addition, their experience and knowledge of combat was frequently stated as a deterrent for going back to such a situation. Though it may seem contradictory, the reasons my informants gave for having joined the war sounded remarkably similar to motivations for social activism. They usually expressed it as a desire to contribute to a better, more just, community. I argue that ideology played an important part in motivation to join armed groups during the war and carries over in participation in social activism today. These decisions need not be seen as polar opposites, but rather as similar motivations towards contributing to positive change taken in different circumstances.     

Interaction and participation in sub‐war conflict, 1959–63

This research is concerned with the spread of sub‐war conflicts. It is hypothesized that higher levels of interaction with the contestants in such conflicts increase the probability of participation. A study of the behavior of the states in the CREON data set toward the Cold War during the years 1959–63 supports this contention. Attention then centers on determining the types of states that are most prone toward high levels of interaction. The findings in this section indicate that alliance members have significantly higher levels of interaction than non‐members. For members there is a strong negative logarithmic relationship between a state's geographical distance from the center of conflict and its level of interaction. This suggests that security interests strongly affect the inclination of such states to participate. Among non‐members of alliances, economic involvement in the international system and ties to the Warsaw Treaty Organization are most closely associated with interaction.     

Information warfare and nuclear conflict termination

This study considers the possible implications of information warfare for efforts to terminate a nuclear war, or a war between nuclear armed states that is about to go nuclear. Information warfare could interfere with some of the requirements for nuclear conflict termination in at least five ways: by increasing the difficulty of accurate communication between heads of state; by decreasing the likelihood of military compliance with terms of ceasefire or settlement; by reinforcing mass images of the enemy that make it more difficult for leaders to negotiate; and by making battle damage assessment more complicated; and by increasing the amount of uncertainty within an already chaotic government decision‐making process and within a possibly acephalous military instrument.     

Neutrality Regimes

Abstract

I analyze a model of war expansion in the shadow of international law, where neutrality regimes emerge as equilibria in which only aggressive states are expected to violate the law. By sorting belligerents according to their ambitions (restrained or aggressive), neutrality regimes can help resolve third-party uncertainty over the desirability of balancing. Punishment for violations of the law emerges in equilibrium from self-interested power calculations absent any principled legal commitment. The model shows that (a) neutrality regimes can be effective not despite but because of inconsistent compliance; (b) strong third parties are uniquely prone to failures to balance under neutrality regimes; and (c) ratification of neutrality regimes can be facilitated by mutual and severe mistrust. Neutrality regimes need not be epiphenomenal to power politics; rather, they can support balance-of-power systems.     

The enemy within: rethinking arms availability in sub-Saharan Africa

Over the past decade small arms and light weapons availability has been singled out as one of sub-Saharan Africa's highest profile challenges. Yet the construction of the threat of arms availability as one of authorised trade and illicit trafficking across international borders has resulted in a narrow focus on regulating lawful exports and imports and brokers. While these are real and legitimate concerns, the authors contend that small arms and light weapons availability should be re-evaluated as a complex social phenomenon involving dynamic supply and demand dimensions. A limited emphasis on controlling authorised transfers to war zones glosses over the challenges of illegal markets, the gradual emergence of national arms production capacities across Africa and the systematic diversion of weapons and ammunition surplus from the domestic stocks of security services into civilian hands. It also obscures a more dynamic landscape of armed violence across the continent which extends beyond war zones. Whilst the conventional interpretation of arms availability is favoured by African diplomats and international arms control experts, such a reading potentially obscures the weaknesses of security governance and the myriad motivations and means shaping small arms and light weapons acquisition and misuse amongst armed groups and civilians.     

Back to the future: How Serbia is heading the way of post‐versailles Germany

This analogy written before Milosevic's ouster theorizes that Serbia in the aftermath of Kosovo mirrors Germany after 1919 as a nation forced to accept an imposed peace. From the evidence a resurgence of Serb nationalism and territorial ambition is still inevitable. Various parallels support this conclusion including the use of post‐war sanctions, demands to hand over a wanted war criminal and owe up to guilt, geographical fragmentation, political uncertainty, economic depression, and military association with Russia. The salient point remains one of oversight by the victors to acknowledge an ignominious settlement is the source of all grievances and patterns of instability.     

Repression,Grievances, Mobilization,and Rebellion: A New Test of Gurr’s Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion

The concept of polarity has been subject to imprecise and often diverse use. This note explores problems associated with the varied use of the term and proposes an alternative approach to classifying international systems which treats horizontal and vertical dimensions of power as distinct structural variables. In this approach, the present system is distinguished from the classical balance of power system containing pluralized patterns of conflict on the one hand and from the Cold War system with a marked concentration of power on the other. In the contemporary system polarized patterns of conflict coexist with processes of power diffusion. To the extent polarizations persist in a more diffuse power setting, the decentralized power balancing system through which stability was sought in multipower systems cannot function‐nor are the polarized conflicts likely to be controlled as a result of the two‐power effort at balancing power which occurred during the post‐war period. The factors affecting the stability of the present system, it is suggested here, can be better understood by examining analogous structures in which processes of power diffusion occur in the context of polarized conflict and not as a result of spurious comparisons which mistake the diffusion of power for the pluralization of conflict.     

Not Whether,But When? Governments’ Use of Militias in War

Abstract

Although government use of militias during civil conflict can ultimately undermine state authority, governments still use militias for battlefield assistance. This paper examines the selectivity of government decisions to use militias by disaggregating civil conflict to the level of battle phases. Civil-conflict battles typically consist of four phases: preparation, clear, hold, and build. I argue that governments decide to use militias based on the strength of government security forces, operational advantages of militias, and the type of battle phase. Governments will limit the use of militias during key battle phases that are likely to receive increased media attention unless a victory secured by government security forces is unlikely or militias hold an operational advantage. A comparative analysis of the offensive operations in Tikrit and Ramadi during Iraq’s war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) lends initial support to this theory.     

Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of ‘peace and nuclear disarmament’ was established through speeches he made such as ‘Atoms for Peace’ (December 1953) and ‘Open Skies’ proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing ‐ and threatening ‐ ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.     

The tyranny of distance: Redefining relevant dyads

A variety of definitions of “crisis” plague the study of international crisis. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate the reasons for the divergence and a possible solution to the problem.

Definitions of “crisis” tend to incorporate a variety of elements. Some focus on the micro‐level of decisionmakers in particular countries; others look at the macro‐level of international system change; still other definitions are multi‐level, incorporating both micro‐ and macro‐components. A second set of differences is rooted in metaphysical assumptions. Some definitions look at “crisis” as something recognized by the mind of the individual, a perceptual process that is basically mental; other definitions, which tend to equate “crisis” with “stress,” assume that “crisis” is a physical phenomenon that can be measured by information flows, physiological tensions, or other objective observable behavior. A dualist approach insists that “crisis” is simultaneously physical and nonphysical is also evident in the literature. A third aspect of “crisis” definitions is whether the researcher seeks to stipulate an arbitrary meaning for the term on the basis of supposed self‐evident logic or whether data are collected prior to an effort to define the term; this is the familiar distinction between rationalism and empiricism, with facet theory as an approach that combines elements of both approaches.

Various approaches attempt to test theories of “crisis” with definitions determined by their metaphysical foundations. The models identified are as follows: hostile interaction, individual stress, physiological overload, organizational response, and cost calculation. Findings based on various empirical tests of the theories show that there is very little agreement in the literature on variables associated with “crisis”; more often than not, if a variable is linked with “crisis” positively in one study, the same variable is either linked negatively or has no correlation with “crisis” in a second study. The source of the empirical divergence may be that the various studies sample different cases—or differing definitions may account for the lack of consensus in the field.

The paper concludes by urging that research on international crisis should be absorbed into larger theoretical concerns that focus on the objectives motivating the studies, as this appears to be one way to maintain definitional uniformity. Studies on crisis anticipation and crisis management should be viewed as efforts at war prevention. Studies on crisis management, which aim to reduce foreign policy fiascoes should be conceived in terms of foreign policy management. Findings of such studies can then be appraised in terms of the goals they seek.     

Determinants of Foreign Aid: Rivalry and Domestic Instability

Foreign aid is usually seen as a form of international cooperation. Thus, the expectation is that states engaged in international rivalry with one another should be unlikely to provide each other aid. However, they do provide their enemies aid. We consider how situations of uncertainty influence aid transfers between states. We argue that states may provide each other aid to limit uncertainty from potential regime changes that could lead to war. Such uncertainty is particularly bad for rivals who are prone to militarized conflict. We find that rivals may provide one another foreign aid when one of the countries is experiencing regime-threatening levels of domestic instability. We compare these results to the behavior of nonrivals and find that: Rivals are likely to provide their enemies aid in times of uncertainty; rivals are no less likely to give aid to each other than are nonrivals; and rivals provide more aid during times of instability than do nonrivals.     

Libyan Arms and Regional Instability

As security continues to be a primary challenge in post-Qadhafi Libya, the availability of weapons to nearby opposition groups and armed insurgencies is a source of major concern for Libya’s neighbours and the international community. Uncontrolled weapons proliferation and the rise of new armed groups have gone hand in hand across various conflict fronts. While what is known about weapons acquisition dynamics does not make it possible to establish a strict causal relationship, by observing variations in the various contexts, critical factors can be identified, such as the emergence of a protection market, the multiplication of tactical options and splintering processes, which facilitate comprehension of how greater circulation of weapons is related to regional volatility and destabilisation.     

Fused in combat: Gender relations and armed conflict

Do gender relations change through conflict? How might conflict itself be fuelled by aspects of gender identity? A recently completed research project that combined oral testimony with more conventional research methods concluded that conflict has undoubtedly given women greater responsibilities, and with them the possibility of exerting greater leverage in decision making and increasing their political participation. The research sheds light on the role of ordinary citizens as 'actors' responding to crisis, and describes how gender identities are woven into a complex web of cause and effect in which war can be seen as a 'conflict of patriarchies'.