Does Legal Semiotics Cannibalize Jurisprudence?

Does Duncan Kennedy successfully cannibalize jurisprudence? He attempts to do it by demonstrating the inexistence of rightness in legal argumentation. If there is no right legal argument, then there is no right answer in adjudication, adjudication is not a rational enterprise and legal doctrine cannot be said to be a science. It can be shown that skepticism is self-defeating. Duncan Kennedy can avoid self defeat only because he actually believes in a lot of legal arguments. His thesis that judges decide questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators does not hold. Judicial reasoning is subject to constraints that do not affect legislators. It must be based on the sources of law and is limited by rules of procedure. Even when the judges have ‘interstitial’ legislative powers they are, unlike the legislator, bound to fit the system and their decisions are considered in procedure from the perspective of the right answer doctrine. The only work that can convincingly refute the skeptic argument against legal science is the reconstruction of jurisprudence as a scientific enterprise. Such work is beyond the scope of any single paper. The article aims to give some inspirations for such a task.     

Faith in the Court: Religious Out‐Groups and the Perceived Legitimacy of Judicial Decisions

The question of whether judges’ personal characteristics and values bias their decision making has long been debated, yet far less attention has been given to how personal characteristics affect public perceptions of bias in their decision making. Even genuinely objective judges may be perceived as procedurally biased by the public. We hypothesize that membership in a religious out‐group will elicit stronger public perceptions of biased decision making. Using a survey experiment that varies a judge's religious orientation and ruling in a hypothetical Establishment Clause case, we find strong evidence that judges’ religious characteristics affect the perceived legitimacy of their decisions. Identifying a judge as an atheist (a religious out‐group) decreases trust in the court, while identifying the judge as a committed Christian has no bearing on legitimacy. These results are even stronger among respondents who report attending church more often. Thus, we argue that perceptions of bias are conditioned on judges’ in‐group/out‐group status.     

In-house or in court? Legal challenges to university decisions

Every day, decisions are made in universities that affect students. When a decision adversely affects a particular student, what means of redress does that student have? The circumstances in which a student has a legal claim against their university are generally unclear. Courts have traditionally tended to draw a distinction between ‘purely academic’ decisions and disciplinary decisions. There has been reluctance on the part of courts to intervene in non-disciplinary decisions which involve academic judgment, for example, the grade to be given to a student's work. On the other hand, where the decisions are purely disciplinary, for example, in relation to a student's behaviour towards others or towards university property, the courts have made it clear that there is essentially no difference between this and disciplinary matters within any other public institution or organization. However, disciplinary decisions that are connected with allegations of academic misconduct, for example, cheating and/or plagiarism, have been more problematic for the courts. Historically, the debate was whether any such decision was justiciable in public law. Recently the question has also been whether an aggrieved student may succeed in a private law action against a university. The legal issues raised by university decisions affecting students have not yet been clearly resolved in all jurisdictions. Indeed, in some cases, judges have raised many more questions than they have answered. This article will review the framework for legal challenges to university decisions against a background of recent judicial attitudes in Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US.     

From Bail to Jail: The Effect of Jail Capacity on Bail Decisions

One of the more important decisions made by judges in the criminal justice system is the bail decision. Factors that judges take into consideration when making a bail decision, such as seriousness of the offense, flight risk, and public safety, are typically seen by researchers as the primary determinants of such a decision. However, one aspect that researchers have not studied extensively—rated jail capacity – could play an important role in a judge’s decision. Overcrowding in jails leads to numerous problems, both for the offender and the system itself, so judges may be more willing to release offenders into the community during the pretrial period if the local jails are overcrowded. The current study examines the effect of rated jail capacity on decisions regarding bail amounts, release on recognizance (ROR), financial release, and conditional release in eight Florida counties. Results indicate that rated jail capacity plays a role in judges’ bail decisions, suggesting that judges are concerned about housing more pretrial offenders in crowded jails.     

Why Fair Procedures Always Make a Difference

Section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (as inserted by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015) requires judges to refuse relief in judicial review of administrative decisions if it is ‘highly likely’ that the conduct complained of did not make a significant difference to the outcome of the decision. The strongest justification for this ‘Makes No Difference’ principle is provided by a ‘narrow instrumental view’ of fair procedures, according to which their value lies only in their producing the correct outcome. This conception of procedural fairness, however, is impoverished and flawed as a matter of political morality. Fair procedures reflect a conception of citizens as participants in their own governance and play an important communicative role in democratic legal orders. Inasmuch as it leaves no room for these aspects of the value of fair procedures, the Makes No Difference principle embodied in section 31(2A) is pro tanto unjust.     

An Acquittal for Epistemicism

Scott Soames argues that consideration of the practice of legal judgement gives us good reason to favor the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory of vagueness against epistemicism. Despite the fact that the value of power-delegation through vagueness is evidenced in practice, Soames says, epistemicism cannot account for it theoretically, while the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory is capable of it. In this paper, I examine the two possible arguments against epistemicism that can be extracted from Soames’s account: (1) an argument based on unknown obligations, and (2) an argument based on power-delegation through vagueness. The first argument tries to convince us that, as based on epistemicism, the law has already decided the borderline cases, so that judges have obligatory decisions even in such cases: therefore epistemicism is inconsistent with the discretion of judges in borderline cases. I show that even if we sympathize with Soames’s intuitions concerning the legal practice, the argument he offers is not conclusive since it is either invalid, unsound, or paradoxical. The second argument holds that only the gaps which the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory predicts give judges the possibility of lawmaking in borderline cases. However, by categorizing the vague laws as imperfect laws, the judges can claim the right of lawmaking without any need to refer to gaps in the law. By neutralizing these arguments, I argue that epistemicism is able to explain the phenomena just as well as the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory.     

Judges as Readers,Authors and Dialecticians: Legal Interpretation in the EC<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis>HR Cases on Mental Disability

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.     

Potential Impact of Research on Adolescent Development on Juvenile Judge Decision‐making

This paper discusses how biological and psychological literature on the developmental differences between juveniles and adults may affect juvenile judges in their “dual role” as retributive and rehabilitative decision‐makers in juvenile cases, specifically focusing on sentencing. Particularly, it discusses potential influences of this research on adolescent development regarding four factors known to be integral in juvenile judge decision‐making: legal factors, characteristics of juvenile offenders, and individual structural and social contexts in which judges’ decisions are made. To conclude, implications and recommendations stemming from this discussion are considered.     

The Role of Panels in Enhancing Legal Predictability

This article considers the justification for using panels of judges to make decisions in common law systems. The usual argument is that panels are more likely than lone judges to make correct judgments. This article suggests an additional justification: panels increase the law's predictability, so potential litigants can anticipate correctly which legal rules will apply in their cases. Three models, each with a different conception of the legal process, are employed to demonstrate the predictability-enhancing effect of panels. Comparison of the models suggests the effect is strongest when precedent has a substantial impact on how judges make decisions.     

Just Cognition: Scientific Research on Bias and Some Implications for Legal Procedure and Decision‐Making

Common law judges have traditionally been concerned about bias and the appearance of bias. Bias is believed to threaten the administration of justice and the legitimacy of legal decision‐making, particularly public confidence in the courts. This article contrasts legal approaches to bias with a range of biases, particularly cognitive biases, familiar to scientists who study human cognition and decision‐making. Research reveals that judges have narrowly conceived the biases that threaten legal decision‐making, insisting that some potential sources of bias are not open to review and that they are peculiarly resistant to bias through legal training and judicial experience. This article explains how, notwithstanding express concern with bias, there has been limited legal engagement with many risks known to actually bias decision‐making. Through examples, and drawing upon scientific research, it questions legal approaches and discusses the implications of more empirically‐based approaches to bias for decision making and institutional legitimacy.     

THE ROLE CONCEPT IN JUDICIAL RESEARCH

This article addresses the state of research which uses role concepts to explain the process of making decisions in legal institutions. After identifying several important limitations of previous research, a new scale—measuring normative orientations toward discretion—is proposed. The results of administering this scale to samples of Iowa and California judges suggest that the measure is fairly reliable, and an argument is made in favor of its validity. The article concludes with some observations on the importance of measurement in research on the legal process.     

Bias in the Family: Race,Ethnicity, and Culture in Custody Disputes

This essay examines the role of racial, ethnic, and cultural bias in custody cases. It analyzes cases where the court explicitly considered the parents’ racial, ethnic, or cultural background and cases where the court did not acknowledge these factors but where it is clear from the court's opinion that biases influenced its decision. It then briefly describes the literature on implicit bias to demonstrate how biases may influence the assessments of custody evaluators, lawyers, and judges despite best efforts to make fair and impartial decisions. Drawing on studies suggesting that individuals can reduce their implicit biases and their effects on decision making, the essay explores individual strategies and institutional reforms to address bias in custody disputes.     

Judges’ sentencing decisions with older offenders

Older offenders tend to be treated with more leniency in the criminal justice system. A number of studies show that older offenders are less likely to be incarcerated, and when they are incarcerated, are more likely to receive shorter sentences. However, to date, no research has directly examined why such leniency occurs. This study asked U.S. state trial court judges to reflect on their sentencing practices with older offenders and to rate the factors considered most important when sentencing this population. Responses were received from 212 judges. Only 31% of judges acknowledged treating older offenders with greater leniency. These judges also indicated that they predominantly rely on legal factors when making decisions about sentencing with older offenders rather than factors specifically associated with age. Only cognitive impairment was identified by judges as one of the five most important factors to consider when sentencing older offenders. These results are discussed in terms of judges’ awareness of how they weigh information to make legal decisions. The influence of judges’ age and attitudes about aging on sentencing decisions are also explored.     

The ‘Heathrow’ Case: Polycentricity,Legislation, and the Standard of Review

The recent Court of Appeal decision in the ‘Heathrow’ case, Plan B Earth v Secretary of State for Transport is an illustration of the challenges of reviewing polycentric and expert decision-making. The issues raised in the case concerning the Planning Act 2008 are an illustration of a court's expository role in such contexts. The Court tackled directly a series of interpretive questions concerning the Planning Act 2008's obligations regarding the consideration of climate change. The Habitats and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive issues raised in the appeal, in contrast, were presented with the question of the intensity of review foregrounded in legal argument. The Court therefore sought to articulate the ‘standard of review’ and to apply it to the government's decisions. This way of framing the issue unfortunately sidelined the courts’ expository role in relation to intepreting the Habitats and SEA Directives, leaving key provisions under-analysed.     

Dyzenhaus on Positivism and Judicial Obligation

Abstract
The author criticizes the argument in Dyzenhaus (1991) that a study of South African judicial decisions establishes the superiority of Dworkinian anti-positivism over legal positivism. Among the claims criticized are: (1) Positivism and anti-positivism each imply a specific theory of judicial duty, and the decisions of South African judges are explained by their adherence to one or the other of these theories; (2) resistance to South African government policy was morally required of judges; (3) the only theory which supports this resistance (anti-positivism) is therefore the correct one; (4) the cases establish that judges do not have discretion in hard cases; (5) Dworkin's theory does not imply that South African judges are required to apply the wicked principles embedded in their legal system; (6) positivism involves a pragmatic contradiction.     

Judicial discretion and sentencing disparity in adult felony courts in Israel

This study focuses on a series of legal, extralegal, and systemic variables presumed to affect the workings of criminal-justice systems. These variables are employed first to analyze the decision of the court to refer defendants for presentence investigation when such a referral is not mandatory, then to examine how these referrals, once made, influence disposition. The relationship of legal representation to disposition is also explored.The findings contradict conventional wisdom regarding the advantages to defendants of legal representation and of presentence reports. Lawyers do not appear to influence either referral or sentencing. The presentence reports are requested by judges seeking to individualize their sentencing decisions, but this process of individualization is as likely to result in harsher sentences as in greater leniency.     

On the Frontlines: Making Decisions in Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits

This article looks at forty-two decisions in civil pollution cases in China as a window onto judges' political logic and the accompanying implications for environmental enforcement. The starting point is a typology of judicial decision making in one-party states based on two dimensions of decisions: the degree of legal formality (e.g., how closely judges adhere to the letter of the law) and individual autonomy (e.g., judges' power to make decisions in individual cases). Mapping pollution decisions onto this typology highlights shifting judicial strategy. While Chinese judges typically comply with instructions when the political pressure is dialed up, a combination of shifting incentives, uncertainty about the law, and political ambiguity can also allow de facto discretion in low-profile, run-of-the-mill cases. Everyday cases tend to cluster under the rubric of "rough justice" in which judges weigh competing political priorities and aim for a livable compromise that dents but upholds the status quo. This sample of cases also shows judges occasionally innovating at the margins by offering new legal interpretations or validating new types of claims. Although Chinese courts remain weak tools for environmental protection, limited innovation suggests that they can help nudge along local incremental social change.     

Judges as satisficers: a law and economics perspective on judicial liability

If judges are guardians of the law, who is to protect the individual member of society from the occasional corrupt, malicious, or reckless judge? The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to the last part of this question, focusing more heavily on cases of negligently inflicted harm. Departing from Simon’s bounded rationality and influenced by other constructs in behavioral law and economics, we view judges as satisficers who make decisions within real-world constraints, such as imperfect information and uncertainty, cognitive limitations and erroneous information. Judges are limited by the commonly observed barriers to the decision making process. Because their goal is not to optimize but to render opinions that are merely satisfactory, they often act as poor agents of their principals’ interests. In this light, it becomes clearer why judges tend to engage in behavior that is “improper”, especially under the circumstances of the currently overloaded judicial caseloads. We first address the differences in judges’ roles in Anglo-American and Continental legal systems. We then present our simple model for judicial misbehavior based on an understanding of judges as “satisficers”. Next we discuss the particularities of judicial errors and introduce a realistic and viable construct of “inexcusable judicial error”. On this basis we evaluate the impact of various incentive schemes on judicial behavior, focusing on the civil liability of judges. We conclude that civil liability for grave judicial errors is the most adequate remedy.     

司法裁决的后果主义论证

后果主义论证是法律论证的一种形式,是实现合理的司法裁判和证成裁决结论的重要要素。司法中后果主义论证关注不同裁判方式所带来的可能后果,通过评判不同的后果来选择裁决结论。与一般情境中的后果论不同,司法裁决的后果主义论证主要出现在法官为正当化案件裁判所进行的二次证明中,它是基于可欲后果的证立,这种可欲后果是裁决的逻辑后果或一般后果。     

The Influence of Administrative Law Judge and Political Appointee Decisions on Appellate Courts in National Labor Relations Board Cases

Scholars have long been simultaneously concerned with the factors that influence appellate court decision making and the level of deference that the courts allow for agencies. However, scholars have treated administrative agencies as unitary actors with a single level of decision making, but in reality agency decisions involve input from multiple actors within the agency. I argue that appellate courts rely more heavily on decisions made by actors in the bureaucracy with greater levels of expertise and who are less politically motivated as cues in their decision making. This theory is bolstered by legal precedent in the area of administrative law that suggests courts should more heavily rely on the expert judgment of administrative judges. Thus, as a result of their increased expertise, appearance of political neutrality, and institutional support, courts will be more reliant on decisions issued by administrative law judges (ALJs) than those issued by the political appointees as cues in their decision making. Using over 300 unfair labor practice decisions issued by the federal appeals courts on review of cases from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), I develop a model of appeals court decision making in unfair labor practice cases as a function of the initial decision of the ALJ, the final order of the political appointees of the NLRB, case characteristics, the ideology of the deciding appeals court panel, Supreme Court influence, and economic factors. Though the ideology of the court plays a role in its decision making, cues from ALJ decision making and that of the Board weigh more heavily in appellate court outcomes. However, cues from ALJ decisions play the most consistent role in appellate court decision making, even in more difficult cases. This has important implications for agency strategy in courts and suggests that future research should consider the influence of lower‐level decision making over appellate court decision making in the area of administrative law.