US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

National security vs. economic interests: reassessing Taiwan's mainland policy under Chen Shui‐bian

Having finished its first term, the Chen Shui‐bian Administration has found itself in deep water in the troubled cross‐Strait relations. Not only has Chen himself been making contradictory remarks, the Cabinet has been indecisive over issues related to China. The most difficult and irritating case for the DPP government has been the handling of the call made by high‐tech industries to allow them to invest in the mainland. The controversy seems to highlight a dilemma for Taiwan: while it needs the mainland market to save it from the current economic doldrums and create yet another potential ‘miracle’ of becoming a global economic powerhouse, it is worried that further economic engagement with its former rival may pose new kinds of threats to its national security. The debate over whether to allow an eight‐inch wafer foundry, the crown jewel of Taiwan's economy, to invest in the mainland market is but one case, albeit a highly significant one, of the difficult relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.     

Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

National identity and Taiwan's Mainland China policy

Taiwan is a mildly divided society—divided essentially along the lines of national identity. Indeed, there is no doubt that national identity is the dominant factor affecting Taiwan's mainland China policy. Other factors such as business interests and security concerns may enter the picture from time to time, but they often get bogged down in the national identity controversies. As a matter of fact, there is high correlation between people's attitudes toward business and security concerns and their positions on the national identity issue. The key to understanding Taiwan's mainland China policy is thus the distribution of voters on the national identity issue and how it is translated into the political fortunes of various political parties in the electoral game.     

Competing conceptions of Taiwan's identity: The irresolvable conflict in cross‐strait relations

Supporters of unification and Taiwan independence advocates view Taiwan's status through radically different logical frameworks. Unification supporters are guided by historical determinism. They believe that because Taiwan was part of China in the past, and because the island's residents have ancestral ties to mainland China, Taiwan is therefore an unalienable part of Chinese territory that must be brought under the control of the mainland Chinese state. In contrast, advocates of Taiwan independence are guided by the logic of pragmatism. In their view, cultural identity does not dictate political identity, and decisions about Taiwan's status should be guided by the will of the island's people, rather than by an abstract notion of historic destiny. Both of these approaches are rooted in long‐standing concepts of Chinese identity. Chinese ethnicity has long included both a hereditary and a cultural component. In the past, the cultural component allowed China to absorb populations on its periphery. Today, it serves as an outlet for Taiwan independence supporters seeking to redefine Taiwan as a political entity separate from the mainland Chinese state.     

The origins of conflict across the Taiwan Strait: The problem of differences in perceptions

In 1995 and 1996, the Taiwan Strait became an area of considerable tension. Relations between Beijing and Taipei deteriorated as a result of perceptions by leaders in the People's Republic of China that Taiwan was moving toward independence, especially after President Lee Teng‐hui made a widely publicized trip to the US in the summer of 1995. An assessment of the differences in perceptions by scholars, officials and the populations on the two sides, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, are instructive. The author looks at five areas where disparate views are noticeable and divisive: the history of Taiwan (especially its ties with the mainland), Taiwan's legal status, views of the ‘Taiwan issue’ espoused by Beijing and Taipei, current relations between Beijing and Taipei, and the stance of the international community and the nature and structure of international politics. Scenarios are presented regarding the future of the conflict.     

Chinese nationalism,Taiwan autonomy and the prospects of a larger war

In contrast to the belief that the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits crisis was caused by the visit of the President of Taiwan to Cornell University, in fact, the post‐Mao ruling groups in Beijing made forcing early reunification with mainland China on Taiwan a top priority soon after assuming power in 1978. This new focus on Taiwan's reunification reflects a policy switch. It is not a continuation of Mao era policies. The switch is basic. It involves a profound change in the content of Chinese nationalism from Mao era nationalism, which is seen by its critics in China as insufficiently promoting the national interests of the Chinese people. The new, post‐Mao nationalism in China not only challenges Taiwan's autonomy, it also could endanger peace in the Pacific‐Asia region. Consequently, it is important to rethink the political dynamics at work in China and in the region if the parties involved hope to avoid a larger war.     

台湾当局亚太经济战略的演变、动因及影响——基于“一个中国”框架视阈的分析

自上世纪90年代以来,台湾当局的亚太经济战略均以减缓两岸经贸关系发展、挑战＂一个中国＂框架为主轴。马英九上台后,以＂黄金十年＂愿景为蓝图,在＂壮大台湾、连接亚太、布局全球＂的总战略下＂通过大陆走向世界＂,以＂战略平衡＂、＂同步多轨＂、＂官民结合＂等方式推动对外签订双边经济合作协议（ECA）及加入TPP、RCEP等多边经济合作机制。这一战略虽给大陆维护＂一个中国＂框架带来新课题,但总体上保持两岸政经良性互动,稳住两岸关系和平发展大局,并对未来两岸关系发展产生深远影响。     

Taiwan's New Grand Strategy

Since Ma Ying-jeou assumed the presidency, Taiwan's relations with Mainland China have been profoundly transformed. This article uses the perspective of a grand strategy to interpret and explain Taiwan's new approach to cross-Strait relations. It suggests that Ma's government has adopted a grand strategy of accommodation that uses assurances, confidence building, and economic integration to enhance Taiwan's security. This new grand strategy has both ideational and materialist roots. The article also assesses the preliminary results of Taiwan's new security approach and its future sustainability.     

Explaining Taiwan's Revisionist Diplomacy

Taiwan is a revisionist power. Its independence movement challenges a vital status-quo interest of mainland China's opposition to a de jure Taiwan declaration of independence and maintaining, however ambiguously, Taiwan's commitment to the ‘one-China’ formulation. Why is it that a small and vulnerable island off the coast of a great power has continued to challenge the vital interest of that great power and risk war? Adopting a ‘levels of analysis’ approach to Taiwan's mainland policy, this paper addresses this question by examining four prevalent explanations for Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy: (1) the mainland deterrent is ineffective, reflecting Taiwan doubts about either mainland capabilities or mainland resolve to wage a retaliatory war; (2) in an example of the security dilemma in alliance politics, US commitment to Taiwan, although aimed at deterring PRC use of force, encourages Taiwan to challenge the status quo because the Taiwan leadership is confident of US intervention and US ability to defend Taiwan; (3) because of the development of a ‘Taiwan identity’ and of corresponding domestic political pressures, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to adopt a pro-independence policy; (4) Chen Shui-bian has a personal commitment to Taiwan independence and has been willing to challenge the mainland's interest in one-China, despite risk of heightened conflict and regardless of domestic political considerations.     

Beyond Power Politics: institution-building and Mainland China's Taiwan policy transition

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and ‘institution deficit’ in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry?     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

Southeast Asia and cross‐strait relations: The policy of separation of politics and economics

During the periods of July‐August 1995 and mid‐March 1996, China initiated a series of missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and the mainland for many was considered responsible for the rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait. But, Southeast Asian countries held Taiwan responsible for stimulating the mainland's military actions because of the island's claim for independence. Why? There are three different theoretical arguments on this issue, i.e. those of political primacy, economic determinism, and the separation of politics and economics. This paper contends that the principle of separation of politics and economics is the policy that Southeast Asian countries pursue in developing their relations with the PRC and the ROC, i.e. maintaining official and full‐scale relations with the PRC, but keeping unofficial and economic links with Taiwan. Therefore, for Southeast Asian countries, the PRC's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait were a political and not an economic problem, and one between the mainland and Taiwan. This is the key factor in explaining attitudes in Southeast Asian nations toward the Taiwan Strait crisis.     

两岸政经互动：理论探索与路径选择

2008年5月以来,两岸双方在反对“台独”、坚持“九二共识”的政治基础上,开创了和平发展的新局面。两岸政治关系有所改善,经济关系突飞猛进,然而两岸政治关系的相对滞后已明显妨碍到两岸经济关系的进一步深化。在两岸关系步人“深水区”之后,两岸双方应积极采取有效措施,维护巩固“一中框架”,加强法律制度建设,开启政治对话进程,深化媒体交流合作,努力推进两岸政治关系与经济关系的良性互动,为巩固与深化两岸关系和平发展提供有力保障。     

US‐China relations and the Taiwan factor

With the diplomatic warming of US‐China relations, the recent resumption of the Koo — Wang meeting and Taiwan's elections for legislators, mayors, and city councilors, cross‐Taiwan Strait relations are at another historical turning point. While the improvement of US‐China relations tends to relieve both sides from rhetoric exchanges of ‘China threat’ and ‘US‐Taiwan conspiracy’, Clinton's oral declaration of the ‘Three No's’ has raised serious concerns in Taiwan. With such a background, a group of experts and policy‐making participants from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China gathered again at a conference on ‘US‐China Relations and the Taiwan Factor’ in Washington, DC in mid‐October 1998. This was the second episode in a series of symposia on US‐China relations sponsored by the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS). The symposium attempts to provide a free, intimate, and long‐term forum for a group of influential experts with different perspectives from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. As a result, a deep understanding of common interests has been reached and clear differences have also been recognized through direct dialogue and frank exchange of ideas.     

The Taiwan conundrum: heading towards a new war?

Taiwan's controversial 2004 presidential election has drastically changed the political landscape of the island. The balance of power is turning greatly in favor of the pro‐independence DPP and TSU coalition. China now focuses its energy on building up a well‐off society in an all‐round way. China will try its best to solve the Taiwan question peacefully. As Chen Shui‐bian has made up his mind to carry out his timetable for independence, Beijing is being driven into a corner. Chen Shui‐bian's victory not only constitutes a big challenge to China, but also a big challenge to the US. At the moment US–China relations are in one of the best stages of all time, but if the Taiwan issue goes out of control, US–China relations would be devastated, leading to a serious confrontation which might trigger a disastrous war between the two countries. In order to avoid such a worst‐case scenario, the two countries should coordinate to manage the situation and take effective measures to keep the issue under control.     

Coping with the Global Financial Crises: institutional and ideational sources of Taiwan's economic resiliency

Over the last two decades, Taiwan has weathered two global financial crises: the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the sub-prime loan crisis of 2008–2009. Each time the island's economy emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed. Many of the elements that constitute Taiwan's economic resilience have been fostered through entrenched institutional arrangements and established policy orientations over a long period. Taiwan managed to retain the bulk of these long-running sources of economic resilience despite the tremendous external pressures exerted by neo-liberal policy advocates to dismantle these ‘out-dated’ policy thinking and practices in the name of reform during the decade-long interval between the two crises. Taiwan was able to cope with the 2008–2009 global financial crisis thanks also to a more enabling regional environment created through stronger cooperation among Asian economies and under a new awakening among the East Asian policy makers.