Different Threats,Different Militaries:Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies

Why do some states generate competent, professional military organizations, while others fail to do so even when they have the required economic, demographic, and technological endowments? Variation in states’ military organizational practices—their core policies related to promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information management—holds the key. This article develops a typology of such practices and explains why and how they vary in response to the internal and external threats facing particular regimes. The article then subjects this argument to a carefully designed plausibility probe comparing the threat environments and military organizational practices of two states whose differences are both intuitively and theoretically puzzling: North and South Vietnam during the period 1954–1975. The initial evidence provides support for the theory and casts doubt on existing explanations of military organizational behavior focused on external threats, democracy, or the degree of political intervention in the military. The findings have important implications for foreign policy, as well as for future research on authoritarianism, civil-military relations, and military effectiveness.     

Sovereignty at Sea: States and Security in the Maritime Domain

The oceans present a variety of perils to both states and private actors, ranging from smuggling to direct attacks on vessels. Yet, a disconnect exists between states’ maritime power and sovereign fleets due to the emergence of open shipping registries in the 20th century. How have great powers like the United States responded to threats generated by transit of the oceans for legitimate and illicit purposes? The nature of peacetime security threats that states confront at sea has shaped divergent responses. The main maritime powers draw a distinction between threats aimed at states and threats to commerce. Where perceived threats to the state are concerned, great powers have sought to revise understandings of the protections sovereignty provides—specifically, by seeking expanded interdiction rights—to further their own security goals. When maritime powers perceive that international commerce is under threat, they delegate the sovereign protection function both upward to internationally sanctioned maritime coalitions and outward to private security firms. These policies are responses to the security challenges that result from the decoupling of sovereign power and the merchant fleet that followed the emergence of open shipping registries.     

Cheap Hawks, Cheap Doves, and the Pursuit of Strategy

The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.     

Threats,opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948–1982

This paper explores empirically how domestic political and economic challenges affect political leaders’ propensity to respond with the use of force at home and abroad. The foreign policy and world politics literatures are replete with references to leaders’ alleged use of external conflict when confronted with domestic challenges, but rarely consider domestic responses to dissent or the role of interstate threats. Comparative research on repression primarily focuses on linkages between domestic challenges and leaders’ resort to repressive policies, but ignores international alternatives. Neither literature considers the influence of external threats and opportunity structures on resort to use of force and coercion at home and abroad. Alternatively, we contend that foreign conflict and repression are complementary and potentially interchangeable policies that leaders may use to maintain political power in the face of domestic pressure. We hypothesize that the level of domestic political constraints conditions the opportunity and likelihood of selecting either repression or foreign conflict in response to domestic challenges. Since the ability to capitalize on external conflict involvement in all likelihood is not independent of international opportunity structures, we explicitly address differences in the availability of historical interstate animosity. We test our hypotheses on resort to repression and external dispute involvement on a global sample of political leaders for the period 1948–82. Our results indicate that repression and external conflict involvement appear to be largely independent and driven by different challenges: While there is some evidence that domestic conflict increases the likelihood of disputes and that external threat may promote repression, there is little support for the idea of direct substitution in kind since leaders frequently combine both dispute involvement and repression.     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.     

New Security Challenges and the Need for New Forms of EU Cooperation: The Solidarity Declaration against Terrorism and the Open Method of Coordination

Abstract

The new transnational security threats, such as terrorism, challenge traditional methods of European Union cooperation. In the era of threats to inter-state peace the Union engendered security through ‘passive’ integration in the form of the abolition of European borders. Today the EU is increasingly given the responsibility for creating security and safety, both externally and internally, by the means of ‘active’ security instruments such as the European Security and Defence Policy and the Solidarity Declaration of 2004. The challenge is that these policies and principles require a vision beyond that of a free market, common threat perceptions and effective coordination of the crisis management capacity of EU member states. This article argues that the practical needs following this qualitative step, such as the strategic engagement of new security actors and levels of EU governance on a long term basis, are very similar to the ones that the Open Method of Coordination has attempted to resolve in EU cooperation in the field of welfare policies. It suggests that this method should be used also to strengthen the Union security policy and crisis management capacity.     

Cheap Hawks, Cheap Doves, and the Pursuit of Strategy

The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.     

Affecting trust: Terrorism,internet and offensive information warfare

The national security consequences of the potential use of the Internet by terrorist organizations have attracted the interest of many academics and government and intelligence officials. The goal of this article is to provide a new explanatory angle concerning the possible targets of terrorists’ offensive information warfare (OIW) operations. It argues that these organizations may prove more valuable and effective to undermine on‐line activities of leading electronic commerce sites than to target elements of the critical national information infrastructure. These offensive actions, in fact, would directly impact one of the explanatory elements for the Internet's success: users’ perception of its trustworthiness. Before tackling its arguments, the article provides a definition of offensive information warfare. Then, it investigates how terrorist organizations would formulate their operational style concerning offensive information warfare. The stage is then set to define the central argument of the article by drawing from studies carried out in the areas of information security, international management and electronic commerce. The article concludes with a set of policy recommendations to counter these potential threats and thus make the Internet a safer communication instrument for economic, commercial and social development.     

Biological Attack,Terrorism and the Law

ABSTRACT

According to President George W. Bush, we are living amidst ‘the first war of the twenty-first century’. How then should the United Kingdom react? It is suggested that at least two strands of legal policy and response should be considered. The first concerns the design of antiterrorism laws and policies. For the purposes of this paper, the remit will be confined to how antiterrorism laws have responded to the threat from biological attack. The second aspect concerns the laws and policies about terrorism risk management, part of the agenda of which takes us back to threats to health from biological attack.     

Two-Level Security Management and the Prospects for New Democracies: A Simulation Analysis

Most new democracies face serious internal, ethnic/separatist conflicts; in addition, some face international threats. The literature on the growth of democracy in the global system and its impact on world politics does not fully account for the dual threats all states must address in managing their security. Based on theoretical work by Starr (1994) which describes the "common logic" of conflict processes in war and revolution, we outline a model of how states respond to security threats from both external and internal sources. Using computer simulation, we analyze the model and evaluate the relative importance for state security of factors such as system size, numbers of democracies in the system, extraction/allocation strategy pursued by new democracies, and government legitimacy level. Our results show that new democracies thrive in systems that are predominantly democratic. Also, ally support can provide crucial resources for new democracies facing internal threats. Finally, "endangered" democracies can recover security by attempting to buy off domestic threats rather than deter them, and by improving legitimacy.     

My Opinion of the Current World Security

What the current world is most concerned about is the situation of security.Without security,it is not to mention economic construction,nor peaceful development,nor people living and working in peace and contentment.Allcountries in the world are no exception in this regard.This article will deal briefly with the questions of whether the cur-rent world is secure,where the threats to the world security come from and how these threats are coped with.I.The current world is secure on the whole but…     

Japanese revisionists and the ‘Korea threat’: insights from ontological security

Abstract

This article contributes to the debate on Japanese security. Drawing on insights from ontological security, it challenges conventional understandings that China and North Korea are Japan’s main security threats. It argues that South Korea poses a powerful threat to the Japanese right-wing revisionists’ perception of Japan. The revisionists have attempted to secure Japan’s identity from the ‘Korea threat’ by labelling South Korea a ‘non-democracy’, and this tactic has been taken up by the Japanese government as well. The article concludes by pointing out that such moves could unwittingly result in the emergence of security dilemmas between the two main democracies in Northeast Asia.     

Russia's information warfare structure: Understanding the roles of the security council,Fapsi, the state technical commission and the military

During the past two years, Russia has made significant progress in improving its infrastructure responsible for information security. Security specialists also have produced a draft information security doctrine (which the US does not possess) that discusses critical information issues and areas, and the internal and external information threats to the state. The primary organizations responsible for information security in Russia are the Security Council, responsible for national interests affected by the information age; the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), responsible for ensuring the security of state communications and conducting intercept operations; the State Technical commission, devoted to the development of international laws, licensing and certification of IW related policies; and the Russian armed forces, responsible for studying the impact of information operations on military art.     

International Conflict,International Security Environment,and Military Coups

Why do some countries repeatedly experience military coups while others seem immune? Are countries more prone to military coups when faced with external threats? The answers to these questions still remain contested: While several scholars hold that countries facing external threats are more vulnerable to coups, others argue that such countries are actually more secure from coups. I argue that by failing to distinguish between immediate and acute threats, caused by wars and militarized conflicts, and chronic threats from a state’s international security environment, the existing literature ignores the possibility that these two types of external threats differently affect the likelihood of coups. I propose that wars and militarized conflicts, infrequent and often short lived, decrease coup propensity, while a threatening security environment increases coup risk. I find strong supporting evidence that the presence of chronic international threats increases the likelihood of coups while acute international conflicts lower that likelihood.     

印度尼西亚海洋安全思维与合作逻辑

对地理特征的认知塑造一个国家的海洋安全思维。印尼具有“群岛特征”(陆地分散、海上邻国多和海域广阔)和“海权特征”(海上战略位置、良港和重要航道、海洋资源)两组地理特点,分别指向海洋“作为威胁”和“作为秩序来源”两种相互矛盾的认知模式。如何处理这对矛盾成为厘清印尼海洋安全思维发展的核心问题。在民族国家建构初期和冷战背景下,印尼着重应对与“群岛特征”相关的安全威胁。以苏西洛为转折点,印尼开始追求“海权特征”带来的秩序福利。群岛海洋安全思维的长期实践塑造了当前印尼海洋安全现状和合作逻辑:“重陆轻海”政策导致海洋安全能力落后,使印尼重视提升海上执法能力的务实合作;海盗问题的跨界性质使印尼提供安全公共产品的意愿较低,产生了“搭便车”的合作逻辑;1982年《联合国海洋法公约》确认了印尼的“岛国内海”权利,该公约被印尼视为海洋安全的制度保护伞和合作的底线。     

The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad

Russia's recent actions in its neighbourhood have not only upset Western policies but have also reinvigorated arguments that Russia may be promoting autocracy to counteract democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States. They have also underlined a broader problem: that of how illiberal powers may react to democracy promotion, especially when their strategic interests are at stake. This article investigates these issues by studying Russia's interactions with the countries in its neighbourhood and democracy promoters. First, the article argues that even if Russia has contributed to the stagnation of democratization and ineffectiveness of democracy promotion in its neighbourhood, its actions do not constitute autocracy promotion and largely lack ideological underpinnings. Second, Russia's counteraction to democracy promotion stems from its ambitions of restoring its great power status, maintaining its regional influence, and perceiving Western policies as a threat to its interests. Third, when it considers its strategic interests undermined, Russia employs economic and military threats (sometimes incentives) against its neighbourhood countries to make the compliance with Western policies less preferable.     

Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War

The United States has played an important role in European security since the early 20^th century. From the time of the end of the Cold War, this role has changed as a consequence of the lack of a common territorial threat and the overwhelming power of the United States relative to Europe. How have European states responded to the challenges of the American world order? Are they adapting their security policies to match the challenges of US security policy and the American world order? What are the implications of the European response for the transatlantic relationship? This article seeks to describe and explain European security behaviour in the American world through the prism of two realist theories: balance of power realism and balance of threat realism. Despite sharing a common starting point in realist assumptions, each theory allows us to tell a different story about Europe's position in the American world order as well as the opportunities and challenges it faces.     

Globalisation,Transnational Political Mobilisation,and Networks of Violence

This article examines how globalisation processes provide new incentives and opportunities for non-state political entrepreneurs to build transnational political movements. Drawing on the literatures on non-violent social movements and transnational networks, the article examines terrorism and political violence as components of the ‘repertoires of contention’ used by radical transnational groups seeking political change. Examples from both the pre- and post-9/11 periods are provided, and the implications for traditional models of state security are discussed. The article concludes by contending that the combination of increased levels of globalisation and the emergence of new networks of violence is creating a fundamental shift in the international security environment, in which the distinction between internal and external security threats is increasingly blurred. While state security strategies are reflecting these changes, less attention has been paid to the political implications of these changes. New security responses need to also be matched by new sets of political strategies at the global level.     

New Approaches to Information Security

The potential for change is increasing rapidly in the 21 st century, especially in the information and communication technology （ICT） field. Innovations in ICT are constantly making new breakthroughs and all kinds of technologies, applications and services are being interwoven. Inevitably, the broad application of new technologies provides cyber attackers more tools and opportunities to launch attacks. Old information security^1 policies are facing new challenges, emerging threats and unsolved risks. Finding effective solutions to cyber threats has become an urgent task for the international community.     

Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution

In order to counter the threat of a coup, states often undertake a number of strategies to “coup-proof” their militaries, such as creating institutional redundancy, severely limiting interbranch communications, and basing promotions on loyalty rather than merit. As a result of such policies, however, the fighting effectiveness of these armed forces is degraded, and the marginal return on military investment is greatly reduced. We argue that leaders who have coup-proofed their militaries undertake several substitution policies in order to offset their military weakness when faced with external threats. These policies include pursuing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and forging alliances. We find support for these theoretical predictions in quantitative tests on data with global coverage between 1970 and 2001.