“The future of events data mareiages: A question of compatibility”

The paper examines the performance of tit‐for‐tat in iterated plays of prisoners’ dilemma and chicken. In particular, the paper examines, via computer simulations, a space of surrogate Axelrod‐type tournaments over these games. The surrogate tournaments are specified in terms of characteristics of strategies similar to those Axelrod identifies as fundamental.

The paper shows that the zones of optimality for tit‐for‐tat in tournament play of both prisoners’ dilemma and chicken remarkably constrained, but that tit‐for‐tat generally does well relative to other strategies. Furthermore, our results show that the success of tit‐for‐tat is sensitive to the number of players and the assignment of payoff values.     

The arms race noninteraction puzzle: The effects of concept choice and measurement error on the estimation of the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race

The continuing failure to find interaction in the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race remains a puzzle. In this analysis the effects of concept choice and measurement error on the estimation of a Richardson‐type model of the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race is examined. Employing a multiple indictor model, it is demonstrated that significant random and systematic measurement error exists. The use of military expenditures as an indicator of economic burden is shown to generate severe statistical problems. Lastly, it is demonstrated that the lack of fit of typical single indicator models is more a measurement error problem than a model specification problem.     

Arms transfer and recipient cooperation with supplier policy references: The case of the Middle East

The principal hypothesis of this paper is that the utility of arms transfers as an instrument of supplier influence is highly dependent upon two sets of variables over which the supplier has little control. This is partly because the recipeints’ demand for arms rests largely on forces outside the major power suppliers’ control. The relative impact of arms transfers is evaluated in conjunction with 1) the arms transfers to the recipients's principal local adversary; 2) the intensity of the recipient's conflict involvement; 3) the amount of political support it receives from its major power supplier/patron; and 4) the identity of the supplier country itself. Recipient countries are Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Supplier countries are France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States for the years 1947–1973.

Combat aircraft weighted by their performance characteristics and treated as the dominant weapon system are used as the “arms transfers” variable. Conflict, cooperation and political support variables include both verbal and non‐verbal actions weighted for their relative intensity by a 13 point interval scale.

Multiple regression using standardized (beta) coefficients is used in a time series analysis to determine the relative impact of arms transfers and other salient influences on the intensity of recipient cooperation to its principal major power supplier.

The findings in general support the main hypothesis. They suggest that arms transfers may be one useful instrument for extracting additional increments of cooperation from Egypt and Israel, (particularly in the context of Egyptian‐Israeli peace negotiations) but not for any of the other recipients in the study. However, this inference is valid only so long as those two countries continue to be engaged in an arms race with each other, heavily involved in conflict with their neighbors, and economically dependent upon outside powers. Cooperation of the Arab states with their respective major power suppliers is more strongly affected by the quantity of arms transferred to their respective regional adversaries and the intensity of political support from their suppliers than by their own arms transfers. Given the differential impact that the identity of the supplier had on cooperation intensity one conclusion is that the major power suppliers may not be equally successful in using arms as an instrument of political influence. Another is that the development of a “special relationship” between supplier and recipient in conjunction with supplier support for the recipient is probably a prerequisite for effectively using arms transfers as an instrument of supplier influence or coercion.     

Horse‐race Journalism and pollsters' performance in Israel

Abstract

This paper examines the interaction between the horse‐race attitude of the press in covering election campaigns and pollsters’ performance in Israel. Attempting to provide highly processed and more exciting reports, the press encourages pollsters to switch from relatively conservative approaches to projecting election results, into more daring ones, prone to situational errors. Moreover, criticizing such errors when they occur, the press focuses mainly on those errors consistent with its horse‐race orientation. Professional and political implications of the press's orientation and pollsters’ performance are discussed.     

Shaping the race issue: A special kind of journalism

The paper examines the press coverage of the Los Angeles Times in the 1982 gubernatorial election between Mayor Tom Bradley and George Deukmejian in terms of the proclivity to highlight Bradley's race in campaign news stories. The paper focuses on the statement made by Deukmejian campaign manager, Bill Roberts, in the early days of October, with his candidate trailing badly in the polls, that “there was a hidden anti‐black vote” that would aid Deukmejian on election day. The authors detail the Los Angeles Times coverage of this statement and the tendency of the Times to focus on this story during the entire month of October rather than to report on the issues addressed by the candidates. The analysis notes that as campaign coverage zeroed in on the race issue, so did polls and voter interest. After examining the coverage and Deukmejian's narrow victory, the authors pose questions of ethics to reporters engaged in this writing and outline concerns for such practices in future elections and campaigns.     

A Review of: “The U.S. Catholic Press on Central America: From Cold War Anticommunism to Social Justice,by Edward T. Brett”

In a few short years, the World Wide Web has become a standard part of candidates' campaign tool kits. Virtually all candidates have their own sites, and voters, journalists, and activists visit the sites with increasing frequency. In this article, we study what candidates do on these sites—in terms of the information they present—by exploring one of the most enduring and widely debated campaign strategies: “going negative.” Comparing data from over 700 congressional candidate Web sites, over three election cycles (2002, 2004, and 2006), with television advertising data, we show that candidates go negative with similar likelihoods across these media. We also find that while similar dynamics drive negativity on the Web and in television advertising, there are some notable differences. These differences likely stem, in part, from the truncated sample available with television data (i.e., many candidates do not produce ads). Our results have implications for understanding negative campaigning and for the ways in which scholars can study campaign dynamics.     

Credibility,source identification and message acceptance: The case of political persuasion

Abstract

This paper addresses questions related to effects of source credibility on message acceptance. More specifically, we look at (a) the effects of attributed credibility of the source on message acceptance in situation of source identification versus non‐identification, and (b) the effects of attributed credibility of two competitive sources on the acceptance of their respective messages in positively versus negatively predisposed audiences.

Source identification and source competition relate to the more general problem of persuasion and inoculation. Political parties often strive to persuade partisan, hostile, or politically neutral audiences while simultaneously trying to inoculate them against the message of opposing parties. These processes of persuasion can take place in situations where the source is either identified (e.g., a well‐known politician clearly linked with a political party) or not identified (e.g., a journalist who presents a politician's point of view without naming him/her). In cases where the source has been identified, the audience may remember the message itself and yet forget who had advanced the message. This raises the question of the extent to which communicators should concern themselves with the attributed credibility of the source in situations of either source identification or non‐identification? And how important is credibility in reinforcing the support of partisans or in persuading neutral and hostile audiences? These are some of the issues we examine experimentally in this article.     

How Accurate Are Survey Responses on Social Media and Politics?

How accurate are survey-based measures of social media use, in particular about political topics? We answer this question by linking original survey data collected during the U.S. 2016 election campaign with respondents’ observed social media activity. We use supervised machine learning to classify whether these Twitter and Facebook account data are content related to politics. We then benchmark our survey measures on frequency of posting about politics and the number of political figures followed. We find that, on average, our self-reported survey measures tend to correlate with observed social media activity. At the same time, we also find a worrying amount of individual-level discrepancy and problems related to extreme outliers. Our recommendations are twofold. The first is for survey questions about social media use to provide respondents with options covering a wider range of activity, especially in the long tail. The second is for survey questions to include specific content and anchors defining what it means for a post to be “about politics.”     

Elections,Election Outcomes,and Democracy in Southern Africa

Elections and election outcomes are widely used as a convenient short cut to measuring democracy. If this were correct, information on elections and election outcomes would be a time- and cost-saving means of identifying regime type. However, this article shows that the influential democracy measures of Beck et al., Ferree and Singh, Przeworski et al., and Vanhanen fail to adequately identify regime type when applied to ten countries in Southern Africa. For most countries, it is not possible to distinguish democracies from non-democracies on the basis of elections and election outcomes. Multi-party elections are not always free, fair, and democratic; dominant parties and dominant party systems are not necessarily undemocratic; large election victories are not by themselves proof of foul play; and not all authoritarian regimes maintain their rule through overwhelming parliamentary or electoral majorities.     

Limits to cooperation: Iterated graduated games and the arms race

The arms race is often modeled as mutual defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma game and arms control as reciprocal cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, while Chicken and other games are used to represent different aspects of superpower rivalry. This paper develops a model of the macro‐structure of superpower rivalry in which each of these games occur at different levels of military expenditures or other measures of military effort. In this iterated graduated game model the two rival states repeatedly select from an ordered sequence of policy options, and each state experiences tradeoffs among the desire to gain an advantage over the rival, the dangers of escalation, and the intrinsic benefits and opportunity costs of military expenditures. Analysis of numerical examples demonstrates that equilibrium in this model corresponds to the intermediate levels of cooperation and conflict characteristic of superpower rivalry. A concluding discussion indicates that this model is also consistent with the existence of policy competition among domestic groups with conflicting interests.     

The role of journalists’ questions in campaign forums

This article examines the role of journalists’ questions in campaign agenda‐setting, through an analysis of questions and answers from the 1984 campaign forums. The intention is to identify more fully the conditions and techniques in operation as the agenda is being composed and to illuminate ways in which questioners and candidates vie for dominance.

While the audience may see panel members as uninhibited inquisitors, the setting and context of forums circumscribe panelists’ actions and exert a moderating effect. Panel members are screened and can be vetoed by candidates, and they are bound by demands of television, concerned about embarrassment, reluctant to antagonize candidates, and influenced by the existing campaign agenda. They have influence in introducing topics and guiding discussion, but their questions can be disarmed or neutralized by an array of devices. To the extent that the forums contribute to the public agenda, the power to shape the contribution rests primarily with candidates and secondarily with questioners.     

Kan politieke televisiedebatte kiesers oorreed? 'n Loodsstudie

SUMMARY

The influence of political debates on television during the run-up to the general election of 6 September 1989 is examined in a pilot study. The study is not representative and aims at identifying aspects to be examined in greater depth during the next general election. The study indicates that political debates on television play an important role in influencing respondents' choice of political party. Secondly, television debates provide new information for many respondents on the parties they do not support.     

Deterrence,uncertainty and cooperative behavior

The paper analyzes deterrence relationships in situations when the relevant forms of behavior are subject to lags such as in the case of foreign interventions and technological arms races. Mutual deterrence is a way of inducing cooperative behavior. Successful deterrence, in the cases considered, can be considered as ways of inducing cooperative behaviors in Prisoners’ Dilemma Supergames, the model used in this paper. It is argued that, in general, deterrence is more likely to be successful and hence cooperative behavior more prevalent in systems where the actors can move between strategies quickly (i.e., are flexible) and which are characterized by low uncertainty. The paper also analyzes the concept of discounting and time preference in the discussion of political phenomena where the concept has no market interpretation. It is analyzed as a rational response to uncertainty.     

Book notes

AA.VV., Le riforme economiche net paesi dell'Est, Vallecchi, Firenze, 1966, pp. 349, L. 2.000.

AA.VV., Tendenze del capitalismo europeo, Editori Riuniti‐Istituto Gramsci, Roma, 1966, pp. 829, L. 3.500.

AA.VV., The Dimensions of Diplomacy, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1964, pp. 135, $ 3.95.

Abel Elie, La crisi dei missili, Garzanti, Milano, 1966, pp. 215, L. 2.000.

Cornell Richard, Youth and Communism, Walker and Co., New York, 1965, pp. 194, $ 6,50.

Gardner Richard, L'Onu e la politico mondiale, Cappelli, Bologna, 1966, pp. 179, L. 6.000.

Granick David, Il dirigente europeo, Comunità, Milano, 1966, pp. 370, L. 3.000.

Leone Ugo, Le origin'i diplomatiche del Consiglio d'Europa, Giuffré, Milano, 1965, pp. 335.

Nenni Pietro, Il socialismo nella democrazia, realtà del presente, Vallecchi, Firenze, 1966, pp. 380, L. 2.000.

Sweezy Paul and Huberman Leo, Teoria della politica estera ame‐ricana, Einaudi, Torino, pp. 180, L. 1.200.

Other books.

AA.V.V., Marxism in the Modern World, edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Hoover Institution Publications of Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1965, pp. 271, $ 5.95.

Berding Andrew H., The Making of Foreign Policy, Potomac Books, Washington D.C., 1966, pp. 92, n.p.g.

Brown J. F., The New Eastern Europe: The Khrushchev Era and After, F. A; Praeger, New York, 1966, pp. 236, $ 6.50.

Carter Gwendolen and Herz John H., Government and Politics in the Twentieth Century, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1965, pp. 228, $ 5.50.

CNEN, L'energia nucleare nell'Urss, Cnen, Roma, 1966, pp. 188, n.p.g.

Duchene Francois, AU delà de l'Alliance, Institut Atlantique, Bou‐logne‐sur‐Seine, pp. 64, n.p.g.

Ferrarotti Franco, Idee per la nuova società, Vallecchi, Firenze, pp. 241, L. 2.000.

Freidel Frank, America in the Twentieth Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963, pp. 593, n.p.g.

Gerschenkron Alexander, Il problema storico dell'arretratezza eco‐nomica, Einaudi, Torino, 1965, pp. 430, L. 4.000.

Giammanco Roberto, Dialogo sulla societa americana, Einaudi, Torino, 1964, pp. 266, L. 2.000.

Havemann Robert, Dialettka senza dogma, Einaudi, Torino, 1965, pp. 229, L. 500.

Hoffmann Stanley, Conditions d'un ordre mondial, Congrès pour la liberté de la culture, Paris, 1966, pp. 28, n.p.g.

Hofstadter Richard, Miller William, Aaron Daniel, The American Republic, Prentice Hall Inc., New Jersey, 1965, volume I, pp. 698, volume II, pp. 701, n.p.g.

Kaldor Nicholas, Saggi sulla stabilità economica e lo sviluppo, Einaudi, Torino, 1965, pp. 327, L. 2.500.

Kirby Stuart E., Youth in China, Dragonfly Books, Hong Kong, 1965, pp. 251, n.p.g.

Myint Hla, The Economics of the Developing Countries, F. A. Prae‐ger, New York, 1965, pp. 184, $ 5.50.

Palmer R. R., The Age of the Democratic Revolution. A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800, Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 575, $ 10.00.

Snow Edgar, Stella rossa sulla Cina, Einaudi, Torino, 1966, pp. 575, L. 2.000.

Stucki Lorenz, Behind the Great Wall ‐ An Appraisal of Mao's China, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1965, pp. 154, $ 4.95.

Tanham George K., War without Guns, American Civilians in Rural Vietnam, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1966, pp. 138, $ 4.95.

Uri Pierre, Une politique monetaire pour l'Amérique Latine, Plon, Meaux, pp. 114, n.p.g.

Willis Roy F., France, Germany and the New Europe 1845–1963, Stanford University Press, California, 1965, pp. 387, $ 8.75.

Vaciago Giacomo, Problemi economici del disarmo, Vita e pensiero, Milano, 1966, pp. 44, n.p.g.

Vismara Maria, Le Nazioni Unite per i territori dipendenti e per la decolonizzazione, Cedam, Padova, 1966, pp. 588, L. 6.000.     

Book notes∗

Financing the United Nations System, The Brookings Institution, 291 Washington, D.C., 1964, pp. 306, $ 6.75.

I controlli sul potere, Vallecchi, Florence, 1967, pp. 163, Lit. 1.500.

La Nato, problemi e prospettive, Giuffrè, Milan, 1967, pp. 304, Lit. 3.000.

Latin American Trade Patterns, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 324, $ 6.00.

Sciences Humaines et Intégration Europeenne, A. W. Synthoff, Leiden, 1961, pp. 423, n.p.g.

Bechhoeffer, Bernhard G., Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1961, pp. 598, $ 1.50.

Brown Robert T., Transport and the Economic Integration of South America, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. 278, $ 6.00.

Brugmans Henri, L'idée europeenne 1918–1966, De Tempel, Tem‐pelhof, 1966, pp. 316, n.p.g.

Buerstedde Sigismund, Der Ministerrat im konstitutionellen System der Europädischen Gemeinschaften, De Tempel, Bruges, 1964, pp. 232, n.p.g.

Camps Miriam, European Unification in the Sixties, from the Veto to the Crisis, McGraw‐Hill Book Company, New York, p. 273, n.p.g.

Ch'afen Jerome, Mao Tse‐tung e la rivoluzione cinese, Sansoni, Florence, 1966, pp. 477, Lit. 2.000.

Cognard Pierre, Le déft scientifique et technologique américain, Centre de recherches Européennes, Lausanne,’ 1967, pp. 42, n.p.g.

Comunità Europea del Carbone e dell'Acciaio ‐ Alta Autorità, 15^a Re‐lazione generate sulla attività della Comunità (1° febbraio 1966–31 gennaio 1967), Luxembourg, 1967, pp. 441, Lt. 1.870.

Fortuna Franco, Commercio internazionale, lineamenti tecnico‐eco‐nomici, Giuffrè Editore, Milan, 1967, pp. 423, Lit. 4.000.

Frankel Charles, The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 147, $ 5.00.

Heilbrunn Otto, Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1965, pp. 143, 21s.

Heraud Guy, Popoli e lingue d'Europa, Ferro Edizioni, Milan, 1966,. pp. 409, Lit. 4.200.

Horowitz Irving Louis, Il giuoco della guerra, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1967, pp. 401, Lit. 4.000.

Johnson Harry G., Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1967, pp. 248, $ 6.75.

Lefever Ernest W., Crisis in the Congo: A U.N. Force in Action, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 200, n.p.g.

Marcuse Herbert, L'uomo a una dimensione, l'ideologia della so‐ 295 cietà industriale avanzata, Einaudi, Turin, 1967, pp. 266, Lit. 1.000.

Partito Repubblicano Italiano, L'Italia e la non proliferazione delle armi nucleari 1965–1967 (libro bianco), 1967 .

Pennisi Giuseppe, L'associazione Cee‐Sama: un esame critico, Qua‐derni d'Africa n. 6, Casa editrice Pietro Cairoli, Como, 1967, pp. 92, Lit. 800.

Robock Stefan H., Brazil's Developing Northeast: A Study of Regional Planning and Foreign Aid, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1963, pp. 201, $ 2.00.

Russell Ruth B., United Nations Experience with Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1964, pp. 162, $ 1.00.

Sapin Burton M., The Making of United States Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. 380, $ 7.50.

Schmid Karl, Aspetti psicologici dell'unificazione europea, Edizioni Ferro, Milan, 1966, pp. 230, Lit. 2.800.

The World Almanac 1967, Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., New York, 1966, pp. 912, $ 1.65.

Ulam Adam B., Lenin e il suo tempo, Vallecchi, Florence, 1967, pp. 1020, 2 volumi, Lit. 2.000.

Westwood Andrew F., Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. 106, $ 1.95.

Van Gestel M.‐B. editor, Walter Hallstein, Bibliographie seiner Veröffentlichungen, J. Reekmans and Zonen, Louvain, 1965, pp. 49, n.p.g.     

中日韩FTA战略比较研究

区域经济一体化逐渐成为国际经济合作的重要形式,作为东亚区域一体化合作的主要成员国中、日、韩三国,也纷纷开始了各自的RTA/FTA体系的尝试,以避免被排除在区域经济一体化进程之外。但由于目标的不同,中、日、韩三国FTA战略也大相径庭。各国优先考虑的谈判对象和建立FTA的进度也各不相同,建立FTA所涵盖的内容也存在很大差异。建立三国稳定的政治互信关系和固定的磋商机制、确立时间表、与日本协调FTA战略、加强产业结构调整等措施将加速中、日、韩FTA合作进程。     

Symbolic reflections of the environmental crisis: Some International Implications

In the present age of burgeoning population growth, world‐wide famine, worsening energy crises, and natural resource depletion, two realizations have become evident: the earth's resources are finite; and the world community is very interdependent. This finity, the interrelatedness, and their implications for the global environment can be studied by using three models: (1) the environmental crisis model, depicting the impact linkages between crisis areas; (2) an international feedback model, illustrating possible repercussions on the international political system if restorative‐preventive environmental measures are procrastinated; and (3) the United Nations machinery model, setting out the functional apparatus designed to deal with the eco‐crisis on a global scale.

We have reached an environmental cross‐roads‐a time for deliberate decision‐making and policy implementation. We must accomplish a readjustment of social, economic, and technical priorities and perspectives‐in short, a functional approach where national governments and international organizations act in concert to restore and safeguard the human environment.     

New Event Data in Conflict Research

This paper first presents an overview of data on 390 international crises, which incorporate 826 foreign policy crises, from the end of 1918 to the end of 1988.

A set of crisis profiles is then constructed for the two superpowers of the post‐World War II era, and for three regional systems, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The data on international crises are presented in terms of a common format for the regional profiles, with slight modifications for the superpowers, in order to facilitate comparisons: time and space; duration; onset; threat; behavior; severity of violence; US/USSR activity; global organization involvement; and outcome. Within these categories, distributions are noted for each of the polarity structures—multipolarity (1918–39), bipolarity (1945–62), and polycentrism (1963–1988). Thereafter, comparisons are made between US and USSR crises (after World War II), and among the three regional profiles.

The central thrust of the findings from these profiles is clear: they focus attention on the dual characteristics of twentieth century crises, their pervasiveness and diversity. These traits, in turn, make much more difficult the task of constructing a theory that provides a systematic explanation of interstate crisis from onset to termination. Complex reality imposes an intolerable burden on the search for necessary and sufficient conditions of crisis. In positive terms, it leads to a shift in focus, from ‘necessary and sufficient’ to the “most likely” conditions as the most credible path to theory.     

Fighting for a name on the ballot: constituency-level analysis of nomination violence in Zambia

ABSTRACT

What factors increase the likelihood of nomination violence? Nomination violence can be an expression of both horizontal conflict, between local political elites, and vertical conflict, between national and local elites. We theorize about factors that may increase the risks of vertical and horizontal conflict and leverage a unique dataset of constituency-level nomination violence obtained from surveys with 464 domestic election observers active in the 2016 Zambian general election. Our statistical analyses show constituencies with an incumbent standing for re-election were more likely to experience nomination violence. Also, contrary to previous research on general election violence, we theorize and find that more rural constituencies had a higher propensity for nomination violence than urban constituencies. Our findings highlight the importance of intra-party power relations and the bargaining relationship between the centre and periphery.     

Mutual and unilateral cooperation in arms race settings

Accounts of numerous historical and contemporary arms races suggest that cooperation, in the form of a slowdown, freeze, or reduction, is uncommon and difficult to achieve. Analytical and empirical results from the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game which, it is argued, closely resemble the structure and decision problems facing arms race participants, demonstrate that cooperation is unlikely but possible. In this analysis, the analytical conditions under which cooperation is individually “rational” (in an expected payoff sense) are discussed in detail. Then, the stumbling blocks to cooperation, even when individually rational, are discussed. No absolute solution is offered since none appears to exist. However, institutional, structural and mediating devices which can make cooperation more likely are suggested.