“Don't knows” and public opinion towards economic reform: Evidence from Russia

As market reform has spread throughout the globe, both scholars and policy makers have become increasingly interested in measuring public opinion towards economic changes. However, recent research from American politics suggests that special care must be paid to how surveys treat non-respondents to these types of questions. We extend this line of inquiry to a well-known case of large-scale economic reform, Russia in the mid-1990s. Our major finding is that Russians who fail to answer survey questions tend to be consistently less “liberal” than their counterparts who are able to answer such questions. This finding has implications both for our understanding of Russian public opinion in the 1990s, as well as for measuring attitudes towards economic reform more generally.     

Energy security and Russia’s gas strategy: The symbiotic relationship between the state and firms

The way how Russia ignores the EU’s quest for liberalization and sustains a control over markets and supplies is directly related to her use of gas as leverage. Russia’s strategy affects many European and non-European countries during all stages: demand, supply and transit. It is not, however, possible to generalize a common statement that the EU’s position is based on a policy of market liberalization while Russia pursues an opposing strategy of increased state control. Russian energy strategy leads markets in Europe; sets tone for energy supplies at homeland and abroad, benefiting from a variety of means. This article shows how a symbiotic relationship between the Russian state and Russian energy companies emerge from a structure in which trade, markets and international politics have been embedded within the state interests and firm behavior. It identifies the economic and geopolitical trends with regard to recent developments of Russia’s strategy.     

Higher Education in Transition to a Market Economy: Two Case Studies

THE IDEA FOR THIS ARTICLE came from a visit to Tomsk that took place in May 1997. The authors visited the State University of Tomsk, one of Russia's leading universities, with an enviable research record and very good library and computing facilities, and were fortunate enough to be able to interview senior staff of the university concerning their budgets and financial situation. Apparently the situation in Tomsk is not especially bad; indeed it may well be rather better than elsewhere in Russia. In order to have a little basis for comparison and to provide a second case study, we also investigated some aspects of the financial arrangements at the Economics Faculty of Moscow State University. What we learned from these two cases-admittedly far from a representative sample-not only revealed a great deal about the current state of higher education reforms in Russia but also provided a snapshot of the state of Russian economic reforms in general. Hence although this article is partly about Tomsk and Moscow, it is also about these wider issues. In significant respects, Russia remains quite distant from a well-functioning market-type economy, and some of these respects are important for the higher education sector. In a very fundamental sense, one could identify the main source of Russian shortcomings in reforms as a general problem of the state.1 However, this is not the place for a general review of such a major topic. Instead, in this article we focus on a few aspects of Russia's reforms in so far as they affect higher education, namely (1) ownership, property rights and governance issues; (2) funding issues and the state budget; (3) the tax regime and (4) non-functioning of the market economy. In what follows, therefore, we proceed as follows. First we outline some general issues relevant for the reform of a system of higher education moving away from former, Soviet-type structures, focusing on the Russian situation; then we present the case studies of Tomsk and Moscow. The following section examines issues concerning higher education in particular and the reform process more generally, as highlighted in the two case studies and in the light of the above four issues. We end with a short concluding section.     

Elite recruitment and state-society relations in technocratic authoritarian regimes: The Russian case

This article argues that Russia has a peculiar form of authoritarianism that exhibits pronounced technocratic features. The analysis places in a comparative frame the bases of regime legitimacy and the paths to political, administrative, and economic power in Russia. By locating the Russian state in a matrix that considers the ideology of governance on one axis and the backgrounds of elites on the other, the article highlights areas of overlap and separation between state–society relations in Russia and other regimes in the developed and developing world. It also illustrates the ways in which technocratic elites in Russia differ from their counterparts in other parts of the world.     

The gender base of institutional support in Lithuania,Ukraine and Russia

This literature review pertains to women's status in Soviet society. This study examined the degree to which attitudes toward established institutions, support for the reform process, and generalized political orientations significantly reflect gender differences. Regression models were tested among Russians, Ukrainians, and Orthodox believers in Russia. Gender differences were apparent in the evaluations of the Communist Party. Ukrainian women were more supportive of the Communist Party. Age was the only significant factor in Russia; increased age was associated with more positive attitudes toward the Communists. More Ukrainian and Russian women than Orthodox women believed that political reform is moving too rapidly. Less educated and higher income women were more likely to believe that reform is proceeding too rapidly. Russian men were more likely to have participated in a political rally than Russian women in the model which includes socioeconomic controls. Russians with higher education were more frequent participants in political demonstrations than Russians with less education. Ukrainian women were more likely than men to be pacifists. Over 20% of the variance in pacifism scores was explained by sex and sociodemographic factors. The author concluded that gender differences are apparent in the strength of pacifism, the frequency of participation in demonstrations, attitudes toward reform, and evaluations of the Communist Party. Russian women compared to US women did not necessarily support liberal, democratic reforms. Lithuanian women and urban women were less supportive of the status quo and established economic and political institutions compared to Russian, Ukrainian, or rural women. Women and men responded similarly at the same educational levels. Women had a more humanitarian view of the environment and peace. A four-stage stratified sample of 2336 individuals (796 in Russia, 826 in the Ukraine, and 714 in Lithuania) was used. The survey instrument was designed by a team from the University of Iowa working with Soviet scholars.     

Forced migrant “compatriots” from Ukraine: Accessing legal residency and citizenship in the Russian Federation

This paper examines the Russian migration and citizenship regime as encountered by forced migrants from Ukraine who fled to Russia during the period of 2014–2016. Based on legal and other official documents, media articles, and interviews, it gives an account of these migrants’ reception in Russia in theory and practice. Russia made great efforts to accommodate them, and in Russian media they were often spoken of as an easily integrated labor resource and as potential citizens. In 2015–2016, around 165,000 Ukrainians acquired Russian citizenship. While ethno-cultural similarity does privilege Ukrainian migrants in Russia, full asylum has been granted sparingly, and citizenship is not unconditionally granted. As this paper shows, Russian authorities have rather tried to control and distribute these forced migrants for the benefit of the state, according to principles of selectivity and economic interests – giving privileged access to permanent residency and citizenship to working-age people willing to settle in regions where population growth and more workers are deemed necessary. However, permanent residency and citizenship are also available to those able to circumvent or pay their way through the obstacles encountered – taking advantage of the flexibility inherent in a system that is not totally consistent.     

Society and transition in post-Soviet Russia

Applying traditional notions of the concept `political cleavage' to Russian society is premature. Judicious analysis of public opinion data demonstrates that, despite any statistically significant differences of opinion that may exist, major Russian social groups have substantively similar attitudes toward economic reform. As economic issues are likely to dominate political life in Russia for the foreseeable future, the homogeneity of opinion on those issues minimizes the potential for socially based political cleavages. This social environment weakens the rationale for adherence to democratic institutions, which are essentially a means for peaceful mediation of societal conflicts.     

Divergence and dispersion in the Russian economy

While post-war economic development In market economies was characterised by geographical concentration of economic activity, this was not the case in the Soviet Union. Soviet economic development resulted in a highly dispersed economic landscape with mono-industrial towns scattered around the country. One plausible reason for this was low perceived transport costs as seen by Soviet planners. Another reason was that political and not only economic motives governed industrial location (Maurseth, 2001a). In addition to the sheer size of the country, these factors made the Soviet Union one of the most transport-intensive economies in the world. The post-Soviet Russian economic geography faces Russia with important challenges. Production, population and employment patterns are likely to change dramatically. There are at least four reasons for this hypothesis. The first is structural change in the Russian economy. Production patterns in Russia were highly distorted. In the future industrial production, and in particular heavy industry, will represent a smaller share of total production while consumer industry and services will probably experience relatively higher growth rates. The second reason to expect a changing economic geography is that transport costs are likely to increase. While the Soviet Union implicitly subsidised transport heavily, Russia now faces important challenges due to increasing transport prices. The third reason for expecting change is population changes. Recently, migration from the climatically least hospitable areas has been growing. In the future, these trends are likely to continue. Fourth, and partly as a consequence of the above-mentioned factors, market access will probably become more important for location of Russian industry. The Russian economic landscape is therefore likely to become more concentrated in the years to come.     

The Political Resurrection of Russian Governors

Elections for all 83 Russian governors were reinstated in Russia in 2012, seven years after they had been suspended. The democratic reform coincided with renewed political activism in Russia since December 2011, but the reform was as much a belated recognition of the shortcomings and failures from appointing Russian governors. Pragmatic necessity and not democratic conversion was the determining factor. Based on the first elections in October 2012, the reform will have only a limited effect over the next few years on democratic change in Russia, at most placating liberal and regional demands while consolidating personal rule under Putin.     

Putin's Power Revisited: How Identity Positions and Great Power Interaction Condition Strategic Cooperation on Syria

Abstract

This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and negotiated in domestic debates, but they are also informed by interaction with other states. The article explains the shift in Russian policies away from pragmatic cooperation with the West in Syria from autumn 2015 onwards. While the Russian leadership initially sought such cooperation, the prominence of anti-Western discourse in Russia following the crisis in Ukraine as well as the West's rejection of Russia in this period spurred Russia to act independently in Syria.     

Asymmetric bilateral bargaining in the new Russian Federation: A path-dependence explanation

In this essay we identify economic and political factors that led both the federal centre and the regions in Russia first to open the process of federal bargaining and then to pursue it in the form of signing bilateral treaties, unique for each region. Many Russian politicians and most scholars of Russian politics view asymmetric bilateral bargaining as a dangerous institutional choice contributing to federal instability and potentially threatening the disintegration of Russia. We offer an alternative view. While the treaty-signing practices are actively maintained by Russian political elites, we argue that the genesis of asymmetric bilateral bargaining in Russia had a strong `path dependence' component. In particular, it was precipitated by the developments of the last period in evolution of the Soviet federalism.     

What kind of capitalism for Russia?: A comparative analysis

Post-communist governing elites had a vision of a transition to a type of society characterised by wealth, markets, private ownership, democracy and civil society. The transformation in Russia is analyzed in terms of company structure, economic outcomes and patterns of social integration, elite and class fragmentation. On the basis of a comparative political economy, different models of capitalism are defined (competitive or market-led and cooperative or negotiated). The Russian economy is defined as a perverse chaotic social formation. It is contended that policy should move towards a state-led “negotiated” type of capitalist system.     

War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.     

Russia's post-crisis growth: its sources and prospects for continuation

This article provides an in-depth analysis of Russia's post-crisis growth, with a view to understanding the prospects for its continuation. It examines in detail the chief drivers of growth, as well as the main developments and policies that have been underlying it. A key finding is that the role of the oil sector, and particularly privately owned oil companies, has been vastly more important in driving economic growth from 2001 to 2004 than thus far recognised. The oil sector's contribution to growth has hitherto been severely underestimated because official data do not account for transfer pricing and thus fail to fully reflect the importance of the hydrocarbon sector in the Russian economy. In the light of this finding, this article also assesses the economic impact of the ‘Yukos affair’. Looking forward, it is reasoned that—given its economic structure—Russia is bound to remain a heavily resource-dependent economy for some time to come. The article further argues that, given good macroeconomic management and the avoidance of gross policy errors, Russia could realistically hope to sustain high growth rates over the medium term. However, given current tendencies for greater state involvement in key sectors of the economy, such an outcome is not by any means guaranteed.     

Ukraine between Russia and the European Union: Triangle Revisited

Ukraine has long been considered as a bone of contention between the EU and Russia which could eventually lead to a geographical split of the country. This interpretation, however, fails to explain the dynamic of the Ukrainian revolution and Russian–Ukrainian war. To address the deadlock in understanding the mixed dynamics of the situation in Ukraine, the article argues that the relations in the EU–Ukraine–Russia triangle are affected by the combination of choices that the Ukrainian political class, business elites and broader society make in four major dimensions: internal political practices; economic dimension; a dimension of international politics; and an ideological dimension.     

Post-Soviet Developmentalism and the Political Economy of Russia’s Electricity Sector Liberalization

Observers of Russian state market relations typically consider the state as an entity engaged in creating rent-seeking opportunities for bureaucrats or powerful economic interests. The trajectory and outcomes of electricity sector reforms demonstrate the limits of this perspective and serve to highlight a developmental strand in Russian economic policy, which I call post-Soviet developmentalism. I found that post-Soviet developmentalism is key to understanding the patterns of market institutions that have emerged in the newly liberalized electricity sector and that they cannot be adequately explained if the state is largely seen as a predator or as captured by oligarchic interests. A close analysis of the institutional underpinnings of new electricity markets suggests that they were shaped in political bargains, in which the government sought to enlist Russia’s oligarchic conglomerates for its modernization agenda and developmental priorities. The paper links this discussion to three sets of theoretical literatures: It speaks to the debates on the post-Soviet transition, more broadly to the political economy of market reform, and finally, it addresses the developmental state literature.     

Rethinking the Economic Relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia

According to their governments, economic relations between Kazakhstan and Russia—the two largest post-Soviet countries—have been exceptionally solid and robust. However, statistical data demonstrate that Russian investments in Kazakhstan's economy have been weak, and that Kazakhstan has only recently increased investment in the Russian economy. This raises the question of whether relations between the two countries have been more uneven than has been claimed officially. The article also explores the influence of off-shore investments via third countries and other aspects of the bilateral relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia and the involvement of each country in the other's economy.     

Russian banks’ profit strategies: the evidence from various types of banks

This paper offers an analysis of profit strategies pursued by Russian banks depending on their ownership type, including federal state banks, banks of mixed ownership, banks connected to enterprises producing for the final consumers, and regional pocket banks owned by one particular business group or enterprise. The paper outlines a set of factors that capture a range of potential hindrances on the way to banks’ involvement in Russian economy. It traces how the characteristics of the state regulation and peculiarities of the economic sectors affect the proliferation of certain type of banks—pocket banks—at the expense of others. It looks into how the various types of banks function under the given set of political and economic constraints, and how these constraints shape the banking system in Russia and its relationships with the enterprises and sectors.     

The sources of Russia's fear of NATO

The paper analyzes Russia's perception of NATO since the beginning of its eastern enlargement. Russia's reaction to the enlargement evolved from attempts to diffuse its potential damage through a limited cooperation to passive and then active policies of containment. The latter have resulted in a risky behavior with respect to the alliance and a concentration of Russian military on the Western border. Two factors can assist us in explaining Russia's evolving perception of NATO from a potential partner to a renewed military threat – the historical experience of viewing the alliance, and the West in general, as potentially threatening and the post-Cold war interaction with NATO that served to strengthen the historically developed perception. As of today, Russia has learned from its interaction with the alliance that NATO remains a principle threat to Russia's national security and that through the alliance's expansion the West seeks to exercise its cultural, economic, and political domination in Eurasia.     

The Concepts of State and Society in Defining Russia’s Domestic Political Unity: A Research Note

Abstract

Vladimir Putin’s long period in power has so far raised scant discussion about the political concepts that underpin real state and societal unity, and especially about the domestic political implications of these concepts. Despite this, key concepts of his political regime, such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘sovereign democracy’, have frequently been used in Russian political discourse. This essay examines the way the current Russian administration has used concepts that stress strong societal unity, and the creation of a stable state and societal unity to support the development of real functioning dynamics in the society. It charts the shift from ‘sovereign democracy’ to ‘sovereignty’ around 2011–2012 as a key discursive concept in moving towards a more isolationist international stand and consolidating Putin’s power by emphasising Russia’s unique political tradition, which requires a strong leader as the basis of national unity and to ensure Russian sovereignty.