Counter-Terrorism,Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection,Exchange and Analysis

In this article we seek to address the emerging role of the European Union (EU) as a security and intelligence actor from the perspective of counter-terrorism. Intelligence as a process and product has been strongly promoted by the EU as a useful and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, organized crime and public order problems. A range of agencies has been established that collect, analyze and operationalize intelligence in view of strategically defined security threats. Examples are Europol and Frontex. This article makes an inventory of their roles and competences in the field of intelligence and looks at the list of instruments that encourage the sharing of intelligence between different law enforcement and security agencies. Moreover, it is argued in this article that as intelligence becomes more hybrid and as the EU only holds light powers of oversight on ownership and integrity of data, considerable governance challenges lurk around the corner. As ‘intelligence’ is usually a complex and sensitive product, it often travels outside formal bureaucratic channels, which undermines accountability and transparency of where, how and for what purpose the intelligence was gathered.     

Policing Uncertainty: Intelligence,Security and Risk

Today, the idea of risk is ubiquitous, a presence in debates across a range of fields, from investment banking to politics, from anthropology and sociology to health, environmental and cultural studies. While this ubiquity attests to the importance of the concept it is at the same time a potential weakness in that it injects the term into a wide range of debates in each of which its meaning can be subject to different emphases and meanings. The notion of risk is of obvious importance to security intelligence, but here too its ubiquity has had an impact on specificity of meaning. While the term is widely used in both the profession and study of intelligence, its usage can carry different meanings and it can be used interchangeably with linked terms. Given the importance of the idea of risk to intelligence, clarity of meaning is essential. This article sets out to consider the meaning of, and relationship between, uncertainty and risk in a security intelligence context, propose a framework on which a common understanding can be built, and illustrate how this can help in thinking about the nature and role of security intelligence.     

Analytic Outreach for Intelligence: Insights from a Workshop on Emerging Biotechnology Threats

This article describes a new effort to engage in analytic outreach between academic scholars and intelligence analysts on the issue of emerging biotechnology threats to US national security. The context of this outreach was a September 2012 meeting in London to explore possibilities for enhanced analytic outreach in relation to emerging biotechnology threats, supported by the UK Genomics Policy and Research Forum. This meeting consisted of a mix of current and former intelligence practitioners and policy officials, and social science and scientific experts, from both the UK and the US. As will be described below, this unique pairing of experts and subjects revealed new insights into how to improve intelligence assessments on biotechnology and bioweapons threats. It also revealed continuing challenges in reforming assessments within existing intelligence work routines.     

Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness,advice or co-production?

ABSTRACT

Communication aimed at the public has been an almost absent topic in intelligence studies. This is despite a growing recognition of the importance of communicating towards the public in preventive security, counterterrorism, cyber security and organized crime prevention. This article attends to the practice of communicating intelligence to the public. It does so in order to show the diversity of communication practices in Western intelligence today. By investigating how the intelligence community communicates about ‘communication’ to the public, the article identifies three different concepts of communication, that each exposes different understandings of the public and democratic concerns.     

Favorite INTs: how they develop,why they matter

Collection of important information is a critical part of the intelligence business. Less recognized and studied is the differential use of types of intelligence information based on personal and organizational preferences for, and biases against, specific intelligence collection disciplines, or ‘INTs’. This article presents a framework for assessing the implications of ‘favorite INTs’ for policy-making, policy implementation, and intelligence analysis. The record shows that favorite INTs negatively influence analysts and the use of intelligence by senior political leaders and military commanders. Practitioners can improve intelligence support and scholars can better understand how intelligence influences decision-making by appreciating how and why favorite INTs develop and influence decision-makers and analysts.     

‘A Profoundly Disruptive Force’: The CIA,Historiography and the Perils of Globalization

This essay argues that, since 1989, the CIA has been slow to understand the transformative impact of globalization upon its own activities as an intelligence agency. While the CIA spent considerable time examining global trends as part of its work on generalized strategic analysis, its thinking about how globalization would change its own business was less prescient. This problem is explained in terms of the way in which debates over the CIA have been framed historiographically. While intelligence studies as a subject has been successfully integrated into mainstream international history, it has failed to make the same connections with international relations. As a result, those debating how intelligence might change have tended to focus quite narrowly on matters of bureaucratic organization and have taken only limited interest in global politics. This is stark contrast to those working on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism, who have engaged in wider debates about world affairs. This needs to change, since the perils of globalization remain the over-arching challenge for the CIA over the next ten years.     

Plots,murders, and money: oversight bodies evaluating the effectiveness of surveillance technology

Intelligence agencies routinely use surveillance technology to perform surveillance on digital data. This practice raises many questions that feed a societal debate, including whether the surveillance technology is effective in achieving the given security goal, whether it is cost-efficient, and whether it is proportionate. Oversight bodies are important actors in this debate, overseeing budgets, legal and privacy matters, and the performance of intelligence agencies. This paper examines how oversight bodies evaluate the questions above, using documents produced by American and British oversight mechanisms.     

Axis prisoners of war as sources for British military intelligence, 1939–42

It was during the Second World War that the Allies developed a sophisticated intelligence system to harness information garnered from the hundreds of thousands of Axis captives taken during hostilities. Indeed, prior to 1942, many Allied field commanders displayed a healthy scepticism towards intelligence obtained from this source. Such suspicions were eventually overcome. This article examines British efforts during the formative period 1939–42 when an integrated infrastructure was painstakingly established to extract, collate and assess material obtained from Axis POWs. It not only examines the intelligence organisations which were established by each of the British armed services, but also analyses the variety of military and political information obtained and how it was interpreted and disseminated.     

Problems in the Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Rethinking Korea,Tet, and Afghanistan

Accusations of failure by elements of the US intelligence community (IC) have followed in the wake of nearly every war and terrorist bombing since Japan's successful strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This article will illustrate how some problems that exist inside the ‘intelligence-policy nexus’ are beyond the control of the IC. By investigating the dynamics and tensions that exist between producers of intelligence (the IC) and the consumers of those products (policy-makers), we review three different types of alleged failure. First, by revisiting the Chinese intervention in Korea, we show that a rarely listed case in the literature is in fact a classic example of producer-based failure generated from within the IC. However, in our study of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War (1968), we show that the alleged intelligence failure by producers should be more accurately described as a ‘failure of intelligence’ by consumers. Third, by revisiting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), we conclude that there existed neither a producer nor a consumer failure. The Carter Administration made a conscious policy choice to act surprised (when it was not).     

A confusion,not a system: the organizational evolution of strategic intelligence assessment in Canada, 1943 to 2003

Recently released documentation has for the first time made it possible to describe the organizational evolution of strategic intelligence assessment in Canada. During the 60-year period surveyed in this article, the analytical groups involved in strategic assessment and the interdepartmental intelligence committee structure underwent a number of changes. These were almost invariably incremental steps—shaped by bureaucratic factors and resource constraints—rather than initiatives guided by a broader vision of the role of intelligence assessment in support of Canadian foreign and defence policy. This organizational study provides the foundation for long-overdue research into the foreign intelligence function in Canada.     

Mirroring Risk: The Cuban Missile Estimation

The Cuban Missile Crisis is by this point well known to all scholars of international politics. Yet, although it has yielded countless lessons over the years, one critical aspect of the case has remained unexamined: the failure of estimation prior to the crisis that led US officials to discount the possibility of a missile deployment in Cuba. This article re-examines US intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis in light of the concept of ‘mirroring risk’, introduced in this article. I present a framework for understanding a class of intelligence failures that are caused by the mis-assessment of how an adversary frames a decision and the risks that they are willing to take. I also present a new two-stage process for understanding how individuals assess the risk-propensity of adversaries in international politics.     

The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World

Abstract

In 1946 veteran British intelligence officer Kenneth Strong undertook the Directorship of a new intelligence organization, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). The JIB absorbed the responsibilities of several wartime intelligence organs, and was responsible for economic, topographic, and aspects of scientific intelligence on an inter-service basis. Its responsibilities grew over the following 18 years; most notably, it absorbed atomic intelligence in 1957. When the Defence Intelligence Staff was created in 1964, absorbing the JIB and the individual Service agencies, JIB was at its heart and Kenneth Strong its first Director. The organization conducted key work in the early Cold War, was at the centre of an international network of Joint Intelligence Bureaux, and was an important stepping stone in the movement to centralize military and military-relevant intelligence in Britain – but the historiography pays it surprisingly little attention. This paper introduces the JIB and various aspects of its work, and demonstrates that its low profile in the historiography is unjustified.     

Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance

After major intelligence failures it is often asked why intelligence and security officials failed to heed the many ‘wake-up calls’ that had been provided by earlier failures and surprises. This article addresses this question by examining intelligence failures as ‘focusing events’, which is a concept used in the literature on government policy making to explain how disasters and crises can stimulate policy change and help organizations and decision-makers learn. It argues that in order for an intelligence failure such as a major terrorist attack to inspire improved intelligence performance – to be a true wake-up call – that failure must not only act as a focusing event to bring more attention to the threat, but it must also lead to increased intelligence collection and greater receptivity toward intelligence on the part of decision-makers.     

What News on the Rialto? The Trade of Information and Early Modern Venice’s Centralized Intelligence Organization

This article explores one of the earliest centrally organized state intelligence services in world history. Contrary to the orthodoxy that sees systematized intelligence as a modern political phenomenon, this was developed in early modern Venice. The article reveals the complex organization of Venetian systemized intelligence that distinguished it from other contemporaneous states’ espionage networks. It also shows how Venetian authorities commodified intelligence by engaging citizens and subjects in a trade of information for mutual benefits. Ultimately, the article challenges our understanding of early modern political communication and offers a fresh vista of intelligence as a business trait and economic necessity.     

Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol

Abstract

This article analyses the gap between government ambitions and actual outcomes in the case of European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. Specifically, it investigates why Europol has not managed to live up to its tasks despite outspoken government support. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, the study suggests why bureaucrats might be motivated to resist calls for international cooperation. By examining the process by which Europol has developed as an actor in the counter terrorism field, this article shows how development in the field of intelligence cooperation is not exclusively the reflection of government preferences. It concludes by suggesting that scholars could gain greater insight from a less state centric approach to the study of intelligence. In addition, the article suggests that policy makers cultivate a greater familiarity with bureaucratic factors and that they continually work with those factors in mind.     

Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters

This paper focuses on how pre-existing policy priorities and goals among policy elites in the US, UK, and Australia encouraged the blurring of strategic and tactical intelligence assessment as a mechanism for legitimising the Iraq invasion. Through the selective use and interpretation of sometimes vague or unsubstantiated tactical and technical intelligence and the many uncertainties it contained, proponents of the war were able to undermine existing strategic assessments on Iraq by introducing a range of possible, but largely unsubstantiated, threat scenarios as justification for military action. The paper argues that in so far as intelligence reforms are needed, they should be focused primarily on the interface between analysis and policy making, and the issue of how policy makers interpret and understand the uncertainties that intelligence assessments necessarily contain.     

Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)

Abstract

We introduce the latest member of the intelligence family. Joining IMINT, HUMINT, SIGINT and others is ‘SOCMINT’ – social media intelligence. In an age of ubiquitous social media it is the responsibility of the security community to admit SOCMINT into the national intelligence framework, but only when two important tests are passed. First, that it rests on solid methodological bedrock of collection, evidence, verification, understanding and application. Second, that the moral hazard it entails can be legitimately managed. This article offers a framework for how this can be done.     

New ways of thinking: The intelligence function and strategic calculations in the admiralty, 1882–1889

Intelligence analysis is often viewed as a distant relative of the policy deliberations within military and naval organisations. This is especially apparent in contemporary settings, where policymaking is rigid and highly compartmentalised by the firewalls that exist between intelligence producers and consumers. The purpose of this article is to examine an overlooked case from intelligence history, when the creation of an intelligence function within the Admiralty had a profound impact upon the formulation and conduct of British naval policy in the 1880s. This inevitably encouraged new ways of thinking about how the Admiralty organised and prepared for war.     

Orientalism and Intelligence Analysis: Deconstructing Anglo-American Notions of the ‘Arab’

Despite revived notions of a ‘cultural divide’ between East and West, Edward's Said's ‘Orientalism’ has received little attention from scholars of intelligence and diplomacy. This article brings to light for the first time a number of recently declassified documents of a different nature to usual assessments produced by Anglo-American analytic bodies: those focussed primarily on the issue of ‘national character’. Using and critiquing Said's thesis of Western ‘Orientalism’ it reveals some critical and enduring conceptualizations articulated by the diplomatic and intelligence community about Arab culture such as the role of Islam, rhetoric, political motivation and notions of ‘honour’. Such a critical approach demonstrates how diplomatic and intelligence history can also be a history of culture, ideas and institutional mentalité.     

James Bond,Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the ‘imagined’

This article looks to answer the question of why the James Bond novels and films should matter to scholars of intelligence and national security. We argue that Bond is important because, rightly or wrongly, and not without inaccuracy, it has filled a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence agencies and security threats. On another level, this article explores the unexpected yet important interactions between Bond and the actual world of intelligence. We contend that the orthodoxy dictating that Bond and spying are diametric opposites—one is the stuff of fantasy, the other is reality—is problematic, for the worlds of Bond and real intelligence collide, overlap and intermesh in fascinating and significant ways. In short, Bond is important for scholars because he is an international cultural icon that continues to operate at the borders of fiction and reality, framing and constructing not only public perceptions but also to some degree intelligence practices. Core narratives of intelligence among not only the public but also policymakers and intelligence officers are imagined, sustained, deepened, produced and reproduced through and by Bond. We conclude that Bond and intelligence should be thought of as co-constitutive; the series shapes representations and perceptions of intelligence, but it also performs a productive role, influencing the behaviours of intelligence agencies themselves.