Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its “Behind‐the‐Table” Challenges

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing “internal” with “external” negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated “at the table.” Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively “selling” the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its “behind‐the‐table” barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's two‐level games schema, I characterize such “behind‐the‐table” or “Level Two” barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind‐the‐table challenges, I pay special attention to the end‐of‐Cold‐War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.     

Shaking off the neoliberal shackles: “democratic emergence” and the negotiation of democratic knowledge in the Middle East North Africa context

ABSTRACT

There is a general assumption in democracy promotion that liberal democracy is the panacea that will solve all political and economic problems faced by developing countries. Using the concept of “good society” as analytical prism, the analysis shows that while there is a rhetorical agreement as to what the “good society” entails, democracy promotion practices fail to allow for recipients’ inclusion in the negotiation and delivery of the “good society”. Contrasting US and Tunisian discourses on the “good society”, the article argues that democracy promotion practices are underpinned by neoliberal parameters borne out from a reliance on the transition paradigm, which in turn leave little room to democracy promotion recipients to formulate knowledge claims supporting the emergence of alternative conceptions of the “good society”. In contrast, the article opens up a reflective pathway to a negotiated democratic knowledge, which would reside in a paradigmatic change that consists in the abandonment of the transition paradigm in favour of a “democratic emergence” paradigm.     

Attorneys and Negotiation Ethics: A Material Misunderstanding?

Our research suggests that a true norm of ethical negotiation behavior exists within the legal profession. This conclusion is tempered, however, with the knowledge that a large minority of our research respondents — at times approaching one‐third of them — engaged in unethical and even fraudulent behavior. Additionally, the survey respondents were not saddled with the pressures that practicing attorneys typically confront (pressures likely to make people behave less, rather than more, ethically). In an attempt to understand the reasons for such a high frequency of unethical negotiation, we have identified three major contributing factors: too many lawyers have only a superficial understanding of rules that are more complicated than they appear; lawyers frequently take their “zealous advocate” role too far, thereby placing client loyalty above other important values such as respect for truth and justice; and the practice of law and the people who are drawn to it are highly competitive. To address these factors, we suggest approaching the problem from several different angles. In the classroom, we suggest a focus on the relevant legal standards, including a focus on the often misunderstood law of fraudulent misrepresentations. Because many students fail to appreciate the differences between “ethical” behavior, the floor of socially acceptable conduct, and the expectations that others have for how they will be treated, we also suggest that lawyer training programs focus on the important role that personal relationships and one's reputation play in the legal profession, and how falling short in these areas can decrease one's negotiation effectiveness. For the profession itself, we also suggest clarifying the attorney rules of conduct and provide a number of tactics and strategies to defend against lying and deception during negotiation. Finally, we recognize there are certain psychological factors at play that can cause people to engage in behavior inconsistent with their personal sense of ethics. We believe the only way to avoid these lapses is to integrate conscious and reflective practices that can bring ethical concerns to the forefront of lawyers' decision‐making and thought processes.     

Empowering Students to Create and Claim Value through the Thomas–Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument

In a world of problem‐solving lawyering, principled negotiation, and integrative bargaining, to describe a negotiation as “distributional” may strike some as heretical. Still, we disserve our students if we ignore distributional bargaining altogether. Unfortunately, many law students who are drawn to negotiation classes bring with them a fundamental discomfort with claiming value. Contrary to the stereotypes that attribute aggression and “sharp practices” to lawyers, many law students struggle to become more assertive. The Thomas–Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI) is one tool that I have found can help raise students' awareness of, and comfort with, the reflexive responses to conflict that can impede their attempts to claim as well as create value in negotiation. The insights students gain from taking the TKI can be quickly put to use in the next negotiation role play. Although it may help students realize their dominant response to conflict, the TKI highlights that no single approach to negotiation is always best. Thus, the TKI can both encourage the reticent to claim more value in negotiation and suppress the seemingly insatiable appetites for value claiming that drive other students. When administering the TKI, I encourage students to learn at least four major lessons:

• 1 A negotiator has a choice in resolving the dilemma between value claiming and value creating. We are not just stuck with our reflexes.
• 2 Still, it is good to know what our reflexive response to conflict is likely to be so that we are more mindful of the choices as we make them.
• 3 Departing from reflexes requires energy: preparation, planning, mindfulness, and conscious effort.
• 4 Adaptability is desirable. A well‐integrated negotiator might move from one TKI “type” to another as a negotiation progresses.

In this article, I seek to give a very brief overview of the ways I have used the TKI to convey these lessons, increasing students' comfort with, and management of, value claiming. To this end, the article will describe the TKI, explain how I administer and debrief the students' encounter with it, and point out some potential pitfalls of this process.     

Developing Superior Negotiation Case Studies

While a great deal of excellent advice exists for producing case studies on managerially relevant topics in general, negotiation cases have distinctive aspects that merit explicit treatment. This article offers tailored advice for producing cases on negotiation and related topics (such as mediation and diplomacy) that are primarily intended for classroom discussion. It describes how to decide whether a negotiation‐related case lead is worth developing and how to choose the perspective and case type most suited to one's objectives. Finally, in by far the longest part of the discussion, it offers ten “nuts and bolts” suggestions for structuring and producing an excellent negotiation case study.     

Making the Most of the First‐Offer Advantage: Pre‐Offer Conversation and Negotiation Outcomes

Why do some negotiators benefit from making the first offer during negotiations while others do not? This study explores the contents of conversations that take place before negotiators make their first offers in order to learn more about the differences between ultimately successful first offers that benefit from anchoring effects and ultimately unsuccessful ones in which negotiators apparently derive no benefit from making the first offer. In‐depth qualitative analyses of the conversations that role players engaged in prior to their first offers were conducted in simulated negotiation exercises. Their analysis identified five different conversational tactics that negotiators employed in one‐on‐one negotiations to gain power in the negotiation, or what they call here “power conversation tactics.” Their findings suggest that the negotiation outcome (i.e., net value) was related to how the negotiators employed and combined these tactics during the pre‐offer conversation. Based on these findings, they conceptualized four types of power‐gaining/power‐losing pre‐offer conversation scenarios and explored the link between negotiation outcomes and each of these types of pre‐offer conversations. This study further develops the literature on power dynamics and conversations in negotiations as well as the literature on the anchoring effect of a first offer.     

The Reputational Advantages of Demonstrating Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students

Lawyers should care about their reputations. But exactly what sort of reputation should lawyers seek to establish and maintain in the largely nontransparent context of legal negotiation? And even if a lawyer has developed a reputation as a negotiator, how will he/she know what it is and how it came to be? I force my students to grapple with these questions by incorporating the issues of reputation and reputation development into my negotiation/mediation course. I introduced this innovation at the same time that I decided to increase my focus on developing students' skills in distributive (or value‐claiming) negotiation. Although legal negotiation certainly offers frequent opportunities for the creation of integrative joint and individual gains, the process will almost inevitably involve distribution. The pie, once baked, must be cut. As a result, I now base a portion of my students' final grade on the objective results they achieve in two negotiation simulations. Two dangers of this assessment choice are that it can encourage students to focus only on the numbers and, even worse, engage in “sharp practice”— an extreme form of hard bargaining that tests ethical boundaries — in order to achieve the best short‐term distributive outcomes. Of course, neither a quantitative focus nor sharp practice is synonymous with a distributive approach to negotiation. Nonetheless, to counterbalance the temptations posed by the focus on, and ranking of, objective results, I also base part of students' final grades on their scores on a “Reputation Index.” These scores are based on students' nominations of their peers, accompanied by explanatory comments. This article describes the Reputation Index and how I use it. It also explores the empirical support for the validity of the Reputation Index as a tool for simulating the development and assessment of lawyers' reputations in the “real world.” To that end, the article considers research regarding the bases for lawyers' perceptions of effectiveness in legal negotiation, the sometimes counterintuitive distinction between negotiation “approach” and negotiation “style,” and the relationships among perceptions of negotiation style, procedural justice, trustworthiness, and reputation.     

A no-displacement option? Rights,risks and negotiated settlement in development displacement

“Voluntary” land transfer agreements, negotiated directly between “willing buyers and willing sellers”, present a seemingly empowering alternative to the use of legal instruments for land acquisition or transfer which entail forced displacement. Yet asymmetrical bargaining power between the negotiating parties can undermine the fairness of negotiated outcomes and the right of the sellers to a “no-displacement” option. Viewed against a complex background of bourgeoning land transfers in multiple sites, this article examines rights-based and risks-based approaches to negotiated settlements, concluding that measures to address asymmetries in bargaining power must look beyond enhanced negotiation procedures to address underlying social and political dimensions.     

Essence of Negotiation: Understanding Appeasement and “The Great Munich Stereotype”

The relative merits of rational choice and behavioral approaches to the study of negotiation continue to be hotly debated. This article tests qualitative postdictions (assertions or deductions about something in the past) from these paradigms as well as the alternative approach of new institutional theory against the extensive record of negotiation process, contractual form, and contract implementation from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I find the incomplete relational form of the peace treaty to be consistent with the behavioral and new institutional concepts and find that only behavioral theory can explain how unilateral German moves unraveled the treaty during the 1930s. But the historical record further reveals that the close fit between the behavioral paradigm and these events is more than coincidence. I also discuss the role of conference participants, particularly John Maynard Keynes and Walter Lippmann, in establishing the basis for modern behavioral science. The behavioral paradigm emerged from efforts to understand and fix serious policy mistakes such as those made in the peace negotiations. The study of human error was intended to serve as the basis for broad‐based organizational solutions. Finally, I discuss the impact of “the Munich stereotype” on such recent events as the planning for the American invasion and reconstruction of Iraq; such examples suggest continued imperfections in the system of organized intelligence that has actually evolved in the United States.     

Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.     

The Walk in the Woods: A Step‐by‐Step Method for Facilitating Interest‐Based Negotiation and Conflict Resolution

In this article, we describe a method we have used successfully in both academic and professional settings to rapidly introduce novice negotiators to the principles and practice of interest‐based negotiation: “the walk in the woods.” The walk incorporates much of the principles of interest‐based negotiation: fostering self‐awareness, cultivating curiosity, and understanding the importance of world view. The walk's effectiveness is illustrated in this article using the case of the merger of two large, complex health‐care organizations.     

Consensus Arbitration: A Negotiation‐Based Decision‐Making Process for Arbitrators

In reaching their decisions, arbitrators are currently expected to act like judges by listening fully to both sides and then withdrawing to write the final and complete decision. But because of some key differences between their roles, I argue, arbitrators and judges should exercise completely different styles of decision making. Unlike judges, who make decisive rulings in order to enforce the law, arbitrators are empowered and chosen by the parties themselves to handle specific disputes or govern continuing relationships. Instead of shifting a negotiated process into an authoritative one, arbitrators have the capacity to solicit input from parties as they craft the award. Under a new model of arbitration that I call “consensus arbitration,” arbitrators would facilitate negotiation between the parties but retain the power to break impasses with partial, incomplete decisions, behaving more like facilitators than judges.     

The Culture of Interest: A Proposed Addition and Revision of the Three‐Culture Model

Negotiation and conflict resolution theorists have classified world cultures according to three types for the purpose of describing and predicting some of the ways in which individuals and groups within broad, geographically based cultural groups behave in conflict and negotiation‐related situations. These three broad categories, called “cultural syndromes,” have described these cultures according to the relative value they place on these three concerns: honor, face, and dignity. Based on our examination of the literature on the cultural dimensions of negotiation and conflict management, our own practice, and an analysis of literature and practice pertaining to the place and utility of the honor, face, interest, and dignity attributes within and between cultural groups , we propose a reformulation of this typology. Our reformulation would replace the broad “dignity” category with a new category that we call “interest,” which we believe better characterizes Northern European and North American cultures. We also argue that a cultural orientation toward dignity is universal and not geographically unique and is thus shared by all three cultures. This new formulation, we believe, more accurately characterizes the global range of orientations toward negotiation and conflict resolution and would, if adopted, help scholars and practitioners better understand culturally divergent conflict orientations and behaviors as well as the ramifications of such differences for negotiation and conflict resolution practice.     

Mediation and the Art of Shuttle Diplomacy

Mediation caucusing — that is, separate meetings conducted by the mediator with some, but not all, of the parties — is widely used, but it has become increasingly controversial, as some mediators advocate for a no‐caucus form of mediation using only joint sessions with all parties present. The rationale for the no‐caucus model is that caucuses give the mediator too much power at the expense of the parties, and joint sessions improve the parties' understanding of each other's views. But caucusing adds value to mediation in several ways. First, from the standpoint of economic theory, caucusing provides mediators with an important tool for overcoming two impediments to settlement — the “prisoner's dilemma” (caused by the parties' fear of mutual exploitation) and “adverse selection” (caused by the failure to disclose information). Second, caucusing can help the mediator overcome a variety of negotiation problems, such as communication barriers, unrealistic expectations, emotional barriers, intraparty conflict, and fear of losing face. Third, caucusing provides a more private setting in which the mediator can develop a deeper and more personal understanding of the parties' needs and interests. Although the no‐caucus model may be appropriate for certain types of mediation (particularly those cases in which the parties will have an ongoing relationship), some parties may prefer the efficiency that can be achieved with caucusing, even if that means sacrificing certain other values — such as greater understanding — or giving the mediator more information than the parties have, thus creating the risk of manipulation by the mediator. Moreover, the choice is not binary — numerous variations and hybrid formats can be useful, such as sessions in which the mediator meets with only the parties' lawyers or with only the parties. Choosing the best format for a mediation is more of an art than a science, and mediators should consider, with the parties, whether the parties' objectives would be best served using only joint sessions, extensive caucusing, or a combination of these approaches.     

From Lab Experiments to Real Negotiations: An Investigation of International Iron Ore Negotiations

Negotiation researchers have conducted a large number of experimental lab studies to identify the factors that affect negotiation outcomes, but it remains unclear whether those results can be generalized to real‐world negotiations. To explore this question, we analyzed the dynamic international iron ore annual negotiations that took place from 2005 to 2009. We found evidence that supports two important findings from previous experiments. Specifically, we focused on the impact of negotiators’ best alternatives and first offers on negotiation prices using multiple case study analysis. We found that iron ore prices increased more when the gap between the previous year's negotiated price and the price on the alternative spot market, a public market in which commodities are traded for immediate delivery, was larger, which suggested that buyers were sensitive to the strength of this alternative, supporting the literature on the role of alternatives. We also found that the first offer price significantly influenced the final price. Our findings extend two important experimental findings from the negotiation literature to large‐scale business negotiations in the real world.     

Ingredients of a Successful Track Two Negotiation

During three days in 2003, an Israeli–Palestinian group met in London to negotiate the draft of the “Geneva Initiative,” which offered a potential final status agreement between Israel and Palestine. In this article, I analyze the video recording of these unofficial negotiations and examine how the framing and conduct of the talks enabled significant progress toward reaching an agreement. I describe six main framing techniques used by the mediators: calling the meetings an “exercise,” which reduced restraints on the participants and enhanced their flexibility, avoiding deep historical issues to focus solely on future‐oriented pragmatic solutions, allowing the participants to discuss any topic they chose while deliberately avoiding crucial narrative issues, convincing the participants that this track two negotiation was crucial for the future of official Israeli–Palestinian relations, accentuating the parties' understandings and agreements with each other, and building a sense of superordinate group identity among the participants, to encourage cooperation. These components were the key “ingredients” for the first — and still the only — (unofficial) detailed proposal for an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement. They provide lessons that could improve the success of other track two negotiations.     

Assessment Procedures for Skills‐Based MBA Courses Adapted from the U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps Leadership Development Program

Measuring student progress toward the achievement of learning outcomes in negotiation skills courses is a difficult task. Measuring the effectiveness of the delivery of course instruction can be equally challenging. This article proposes some answers to these questions: How can student performance in skills such as negotiation, leadership, and teamwork (sometimes referred to as “soft skills”) be effectively measured and accurately evaluated? What standards can be used to determine whether student performance is superior, adequate, or inferior? How can teaching effectiveness be evaluated to determine whether students are receiving the instruction necessary to achieve the course learning objectives? This article describes how the authors collaborated on an adaptation of the assessment processes used in the U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadet Leadership Development Program for use in an MBA course on negotiation skills. We report on a pilot effort that has demonstrated that the ROTC‐style leadership assessment process can be successfully adapted for use in a graduate course on negotiation and that it provides useful means for evaluating both individual student performance and overall course effectiveness. While our work involved a negotiation course, we suggest that the process could be adapted for use in other skills‐oriented courses such as leadership.     

The East African community and Europe

The European Union and Russia are preparing to negotiate a new comprehensive agreement at a time when their bilateral relations have become increasingly prickly. On the one hand, Vladimir Putin's Russia is perceived as having gone undesirably far in reverting to a semi-authoritarian state and in exerting economic and political pressures on some pro-Western, former Soviet states. On the other hand, the EU's Russia policy remains ambivalent because of the continuing deference towards Moscow of a number of large European countries and the confrontational posture of some new EU member states. Other factors add to this deteriorating state of affairs. For one, there are a number of legal complications coming from the shape and scope of the new agreement. Perhaps more importantly, there are several political uncertainties, first and foremost the definition of those “common values” upon which the new treaty should be based. To get out of this quandary, the two sides will have to scale down their ambitions on the new agreement. A mutually acceptable formula might imply the negotiation of a concise “framework” treaty, accompanied in due time by sector-specific agreements.     

Negotiating normative premises in democracy promotion: Venezuela and the Inter-American Democratic Charter

ABSTRACT

This article analyses negotiations on democracy promotion by looking at the case of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. It argues that Venezuela contested the concept of representative democracy during the Charter negotiations, advancing the notion of “participatory and protagonist democracy” and that, even if it was unsuccessful in its demands, the country contributed to deepening the debate on the concept of democracy, on which there is far from worldwide consensus. The article suggests that the main drivers of the negotiation process and the final agreement were domestic political changes in Venezuela, specific features of the negotiations, and the structural position of Venezuela in the field of democracy promotion in the global and regional contexts, which were, at the time, favourable to a compromising attitude to conclusion of the Charter, even if not to the concept of democracy.     

Teaching Negotiations in the New Millennium: Evidence‐Based Recommendations for Online Course Delivery

Traditional methods for teaching negotiation have required both instructor and student to be physically present in the same location. With the advent of the Internet and associated technological advances, however, instructors may now transcend geographical barriers and effectively deliver the same content virtually. In this article, we present an exploratory study comparing two masters‐level negotiation courses: one taught using a traditional in‐person method and the other taught online. Results showed no significant difference in knowledge acquisition as quantified by objective measures, including mean grades. In addition, self‐report data indicate that, although students' skill and mastery of negotiation improved in both courses, online students reported that they experienced less interaction and social engagement with their classmates and instructor. Several course development strategies and best practices are discussed.