The Economics of Power Transitions: Australia between China and the United States

This article examines Sino–Australian economic relations, and their impact on the ties between the United States and Australia. First, drawing on power transition theory, it is argued that in a post-Cold War environment, economic ties play as great a role as strategic relations in determining the orientation of third-party states. Second, it is also argued that Australia's deeper economic and commercial ties with China have usurped a role previously held by the United States. This has forced Australia to pursue a bifurcated foreign policy—one split between its economic and national security needs. Third, these deeper ties with China have generated a degree of alliance drift between Australia and the United States. As a result, there is now a significant debate in Australia over the future of both bilateral relations—even as its space for policy innovation remains limited.     

China and Major Power Relations in East Asia

Tremendous changes have taken place in East Asia in the post-Cold War era, which have a great impact on Chinese foreign policy and its relations with major powers in East Asia. This new power configuration is related to as 'two ups' and 'two downs', which have become apparent since the early 1990s. The 'two ups' concern the rise of the United States and China. The United States' rise to sole superpower status has given Washington a dominant role in all four dimensions of world affairs: political, strategic, economic, and technological/cultural. Meanwhile, China has achieved a spectacular economic performance for the past two decades, sustaining high growth rates, and escaping, so far, the Asian economic crisis of 1997‐98. This expansion has greatly increased China's influence in regional and global affairs. The 'two downs' refer to the downturns of Russia and Japan. This article provides a detailed analysis of China's international environment in the context of the changing dynamics of major-power relations in East Asia. Special attention is paid to the crucial Beijing‐Tokyo‐Washington triangle. The examination focuses upon political, economic, and strategic dimensions.     

US–China Relations in the Era of Globalization and Terror: a framework for analysis

The coming decade could provide the opportunity for the United States to consolidate stable Sino–American relations and expand US–China cooperation on a wide range of global and regional issues. Such a constructive relationship would not be conflict-free or without competitive aspects, especially in the political and economic realms, nor is its development inevitable. But the United States is not likely to conclude that a strategy of containment toward China is either necessary or feasible. Similarly, China will likely continue to pursue a strategy of seeking cooperative ties with the United States rather than adopting an anti-hegemonist coalition strategy to counter American power and influence. A key factor underlying this assessment is that ‘globalization’ is reshaping the global strategic environment. In this new strategic situation, the interests of the United States and China will limit strategic competition between them and compel closer cooperation to respond to shared strategic threats and challenges. Globalization has led to converging—though by no means identical—national interests in many critical areas and a common interest in maintaining the overall global system of regimes, treaties and organizations governing international economic, political and security relations to the benefit of both countries. This high-level common interest does not preclude sharp differences over specific issues, but it is likely to create pressure on the United States and China to cooperate in many areas to defend, maintain and strengthen the system and to restrain them from pursuing containment or confrontational strategies toward each other.     

Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations under the Post-'11 September' Strategic Settings

Sino-US relations and cross-Strait relations are always interrelated and so is the US policy towards cross-Strait relations. The United States has taken its global strategic and fundamental national interests as points of departure. The Bush Administration has undergone a cycle of being tough towards China and titling towards Taiwan first and then readjusting towards the middle ground. There are many reasons to explain this change and the events of 11 September stand out very prominently. This change once again proves that once the US put strategic consideration first it will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the Taiwan issue should not be a damaging and/or diverting factor. However, there still exist fundamental differences over the Taiwan issue and the Bush Administration's military-to-military relations with and arms sales to Taiwan are matters of great concern.     

Perceptions of Danger: The China threat theory

The People's Republic of China witnessed unprecedented growth at the end of the twentieth century and the manner in which it will choose to use its consequent power in the twenty-first century has become a hotly debated topic in foreign policy circles. Some have chosen to interpret China's emergence as an economic and aspiring military superpower as a threat to the national interests of the United States and Asian-Pacific security. This threat has been categorized as ideological, economic, and strategic. This essay explores the China threat theory through an in-depth analysis of the arguments of 'anti-China hands' as outlined in a variety of right wing publications.     

China's Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States

During the past few decades, China's economic success has permitted it to pursue a greater role on the international stage. China is recognized both as a regional and aspiring global power. Nowhere is this more evident than within Southeast Asia, where China's more active diplomacy is reflected in growing trade relations, proposals for stronger security ties, and the signing of numerous cooperative agreements on issues as varied as environmental protection, drug trafficking, and public health. As a whole, the region has received China's activism with both enthusiasm and trepidation. China has expended significant effort to assuage the fears of its neighbors by adopting a foreign policy approach that is active, non-threatening, and generally aligned with the economic and security interests of the region. This positive diplomacy has clearly yielded some success, most notably in the trade realm, where China is rapidly emerging as an engine of regional economic growth and integration that may well challenge Japanese and American dominance in the next three to five years. In the security realm, China's diplomacy, while rhetorically appealing to regional actors, has yet to make significant inroads in a regional security structure dominated by the United States and its bilateral security relationships. Most significantly, however, if China is to emerge as a real leader within Southeast Asia, it will also need to assume more of the social and political burden that leadership entails. As China continues to advance itself as a regional leader, its policies on issues such as health, drugs, the environment and human rights will face additional scrutiny not only for their impact on the region but also for the more profound question they raise concerning the potential of China's moral leadership. For the United States, China's greater presence and activism suggest at the very least that it cannot remain complacent about the status quo that has governed political, economic and security relations for the past few decades. Shared leadership within Southeast Asia will likely include China in the near future, with all the potential benefits and challenges that such leadership will entail.     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

Dynamic Balancing: China's balancing strategies towards the United States, 1949–2005

This paper occupies a middle ground in the debate between regional area specialists in foreign policy analysis and international relations theorists in international studies. Based on balance of power and balance of threat theories, a ‘dynamic balancing’ model is introduced to explain states' foreign policy strategies. Its claims are: (1) the polarity of the international system shapes whether a state's strategic choices should be balancing with external efforts or balancing with internal efforts; (2) leaders' perceptions of external threats determine when and how a state pursues different balancing strategies. The application of the dynamic balancing model to China's balancing strategies towards the United States suggests that the future of Sino–American relations depends on the strategic interactions and mutual threat perceptions between the two nations.     

Between Confrontation and Assimilation: China and the fragmentation of global financial governance

This article explains China's multilateral approach towards regional and global financial institutions in the early twenty-first century. Challenging the dichotomous views of ‘eventual assimilation’ and ‘systemic conflict’, the article argues that China's strategic behavior suggests neither one-way assimilation into an American-centered liberal order nor a collision course with the United States and its Group of Seven (G-7) allies. China seems intent on exploring both global and regional options lest it should limit the range of strategic options available to itself. China has been pursuing a risk-averse counterweight strategy, that is, developing regional financial institutions and thereby avoiding overdependence on G-7-centered global institutions while maintaining collaborative relations with those global institutions. Such behavior will facilitate the emergence of a more fragmented and multilayered form of global financial governance in the post-global crisis world.     

Discussion of 'International Political Economy from a Chinese Angle'

According to Zhu Wenli, Chinese scholars of political economy have been examining many of the same issues as their American counterparts, but have reached quite different conclusions. Chinese scholars accept the importance of globalization, but do not believe that globalization is making the nation-state less relevant or international regimes more powerful. They concede that economic and other transnational issues are becoming increasingly salient in international affairs, but conclude that they are simply altering the ways in which nations compete for power rather than making the international system more cooperative. They agree that much of today's world order is rooted in American hegemony, but do not consider that US foreign policy can be characterized as 'benign'. These conclusions have troubling implications for US‐China relations. They suggest that China will not agree to be integrated into an international community led by the United States, and that the relationship between Beijing and Washington is more likely to be competitive than cooperative.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

Hong Kong in United States‐China relations: The international politics of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty

This article examines the implications of the political transition of Hong Kong on US‐China relations in strategic, political and economic dimensions. It evaluates the impact of Hong Kong's changing status in the context of the engagement‐containment debate on China policy in the US. It suggests that US concerns over questions such as democracy and human rights and China's rejection of foreign interference’ in Hong Kong would turn the territory into a source of political conflict between the US and China. Finally it points out that any major trade confrontation between the two countries would have serious implications for the territory. The article concludes by arguing that if Hong Kong could continue to be a prosperous and free society with a global outlook, it would facilitate China's integration with the global community, but if a reversion to authoritarian rule occurred in Hong Kong, US‐China relations will be aversely affected.     

China's Economic Diplomacy towards the Arab Countries: challenges ahead?

Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, China has adhered to its ‘business-first’ economic diplomacy towards the Arab countries, a policy driven by China's ongoing geoeconomic interests. The ten-year-old China–Arab States Cooperation Forum serves as the nucleus for China's economic diplomacy in the region. The Chinese authorities have also initiated interagency coordination and central–local governments' power sharing in order to pursue this diplomacy successfully. However, while its economic diplomacy may be evolving, China, unlike what it has achieved in Black Africa, seems to have failed to develop strategic, political and cultural exchanges with its Arab counterparts. The intertwined geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that have emerged since the Arab revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the longer run.     

Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

Limited Defensive Strategic Partnership: Sino–Russian rapprochement and the driving forces

The deepening rapprochement between China and Russia, those two formidable continental powers, constitutes one of the most noteworthy phenomena in post-Cold War world affairs. Through detailed investigation of this vital bilateral relationship over a variety of issue areas, we characterize the current Sino–Russian relations as a limited defensive strategic partnership, with strategicness constituting the core of the Sino–Russian relationship. More than that, we further argue that the Sino–Russian rapprochement is externally-driven rather than internally-driven. More specifically, realism's balance of power theory, or its variety balance of threat theory, provides a relatively convincing explanation regarding the increasingly strengthened Sino–Russian strategic partnership. In a roughly chronological way, this paper will demonstrate how America's increasing unilateralism in its foreign policy approaches was correlated with, and thus contributed to, the deepening rapprochement between China and Russia.     

China Goes to Africa: a strategic move?

Entering the twenty-first century, particularly under the reign of Hu Jintao, China began to pursue an increasingly pro-active diplomacy in Africa. Most analysis on China's offensive diplomacy in Africa focuses on Beijing's thirst for energy and raw materials, and for economic profits and benefits. That is why it is often called ‘energy diplomacy’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ as if China, just like Japan in the 1980s, became another ‘economic animal’. But if one looks at the history of the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing has seldom pursued its diplomacy from purely economic considerations. Is this time any different? This article exams China's diplomacy in Africa from a strategic and political perspective such as its geo-strategic calculations, political and security ties with African countries, peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts in the region, support for African regionalism, etc. It argues that China's diplomatic expansion in Africa, while partially driven by its need for economic growth, cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration its strategic impulse accompanying its accelerating emergence as a global power. Africa is one of China's diplomatic ‘new frontiers’ as exemplified by new Chinese leader Xi Jinping's maiden foreign trip to Africa in 2013.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

The Rise of Neoclassical Economics and China's WTO Agreement with the United States in 1999

Drawing on the historical institutionalists’ emphasis on the effects of ideas on policy making, this paper focuses on the importance of economic ideas and ideologies on China's trade policy making with regard to the signing of the WTO agreement with the United States in 1999. The paper argues that trade liberalization in China was a result of top Chinese leaders’ embrace of neoclassical economic ideas which conceive a small role for the state in the marketplace, mainly as the regulator of the macro-economic environment and as the enforcer of the rule of law, rather than as a major player in the marketplace. Top Chinese leaders’ socialization with neoclassical economic ideas enabled them to forge a political consensus to link state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms with speedy WTO accession and led to China's major concessions in WTO negotiations with the United States in 1999 which were inconceivable just a few years ago.     

China in Global Food Security Governance

The Chinese public's domestic expectation is that its state will ensure a safe and affordable supply of food. However, in doing so, China has acquired large amounts of farmland abroad which has raised concerns among many developing countries. It has been argued that land grabbing in the developing world is a form of neo-colonialism. This role of a colonial power is in conflict with China's historical role, which presents China as a leader of the developing world. In order to bring these role expectations into conformity with each other, China has taken a more active role in global food security governance. It has brought food security to what is becoming the core of the global governance decision-making system, the G20. China's historical role, together with its growing economic power, has helped to push the G20 to understand the importance of food security. This has shifted the G20's understanding of economic global governance away from the traditional fields of banking and trade regulation toward understanding the developmental-oriented economic structure.     

Competing Realities in China–India Multilateral Discourse: Asia's enduring power rivalry

Asymmetric growth in foreign policy dynamics and power posture between China and India at the regional level is the new contour of current Asian politics. One vital aspect of it is the multilateral power politics or engagement through which rising powers connect and integrate with regional vis-à-vis global conditions in order to contend and compete with each other's strategic interests and primacy. This Asian rendezvous is part and parcel of the rhetoric of liberalist sentiments, which realistically do not work in favor of the developing countries' relationships. The history of the China–India bilateral discourse suggests that. In today's context, the increasing multilateral engagement between the two countries is a potential medium for denying space and holding an edge over each other's priority of acquiring assorted global resources, forming an Asian and a global identity, and notably in securing respective national strategic objectives. Current foreign policy contours of both countries are quite different from the previous order and politics. The boundary will continue to be the fundamental problem in their bilateral discourse, while the Asian discourse of Sino–Indian multilateral politics will be decided by their competition and power rivalry in resources and identity.