Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality,the Freedom of the Seas,and the Myth of the “Civil War Precedents”

This analysis shows the importance of a problem of maritime law in an on-going debate between two interpretations of Wilsonian neutrality that have competed in various guises since the end of the First World War: can British blockade actions in that war be justified by American Civil War precedents? It proves that reliance on the “Civil War precedents” to justify Britain’s blockade measures was disingenuous from the beginning. British diplomats first used it in October 1914, and Woodrow Wilson embraced it to defend his mild response to British violations of neutral rights to incensed American citizens despite continuous protests from the State Department. Whilst all politicians involved knew the comparison was wrong, historians have embraced it as a justification of Britain’s illegal blockade ever since Arthur S. Link claimed it as the key to understanding Wilson’s neutrality policy.     

Looking at Current Taiwan Issue from the Perspective of the US Civil War

Sino-US relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in theworld.Among the various factors that influence Sino-US relations,the Tai-wan issue is of particular importance.The Chinese government and its people willnever allow the current rampant ever-growing separatist activities in Taiwan totake its own course.As the US is bound to interfere with Taiwan issue when Chi-     

Passenger or Driver? A Cross-National Examination of Media Coverage and Civil War Interventions

Existing research on civil war interventions provides contradicting evidence about the role that the media plays in affecting the likelihood of intervention. To date, studies often focus on specific cases (frequently by the United States) leaving it unclear whether the media's influence extends more broadly. In this article we examine this question cross-nationally and argue that we need to account for the possibility that interventions also lead to increases in media coverage. We test our hypotheses using cross-national data on civil war interventions and media coverage. These data include a new measure of media coverage of 73 countries experiencing civil wars between 1982 and 1999. These data allow us to determine whether media coverage is more likely to drive leaders’ decisions or follow them. Toward this end we employ a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood model to control for potential endogeneity between media attention and interventions. The results suggest a reciprocal positive relationship between media attention and civil conflict interventions. Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in media coverage raises the probability of intervention 68%.     

Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996–2006: A New Data Set

This article introduces individual-level microdata on victims of violence in Nepal’s civil war (1996–2006). The data being presented in this study are unique in that they are a census—not a sample—of the known population of victims for which information could be collected. The unit of analysis is the individual victim, and the data provide information on: whether the victim was killed, injured, or disappeared; the districts and villages where they were targeted; their permanent home addresses; the circumstances of the attack (combat, extrajudicial, etc.); socioeconomic information; whether they had any affiliation to rebel groups or other political parties; identification of the perpetrator; and whether the victim was considered to be a government or Maoist informant. After describing the data, an application of the data is performed and some preliminary findings are discussed on the differences in targeting behavior between the government and the Maoist rebels.     

Power Transitions,Status Dissatisfaction,and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

Although power transition theory offers a powerful model of international conflict, scholars have not adequately operationalized the theory's key variable of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the status quo. We argue that status dissatisfaction is an important component of a rising state's overall dissatisfaction with the system. We apply our revised power transition framework to the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War. Japan's revisionist foreign policy was driven by economic and security threats posed by China's control over Korea, dissatisfaction with Japan's place in the China-dominated East Asian hierarchy, the hope for recognition as a great power by the West, status-related domestic pressures, and by belief change that was endogenous to shifting power. Despite several earlier crises, Japan made the decision for war only after it had achieved parity with China, which is consistent with power transition theory's hypothesis that under conditions of shifting power, parity is a necessary condition for war.     

The Radical Crescent: The United States,the Palestine Liberation Organisation,and the Lebanese Civil War, 1973–1978

This analysis examines the efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] to formalise relations with the United States before and after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War. It details the public and private attempts by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to present the organisation as a legitimate partner for negotiations with Israel. However, the American secretary of state and national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, hindered the PLO’s diplomatic initiatives during the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations. Kissinger viewed the PLO as an impediment to his efforts to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict through separate peace agreements, rather than a comprehensive solution. Despite Washington’s objections to the PLO, the organisation had regional and international legitimacy, its stature aided by its political and ideological allies. Yet these ties also contributed to the PLO’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war. Kissinger encouraged Syria’s June 1976 invasion of Lebanon to weaken, if not destroy, the PLO as an independent actor. Although the PLO survived Syria’s intervention, Kissinger’s actions and agreements limited the diplomatic initiatives of the Jimmy Carter Administration.     

Going on the Run: What Drives Military Desertion in Civil War?

Under which circumstances do soldiers and officers desert in a violent domestic conflict? This article studies individual military insubordination in the Syrian civil war, drawing on interviews with deserters from the Syrian army now based in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. A plausibility probe of existing explanations reveals that desertion opportunities originating in conflict events and the presence of safe-havens fail to explain individual deserters' decision making. Accounting for socio-psychological factors—moral grievances and fear—generates more promising results for an inquiry into the conditions under which military personnel desert. While moral concerns with continued military service contribute to accumulating grievances among military members engaged in the civil war, fear—that is, soldiers' concerns for their own safety—is a more effective triggering cause of desertion. The article presents a theory-generating case study on the causes of military insubordination and disintegration during violent conflict.     

On Civil Society Forum of CONGO

On 29-30 June, Civil Society Forum organized by the Conference of Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council was convened in Geneva, Switzerland. Non-governmental organizations throughout the world dispatched 400 or so representatives to the forum, the majority of which came from developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Such a large congregation of NGO representatives in Geneva to discuss the employmen…     

Is the Sum Greater than the Parts? The Terms of Civil War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited

The dominant theoretical approaches to civil war negotiations in the field of political science have sought to explain both the scarcity and high failure rates of negotiated agreements in civil conflicts. This historical pattern, however, has fundamentally changed in the last two decades as changes in international norms and laws, as well as the increased prevalence and competence of peacebuilding professionals, now require conflict actors to have a greater commitment toward negotiations and the enforcement of agreements. While actors in interstate wars seek to avoid accountability, civil war actors seem to embrace the opportunities that these new dynamics create to achieve broad‐based reforms across numerous areas of policy and government. The result, we suggest, is that stakeholders evaluate agreements based on their potential to accomplish an array of sociopolitical objectives. In addition, for strategic and practical reasons, they perceive that those agreements that include more reforms across multiple policy sectors will have the greatest potential. Our examination of nearly two hundred agreements found evidence that the peacemaking potential of a negotiated agreement between civil war adversaries is greatly enhanced when reforms are pursued across many different policy domains. Conversely, our analysis suggests that the greater the number of policy areas left untouched by a peace agreement, the more likely the stakeholders will be to follow that agreement with additional negotiations to enhance that agreement, or, alternatively, the more likely that violence will resume.     

America''''s Difficulties after the War and the International Political Consequences of the War

The U. S. A will succeed militarily in the Iraq war. However, it is far away from the true meaning of victory in war defined by distinguished strategic thinker B. H. Liddell Hart, even inaccessible. Using Hart's own word, the true victory in war is to attain a better state of peace and improve the quality of life for the survivors after the war is over. What await America after the basic success in Iraq are grave military and political difficulties. Moreover, there may be bigger economic and financial troubles as well.     

Just the Two of Us? Civil Conflicts,Pro-State Militants,and the Violence Premium

Quantitative literature discussing violence in civil conflicts tends towards a typical model of engagement between governments and revolutionaries. Whilst recent work has shown the significant impact of multiple anti-government groups, a further feature remains understudied—the role of pro-state militants. This article theorizes a “violence premium” when such groups arise, which leads to all connected groups devoting greater energy to conflict than they would in isolation. Employing duration analysis and data from The Troubles in Northern Ireland, where Republicans act as revolutionary insurgents, Loyalists as pro-state militants, and the British Army as government forces, the violence premium is empirically confirmed. Both Loyalists and Republicans deviate from their underlying strategies to attack more frequently when violence by their rivals increases, with Republicans and the British Army engaging in the same way. An extended analysis, accounting for the status of the victim, shows that the violence premium resulting from interaction between Loyalists and Republicans targeted only the civilian population of Northern Ireland, elucidating the sectarian component of The Troubles. These results show that including all conflict parties and considering how they are linked are important features in studies that aim to determine the net level of violence in civil conflicts.     

Pool Civil Wisdom to Assist Social Development——Sidelights of Civil Society 20 China

正Civil Society 20 China 2016(C20)was successfully convened in Qingdao on July 5th and 6th.Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a message of congratulations to the Conference.State Councilor Yang Jiechi attended the opening ceremony and delivered a speech.Sun Jiazheng,Vice-Chairman of the 11th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and President of China NGO     

The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992–95: The Capabilities–Expectations Gap at the Heart of EU Foreign Policy

Abstract

Using the empirically driven case study of the European Union's response to the Bosnian civil war 1992–95 this article assesses the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through Christopher Hill's ‘capabilities–expectations gap framework’. In assessing effectiveness it explores both the expectations placed on the EU and the capabilities the Union was able to deploy. Moreover, this research suggests that the EU was ineffective in responding to the Bosnian crisis. The EU pursued a rigid strategy of diplomatic and economic foreign policy, failing to generate the political will to attempt alternative approaches. This research argues that the capabilities–expectations gap framework is a useful tool for conceptualising the EU's effectiveness but that it under-specifies the importance of the end result of the policy.     

Reflecting on the Conception of Post-Post-Cold War Era

After the September 11th events and especially after the follow-updevelopment of the US-Russian relationship,many Americangovernment officials in the Bush team stated time and again in various     

The ＂War of Nerves＂ between China and Japan will Be Another Protracted War

Over the past two years since his remm to power, Abe has been implementing a hard-line foreign strategy, and openly ＂challenging＂ and ＂desperately struggling with＂ China. Specifically, the Abe government has been forcefully pursuing a strategy of ＂active pacifism＂, such as ＂revising the constitution＂, lifting the ban on collective defense and modifying the ＂three principles＂ on arms export, implementing a so-called ＂overlooking the globe＂ diplomacy that takes a cold line on neighboring countries such as China and South Korea, and seeking to make joint efforts with Australia, India, the Philippines, Vietnam and USA in order to set up a sea encirclement against China. As Prime Minister, Abe not only paid an open visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, but also repeatedly denied the history of Japanese invasion in China, as well as its aggressive consequences and associated guilt.     

Winning the Battles,Losing the War? An Assessment of Counterterrorism in Malaysia

This work addresses the structural weaknesses that threaten to derail counterterrorism efforts by the Malaysian government. It also highlights the links between various pre-September 11 security issues in Southeast Asia and the terrorism threat facing Malaysia at present. The limitations of the current counterterrorism approach by the government are highlighted. In addition, the paper identifies structural problems such as systemic corruption, weaknesses in border security, and inadequate private sector regulation as key areas of concern. The paper concludes by highlighting the symbiotic relationship between a successful counterterrorism campaign and the rule of law.     

“No More War?” Belgian Reception of the League of Nations and Arbitration After the First World War

After the horrors of the First World War, different initiatives were taken to introduce and institutionalise principles of international organisation such as collective security and arbitration in international relations. The League of Nations was founded, and different bilateral and multilateral arbitration treaties were concluded. This article studies the reception of these internationalist principles by Belgian policymakers and diplomats. I will argue that this reception initially ranged from cautiousness to clear scepticism. Although an evolution towards increased trust in collective security and arbitration can be observed between 1919 and 1929, Belgian policymakers' and diplomats' views during this period remained predominantly based on realist premises and beliefs.