Performance Measurement in Budgeting: A Study of County Governments

This article focuses on the use of performance measurement in public budgeting. Based on a national survey of county governments, it finds that governments use performance measurement in a wide range of budgeting areas. The results also show that performance measurement users are experiencing technical obstacles in conducting performance analysis and obtaining support from legislatures and citizens. The article concludes that analytical competency and political support increase the use of performance measurement in budgeting, which leads to a more efficient, effective, and accountablegovernment.     

Budgetary constraints and municipal revenue forecasting

Conclusion The objective of this research has been to determine whether key budget participants see forecasting as making significant contributions to the budgetary process. The issue is important for at least two reasons. Budgetary tools will be used to the degree budget players perceive them as providing net budgettary benefits. Moreover, the continuing trend toward technological sophistication gives governments opportunities, red herrings or not, to incorporate the technology into the budget process. The issue is also very timely; with the demise of packaged budget reforms but not the values of budget reforms, there may be new opportunities for improving budgeting on a less grandiose, more piecemeal basis, such as using forecasts to analyze budgetary options. The findings here provide some insight into two questions concerning governmental forecasting. First, why do governments use complex methods? In support of previous research, since cities most dependent on intergovernmental aid tend to use complex forecasting, such methods may indeed be seen as a way to help cope with fiscal stress. Also, reflecting the ambiguity of current research, since cities tend to use relatively simple techniques regardless of the revenue source being forecasted, the source is at best a partial determinant of complexity. The most important predictor of complexity, however, was budget format; cities that emphasize reform methods, especially planning, tend to use the most complex forecast methods. The forecasting process was not as important as expected.Second, so what? Does forecasting influence budgetary choices? The evidence from the second part of the study suggest that it can, but within definable limits. Budget directors are more likely than councils to value outyear estimates, but both actors are much less likely to value long-term estimates. The survey results also indicate that revenue forecasts are not as useful for making political decisions as for making management decisions: the forecast is usually used as an internal document, is only sometimes intended to affect council decisions, and is not usually included in the budget. In short, the forecast may be most useful for making managerial decisions since that is what most cities want out of it. It also tends to be more useful if the budget format is less traditional. Finally, the findings indicate that forecasting may be more useful to management to the degree the council finds it politically useful. This is extremely important since it suggests that as powerful as technology may be, budgetary tools that do not meet political needs will be managerially confined.Clearly, more research is needed in this area. Does forecasting actually shape long-range plans? In the long run, will the forecasting effort change the ways cities budget? Can the availability of forecasting information strengthen one actor relative to another? These are important questions that need answering to clarify the impact of forecasting and other technologies on the budget process.     

Budget Procedures and the Size of the Budget: Evidence from Danish Local Government

This paper analyzes procedural influences on budgetary outcomes in Danish local government. By analyzing local governments the study can remedy two shortcomings of most procedural budget studies. The first is that most studies analyze national budget procedures, which means that only a limited and quite heterogeneous number of cases can be analyzed. The second and more fundamental shortcoming in most studies is the lack of a distinction between political institutions and budget institutions. Although this distinction is difficult to establish for empirical analysis at the national level, it is immediately clear when dealing with local governments. The paper tests a number of hypotheses on procedural influences. It finds that budget institutions have no certain effects on budget outcomes in the preparatory phase. However, in the implementation phase budget institutions seem to matter.     

Financing Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost‐Sharing

Before this study, much of the research on interlocal collaboration has focused broadly on interlocal service agreements, of which interlocal cost‐sharing is but one dimension. This study is one of the first to examine the nature of interlocal cost‐sharing agreements for a specific (and critically important) functional area. A mail survey of Florida city and county finance officers finds that the most common interlocal cost‐sharing partnership is between local general purpose governments rather than with local special purpose governments. The strongest incentives for interlocal cost‐sharing are (1) inadequate funding for emergency management in a jurisdiction's capital budget, (2) the perceived inadequacy of federal and/or state homeland security funding, and (3) greater faith in horizontal (local‐to‐local) than vertical (federal‐state‐local) intergovernmental agreements. The research also highlights the importance of asking fiscal condition survey questions in a more functionally specific manner rather than as an “overall fiscal condition” question.     

Incrementalism in Appropriations: Small Aggregation,Big Changes

U.S. federal budget dynamics, as a major attribute of the legislative and bureaucratic decision‐making processes, increasingly calls into question the scholarly focus on incrementalism. What constitutes a “small” change is largely unspecified in previous research that has also been unable to assess incrementalism across multiple levels of aggregation. Using a unique budgetary database, this article analyzes whether budgetary changes are in fact “small” at different levels of aggregation. Surprisingly, a low proportion of changes are small by any logical standard. During most years, more than one‐fifth of budgetary changes are greater than 50 percent, and nearly half are more than 10 percent. The level of aggregation is also important for assessing whether political variables influence incrementalism. A salient finding: change in party control reflects greater influence within micro‐level budget decisions, while divided government manifests more impact on aggregate‐level budget decisions.     

Organizational design and its consequences for administrative reform: Historical lessons from the U.S. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

The landmark U.S. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (BAA) instituted a series of administrative reforms that proponents claimed would improve budgetary control, stability, and coherence. We maintain that the compatibility of governance structures between agency and system levels is critical for understanding why these administrative centralization efforts were successful in achieving these aims for some federal agencies but not others. The BAA reforms impact on budgetary outcomes is evaluated using panel data on major U.S. federal agencies between 1894 and 1940. Applying semiparametric heterogeneous treatment estimation techniques, we find compelling support that administrative centralization of the federal budgetary process enhanced budget stability and coherence for executive departments while resulting in a lower caliber of budgetary performance for independent agencies. These findings imply that system‐level administrative centralization efforts may be effective only when public agencies are structurally amenable to such reforms.     

Performance Measurement and Budget Balancing: State Government Perspective

This research assesses the perspectives of budget officers and agency personnel in state governments about performance measurement applicability for budgeting purposes. Results show that both perspectives consider performance measurement use effective for improving communication, increasing awareness about results, improving service quality, and changing strategies to reach certain results. Then again, the use of performance information is not found as effective, often not at all, for cost or program cutting, or for changing spending levels. This suggests that while today's governors might need to temper their expectations regarding the usefulness of performance initiatives to support budget balancing in the short run, they should remain steadfast in promoting performance measurement applicability for the long-term benefits recognized by both budgeters and agency staff.     

Analyzing How Local Governments Establish Service Priorities

Resource limitations and increasing citizen expectations are causing decisionmakers to reexamine existing approaches to establishing priorities in the funding of governmental services. Using local governments as a contextual example, this article investigates the decision making processes used by Texas cities The research seeks to understand the role different budgetary frameworks, i.e., incremental, performance and community values, play in resource allocation. Factors such as the budget sequence, the participants and the reference sources are considered to better understand local budget deliberations. This research indicates that a mixed or hybrid framework (any combination of the incremental, performance and community values approaches) dominates decision making in Texas cities. That is, most cities attempt to incorporate the politicalness of incrementalism, the results orientation of the performance framework, and the utility maximization desired under the community values framework. Results from this research indicate that Texas cities are moving away from a single framework orientation as a rule and are incorporating more rational and participative aspects into their budget process. This refutes common wisdom on this topic and suggests a more complicated approach to decision making that emphasizes the injection of more objective performance-related data, as well as the subjective perceptions of non-traditionally dominant participant groups.     

Performance Measurement in U.S. Counties: Capacity for Reform

This study examines the capacity of U.S. counties to undertake performance measurement. Based on a national survey of counties with populations over 50,000, the authors address the following questions: To what extent do counties implement performance measurement? Which capacities must be present for different levels of implementation and success? What can counties do to increase their capacity for performance measurement? And, what is the effect of county structure and functions on the use of performance measurement? This study finds that the success of performance measurement is greatly affected by counties' underlying organizational capacities.     

政府整体绩效评价:理论假说及其实证检验——以2008年度广东省为例

政府绩效评价是公共管理及政府管理创新的前沿课题。作为一个全新的范畴,政府整体绩效评价具有典型的本土特色。社会主义历史条件下,我国地方政府整体绩效评价构成了民意表达的基本路径,具有民主导向与技术完善的双重功能。本文提出了政府整体绩效评价结果导向的理论假设,并依据既定的技术方案,基于独立第三方立场和公众满意度导向,利用2008年度针对广东省地方政府整体绩效评价及公众满意度调查的系统数据,检验理论假设的科学性与合理性。研究表明,我国地方政府整体绩效评价是公民对政府表现的综合评价,其过程承担民意表达的功能,其结果将成为民主政治发展和行政体制改革的内在动力。     

Earmarking as a Strategy Against Budgetary Constraints: San Francisco's Children's Amendment

The passage and implementation of the San Francisco Children's Amendment, or Proposition J, in 1991 represents an important expansion of the increasingly common strategy of budgetary earmarking by human service organizations. The core of the initiative was a city charter amendment that earmarked a portion of existing property taxes and established a baseline budget for children's services. Of these provisions, the baseline budget has proven most important in preserving children's services and preventing any substitution effects in a time of increasing fiscal stress for the city/ county of San Francisco. This case also illustrates the role of a strong political appeal in passing technical budgetary initiatives over the objections of elected officials and others. While there was concern about the reduced flexibility created by earmarking a city's budget during a period of retrenchment, this concern was overlooked because of the overwhelming political support for the children's cause. However, conflict between groups was created by the measure as groups fought to be included in the provisions of the amendment and over whether each group had obtained its fair share of funding.     

Deficits, Soft Budget Constraints and Bailouts: Budgeting after the Norwegian Hospital Reform

In the 1990s, the Norwegian hospital sector was characterized by soft budgetary constraints and increasing budget deficits. This was one of the main antecedents of the 2002 hospital reform, where the central state took over ownership of the hospitals from the counties. Arguably, the centralization of ownership, financing and production would harden the budget constraints and increase the budgetary discipline. This analysis shows that this has not been accomplished. Instead, the production has been far above what was planned, and the deficits higher than ever. Two stages of the post-reform budget processes are analyzed: first, the stage where the central state set the budgets and sends signals of budgetary rules (whether the state sends signals of soft or hard budget constraints), and second, how the central state handled deficits in the hospital sector as they emerged (whether the hospitals was bailed out or not). The conclusion is that the central state neither set a hard budget constraint nor managed to stay firm as deficits turned up. It is argued that three mechanisms explain the prevailing problems of managing the hospital sector: uncertainty of the hospitals' financial situation during the transition phase; minority governments; and specific features related to the organization of the budgetary process in parliament.     

Managerial Necessity and the Art of Creating Surpluses: The Budget-Execution Process in West Virginia Cities

Budget execution traditionally has been defined as a straightforward process of implementing the budget as approved. Research into the process has been limited, particularly with regard to local government budgets. This article examines the rebudgeting process using a case study of 15 West Virginia cities. Rebudgeting displayed a consistent pattern for the various budget categories—personnel, contracts, commodities, capital, and contributions—closely resembling the "increase-then-decrease" pattern seen in the overall budget. Empirical data on budgetary adjustments and structured interviews with city finance officials helped to describe budget changes and explain probable causes and effects of behavior during budget execution for these smaller cities. Budget changes were found to be the result of managerial necessity and the exercise of discretion to generate and distribute surpluses.     

When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy

U.S. cities are limited in their ability to set policy. Can these constraints mute the impact of mayors’ partisanship on policy outcomes? We hypothesize that mayoral partisanship will more strongly affect outcomes in policy areas where there is less shared authority between local, state, and federal governments. To test this hypothesis, we create a novel dataset combining U.S. mayoral election returns from 1990 to 2006 with city fiscal data. Using regression discontinuity design, we find that cities that elect a Democratic mayor spend a smaller share of their budget on public safety, a policy area where local discretion is high, than otherwise similar cities that elect a Republican or an Independent. We find no differences on tax policy, social policy, and other areas that are characterized by significant overlapping authority. These results suggest that models of national policymaking are only partially applicable to U.S. cities. They also have implications for political accountability: mayors may not be able to influence the full range of policies that are nominally local responsibilities.     

Performance Measurement in State Budgeting: Advancement and Backsliding from 1990 to 1995

Performance measurement has been one of the dominant themes of budget reform in the 1990s and has been prevalent in the mainstream of budgeting since the 1950s. Given the attention that performance measurement has had nationally, states might be expected to have made major strides in this arena in recent years. The article considers the current status of performance measurement practices, and identifies both advancement and backsliding made by states between 1990 and 1995. The discussion is based on data obtained from surveys of state budget offices in those two years. Indexes of performance measurement were constructed, and these became the bases of regression analyses using independent variables pertaining to state characteristics. Generally, these analyses were unsuccessful in explaining the variations among the states. The findings underscore the diversity among the states in their budgetary practices and the fact that budget reform, in the sense of increased use of performance measurement, is not necessarily achieved in a straight line of progression. The article considers possible explanations for the changes.     

Fiscal Federalism, European Stability Pact, and Municipal Investment Finance: A Microdata Analysis of Spanish Municipalities

In countries where subnational governments control a large partof the public finances, the central government's ability tokeep its commitment to the European Union's Stability and GrowthPact can be a difficult matter. European rules demand that theoverall budget be balanced over the medium term; applying thisrule at subcentral level may unduly reduce capital outlays andlocal budgetary autonomy. This article examines the possibleimpact of budgetary stability legislation on the capital expenditureof Spanish municipalities. The empirical findings suggest thatthe new budgetary stability framework will oblige municipalitiesto (i) limit their investments, (ii) raise the tax burden, or(iii) reduce the funds allocated to other budget items. We believethe Spanish municipal experience is generalizable to other federalcountries in Europe that are facing hard budget constraintsand high earmarked grants.     

Legislative influences in Japanese budgetary politics

Following World War II (W.W.II), Japan adopted a democratic parliamentary system. Since its formation in 1955 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had monopolized Japanese legislature (Diet) for over 35 years. However, it is said that at the center of the budgetary process was the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Elite bureaucrats rather than politicians are typically seen as the agenda-setter. The action of politicians, in particular members of the LDP, to influence the budgetary resource allocation has been largely unexamined. This paper empirically examines the influence of the LDP on the supplementary budget formation and on the revenue-sharing. We find that the LDP had a significant impact on the budget formation. Further, we find that the LDP manipulated transfers from the central government to local governments presumably to maintain its electoral positions.     

Performance-Comparison Projects in Local Government: Participants' Perspectives

How do officials of participating local governments assess the value of their involvement in performance‐comparison projects, including related costs and benefits? In this article, three prominent projects involving city and county governments are examined from the perspective of the participants themselves, revealing gaps between high expectations and subsequent results, but nevertheless suggesting an array of benefits for participants.     

Litigation Costs, Budget Impacts, and Cost Containment Strategies: Evidence from California Cities

Litigation costs are straining many municipalities' budgets and creating more uncertainty and flux in their annual budgetary processes. A 1996 mail survey of California cities conducted by the League of California Cities, to which 210 cities (45 percent) responded, shows that the level of litigation-driven budgetary strain is intensifying. The budgetary impacts of litigation have been quite substantial, no matter whether measured in terms of overall impact, percent increase, frequency and magnitude of budget amendments, actual dollar costs, or the tendency to settle cases just to save money. Population size makes a lot of difference in the level and type of impact as well as the cost containment strategies implemented by a city. Generally, the larger the city (and the more diverse), the greater the strain litigation costs have put on the budget. A higher percentage of big cities (over 100,000) than smaller ones blame rising costs on police liability, personal injury, civil rights, tort, Americans With Disabilities Act, Fourteenth Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims. Frivolous cases are a problem for cities of all sizes. So, too, are the rising incidences of rights-related cases being filed against cities by their own employees as well as private individuals. This trend will likely increase as the nation's population ages and diversifies ethnically and racially.     

PBB in American Local Governments: It's More than a Management Tool

Despite academic findings that performance information seldom is used in appropriations decisions, many professional organizations and governments continue to press for integrating performance information into local public management, planning, and budgeting processes. Is it possible to reconcile such inconsistencies? Looking beyond the executive–legislative relationship and departmental appropriations, the author examines the budget implications of applying performance information at the subdepartmental program level. Case analysis of Indianapolis’s IndyStat initiative underscores that performance measurement application is positively related to intradepartmental program budget changes. Hence, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) can improve local budgeting despite severe political constraints. Still, successful use of PBB requires strong executive leadership, and its effects remain less visible at the departmental level or within the wider political arena of legislative bargaining. The author concludes by recommending some rethinking of the current analytical focus of PBB both in future research as well as recommended practice.