The offensive posture of NATO's missile defence system

A compelling case can be made to develop a NATO's missile defence system in response to the advancement of missile technology and the danger of nuclear weapons. However, this development also undermines Russia's retaliatory capacity, and consequently heightens the offensive potential of nuclear weapons. This article explores the offence/defence posture of NATO's missile defence plans in terms of both capabilities and strategy. It is argued that NATO is incrementally increasing the strength and reach of its missile defence components, while rejecting any international treaty to regulate and limit their future expansion. This corresponds with a strategy of achieving invulnerability through counterforce and utilising NATO as an ‘insurance policy’ against Russia, to be activated when conflicts arise. We conclude that NATO has the capacity to distinguish between an offensive and defensive posture by discriminating between potential targets, but it has displayed no intention to do so.     

Poland's conception of European security and Russia

This article examines the problem of contemporary bilateral relations between Poland and Russia. Its thesis largely attributes the rivalry of these two states in Eastern Europe to conceptions relating to the balancing and bandwagoning of power. This rivalry can be put down to the fact that Polish-Russian relations are being developed within broader global processes such as Russia's relations with NATO, the USA and European Union. The greatest obstacle to the maintenance of mutually beneficial relations is the sensitive issue of security. In recent years Poland has consistently underlined its willingness to reinforce NATO's mutual defense mechanisms by supporting the organization's continued presence in Central-Eastern Europe. This issue has been compounded by Poland's striving to bring the countries of Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine) into closer affiliation with Western institutions favoring European integration, which is evidently perceived as interference in what is regarded by Moscow to be a sphere of Russian influence. This has provoked a number of serious crises in bilateral relations between Poland and Russia since the Euro-Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Russian plans to install new (Iskander) missile systems close to the Polish border and Poland's effective attempts post-2014 to extend NATO presence within its own country testify to the scale of conflicts of interest between the two states and the lack of trust afforded by both sides. The issues highlighted in this paper are of great importance, since they not only enable the complexity of Central European issues to be more fully comprehended but also help to elucidate other global actors' conceptions relating to cooperation with Europe.     

历史演进视角下的欧盟与北约关系走向——兼析拜登当选的影响

自欧盟确立共同安全与防务政策以来,欧盟独立防务与北约之间存在着“相互替代”和“相互增强”两种论调。争论焦点在于价值观念、威胁评估和战略文化、军事和民事能力、国防工业和支出。在过去几年,欧盟与北约的关系也围绕上述四个方面发生变化。具体而言,欧盟与北约之间总体上呈现以合作为主、竞争为辅、两者同步增强的发展态势。美国新任总统拜登承诺修复美国与盟友的关系,包括进一步加强北约。同时,美、欧将在价值观念上回归“旧常态”,在威胁评估和战略文化上进一步靠拢,在民事和军事手段的运用以及增加国防工业投入上也会有更多共识和共同行动。因此,欧盟与北约的关系将进一步呈现相互增强的态势,但前提是欧盟的战略自主建设不只是出于做强自身,而是更多地为了使欧、美双方公平承担相应的责任。     

Georgian readiness for NATO membership after Russian-Georgian armed conflict

The history of the cooperation between Georgia and NATO had started long before the Rose Revolution. Nowadays, Georgia belongs to the countries which want to join NATO. This article gauges the Georgian readiness for its accession to NATO. Study on NATO enlargement provides requirements on future members of NATO, even though it avoids such an explicit formulation. This article concludes that Georgia is not yet ready to join NATO because it has serious deficiencies in the area of democracy building, military readiness, and settling territorial disputes with its neighbours. The only area where the situation is satisfactory is the support of the public for the accession.     

Uzbekistan among the great powers

Under the authoritarian regime of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan has achieved independence and stability by exploiting its natural resources through a strategy of “staple globalism” and by balancing the great powers against each other. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new regime first distanced itself from Russia and tried regional alliances, then accepted help from NATO, and most recently turned cautiously to Russia (and China). Throughout, Uzbekistan has managed to receive considerable assistance from international agencies and military aid from several outside powers, albeit relatively little private foreign investment, owing to its poor business climate. The country has also handled potential conflicts with neighbors without significant violence.     

Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement

This paper examines the roles that key political institutions play in formulating Ukraine’s and Russia’s responses to European Union (EU) enlargement. It provides a structured comparison of how EU-related policies are designed in the two countries. It shows how the differences in institutional setting, mindset of political actors occupying these institutions, and the character of the party system affect the variation in presidential, cabinet, and parliamentary terms of involvement in EU-related matters. It demonstrates that the variation in these terms of involvement has a lasting effect on the nature of policy output in this specific policy area.     

Exploring Strategies and Implications of an Opportunistic Alliance: A Case Study of Pakistan and China

This article seeks to test the validity of ‘balance of threat’ theory as propounded by Stephen Walt that states react to imbalances of threat. It takes into account the factors enumerated by Walt to explore threat perceptions of Pakistan and the strategy they developed to cope with security threats. It attempts to take an overview of Pakistan's security dilemma its responses in twin time frames: the Cold War period (1980–1989) and the post-Cold War period (1990–2000) with relevance to the contemporary period. Pakistan's arms acquisition, upgradation in sophistication of arsenals, increase in fund allocation in defence have all been its tangible tactics to neutralize India's military superiority. Pakistan explored Pan-Islamism to bring the support of the Islamic states. Pakistan also resorted to an active alliance with China, to increase its competency. From a theoretical angle, this article adopts a realist viewpoint, focuses on security concerns of state actors.     

Between emergency and routine – securitisation of military security in Iran and Indonesia

Abstract

The aim of this article is to explain the internal conditions of military security in a non-European context. It utilises securitisation as the theoretical perspective and investigates Iranian and Indonesian case studies to explore how the perception of internal threats and vulnerabilities determines the approaches to military security. It begins with a reiteration of securitisation theory assumptions, followed by clarifying the understanding of security in non-Western contexts. The case studies focus on the conditions which facilitate securitisation, including the nature of securitising actors, assumed concepts of security, and securitisation processes and their outcomes. The analysis indicates a necessity for several alterations in securitisation theory to realise its full potential. Civil–military relations in Asian states differ from those in the West, as both Iran and Indonesia show a high degree of military involvement in political affairs. Military security also becomes securitised as a result of internal political rivalries. The perception of threats is a tool in the struggle to extend the capabilities of security agencies or retain influences.     

Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence

In its first decade of post-communist independence, Poland achieved far more than most dared believe in 1989. Despite domestic political and economic turmoil, it has joined Europe as a new member of NATO and a prospective member of the EU. This article traces the evolution of Polish foreign policy since 1989 over four time periods: First, the early uncertainties from 1989 to 1992 when Warsaw — caught between a reunifying Germany and a collapsing USSR — was intent on solidifying its relations with Central European neighbors. Second, the watershed year of 1993, which witnessed changes in every aspect of Poland's external relations — the demise of Visegrad, first moves toward NATO and EU enlargement, the emergence of serious tensions in Warsaw's relations with the East, especially Russia. Third, the years in the anterooms of Europe from 1994 to 1996, when Poland and its central European neighbors lobbied for early accession to the EU and NATO, while relations with Russia remained in the deep freeze. And fourth, the period since 1997, in which Warsaw has been negotiating its “return to Europe”, joining NATO in 1999 and actively pursuing membership in the EU. These gains have not come quickly or easily; rather, they demonstrate a hard earned consistency in Poland's foreign policy agenda, despite numerous changes in domestic politics, as well as an increasingly realistic vision of the country's place in post-Cold War Europe.     

European Union anti-piracy initiatives in the Horn of Africa: linking land-based counter-piracy with maritime security and regional development

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has resulted in a steady decline in trade through the Arabian Sea and higher costs of doing business for multiple world regions. The EU has responded to the threat with a large-scale anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa, which constitutes the first free-standing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operation that is not entirely dependent on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planning and assets. The operation is designed to interdict Somali piracy operations across the Gulf of Aden and to keep some of the world’s busiest sea lanes open for reasons of world trade. This article argues that the EU preoccupation with military solutions to the piracy problem, based on interventions through the Somali federal government with an emphasis on security, is insufficient because it fails to address the underlying causes of piracy and misunderstands the Somali socio-cultural-security nexus and the need for practical longer term land-based approaches to development. The reduction of Somali piracy activities can be linked to this increased military response capacity as well as to increased security precautions undertaken by shipping companies, but none of these strategies has succeeded in dismantling piracy networks. They therefore offer only a temporary and costly stopgap measure.     

What Are You Prepared to Do? NATO and the Strategic Mismatch Between Ends,Ways, and Means in Afghanistan—and in the Future

This article examines ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations in Afghanistan as a way to get at the strategic disconnects in ends, ways, and means that the author believes are endemic to large-scale protracted stability and COIN (counterinsurgency) operations against adversaries who do not pose palpable existential threats to the members of an alliance. The article focuses mainly on the period that followed President Barack Obama's December 2009 announcement of a civilian and military “surge” in Afghanistan through the early stages of the ISAF offensive in Marjah, which began in February 2010. The article concludes that the fundamental strategic issue is that the Allies are not willing (or able) to devote enough resources to achieve their stated objectives. No matter how much the “Ways” might be improved, the “Means” are not sufficient to attain the “Ends.” Thus, what is needed is a more realistic understanding of what ISAF can accomplish in Afghanistan and what NATO might be expected to accomplish in future operations.     

Headquarters of Terrorists Is “Virtual Ummah”

Though anti‐American terrorism springs these days as much from Yemen and the “virtual ummah” as from Afghanistan, President Obama has nontheless further committed US troops to stabilizing a country well‐known as the graveyard of empires. What can the only Muslim country that belongs to NATO offer by way of advice? How best can the US keep its focus on the terrorist threat despite its diversion in Afghanistan? Turkey's former envoy to Afghanistan and two of Europe's leading experts on Islamist terrorism offer their views.     

The final triumph of the Pax Americana? Western intervention in Yugoslavia and Russia's debate on the post-Cold War order

This paper addresses the question of world order by considering how Western military actions in Yugoslavia were perceived from a different cultural perspective. It traces how the NATO-led bombing campaign during March–June of 1999 affected various visions of world order that had existed in Russia before the campaign and describes the discursive change this campaign produced. The argument is made that Russia's foreign policy elites, from Westernizers to Neo-Communists and Expansionists, perceived Western goals in Yugoslavia differently from their counterparts in the West. However, they differed in their recommendations regarding Russia's response and lessons to be drawn from the Kosovo crisis. The paper also identifies several points where the different perspectives can converge. More specifically, all Russian schools of thought viewed the NATO campaign as a dangerous precedent potentially destabilizing the existing world order. They also shared the conviction that Russia should play a larger role in world affairs and that without Russia's involvement there could be no peace and stability in the Balkans and in Europe. They point to the United Nations as the only forum for debating the legitimacy of military interventions and for preventing interventions carried out without the approval of the UN.     

Between willing and reluctant entrapment: CEE countries in NATO's non-European missions

The article focuses on Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries' experiences related to Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, three non-European theatres of Western military operations, in predominantly Muslim lands, in the decade between 2001 and 2011. CEE countries readily became involved in two of these foreign missions (Afghanistan and Iraq) because of their deep ties to Western politico-economic structures, without direct security interests compelling them to do so, but not without normative convictions regarding what were seen by them as virtues of the two missions. In Libya, however, they were reluctant to join the Western intervention. In light of this, the article is interested in examining how political elites within the region relate to the generally constrained security policy agency that they have. A key argument advanced is that such agency may be located in how external hegemony is mediated in elite discourses of threat and legitimacy construction. This as well as the three case studies outlined in the article show that the seeming changes in CEE countries' behaviour in fact boil down to a simple set of rules guiding their behaviour. Having identified this “algorithm” as an implicit pattern of CEE foreign policy behaviour, originating in the intra-alliance security dilemma within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the article formulates its conclusions about the alliance policy of these countries largely within a neorealist framework.     

How Turkey's Soft Power Can Aid NATO in Afghanistan

Though anti‐American terrorism springs these days as much from Yemen and the “virtual ummah” as from Afghanistan, President Obama has nontheless further committed US troops to stabilizing a country well‐known as the graveyard of empires. What can the only Muslim country that belongs to NATO offer by way of advice? How best can the US keep its focus on the terrorist threat despite its diversion in Afghanistan? Turkey's former envoy to Afghanistan and two of Europe's leading experts on Islamist terrorism offer their views.     

America's “Maginot Line” Defense Against Terror

Though anti‐American terrorism springs these days as much from Yemen and the “virtual ummah” as from Afghanistan, President Obama has nontheless further committed US troops to stabilizing a country well‐known as the graveyard of empires. What can the only Muslim country that belongs to NATO offer by way of advice? How best can the US keep its focus on the terrorist threat despite its diversion in Afghanistan? Turkey's former envoy to Afghanistan and two of Europe's leading experts on Islamist terrorism offer their views.     

Iran's nuclear programme and the west

Judged by the media reports and statements by US officials in recent months, the USA is seriously considering, or at least thinking about, taking military action against Iran, if it refuses to forgo its legal right to enrich uranium for its nuclear energy programme, which Washington claims is a cover for making nuclear weapons. Iran denies the allegation. The effects of such an attack on Iranian society and the political ramifications beyond Iran's borders are discussed and analysed here. The irony of the present dispute between the West and Iran is that, for three decades up to the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Europeans and Americans helped, in fact earnestly encouraged, Iran in the development of its nuclear programme. The article explains the reasons for the failure of talks between Iran and the European trio to resolve the issue. It argues that, even if the question of Iran's nuclear programme were resolved, the 27-year conflict between the two countries would be unlikely to end in the near future. For Washington the name of the game is ‘regime change’ in Iran, either through military means or through fomenting internal chaos, hoping for implosion. But considering the political and military difficulties that Washington is experiencing in Afghanistan and Iraq, achieving either of these options is highly problematic.     

The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War-Fighting: The Bosnia Precedent

This article examines the manifestation of jihadist ideology in the strategic thought and behavior of war-fighting forces. Employing the “strategic approach,” it aims to determine whether jihadist ideology is a military asset or a strategic disadvantage for armed forces. It hypothesizes the impact of jihadist ideology on the use of force by examining its potential effects in seven strategic aspects: vision, threat perception, objectives, strategy, constituency, legitimacy, and conduct. It concludes by discussing the contradictory effects of jihadist ideology on the utility of force. Theoretical arguments throughout the article are elaborated by a discussion of jihadist forces in the Bosnian civil war.     

Fighting crime and maintaining order: shared worldviews of civilian and military elites in Brazil and Mexico

Abstract

Domestic internal security missions have become a centrepiece of Brazil and Mexico’s counter-narcotic efforts. Relying on a set of interviews, this article addresses narratives of elites engaged in the decision-making process and implementation of military operations to counter drug trafficking crimes in Rio de Janeiro and Tijuana. In spite of different levels of drug trafficking organisation and international ramification, this article points out the existence of shared narratives of growing insecurity and criminal strength in Brazil and Mexico, justifying state military reaction against a perceived national security threat. The article thus suggests the relevance of civil–military elites’ perception in defining public policies’ instruments and, ultimately, in upholding the militarisation of security in democratic regimes.     

State disintegration and power politics in post-Suharto Indonesia

This article illustrates how discourses on ‘state fragility’ have been instrumentalised by the Indonesian military in order to consolidate its political and economic power after the fall of Suharto. In the wake of Indonesia’s transition to democracy violent conflicts escalated in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, the Moluccas and Sulawesi. Most notably East Timor’s successful secession spawned fears over the potential ‘balkanisation’ of Indonesia. In this context the Indonesian military, which had been shunned for its involvement in Suharto’s New Order, managed to re-establish itself as the ‘guardian of the nation’. Based on fieldwork in Indonesia, the article describes how post-9/11 discourses over a potential break-up of Indonesia were used by the Indonesian military to reconsolidate its power in the post-Suharto era. The research findings illustrate that, against the looming threat of state disintegration, attempts to revoke the military’s prerogatives have either failed or have been aborted during the planning stages.