Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission

This study examines the unfair trade decisions of the InternationalTrade Commission (ITC) and how they have been affected by Congress.It begins by identifying the means Congress can use to influenceITC decisions and then estimates both the extent to which thesemeans have been used and the extent to which they have shaped theITC's behavior. The study reaches two conclusions. First, Congresshas tried to shape the ITC's behavior, but it has not tried tomicromanage this behavior. Second, while the ITC's behavior hasbeen influenced by Congress, congressional influence is not asimportant as other factors, such as statutory criteria.     

The ideological nationalization of partisan subconstituencies in the American States

Since the mid-twentieth century, elite political behavior in the United States has become much more nationalized. In Congress, for example, within-party geographic cleavages have declined, roll-call voting has become more one-dimensional, and Democrats and Republicans have diverged along this main dimension of national partisan conflict. The existing literature finds that citizens have only weakly and belatedly mimicked elite trends. We show, however, that a different picture emerges if we focus not on individual citizens, but on the aggregate characteristics of geographic constituencies. Using biennial estimates of the economic, racial, and social policy liberalism of the average Democrat and Republican in each state over the past six decades, we demonstrate a surprisingly close correspondence between mass and elite trends. Specifically, we find that: (1) ideological divergence between Democrats and Republicans has widened dramatically within each domain, just as it has in Congress; (2) ideological variation across senators’ partisan subconstituencies is now explained almost completely by party rather than state, closely tracking trends in the Senate; and (3) economic, racial, and social liberalism have become highly correlated across partisan subconstituencies, just as they have across members of Congress. Overall, our findings contradict the reigning consensus that polarization in Congress has proceeded much more rapidly and extensively than polarization in the mass public.     

Mandating private pensions: experience in four European countries.

This study examines the experience of four countries--the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom--in which the mandating of private pensions exists or has been considered. Proposals to mandate private pensions in the United States have been introduced in Congress several times. The analysis of foreign thinking presented here provides a background on the reasoning behind such a policy and on the integration of private and public systems and the problems involved. A prime reason for mandating private pensions--instead of seeking higher social security benefits or additional social security layers--has been the pressure to avoid higher payroll taxes. Some countries already had such high contribution rates that they sought other means to improve benefits. Adding a layer of private pensions, it was thought, does not involve Government mechanisms and keeps the money in the private sector. Yet mandating by law creates many problems, and no country has fully implemented such legislation.     

Playing the Wrong PART: The Program Assessment Rating Tool and the Functions of the President's Budget

The extensive literature about the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) has not emphasized an issue that appears quite clearly in interviews with senior Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and congressional staff. Budget analysis can pursue efficiency in two ways. One, the object of traditional analysis, involves assessing programs to understand the ratio of inputs to outputs within an agency, and thus the effects of more or less funding. Another approach, termed “budgeting for results,” measures program performance so as to allocate funding among programs in a way that increases total welfare. The second approach is much more difficult because it necessitates comparison of measures of unlike phenomena, requires expertise that often does not exist, and is more easily contested as invoking values rather than facts. Both congressional and OMB sources report concerns that PART weakened budget analysis by diverting resources from traditional analysis. If one goal of reformers is for the OMB to provide analysis that will influence Congress, the focus should be on strengthening the capacity to do traditional budget analysis.     

Re-centring British Government: Beliefs, Traditions and Dilemmas in Political Science

Bevir and Rhodes have offered a useful addition to the tools of political scientists by developing an interpretivist approach to political science. Interpretation is a crucial mechanism for understanding the social world but one that has been underused in political analysis. This article welcomes Bevir and Rhodes' emphasis on interpretivism but suggests that there are a number of problems in the way they use the approach. In particular: they use a narrow definition of interpretivism; they caricature the nature of existing work in political science; the concept of tradition does too much work; and they pay insufficient attention to power and power relations.     

Changing minds? Not in Congress!

This paper shows a variety of evidence that members of Congress are ideologically consistent. Based upon the roll call voting record, once elected to Congress, members adopt a consistent ideological position and maintain it over time. There may be changing minds, but they are not in Congress.     

The power to make war: Congress' search for an effective role

In the heat of Vietnam and Watergate, Congress sought to develop a more effective role in decisions about the use of the armed forces in combat or in potential combat situations. The War Powers Resolution passed in November 1973 was the solution Congress devised to this problem. But the War Powers Resolution has fallen well short of the hoped-for partnership; the most momentous issue to confront the nation-to wage war or not to wage war-still does not effectively engage Congress. Whether such a role is possible for Congress in a system that is built on checks and balances is quite uncertain. Some improvements over the present situation are proposed; but it remains evident that the power to make war will rest primarily in the office of the president.     

EXPANDING THE LIMITS OF POWER: The Federal Reserve and the Implementation of Functional Regulation in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Era

Research on bureaucratic behavior suggests that agencies are more likely to use the implementation process to extend their power and influence under particular circumstances. I argue that when an agency has been delegated considerable power by Congress, but provided only vague guidance on how to implement this authority, an atmosphere of uncertainty and competition is created. Under such a circumstance the agency will feel pressured to further extend its power in order to defend its regulatory turf against competitors and protect the authority it was delegated. I test this proposition by examining the behavior of the Federal Reserve as it implements the functional regulation provisions of the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act. Evidence from the Federal Reserve's dealings with the Securities and Exchange Commission during the approval of the Schwab – U. S. Trust merger provides evidence that the Fed is indeed acting to extend its power and influence.     

Congressional dysfunction: An information processing perspective

The public's approval of Congress is at an all time low. The parties seem to have taken the legislative process hostage for their own electoral gain. Whereas traditional arguments about congressional dysfunction focus on polarized voting coalitions or outputs – particularly legislation – in this article we highlight congressional information processing and how it has changed in this highly partisan era. By coding congressional hearings according to the kind of information on which they focus, we find that members of Congress are receiving one‐sided information to a greater degree and are spending less time learning about potential solutions. We use these results to make numerous recommendations for improving how Congress gathers its information.     

The Political Origins of the Financial Crisis: The Domestic and International Politics of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

For much of the last decade it was clear that the commercial operations of the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were creating an increasing systemic financial risk. That risk was compounded by the fact that the Japanese and Chinese central banks were acting as cheap creditors. The Bush administration and some Republicans in Congress made efforts from 2001 to create a tougher regulatory framework for Fannie and Freddie. Fannie and Freddie were able to defeat these attempts to constrain their operations by a four-fold political strategy involving campaign contributions to members of Congress, a vast lobbying apparatus, the cultivation of a political language around affordable housing for minorities, and abusing and smearing their regulator. Since Japan and China understood that the US government would have to assume Fannie and Freddie's liabilities in a crisis they had no incentive to expose the political fiction that it would not.     

"Conquered Provinces"? The Voting Rights Act and State Power

Congress will soon review key provisions of the Voting RightsAct (VRA). A perennial concern has been the act's effect onfederalism. In 1982, Congress amended the VRA both to preventdiscriminatory electoral outcomes and to enhance minority politicalpower. Since the 1990s, the Supreme Court has adjudicated theVRA in a way that limits states' use of race to protect thatpower. An informal alliance has since emerged between Congress,the Justice Department, states, and minority voters againstwhat they view as a retrogressive voting rights jurisprudence.This article will argue that Congress should restore state autonomyto use race as a remedial factor when districting by reaffirmingthe spirit and intent of the 1982 amendments.     

Congress, the Deficit, and Budget Reconciliation

President Clinton's veto of the 1995 reconciliation bill, the largest and most ambitious such legislation ever passed by Congress, was the first time a reconciliation bill was ever rejected by a president. It was also the first reconciliation bill in two decades to include a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. The fate of this bill, and its scope and contents, suggest the need to assess the evolution of reconciliation within the congressional budget process. In the early 1980s, Congress altered budget reconciliation procedures, putting in place a powerful new capability for deficit reduction. Reconciliation became the primary means within the budget process of restraining entitlement spending and increasing taxes as part of congressional efforts to reduce the deficit. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings magnified certain problems Congress encountered in using reconciliation to control entitlements, producing increased pressure to cut discretionary spending. While the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 included new authority to use reconciliation to restrain entitlements, congressional spending priorities combined with the Peace Dividend to maintain the relative sanctuary entitlement programs have enjoyed. The limits of reconciliation as a deficit reduction tool, both in terms of increasing revenues and curtailing entitlements, are detailed. The inherent procedural advantages accorded to entitlements are contrasted with the treatment of discretionary programs, explaining in part the widening gulf between these two categories of spending. Congress has attempted, without success, to find alternatives to reconciliation. The failure of the seven-year, deficit-eliminating reconciliation bill of 1995 may indicate that certain Limits on the use of reconciliation may have been reached.     

孙中山五权宪制中的国民大会

国民大会是孙中山后期五权宪制架构中的一个重要权力结构。从这一结构所承载的功能来看，它首先是一种“民主”的制度安排；同时，作为中央政制中针对政府权力的“结构性制约因素”，它又具有“宪政”的意义。章力图分析这一机构所折射出的政治理念的基本取向及其自身存在的问题。     

Modelling Online Innovation Among IR and Politics Lecturers

This article discusses the use of collaborative online technology in the teaching of international relations and politics. Using a case study from Australia, it finds low levels of online innovation in these discipline areas that correlate with broader examinations of technology use in higher education teaching. Themes of time poverty, technical competence, and lack of career reward are frequently cited as barriers to trying new approaches. The data indicate that at present the most common outcome of any aspiration for IR/politics staff considering innovation is that the effort required to incorporate collaborative online learning is not repaid. These findings are meaningful, since the current lack of innovation and the perceptions of staff regarding support for such approaches are at odds with the marketplace pressures staff and their institutions are under. Based upon the data collected and the wider literature on technology adoption, this article proposes a “Technology-Assisted Teaching Adoption Model” (TATAM) that attempts to encapsulate the innovation judgements made by academic staff and the steadily diminishing incentives they feel towards changing their online teaching methods.     

Much Ado About Very Little: Reply to Herron

Mitchell S. Sanders Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556 e-mail: msander1{at}nd.edu While Herron (2004, Political Analysis 12:182–190) iscorrect that sensitivity to changes in underlying scale andhow they affect estimates and inferences is generally important,our assumption in Rothenberg and Sanders (2000, American Journalof Political Science 44:310–319) that W-NOMINATE scalescan be directly compared from one Congress to another to studylegislative shirking is quite defensible because scale variabilityis not a substantial problem. Not only are the assumptions inour original analysis regarding variability very reasonable,because any variability is quite small, but effects on consistencyare marginal and, to the degree that they are relevant, indicatethat our test of the shirking hypothesis is conservative. Furthermore,even generous estimates of variability in W-NOMINATE betweenone immediate Congress and another have little impact on results.In addition, Herron's analysis includes an unaddressed censoringproblem that again, while unlikely to have much substantiverelevance, indicates that Rothenberg and Sanders have workedagainst themselves in trying to find shirking. In conclusion,the issues that Herron highlights are of marginal consequencefor the original analysis and, to the extent they matter, onlybuttress the findings generated and the inferences drawn.     

Further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth

Much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues, from an empirical perspective, that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy. In this paper, a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the Congress, the President, and one agency (we use the U.S. Federal Reserve as an extended example) can dictate policy outcomes. The results of the paper include the “Congressional Dominance” theorem: If more than 2/3 of House members, and more than 2/3 of Senate members, agree on something, they get it. The theorem is obvious (the “proof” is in the U.S. Constitution), but often forgotten in the substantive literature. More realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of Congress are more diverse. Powers of the President to influence policy with, and without, appointments are also analyzed.     

Marketing good works: new trends in how interest groups recruit supporters

Charities or interest groups need to attract supporters, who offer both financial support and participation, to achieve their overall goal of influencing public affairs. They can use political marketing to help them attract and retain such supporters. Existing literature indicates they use marketing techniques such as direct mail to communicate to potential new supporters, but new research has discovered that the influence of political marketing is much more comprehensive. The most effective groups are now using political marketing to design the package they offer to supporters. They go through a four‐stage process. First, they conduct market intelligence to understand what supporters want from the organisation and second, they design their product accordingly. Third, they communicate this to potential supporters and then finally deliver campaign progress and they communicate this to existing supporters. They use marketing concepts: they adopt a market orientation and build an organisation designed to take account of its users' needs and wants. Although such charities are often associated with non‐business behaviour, the most successful groups are adopting the concepts and techniques of comprehensive political marketing as the means to increase their influence on government and public affairs. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing

There has been much discussion about how members of Congressdesire money early in the campaign season. However, theoreticalmodels of how contributions are allocated during the electoralcycle have been lacking. Our analysis attempts to remedy thisgap by providing and testing a model which specifies how theprocess of bargaining between members of Congress and organizedinterests produces the pattern of donations observed over thecourse of the electoral cycle. Most notably, our results suggestthat strategic incumbents can receive money early in the campaignif they desire but that they are generally unwilling to paythe price of lower aggregate fundraising and greater provisionof access. These findings buttress earlier empirical findingsthat question the instrumental value of early money. In addition,our results highlight that contribution choices are fundamentallyinfluenced by short-term factors, especially electoral conditions,that do not lend themselves to the routinized behavior necessaryfor contributors to invest in incumbents for long-run payoffs.     

Tracing policy influence of diffuse interests: the post-crisis consumer finance protection politics in the US

Dodd–Frank, the financial reform law passed in the United States in response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, in which proponents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalition building among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals.