Political institutions and FDI inflows in autocratic countries*

ABSTRACT

Why do some autocratic countries attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) than others? Surprisingly, few studies have explored the considerable variation in FDI inflows to non-democratic countries. In this article, I argue that non-democratic countries with seemingly democratic political institutions, such as elected legislatures, attract more FDI inflow than others. This is because these institutions can (1) reduce the transaction costs of investment activities due to the relative transparency of the policy-making process, and (2) act as veto players, making the existing market-friendly policy changes difficult, and thus, promising a more stable investment environment. My empirical results support the main expectation that autocratic countries with legislatures attract more FDI than other autocratic countries, and the institutions’ effects are conditionally modified by the quality of market protecting institutions.     

The Effects of Political Risk on Different Entry Modes of Foreign Direct Investment

Although numerous studies document the effect of political institutions on foreign direct investment (FDI), few works in the political economy literature have investigated the link between political institutions and the mode of entry chosen by investors, be it mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, or greenfield investments. Using panel data for 111 developing countries covering 1980–2006, we find that countries with political institutions that uphold good governance tend to attract higher levels of mergers and acquisitions, as opposed to joint ventures and greenfield investments, because such institutions help to mitigate the special risks faced by merger and acquisition investors. Our findings provide a nuance for understanding the different effects of political institutions based on the particular mode of entry.     

The Interaction Effects of Bargaining Power: The Interplay Between Veto Power,Asymmetric Interdependence,Reputation, and Audience Costs

In international relations, different rationalistic theories have developed to explain negotiators’ behavior and the outcomes of negotiations. The compatibility and interaction effects between the different forms of bargaining power, however, remain unexplored. In this article, I seek to fill this gap by connecting four rationalistic concepts of bargaining power: veto power, asymmetric interdependence, reputation, and audience costs. By showing that domestic veto players are only semiveto players in international politics – because they can veto an improvement but not a deterioration of the status quo – threats based on asymmetric interdependence to disrupt a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship can be connected to veto power; the incompatibility of the factors concerned would otherwise make this impossible. The combination of veto power and asymmetric interdependence, however, raises a theoretical question: Will rational actors ever approve a deterioration of the status quo? Theories of reputation and audience costs can help answer this question. According to these approaches, threatening parties suffer ex post costs when they back down from their own threats. This theoretical analysis sheds new light on how different forms of bargaining power interact with each other and also helps to address some of the theoretical inconsistencies of the original individual concepts. Finally, this analysis suggests some of the weaknesses of empirical studies that have neglected these interaction effects.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment

The industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature.     

Democracy,Veto Player,and Institutionalization of Sovereign Wealth Funds

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have become important and controversial in global economy. We analyze why some SWFs have more encompassing and clearly specified governance rules than others. We argue that SWF institutionalization is structurally rooted in a country’s regime type and number of veto players in public policymaking. Democracy promotes SWF institutionalization by its need for strong rule of law, voters trying to constrain opportunistic behaviors of politicians, and the free flow of information. In contrast, the number of veto players has a curvilinear effect. When the number of veto players is very small, institutionalization is too rigid, constraining, and not preferred; when the number of veto players is moderate, it is optimal for veto players to manage their conflict over SWF governance in a more routine and institutionalized fashion; and when the number of veto players grows above a threshold, it becomes too costly to coordinate and produce mutually agreeable institutional rules. Our empirical analysis of 46 SWFs in 30 countries from 2007 to 2009 provides robust confirming evidence. SWF governance is more institutionalized and transparent in democracies and in countries with four veto players. Our research has important theoretical and policy implications for the ongoing debate over SWF.     

Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process

The EU currently experiences a reform dilemma which is common to many international organizations composed of a large number of veto players who must adopt a change of the status quo. After the accession of ten countries in May 2004, the 25 governmental veto players adopted a modest reform text that proposes as many changes as it retains provisions of the Nice treaty. This ambivalent outcome raised much criticism and has been rejected by the French and Dutch voters who had to ratify the reform. This raises questions on the reasons for change and stability in organizations which attempt to reform their obsolete provisions under the constraint of many (types of) veto players. This study examines under which conditions the positions of the different types of veto players—governments, parliamentary ratification pivots, median voters and the supranational actors—are important to explain the outcome of the draft treaty. Our results suggest that the probability for reform is only determined by governmental gains when we control for parliamentary ratification pivots and median voters from status quo-prone member states. We also find that governments favoring the status quo retain their veto in case either parliaments or voters favor reform. This responsiveness is supported by the fact that median voters also matter when member states did not announce a referendum.     

Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries

This study examines the relationship between foreign economic capital and the level of government respect for two types of human rights in developing countries. Two opposing schools of thought offer explanations as to what this relationship might be like. According to the liberal neoclassical school, the acceptance of liberal economic doctrine will provide positive political benefits to developing countries. The "dependency" school, on the other hand, argues that because ties between core and periphery elites give governments in developing nations an incentive to repress, human rights conditions will worsen as foreign economic penetration increases. The results of previous empirical queries into this matter have been mixed. In contrast to most studies, we focus on a broader measure of foreign economic capital, including foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, debt, and official development assistance. Using ordered logit analysis on a cross-national sample of forty-three developing countries from 1981 to 1995, we discover systematic evidence of an association between foreign economic penetration and government respect for two types of human rights, physical integrity rights and political rights and civil liberties. Of particular interest is the finding that both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are reliably associated with increased government respect for human rights.     

Labor Market Institutions and Outward Foreign Direct Investment in OECD Countries

ABSTRACT

Concern among voters in the United States and elsewhere about jobs moving overseas has spurred significant research into outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), which can depress employment and economic growth. Recent research shows that labor market institutions play a prominent role in influencing inward foreign direct investment in developed economies, but little is known about how such institutions influence OFDI. We argue that increasing labor union density or centralized wage bargaining threatens firms’ profitability and thus leads to higher OFDI flows. Yet union density and coordination of wage setting moderate each other’s effect on OFDI since firms can expect wage moderation, fewer strikes, and labor skill protection that offset labor costs. Our tests using data on 27 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries between 1971 and 2013 suggest this is the case. The findings indicate that a highly stable and institutionalized labor market can lead firms to stay and to return if they have left.     

Contracting with Whom? The Differential Effects of Investment Treaties on FDI

Under what conditions can governments use international commitments such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? Although numerous studies have attempted to answer this question, none considers how investment treaties may have heterogeneous affects across industry. I argue BIT effect is strongest when the obsolescing bargaining problem between firms and governments is most protracted, namely, when FDI relies on strong contracts between firms and states. Using a time series cross-sectional data set of 114 developing countries from 1985 to 2011, I find BITs are associated with increases in infrastructure investment, an industry particularly reliant on the sanctity of government contracts, but not with total FDI inflows. Moreover, BITs with strong arbitration provisions display the strongest statistical effect on infrastructure investment, while BITs that do not provide investors with such protections are not associated with increased investment. My results have implications for both scholarship on the relationship between governments and multinational firms as well as for the study of international institutions more broadly. To properly ascertain the effects of international treaties and institutions, scholars should consider not just whether institutions constrain or inform—or matter at all—but also the extent to which the targets of institutions have heterogeneous responses to them.     

Veto power and power-sharing: insights from Burundi (2000–2018)

Veto power is a key institutional pillar of consociational power-sharing. However, the literature is divided on its impact for institutional functionality. While the founding father of consociational theory, Arend Lijphart, expects veto rights to be exercised sparingly by segmental elites, more recent scholarship emphasizes the need for restrictions (in terms of veto players, veto issues, veto points and procedure) in order to avoid abusive and disruptive veto practice. Burundi’s transition from ethnic conflict to ethnic pacification was strongly based on the use of military and political power-sharing, including consociationalism. This article examines the design of veto rights and their practice in Burundi over the past two decades. The analysis confirms that the institutional design of veto power matters, but it counters the hypothesis that a too enabling veto design induces the abuse of veto rights and disrupts consociational functionality. The Burundi case-study shows that the impact and “shelf-life” of veto rights are best understood by taking into consideration the intersection of veto power with other power-sharing institutions and practices, both formal and informal.     

The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes

While political scientists find that democracy reduces political risk, little scholarship analyzes how authoritarian regimes attract foreign direct investment (FDI). This article argues that while authoritarian countries are generally risky, this risk can be minimized when authoritarian regimes are constrained from both “above” and “below.” Signing international investment treaties are critical for authoritarian countries to signal a commitment to FDI-friendly policies. However, only authoritarian signatories that allow some degree of public deliberation in their policymaking are then constrained from deviating from the policies of the international investment treaties. Panel statistical regressions and a case analysis support the hypothesis.     

Domestic Institutions,Capacity Limitations,and Compliance Costs: Host Country Determinants of Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 1987–2007

The number of investment treaty arbitrations has exploded in recent years. However, the distribution of known arbitral claims varies among states. Some states have had multiple claims brought against them, while others appear not to have experienced any. This article represents the first study to seek causal explanations for this variation. My principal hypothesis is that a country's institutional capacity for protecting investor rights should be negatively correlated with the number of treaty-based arbitral claims brought against it. A panel analysis suggests that, after controlling for other determinants, countries with greater institutional capacity experience fewer disputes than those with lower capacity. This finding reveals an important truth about investment treaties: while they may be designed to help developing countries compensate for domestic-level institutional deficiencies in order to attract more foreign investment, it is precisely those countries with the weakest institutions for which the costs of treaty compliance are likely to be the highest.     

Improving Reputation BIT by BIT: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Accountability

The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has paid an increasing interest to international institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but whether BITs help attract FDI is an unsettled question. Building on the existing literature, this article argues that BITs can change investors’ perceptions and the corresponding investment they make because signing BITs signals the involvement of another powerful country that is able to compel the host government to comply. This implies that the effect of BITs is not constant across signatory countries: BITs are more effective when they are signed with rich and influential countries. Using monadic and dyadic FDI data, this article finds that BITs signed with powerful countries (defined as the top six largest economies) lead to an increase in FDI inflows (both from these signatory countries and from other countries). BITs signed with other countries, despite in a larger quantity, have little influence on FDI inflows.     

Economic Policy,Political Constraints,and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries

As foreign direct investment (FDI) has become increasingly important in the world economy, a large body of literature has emerged regarding the determinants of FDI flows. Some scholars argue that democracy attracts FDI through the mechanism of political constraints, which reduce the risk of negative policy changes. However, the value of policy stability should be conditional on the attractiveness of contemporary FDI-relevant policies. I therefore propose a theoretically more comprehensive argument: political constraints are attractive to investors when the host country policy environment is FDI-friendly, because these political constraints reduce the probability of negative policy changes in the future. When the policy environment is hostile to FDI, on the other hand, political constraints will have little positive effect, and, to the extent they indicate that FDI-relevant policies are unlikely to improve, may even deter FDI. This argument helps explain why the positive relationship between democracy and FDI seems to emerge after a global shift toward FDI-friendly polices. I find robust empirical support for the argument in tests covering more than 100 developing countries from 1970 to 2014, indicating significant effects using a variety of policy and political constraint measures.     

中国东北地区与周边国家的贸易和投资关系

与日本、韩国、朝鲜、俄罗斯等东北亚国家的进出口贸易,在中国东北地区的对外贸易中一直占有较高的比重。日本、韩国还是东北地区最主要的外商直接投资来源国。当然,目前也存在着东北地区与主要周边国家贸易关系总体发展水平不高,利用日本和韩国直接投资地区分布严重不均衡、单个项目规模较小等问题。目前,既存在着东北地区加快发展与周边国家贸易和投资关系的机遇,同时也存在许多短时间内尚难以克服的障碍。因此,促进东北地区与周边国家发展贸易和投资关系既需要抱有合理的预期,更需要采取可行的对策。     

The Political Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Firm-Level Analysis

Many large-N cross-national studies claim to show that political institutions and phenomena determine where foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In this article, I argue that these studies tend to overemphasize statistical significance and often neglect to assess the explanatory or predictive power of their theories. To illustrate the problem, I estimate variations of a statistical model published in an influential article on “Political Risk, Institutions, and FDI.” I find that none of the political variables that the authors consider accounts for much of the variation in aggregate FDI inflows. To ensure that this underwhelming result is not driven by misspecification or measurement error, I leverage a large firm-level data set on the investment location decisions of thousands of multinational firms. Using nonparametric machine-learning techniques and out-of-sample tests, I show that gravity variables can help us develop very accurate expectations about firm behavior but that none of the 31 “political determinants” of FDI that I consider can do much to improve our expectations. These findings have important implications because they suggest that governments retain some room to move in the face of economic globalization.     

Investors,turbulence, and transition: Democratic transition and foreign direct investment in nineteen developing countries

Do profit‐seeking foreign direct investors value a country's transition to democracy? If they do, they should vote with their pocketbooks, resulting in a post‐transition increase in foreign direct investment flows. This study attempts to uncover links between transition to democracy and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, In doing so, it addresses existing arguments about connections between democracy and investor behavior. The regions examined have not only experienced democratic transitions, they also account for the majority of the increasing flow of FDI to the developing world. This research employs time‐series cross‐sectional (TSCS) economic and political data, using ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors. The central finding is that transition to democracy has a negative effect on FDI. Secondarily, political instability and higher levels of democracy also deter foreign direct investors.     

Foreign direct investment and the risk of regime transition in autocracies

Economic globalization and, in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) have often been considered to be catalysts for economic reform and political liberalization. It is argued that openness to foreign investment spurs democratization by empowering pro-liberalization actors and undermining elite cohesion. This article explores and tests three alternative hypotheses linking FDI and autocratic regime survival. The liberalization hypothesis claims that FDI promotes democratization. The state-capture hypothesis suggests that FDI, by increasing the value of power, may raise the risk of an autocratic transition. Lastly, the stabilization hypothesis, contrary to the first two, claims that FDI can enhance dictatorships’ stability by opening new opportunities for distributing benefits to regime elites. The empirical analysis, covering about 100 countries for the time period 1970–2008, uses data on autocratic breakdowns and transition types to test the above hypotheses. The reported evidence does not support the liberalization or the state-capture hypothesis. FDI is found to reduce the likelihood of democratic transitions.     

Conditional on Conditionality: IMF Program Design and Foreign Direct Investment

The article explores how International Monetary Fund (IMF) program design influences foreign direct investment inflows. The author argues that stricter IMF conditionality signals a program-participating government's commitment to economic reforms, as it incurs larger ex ante political cost and risks greater ex post political cost. Thus, the catalytic effect of an IMF program is conditional on conditionality: programs with stricter conditions catalyze more foreign direct investment than those with less stringent conditions. Empirical analysis of the IMF conditionality dataset supports the argument and shows that after accounting for IMF program participation, the more structural conditions included in an IMF program, the more foreign direct investment flows into the country.