Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of 'peace and nuclear disarmament' was established through speeches he made such as 'Atoms for Peace' (December 1953) and 'Open Skies' proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing - and threatening - ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.     

Missing the nuclear boat? British policy and French military nuclear ambitions during the EURATOM foundation negotiations, 1955–56

This paper examines the neglected nuclear dimension of the ‘relaunch’ of Europe at Messina. France favoured British membership of EURATOM and some interests in Britain saw the commercial and diplomatic advantages of Britain's leadership of the European nuclear industry. However, the possibility of a French military nuclear programme and European nuclear proliferation compounded Britain's established reluctance either to participate in European integration or to jeopardize the prospect of Anglo‐American nuclear weapons cooperation. Britain's aversion to using the hypothetical ‘nuclear card’ is a recurrent theme in Anglo‐French diplomacy.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

Rethinking small arms control in Africa: it is time to set an armed violence reduction agenda

Policy-makers and practitioners concerned with small arms control have traditionally focused narrowly on ‘supply-side’ forms of regulation and containment. Concerned that excessive arms availability might destabilise fragile and post-war countries, they typically advance a host of activities such as weapons embargoes, export and import controls, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and weapons collection schemes. These initiatives often achieve fewer dividends than expected. This article argues for a broader conceptualisation of ‘availability’ that accounts for both supply and demand dimensions. Availability would thus extend from arms production and diverse forms of weapons circulation to the manifold factors shaping acquisition and the multiple ways arms are used and misused. A broad spectrum treatment directly acknowledges the many faces of armed violence and allows for more sophisticated diagnosis, treatment and cure. This article considers how a host of ‘second generation’ armed violence prevention and reduction activities might enhance efforts to promote security in the aftermath of Africa's wars.     

EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia's Expectations,Responses and Options for the Future1

Abstract

For Russian policymakers no events in the post-Cold War period have had more momentous consequences or received greater public commentary, both before and after they occurred, than the almost simultaneous enlargement of NATO and the EU that took place in 2004. The most sensitive aspect of this ‘dual enlargement’ for the Russian Federation was the extension of these two organisations into the Baltic States, which had been part of the Soviet Union itself. Despite some uneasiness, Moscow anticipated that the extension of the EU into the former Soviet sphere, even into the former Soviet Union itself, would constitute a generally positive development, while NATO penetration of that sphere would be extremely harmful. Accordingly, Russia voiced little opposition to the EU's plans and made only limited efforts to insure that its major interests would be protected, while it actively sought to forestall the NATO project, especially with regard to the Baltics. As it turned out, however, most of Russia's expectations regarding the impact of these processes were mistaken, and Russia's interests were poorly served by its prior and subsequent responses.     

Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons

This article analyses the potential motivations behind the opposition of a number of Central and Eastern European States (CESs) to the withdrawal of US deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) from Europe. It shows why CES governments obtain no military benefits from the deployed NSNW; it argues CES are unlikely to truly see them as a promising bargaining chip; it suggests CES can derive only limited prestige from US-deployed weapons and the contrasting norm of ‘nuclear disarmament’ likely offers a more attractive option; and it assesses potential bureaucratic interests as improbable to play a decisive role. In contrast, the article proposes a more nuanced elaboration of the transatlantic ‘linkage’ argument. It maintains CES have significant motives to keep the United States involved in Europe, shows how they are likely to mistrust US commitment pledges, and argues they are prone to use the NSNW debate as a convenient instrument (within a limited toolbox) towards locking in the US foothold on the continent.     

A Nuclear-Free Middle East – Just Not in the Cards

A scheduled conference to promote a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has renewed hopes for nuclear disarmament in this unstable region, if only innovative diplomacy could take advantage of the current shifts. However, a realistic assessment suggests that optimism is unwarranted. Fundamental strategic considerations related to Iran's nuclear program, Israel's atomic options, and the region's ingrate security architecture remain nearly insurmountable hurdles. Therefore, policymakers should focus first on attaining a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.     

Interests over norms in western policy towards the Caucasus: How Abkhazia is no one's Kosovo

The potentially numerous cases of ‘genocide’ around the world can now invoke the precedent of NATO's use of military force for humanitarian purposes against Serbia in spring 1999. Such a claim was suggested by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze over Georgia's disputed former autonomous republic of Abkhazia. The conflict over this former ‘Soviet Riviera’ again demonstrates the constraints behind gaining accurate information on the causes and consequences of a conflict. Particularly, it illustrates the difficulty of determining what constitutes ‘genocide’ and against whom, as both the Abkhaz and the displaced Georgians make such claims. On that basis, each party can expect ‐ and equally fear ‐ a NATO‐style military intervention. In the event, even if both sides view themselves as victims of ‘genocide’ and entitled to such intervention, Western perceptions of strategic interests in the Caucasus prevent this scenario. The determination of injustices, quite apart from their redress, goes unanswered.     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

The Sturdy Child vs. the Sword of Damocles: Nuclear Weapons and the Expected Cost of War

Abstract

Is the world better off with nuclear weapons or without? Nuclear pessimists point to the potentially devastating costs of a nuclear war. Nuclear optimists argue that nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war and are thus beneficial. This debate is inconclusive in part because it misses an important conceptual point. We should care both about the cost of war and the likelihood of war, as they combine to form the expected cost of war, which is the product of the two. I discuss five implications of focusing on expected costs. Three support the pessimists: (1) nuclear weapons raise the upper limit on how destructive wars can be; (2) there may be a floor on how low the likelihood of war can go; and (3) risk aversion over damage will raise the expected cost of nuclear war. The remaining two support the optimists: (4) strategic models exhibit a declining expected cost of war; and (5) casualty data show that the expected cost of war is declining over its observed range in the past two hundred years.     

On the study of legal order in future world systems

The disarmament of rival nations can only take place when all countries involved are made better off and a feasibility criterion is also satisfied. Disarmament is more probable when nations face a similar trade off in the acquisition of weapons, when developments in military capabilities can be speedily and accurately verified, and when the existing weapon systems are easily reproducible. A successful disarmament also requires that the speed of the disposition of arms be neither too fast nor too slow.     

Strategic defense without star wars: The case for a defense‐emphasis arms control regime 1

This paper challenges two prevalent assumptions of the mainstream U.S. arms control community: first, that strategic nuclear disarmament? should be regarded as beyond the scope of serious superpower dialogue; second, that strategic defense (especially population defense) is inherently incompatible with the goals of arms control. It does so first by analyzing the events surrounding the Reykjavik summit—the occasion of the first direct negotiations on disarmament between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Next, while identifying grave flaws in the current design of the Strategic Defense Initiative, it will be argued that a defense‐emphasis arms control regime can provide the best long‐term means for addressing the problem of security in the nuclear age.     

Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration

When President Gerald Ford decided to maintain and deepen arms relations with Iran, he cemented a momentum that became near impossible for a successor to break by continuing the policy of his predecessor Richard Nixon. Nixon had given the Shah of Iran a “blank cheque” to purchase whatever American arms he desired—short of nuclear weapons. Although Ford’s authority would be challenged by members of his own Administration and a Congress seeking to claw back some of its authority, the need to support allies in the Middle East against the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained paramount.     

Window of opportunity: Reflections on an idea fashionable in the west

The essay warns about the extreme danger of the fashionable idea that the West has only a marginal role to play in Russia's integration into the world community. It does not take into account the ferocious war of ideas in post‐Soviet Moscow which all but insures that nationalist ambition ‘to return Russia to the status of a leading global power’ would come out a winner. As a result of this the window of opportunity that opened after the disintegration of the Soviet empire may well slam shut again. The only way to prevent it seems to be for the West to create its own strategy of Russia's integration in which the dominant up to now theme of economic assistance (hardware) is replaced by the theme of intellectual participation (or the software of integration). That is why the purpose of the essay is to try to offer a logical set of criteria that could provide the basis for such an intelligent strategy.     

The Balkans and the enlargement of NATO: A sceptical view

Throughout the Cold War, NATO and the USA worked hard to consolidate their strategic presence in Europe, while at the same time containing the Soviet threat. But the road taken by NATO in its effort to reform itself after the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, has not been a royal path, smooth and free of risk. NATO's geopolitical and selective way of eastward expansion encourages the creation of new ‘enemy blocs’ with Russia at their epicentre. The clash between NATO and the European Union over defence and security issues becomes all the more obvious. The humanitarian war over Kosovo was a risky affair whose spillover effects are badly felt today with the uprising of Albanian Macedonians; The Kosovo war, moreover, created a unique precedent in the conduct of foreign policy and clearly bordered on ‘double standard’ politics. Last but not least, the wider implications of Turkey's entry into the European Union may not be, in the long run, as positive for NATO as initially thought they would be.

This article offers a critical overview of NATO's reform process in the 1990s and argues that its transformation from a military defence pact into a political organisation upholding and selectively implementing liberal‐democratic principles may lead the alliance into serious political deadlocks in the years to come.     

British nuclear non-proliferation policies towards Iran and the Middle East

The article argues that British non-proliferation policies towards the Middle East have had limited success because they are circumscribed by dependence on alliances and constrained by other factors such as Britain's historical legacy, its status as a nuclear weapons state and, especially through the European Union's engagement with the region, the communication of self-interest rather than credible pursuit of the declared objective of regional security-building. Despite promoting and implementing its own disarmament policies, Britain has been unable to overcome mistrust and perceptions of hypocrisy in the region in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This is particularly evident in the dispute with Iran, which is examined in detail with the assistance of Adler's ‘double-damned dilemma’ model. The analysis argues that the Western coercive approach has facilitated the stalemate with Iran, because it has encouraged Iran's provocations and allowed it to respond with a strategy of denial. The analysis suggests that Britain and its allies adopt a defusing strategy which does not reduce the dispute to a proliferation problem, but treats Iran's behaviour as a quest for recognition. Britain has little influence on Iran, but might build on its relationship with Turkey to develop this approach in conjunction with its allies.     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

Engaging China in Nuclear Disarmament Debates： Is There a Role for Australia？

China has demonstrated some interest in the resurgence of nuclear disarmament debates over the past few years,but because its own nuclear arsenal is relatively small,because this capability is predicated on a very specific Chinese posture and security concerns,and because it believes firmly that the responsibility for moving towards a world without nuclear weapons belongs in the first instance to the United States and Russia-who between them possess 95% of the world’s existing nuclear weapons-it has displayed a somewhat limited contribution to this debate so far.     

A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture

This article examines the implications of Scottish independence for the UK's nuclear posture. It is argued here that a vote for independence will critically undermine this posture. Since the UK nuclear force operates entirely out of Scotland, and since the Scottish government continues to assert its intention to see nuclear weapons removed from an independent Scotland, it is overwhelmingly likely that a ‘Yes’ vote will prompt a demand for the drawdown of the UK nuclear force in Scotland. If it wished to maintain its nuclear capability, the UK government would then have to make alternative basing arrangements. It is argued here that a host of legal, financial and political difficulties may preclude any such relocation and that Downing Street may ultimately be left with little option but to surrender the UK's nuclear capability. This article concludes that far from weakening the UK, a surrendering of its nuclear posture would result in a stronger and more functional UK military footprint and would bolster the UK's standing in the international arena.     

Frustration and Delay: The Secondary Effects of Supply-Side Proliferation Controls

Abstract

Do trade barriers help slow the spread of nuclear weapons? Supply-side controls on proliferation equipment and material are often dismissed as ineffective because nuclear weapons–seeking states can develop methods to circumvent the controls. However, these global export controls have important secondary effects. By creating barriers to trade, export controls force states to develop costly and inefficient methods that interfere with progress toward nuclear weapons development. Using case evidence beginning with the advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s export control regime in 1974, I argue that the resulting delay and frustration can change leaders’ strategic calculations regarding the value of their nuclear weapons programs. These findings demonstrate that proliferation controls do slow the spread of nuclear weapons, both by delaying existing programs, and by decreasing the likelihood that leaders will make decisions to continue with, or even start, nuclear weapons programs.