Credibility and Flexibility: Political Institutions,Governance, and Foreign Direct Investment

This article argues that the relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment is both nonlinear and conditional upon status quo policies. The empirical analysis demonstrates an inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment in developing countries, with four veto players being the most attractive institutional arrangement. Countries with too few or too many veto players are not favored because of either high policy uncertainty or high policy rigidity. In addition, the benefits and costs of credibility and flexibility vary in good times and hard times. The benefits of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the costs in countries with good initial regulatory environment. The costs of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the benefits when countries are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.     

Legislative powers,veto players,and the emergence of delegative democracy: A comparison of presidentialism in the Philippines and South Korea

This article integrates institutional and rational choice approaches to policy making to explain the emergence of delegative democracy in presidential systems. Delegative democracy, in essence, is a polyarchy which violates the rules and norms that secure the checks on the effective political power of democratically elected presidents at the horizontal level of the relations of the executive, legislature and judiciary. The article argues that delegative democracy is the result of the interaction of two variables: the strength and types of presidents' legislative powers and the configuration of institutional and partisan veto players. Strong, proactive legislative powers and weak veto players permit presidents to establish a delegative democracy; weak, reactive legislative powers and strong veto players hamper the emergence of delegative democracy. This general assumption explains why presidentialism in South Korea and in the Philippines developed in different directions in the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis shows that in case of moderate legislative powers of the president, the number, coherence and ideological distance of partisan veto players becomes particularly important. It suggests that studies of democratic regimes should give special emphasis to the rules regulating the distribution of legislative powers between presidents and parliaments and the configuration of veto players.     

Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process

The EU currently experiences a reform dilemma which is common to many international organizations composed of a large number of veto players who must adopt a change of the status quo. After the accession of ten countries in May 2004, the 25 governmental veto players adopted a modest reform text that proposes as many changes as it retains provisions of the Nice treaty. This ambivalent outcome raised much criticism and has been rejected by the French and Dutch voters who had to ratify the reform. This raises questions on the reasons for change and stability in organizations which attempt to reform their obsolete provisions under the constraint of many (types of) veto players. This study examines under which conditions the positions of the different types of veto players—governments, parliamentary ratification pivots, median voters and the supranational actors—are important to explain the outcome of the draft treaty. Our results suggest that the probability for reform is only determined by governmental gains when we control for parliamentary ratification pivots and median voters from status quo-prone member states. We also find that governments favoring the status quo retain their veto in case either parliaments or voters favor reform. This responsiveness is supported by the fact that median voters also matter when member states did not announce a referendum.     

Veto power and power-sharing: insights from Burundi (2000–2018)

Veto power is a key institutional pillar of consociational power-sharing. However, the literature is divided on its impact for institutional functionality. While the founding father of consociational theory, Arend Lijphart, expects veto rights to be exercised sparingly by segmental elites, more recent scholarship emphasizes the need for restrictions (in terms of veto players, veto issues, veto points and procedure) in order to avoid abusive and disruptive veto practice. Burundi’s transition from ethnic conflict to ethnic pacification was strongly based on the use of military and political power-sharing, including consociationalism. This article examines the design of veto rights and their practice in Burundi over the past two decades. The analysis confirms that the institutional design of veto power matters, but it counters the hypothesis that a too enabling veto design induces the abuse of veto rights and disrupts consociational functionality. The Burundi case-study shows that the impact and “shelf-life” of veto rights are best understood by taking into consideration the intersection of veto power with other power-sharing institutions and practices, both formal and informal.     

Informal democratization: brokers,access to public services and democratic accountability in Indonesia and India

This article compares the role of brokers in mediating access to public services in India and Indonesia. Brokered state-citizen interaction is generally considered to be detrimental to democratic accountability and governance. Yet recent studies are emphasizing that brokers can also be empowering. Reconciling these contrasting assessments, I argue in this paper that the character of brokerage networks shapes the capacity of citizens to hold their politicians and bureaucrats to account. Employing over two years of ethnographic fieldwork in both India and Indonesia, I develop a comparative framework that compares brokerage networks in terms of their degree of fragmentation, institutionalization and levelling. In Indonesia the versatile and more state-centered nature of brokers networks plays into the hands of incumbents, while the fragmented and more levelled nature of India's brokerage networks strengthens democratic accountability. I use this comparison to advance the argument that the evolution of brokerage networks constitutes an important, yet little-noticed dimension of democratization processes. When citizens gain access to public services through networks that are fragmented, institutionalized and less marked by social hierarchies, politicians and bureaucrats face stronger pressures to perform.     

The Interaction Effects of Bargaining Power: The Interplay Between Veto Power,Asymmetric Interdependence,Reputation, and Audience Costs

In international relations, different rationalistic theories have developed to explain negotiators’ behavior and the outcomes of negotiations. The compatibility and interaction effects between the different forms of bargaining power, however, remain unexplored. In this article, I seek to fill this gap by connecting four rationalistic concepts of bargaining power: veto power, asymmetric interdependence, reputation, and audience costs. By showing that domestic veto players are only semiveto players in international politics – because they can veto an improvement but not a deterioration of the status quo – threats based on asymmetric interdependence to disrupt a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship can be connected to veto power; the incompatibility of the factors concerned would otherwise make this impossible. The combination of veto power and asymmetric interdependence, however, raises a theoretical question: Will rational actors ever approve a deterioration of the status quo? Theories of reputation and audience costs can help answer this question. According to these approaches, threatening parties suffer ex post costs when they back down from their own threats. This theoretical analysis sheds new light on how different forms of bargaining power interact with each other and also helps to address some of the theoretical inconsistencies of the original individual concepts. Finally, this analysis suggests some of the weaknesses of empirical studies that have neglected these interaction effects.     

Global diffusion,policy flexibility,and inflation targeting

ABSTRACT

A diverse group of over 30 countries located all over the world—such as the UK, Colombia, and Ghana—introduced inflation targeting, which is a monetary policy that seeks to control inflation through a pre-announced target. Fully institutionalized democracies adopted the policy first because the core features of inflation targeting are consistent with the principles of a liberal democracy. But why was inflation targeting also introduced by less-democratic countries? This article develops the argument that decision makers of less-democratic countries became more likely to adopt inflation targeting when they observed that nearby countries increased the flexibility of the policy. The statistical analysis of data from 76 countries between 1989 and 2013 supports this hypothesis. The finding that the change of a policy toward a more flexible framework drives its global spread addresses a blind spot in the more recent policy diffusion literature.     

Why Play by the Rules? Constitutionalism and Democratic Institutionalization in Ecuador and Uruguay

This article argues that constitutionalism and democratic institutionalization are linked, and that variations in progress towards institutionalized democracy are explained by incentives for political actors to comply with constitutional constraints on their power and to cooperate in governing. The analysis examines the impact of incentives generated by political institutions on Ecuador and Uruguay's contrasting experiences in institutionalizing democracy. Institutions generate incentives for political actors to ‘play by the rules’ when they extend protections, align interest with duty, and encourage negotiation and compromise. Survival provisions, electoral rules, and the nature of parties and the party system are found to generate incentives to cooperate in governing and to comply with constitutional constraints in Uruguay, and disincentives to engage in these behaviours in Ecuador. A new classification of survival provisions is proposed – shared, mixed, and separate – which isolates the impact of these rules on the degree of cooperation in governing. The article's findings clarify the mechanisms by which institutional choices facilitate or obstruct the emergence of constitutionalism and institutionalized democracy.     

Enacting the rules of global finance: sovereign wealth funds and the promotion of corporate governance reform

In the wake of the financial crises of the last two decades, the promotion of corporate governance reform has emerged as a priority concern of the international financial community. This paper draws attention to the role played by Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) in this process. It shows that SWFs’ enactment of a common set of shareholder-oriented corporate governance reforms has not solely been driven from the ‘outside in’—i.e. conforming to prevailing global financial norms and pressures. Indeed, various SWFs are in fact attempting to change financial best practice from the ‘inside out’ by promoting a transformative shareholder-value model of corporate governance throughout the companies they hold in their investment portfolios. To better elucidate the dynamics of this process, this paper looks at the experience of two SWFs in Asia and Europe. More specifically, it will explore the corporate governance agendas of Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global and Malaysia’s Khazanah Nasional Berhad.     

Political institutions and FDI inflows in autocratic countries*

ABSTRACT

Why do some autocratic countries attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) than others? Surprisingly, few studies have explored the considerable variation in FDI inflows to non-democratic countries. In this article, I argue that non-democratic countries with seemingly democratic political institutions, such as elected legislatures, attract more FDI inflow than others. This is because these institutions can (1) reduce the transaction costs of investment activities due to the relative transparency of the policy-making process, and (2) act as veto players, making the existing market-friendly policy changes difficult, and thus, promising a more stable investment environment. My empirical results support the main expectation that autocratic countries with legislatures attract more FDI than other autocratic countries, and the institutions’ effects are conditionally modified by the quality of market protecting institutions.     

Political actors,preferences and election rule re-design in Russia and Ukraine

Institutional designers, international organizations and post-Soviet political actors have directed considerable attention to the design and conduct of elections in postcommunist states. This article explores the nature of electoral system re-design by investigating the motives and interactions of legislators, parties and presidents. Following the veto players literature, the analysis focuses on the determinants of policy stability and change. The process of institutional re-design is evaluated in two cases: the successful introduction of the Law on Political Parties in Russia and unsuccessful attempts at major election reform in Ukraine. The article shows that the outcomes of policy reform processes in these 'superpresidential' systems were not solely determined by presidential preferences. Rather, to fully understand election system re-design, it is critical to evaluate the preferences of all relevant veto players.     

印度洋安全治理制度的发展变迁与重构

21世纪以来,印度洋安全治理制度进入了一个新发展阶段,在此过程中,既创建了新的制度,也有一些旧的制度被改建或者重建。例如,在海盗问题治理领域,就形成了一系列"多层次、多主体"的新制度安排。尽管这些层次不同、范围各异的制度安排大多是非正式的,但新制度安排的出现在某种程度上反映了印度洋安全治理方式的演变。印度洋安全治理制度的发展变迁受到多重因素驱动,包括外部环境变迁、制度学习和不同制度间的竞争、重要的利益攸关国家对制度建设的重视与推动以及非国家行为体积极参与相关治理实践等。由于各种原因,目前制度发展依然面临诸多困境。未来,相关治理主体在制度发展与重构过程中应该继续发挥能动性,在参与治理实践过程中从观念层面和具体操作层面不断推动制度优化发展。     

东盟两大知名主权财富基金投资探析

淡马锡和国库控股是分别属于新加坡和马来西亚的两只主权财富基金(SWF①.淡马锡建立于1974年,以利润为导向,运营业绩不凡,34年来股东总回报率②过18%,其多元化投资形成了以亚洲为中心,在亚洲、欧洲、拉丁美洲和非洲均有涉猎的投资格局.国库控股则成立于1993年,作为马来西亚政府的投资臂膀,也积极进行多元投资,但其与淡马锡的投资特点不尽相同.     

The Impact of Institutionalized Ideas in Coalition Foreign Policy Making: Turkey as an Example, 1991–2002

This study is an attempt to fill an important gap in three distinct yet closely related fields: international relations (IR), comparative politics (CP), and foreign policy analysis (FPA). On a more general level, the study examines the conditions under which domestic ideas influence foreign policy. More specifically, it investigates the role of institutionalized ideas that are represented at the highest levels of the decision-making structure in foreign policy decision outcomes. The theoretical framework advanced in this study calls for three interrelated steps to be taken in examining the relationship between ideas and state action: (1) a clear conceptualization of ideas, (2) a careful analysis of the institutionalization of these ideas, and (3) a methodological exploration of the discord among political actors who represent them. The framework proposes that coalition governments present a potential venue for analyzing and operationalizing how the "battles of ideas" at the decision-making level affect foreign policy choices. The study finds that institutionalized ideas are highly influential in shaping foreign policy choices in coalition government settings when several conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are categorized into three subheadings: (1) reasons to enter into coalition governments, (2) nature of coalition governments, and (3) characteristics of parties. The findings of this study contribute to general IR, CP, and FPA literatures on the role of ideas, coalition government foreign policy making, and comparative foreign policy. The study also contributes to the literature on Turkish politics by entering coalition policy making in Turkish Foreign Policy and showing that Turkish political parties are important actors in foreign policy making.     

数字经济时代的全球数据安全治理与中国策略

进入数字经济时代以来,日益严峻的数据安全风险与变幻莫测的国际形势交织叠加,各国围绕数据安全治理规则博弈呈现加剧态势,引发全球数据安全治理问题。各国际行为体虽然已经意识到数据安全治理的重要性,但对全球数据安全治理并未形成统一的治理框架。全球数据安全治理仅仅由单边、双边和多边框架以及贸易规则拼凑而成,相关治理议题在公民个人、社会、经济以及国家安全等多个层面相继涌现。多领域多维度的数据安全问题难免造成治理主体利益诉求的差异,也导致全球数据安全治理出现了规则碎片化、机制效用不足、治理乏力等问题。与此同时,个别国家的数据霸权主义行为更是使得国际行为体难以凝聚共识,全球数据安全治理步履蹒跚,重视和加强对全球数据安全问题的治理迫在眉睫。中国高度重视数据安全的相关议题,由于中国在数据治理领域起步较晚,仍存在立法不完善、技术创新能力薄弱、国际合作不足、治理乏力等问题。中国需要全面、系统地分析影响数据安全的各种重大风险因素,准确把握全球数据安全趋势,进一步优化中国在全球数据安全治理中的策略选择。     

Exploring political determinants of the magnitude of financial reforms in developing countries

This paper aims to empirically explore political determinantsof the magnitude of financial reforms, namely, under which conditionsa country is more likely to choose a ‘big-bang’type of financial reform versus a gradual financial reform.Especially, how the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) effecton the magnitude of financial reforms is conditioned by politicalinstitutions is quantitatively examined using 30 developingcountries' data from 1973 to 2002. Results demonstrate thatthe IMF's effect on facilitating a big-bang type of financialreforms is contingent upon the number of veto players in thecase of a democratic government. Also, a non-democratic governmentis more likely to engage in big-bang type of financial reformsthan a democratic government, holding other conditions constant. Received for publication October 8, 2006. Accepted for publication December 12, 2006.     

南海共同开发制度化：内涵、条件与制约因素

南海共同开发是当今世界的热点问题之一，但目前南海共同开发的现状没有达到中国与有关争端国的期望值。本文以南海共同开发制度化的内涵为逻辑起点，提出南海共同开发制度化的完成，至少需要4个基本条件：南海共同开发逐渐成为强势的区域共识；南海共同开发制度化符合各方利益，经得起利益的考量；南海共同开发的不断实践；南海共同开发的外在压力。但有许多因素阻碍了南海共同开发制度化的进程。南海共同开发制度化还需要很长的路要走。     

Guilt by association: The link between states�� influence and the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations

Unfavorable views toward a particular state will result in skepticism about the legitimacy of IGOs in which that state possesses influence. The more extensive the avenues of influence, the stronger this “guilt by association.” The rationale is two-fold. First, a state that possesses institutionalized influence (e.g., a veto) within an intergovernmental organization faces substantial difficulties in credibly committing to non-interference with organizational activities. Second, even if a state somehow could commit to abstention from overt interference, it may exert covert ideational influence if it already has embedded its values into an IGO. Elites and laypeople alike recognize the avenues of influence that fuel guilt-by-association. With statistical analyses of public opinion data from 35,397 people in 23 countries, I provide the first systematic evidence that guilt-by-association exists: for the United States, Russia, Japan, and Pakistan, vis-à-vis the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The evidence is robust to numerous alternative specifications. The findings contribute to international relations scholarship by enhancing our understanding of threats to IGO legitimacy and by providing concrete evidence for a mechanism by which antipathy toward powerful states matters in the international realm.     

Hybrid security governance in Africa: rethinking the foundations of security,justice and legitimate public authority

This article asks whether the concept of ‘hybridity’ offers a more convincing account of security governance in Africa than the standard state-focused models. It seeks to clarify the complex intersections between formal and informal, state and non-state security actors, and the varied terrains on which hybridity is constructed, instrumentalised and recalibrated over time. Rather than romanticising informal or ‘traditional’ institutions, it suggests that they too embed their own power hierarchies, become sites of contestation, and do not work equally well for everyone, least of all for the weak, vulnerable and excluded. Thus the focus is placed upon the real governance of security in hybrid systems, and the patterns of inclusion and exclusion (including gender biases) they reinforce. Finally the paper considers how policy-makers and shapers can work with the grain of hybrid security arrangements to create more legitimate, broadly-based and effective African security governance.     

Comment on Vreeland (2011): Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods��the Swiss-bloc case

This comment discusses highlights of Vreeland's excellent analysis of how Switzerland was able to use foreign aid to secure its election to provide the executive director to the IMF from its group of countries. This sheds light on a little understood aspect of the governance of the IMF. The comment goes on to argue, however, that the formal role of the executive directors in the operation of the IMF has been substantially diminished over time and that inclusion of more representatives from emerging market countries in the IMF's senior management team is a more important way of substantively increasing the influence of these countries on the behavior of the IMF.