Amnesty in immigration: forgetting,forgiving, freedom

Whether or not to grant ‘amnesty’ has been a contentious policy issue in a wide range of settings, from human rights violations to draft avoidance to library fines. Recently, the idea of amnesty has come to structure many debates over irregular immigration. While amnesty’s meaning is usually treated as self-evident, the term in fact signifies in a variety of normative directions. This article employs amnesty as an optic to examine accountability questions that structure normative debates over irregular immigration in liberal states. It distinguishes among conceptions of amnesty emphasizing forgiveness, erasure and vindication, and argues that developing a vindicatory account of amnesty is both particularly difficult and particularly necessary in the immigration setting.     

Binding: a resource for exploring interpersonal meaning in three-dimensional space

This paper takes an in-depth look at Binding, a recently theorised resource for analysing interpersonal meaning in three-dimensional space. Binding is concerned with the dialectic between affect and space. Extremes of Binding can evoke claustrophobic and agoraphobic responses to space, whereas median choices produce comfort zones of security or freedom. In considering how security and insecurity are experienced in the spatial realm, the paper also compares Binding with the resources language has for expressing similar meanings. While the examples used in this paper are drawn from the domestic sphere, Binding is relevant to spaces across an endless range of fields – the natural environment, schools, workplaces, retail sites, hospitals, museums – as well as virtual and literary spaces. It can be used to inform the design and analysis of all three-dimensional space – natural or built.     

Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security

The term space security is often used, but seldom analyzed. This is a significant gap in the literature of space politics, as it posits considerable implications for debates on how to deal with a runaway growth in the space debris population, and how we argue for or against space weaponization. Securitizing all threats in space may lead to greater difficulties in enacting debris removal measures, as these systems are inherently dual-use. A case is made for keeping space security in its traditional connotations of national security so that environmental issues related to orbital debris can be resolved with reduced security concerns in a space development framing.     

‘A Profoundly Disruptive Force’: The CIA,Historiography and the Perils of Globalization

This essay argues that, since 1989, the CIA has been slow to understand the transformative impact of globalization upon its own activities as an intelligence agency. While the CIA spent considerable time examining global trends as part of its work on generalized strategic analysis, its thinking about how globalization would change its own business was less prescient. This problem is explained in terms of the way in which debates over the CIA have been framed historiographically. While intelligence studies as a subject has been successfully integrated into mainstream international history, it has failed to make the same connections with international relations. As a result, those debating how intelligence might change have tended to focus quite narrowly on matters of bureaucratic organization and have taken only limited interest in global politics. This is stark contrast to those working on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism, who have engaged in wider debates about world affairs. This needs to change, since the perils of globalization remain the over-arching challenge for the CIA over the next ten years.     

From laboratory to the WMD Commission: how academic research influences intelligence agencies

Academic research can improve national security, yet the process by which findings flow from the ivory tower to intelligence agencies is not well understood by scholars. This article addresses this gap through an exploratory case study of when research impacted intelligence: the incorporation of cognitive biases research in intelligence analysis. The results of this study illustrate the importance of idea entrepreneurs—individuals who promote academic research—as well as the need for making academic findings applicable to intelligence practitioners. These results, while based on a single case, suggest new avenues for scholarship exploring knowledge utilization in intelligence.     

Britain Betwixt and Between: Uk SIGINT Alliance Strategy's Transatlantic and European Connections

Intelligence alliances are among the most intimate and enduring international security relationships. International partnerships have proven to be especially relevant to signals intelligence (SIGINT), where collaboration among allies has been crucial for extending the range and scope of geographic coverage. One of the earliest and most enduring SIGINT alliances dates back to the Second World War, when Great Britain and the United States collaborated in intercepting German and Japanese electronic communications and shared the intelligence product. This Anglo-American wartime partnership subsequently evolved and expanded during the post-war and Cold War eras, and continues up to the present as the core of a wider plurilateral SIGINT alliance involving Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well. Britain's accession to the European Communities, now the European Union (EU), did not, at first, detract from its transatlantic intelligence connection. By the late 1990s, however, European partners had begun to challenge Britain's alliance strategy for SIGINT, in particular, out of heightened concern for their own communications security and in response to the increasing salience of economic intelligence in contemporary international affairs. British statecraft now found itself confronted by mounting pressure from EU partners to reorient the UK intelligence away from its long-standing transatlantic SIGINT connection, so as to undermine American reach and also promote a potentially competing European capability to achieve global coverage in signals intelligence collection. While the 2003 war against Iraq certainly consolidated the trans-Atlantic alliance between the UK and USA, while alienating the Americans from the so-called 'Old Europe' led by France and Germany, the longer term spin-offs from that conflict seem likely to exacerbate those pressures on British intelligence strategy.     

INDIVIDUALISM, COLLECTIVISM AND THE MARKETIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY: Chile and China Compared

Ideological beliefs are of central importance in current debates about the marketization of social security. However, developments in Chile and China suggest that the conventional individualist‐collectivist dichotomy, which has framed ideological debates on social security, fails to capture the complexities of ideological differences as well as the imperative of economic development which appears to be driving social security policy in both countries. Examining events in these countries, it is suggested that the individualist‐collectivist dichotomy needs to be reconsidered. It is also argued at a normative level that these ideologies no longer provide a viable basis for social security policy, and that the “developmentalist” approach emerging in China merits further scrutiny.     

What ‘Space Security’ Means to an Emerging Space Power

The term ‘security’ connotes in a comprehensive sense ‘human security’. Space, by virtue of its inherent characteristics, contributes significantly to different aspects of security – be it for food, education, water, health, environment, energy or defense. The term ‘spacepower’ is used normally with the meaning of ‘might’. However, here it is appropriate to describe it as the demonstrated ability to use the power of space for human welfare. India, in the last 40 years, has conceived, demonstrated, nurtured and put to use the tremendous power of space in various forms for the benefit of human beings, society and country. With the contribution made by space to the sustainable developmental process, there are many more emerging applications in the horizon. Hence there is a continuous need to innovate through advances in technology and applications. When such societal commitments are made with space infrastructure, the main security concern is to maintain continuity of services without any impediment and interference.     

SOE's ‘Prosper’ Disaster of 1943

International economic issues have become a foremost government concern since the start of the global financial crisis, leaving economic security increasingly linked to more traditional concepts of national interest and politico-military security. This prioritization has been reflected in the recent requirements of the United Kingdom's intelligence and security actors. Yet, scholarly research has neglected the relationship between intelligence, international economics, and contemporary security policy. Taking current requirements as a catalyst, this article draws on contemporary British history to explore when intelligence can be used to protect economic security and when intelligence actors can best use economic measures to achieve broader politico-military goals. The use of secret intelligence in the economic sphere does, however, have certain limitations and it should therefore only be employed when necessary.     

Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from 'Liddism' to 'Drainism'

Significant shifts have been underway in security intelligence agencies and processes since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Whereas the previous quarter of a century had seen a considerable democratization of intelligence, the article examines whether UK and US government responses risk the re-creation of 'security states'. Changes since 9/11 in law, doctrine, the intelligence process - targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action - and oversight are considered and it is concluded that there is a danger of the rebirth of independent security states.     

The civilian's visual security paradox: how open source intelligence practices create insecurity for civilians in warzones

ABSTRACT

Images taken by civilians and shared online have become an important source of conflict intelligence. This article explores issues around how states and non-state actors appropriate civilians’ images to produce intelligence about conflict, critically scrutinizing a practice often called open source or social media intelligence. It argues that image appropriation for open-source intelligence production creates a new kind of visual security paradox in which civilians can be endangered by their everyday visual practices because their digital images can be appropriated by outside actors as conflict intelligence. The transformation of everyday images into conflict evidence relies on what Barthes termed the photographic paradox, the paradox that while a photograph is clearly not the reality it depicts, the photograph is casually interpreted as a copy of that reality. When images are appropriated as conflict intelligence this photographic paradox translates into a security paradox. A visual security argument can be made without the intention or knowledge of the image producer, who then comes to perform the role on an intelligence agent. Yet civilians in warzones can hardly refrain from producing any images when they need to call attention to their plight, and to stay in contact with friends and relatives. The paradox, then, is that such vital visual signs of life can rapidly become sources of danger for the civilian. This civilian visual security paradox, it is argued, demands that intelligence actors respect the protected status of civilians in their online collection practices. So far, however, there is little sign of such respect.     

The Prohibition against Torture: Why the UK Government is Falling Short and the Risks that Remain

While the UK's official position is that it neither uses nor condones torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (CIDT), it is now a matter of public and parliamentary record that UK security services and military personnel colluded in rendition, torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, both as part of the CIA's Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (RDI) programme, at military detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and through involvement in the detention and interrogation of prisoners by allied security forces. This paper will explain why the government is falling short of its obligations under international law, and why considerable risks remain that UK intelligence and security services will continue to collude in torture and CIDT .     

Is the Department of Homeland Security an Intelligence Agency?

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applies a variation of the intelligence cycle – the process of planning, collecting, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information characteristic of intelligence agencies – to mitigate the risk of terrorist attack and respond to national security breaches. The intelligence cycle helps DHS encourage voluntary security measures, serve its customers, and avoid economic disruption, but the Department's program setbacks and failures illustrate the difficulty of applying the intelligence model to the needs of homeland security. The Department's particular means of producing intelligence and information challenge the conventional conception and definitions of the intelligence cycle.     

European–Mediterranean Security and the Arab Spring: Changes and Challenges

The policy of the European Union (EU) toward the Mediterranean has undergone two main metamorphoses during the last 25 years. In 1995, it started from a collective security idea with the Barcelona Process, but due to the poor success of this collective approach, it underwent a “realist turn” with the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. The Arab Spring in 2011, by questioning authoritarianism, influenced the perception of what is recognized as a security problem and who can define it. The authoritarian rulers and their supporting security forces are now challenged by their populations, and societal circumstances are so unstable that nearly every domestic problem can be politically given a spin to become a security risk. Aside from this, violent conflicts and civil wars demand an answer from the EU. In this situation, the EU's answer to the Arab Spring does not directly respond to the changing security situation in the Mediterranean. It emphasizes domestic democracy and civil society but does not take up the potential risk discourses. Concerning violent conflicts, the EU as a community is not at all active in the region but leaves this field to its member states, NATO, the Arab League, and the United Nations. Thus, the perceptions, ideas, and needs of Mediterranean security between the EU and the Southern partner states still differ harshly and seem to disregard the risk dimension of the Mediterranean security problems in this period of Arab transition.     

Four Perspectives on Terrorism: Where They Stand Depends on Where You Sit

The general assumption is that there is one objective and universally applicable conceptualization of 'terrorism'. This position is especially prominent in the United States and other Western countries after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Yet, despite such a view, it is possible to distinguish four specific perspectives or paradigms on terrorism: standard/mainstream, radical, relativist and constructivist. While the standard/mainstream approach remains dominant among academics, intelligence analysts and policy makers, the other positions have exhibited their own adherents. In the end, it will be argued that the constructivist perspective is the most accurate. Since 'terrorism' remains too contentious and disputed a term to achieve universal consensus, the constructivist approach has been the most effective in stressing the decisive role that parochial state and national interests perform in any conceptualization of 'terrorism', especially the strategic and security concerns of the dominant or hegemonic power(s) within the international system.     

The Value of Non-Governmental Intelligence: Widening the Field

In the UK, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has a poor track record of predicting attack. In the US, official inquiries into 9/11 identified ‘a failure of imagination’ to conceive of a large scale threat to the American homeland. There is a long-standing literature on surprise attack which emphasizes that clues to predict attack often exist but are not pieced together by an intelligence sector which is not structured to look in the right direction. In a world of increasingly fragmented threats and weak signals, it is apparent that much of the challenge in intelligence work now lies not in collection but in managing requirements, setting priorities, and conducting incisive analysis based on the ability to imagine new threats. One solution to a failure of imagination is to widen the range of people who can contribute to the task. Non-Governmental analysis of security issues, whether by academia, civil society or the private sector, can help to identify emerging issues and set priorities. Whilst collection of secret intelligence may always remain the preserve of specialist Government agencies, the rest of the intelligence cycle can benefit from external contributions and open source intelligence. We argue that the process of setting intelligence requirements could be opened to a wider range of actors. In conflict environments, there may be particular value in an open process to identify what each side would need to know about the other to confidently seek peace.     

The Iraq War and the Responsibility to Protect: Uses,Abuses and Consequences for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention

Before the 2003 Iraq war, the political leadership of the United States and United Kingdom had to sell the case for war to their people and the world. This was attempted through a number of speeches that employed rhetorical justifications for the war. Two prominent justifications used during this period involved the employment of security and humanitarian narratives. The security narrative focused on claims regarding Iraq's undermining of international law, possession of weapons of mass destruction and threat to the world. The humanitarian narrative revolved around claims about human suffering in Iraq and the need to liberate its people. While it is widely assumed that security is the dominant casus belli in the post-9/11 world, there is much evidence to suggest that the humanitarian justifications that played a critical role in the military interventions of the 1990s were still important after 9/11. The use of humanitarian justifications for the Iraq war clearly has implications for the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ movement, which has gained prominence since the December 2001 publication of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report. Based on an extensive content analysis of speeches by the US and UK political leadership before the war, this article will quantify the relative importance of each narrative and analyse what the findings mean for the ongoing debates within the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ movement.     

Counter-Terrorism,Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection,Exchange and Analysis

In this article we seek to address the emerging role of the European Union (EU) as a security and intelligence actor from the perspective of counter-terrorism. Intelligence as a process and product has been strongly promoted by the EU as a useful and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, organized crime and public order problems. A range of agencies has been established that collect, analyze and operationalize intelligence in view of strategically defined security threats. Examples are Europol and Frontex. This article makes an inventory of their roles and competences in the field of intelligence and looks at the list of instruments that encourage the sharing of intelligence between different law enforcement and security agencies. Moreover, it is argued in this article that as intelligence becomes more hybrid and as the EU only holds light powers of oversight on ownership and integrity of data, considerable governance challenges lurk around the corner. As ‘intelligence’ is usually a complex and sensitive product, it often travels outside formal bureaucratic channels, which undermines accountability and transparency of where, how and for what purpose the intelligence was gathered.     

Intelligence,crises and security: Lessons from history?

The scholarly study of intelligence has grown steadily into what is now a distinct sub-field of history and political science. Recent events – notably jihadist attacks on the US, Spain and the UK and the war on Iraq and its aftermath – have generated debate and controversy about the use and representation of intelligence. A plethora of official inquiries have fuelled debates into the ‘intelligence failures’ involved. This essay explores how lessons might be learned from the history of intelligence for contemporary debates and controversies. An overview of the issues includes discussion of how different approaches are apparent between American and British perspectives. Challenges and opportunities for applying lessons from the past are explored and a case is made for greater engagement between academia and officialdom.     

‘The importance of being honest’: Switzerland,neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison

This paper seeks to contribute to a number of debates that have attracted scholarly attention over the last few years. Firstly, by examining the experiences of the Swiss foreign intelligence service, the paper takes issue with what one scholar has dubbed ‘intelligence history snobbery’; a process that has privileged the study of the major powers and overlooked the contribution made to the secret world by the intelligence agencies of small states. Secondly, the paper explores the extent to which a state's engagement in the secret world is affected by its preconceived ideas over its place and standing in the international community. It asks whether the behaviour of a neutral foreign intelligence service is likely to differ from that of any other ‘small’ state, and whether neutrals can be both honest brokers in international affairs, and earnest players in the field of secret intelligence. The final section of the paper looks at the impact of the end of the Cold War and the emerging ‘global war on terror’ on the shape of the Swiss intelligence community.