China's Sovereign Wealth Funds: origins,development, and future roles

China has established two of the world's newer large sovereign wealth funds (SWFs): the official China Investment Corporation (CIC), and the non-official and less transparent State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) Investment Company (SIC). Both provide alternative investment opportunities for China's exploding foreign exchange reserves, at US$2.4 trillion at the end of 2009, the largest in world history. This paper will address how China has accumulated its huge and growing foreign exchange reserves, and what roles these reserves, until 2007 managed only by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), have played in the establishment and development of China's two new SWFs. We will look specifically at why China's foreign exchange reserves have developed, and how the new SWFs are a part of broader efforts to provide investment alternatives for China's ballooning foreign exchange surpluses, particularly in light of the inflow of ‘hot’ foreign speculative funds. We will then point out some of the difficulties for China's financial officials of SWFs as they try to pursue multiple and sometimes competing goals, set by boards of directors representing different bureaucratic and economic interests, all within the context of a general lack of transparency and a rapidly growing economy. Finally, we will present our conclusions about the future roles of the two SWFs as well as of the policies being developed to decentralize foreign exchange reserve holdings while at the same time not slowing the growth of China's foreign trade surpluses, nor its foreign direct investments, nor its overall economic growth. We will also examine the effects of US-promoted Chinese currency appreciation on the future of China's foreign exchange reserves and its sovereign wealth funds.     

The development of corporate governance in China

Over the last decade there have been significant economic reforms in China. Foreign investment is encouraged and there are increasing numbers of joint ventures with foreign partners. The stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzen have developed quite rapidly, and the expansion of China's economy and the growing importance of foreign investment has implications for the development of corporate governance structures in China. The internationalization of institutional portfolios ensures that there is a cross‐border interest in corporate governance, and that China's steps in developing corporate governance will be watched with interest. In this paper, we will explore the existing cultural aspects of China, the structure of share ownership in China, recent developments that have taken place in China's capital markets, including the growing foreign influence, and their implications for corporate governance developments. We compare and contrast the influences on corporate governance in the West with those in China. We conclude that any model of corporate governance which develops in China is likely to embody the special role of the state and certain idiosyncratic cultural aspects of China, whilst taking on certain of the characteristics of an Anglo‐Saxon corporate governance model.     

The Social and Political Implications of China's WTO Membership

China will join the WTO soon. This article does not question the rationale of China's decision to join the WTO; nor does it challenge the premise that, all in all, the potential benefits from WTO membership outweigh the potential costs, at least in the long term. Rather, it focuses on the social and political implications of China's WTO membership. It is assumed that even if WTO membership is potentially a productivity-enhancing move for China, the benefits and costs of such a change will not be evenly distributed. Unless there is a mechanism that can induce or force the winners to compensate the losers, distributive conflicts between the two groups will be inevitable. Such conflicts may weaken or even erode political support for globalization. Thus, to remain committed to globalization, the government of an open economy must play a role in redistributing gains and costs. The first section elaborates this analytical framework. The second section argues that Chinese reforms have changed from a win‐win game to a zero-sum game. As a result, China has turned itself from a relatively egalitarian society into one with huge and growing inequalities. The third section analyzes who will stand to win and lose when China joins the WTO. It predicts that precisely those social groups who have borne the costs of recent reforms will be hit hardest. More significantly, those losers happen to be the social groups that have long served as the political bases of the communist regime. WTO membership thus poses a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese government. The final section discusses the political implications of China's WTO membership.     

Implications of WTO Membership for China's State-owned Banks and the Management of Public Finances: Issues and strategies

WTO membership will dramatically change the environment within which China's financial institutions operate. It increases the urgency of many reforms, including the re-capitalization of state-owned commercial banks and the establishment of a healthy credit culture. The severe under-capitalization of state banks and many state enterprises is part of a growing domestic debt problem that cannot be solved through normal fiscal policy adjustments. It will require the sale or securitization of state assets on a much larger scale than has been undertaken so far. The approach that was taken by the government's four Asset Management Companies to non-performing loan clean-up in 1999 and 2000 was flawed and should not be repeated. State banks should play a larger role in absorbing their own accumulated losses. China should leverage its external financial strength for domestic financial clean up. If the balance of payments remains strong, a mild appreciation of the nominal exchange rate--when the risk of deflation has passed--may serve China's interest. A large and growing proportion of state assets is held in the form of non-tradable shares in partially privatized state companies. To protect state solvency, many of these shares will have to be made tradable and sold in the next 5-10 years. A further strengthening of the fiscal system, along with rapid development of domestic capital markets is essential. Breaking up some or all of the four large state-owned commercial banks into smaller units may facilitate their restructuring and eventual privatization.     

Accession into the WTO: External pressure for internal reforms in China

WTO accession is a blessing to China in that it serves as an effective external pressure to overcome political resistance and to accelerate economic reforms. However, structural, behavioral and cultural constraints will work as an obstacle to China's systemic transmorphosis into a more transparent, fair, efficient, and rule-based economy. In order to overcome such constraints and to reach best possible evolutionary trajectories to a WTO-compatible system, post-accession China is required to focus on social, legal and political system reforms, departing from the previous emphasis on economic reform. Peer pressure from other member countries would also be of additional help. Without fully successful non-economic system reforms, it may go through a period of policy errors and socio-economic instability, contrary to the rosy expectations by casual observers, and the Chinese leadership would find itself trapped and betrayed by its idealized notions of joining WTO to push internal reforms.     

Rural China and the WTO

China's entry into the World Trade Organization has been applauded for the benefits it will confer on China's economy and for granting recognition to China's modernizing efforts. The scrutiny of the outside world will force China to regularize many of its practices, such as legal and economic practices. But most of the discussion of the WTO has focused on a very limited segment of China's society. This article considers the realities of rural Chinese life, warning that the consequences of China's increased pressure to reform may be more negative than positive and that the prospect for rural China is far from clear.     

From Financial Assets to Financial Statecraft: the case of China and emerging economies of Africa and Latin America

Over the past few decades, China has accumulated over US$3.4 trillion of official foreign exchange reserves as it rises to become a global power. Do China's financial assets increase its ability to pursue its national interests internationally? With the globalisation and rising influence of Chinese state-owned enterprises, state-owned banks and sovereign wealth fund, as well as China's growing clout in several regional groupings, it is clear that China does possess the necessary mechanisms to assert its financial power. This article examines the efficacy and limitations of these mechanisms in Africa and Latin America, in the economic and political domains. In the economic domain, China has consistently used foreign oil contracts and acquisitions to secure direct oil flow from developing nations. An analysis of recent cases shows that while China is able to successfully harness its financial power in its pursuit of oil, it needs to fulfil its promises to the satisfaction of the recipient countries in order to maintain the value of its offers. In the political domain, China has used its financial assets to purchase diplomatic allegiance from various African and Latin American countries in support of its One-China policy. Studying both successful and unsuccessful cases reveals that while China is generally able to use its financial power in third-world countries against Taiwan successfully, its national goals have, in recent years, shifted to the economic realm, even with countries that still recognise the Taipei government.     

Market reforms,globalization and social justice in China

The pursuit of social justice is an important goal of public policy in China under socialism. The embrace of market reforms and increasing globalization has radically transformed China's redistribution regime as well as distorted old commitments to social justice. This paper reviews China's attempt to realize the goal of social justice, including its changing rhetoric, strategies and actions. I shall first set out the historical context by adducing the salience of development and justice in the period before and after the market reforms. This will be followed by an analysis of the state reform discourse in justifying market reforms and their function in development and human welfare. An evaluation of social and redistribution policies and their implications, including the intellectual and public debates on efficiency and equity, will be presented. In the final section, recent critiques on the market and worries associated with China's entry into the WTO will be considered.     

Domestic Openness in post-WTO China: central and local perspectives

This article seeks answers to three basic questions about the WTO's impact on domestic openness in China: is China a more open society as a result of its WTO membership; in what way has the WTO affected reform and openness; and, is WTO membership leading to political liberalization or translating into a demand for democracy as democracy advocates predicted? To this end, it identifies and analyzes the WTO-related reforms at central and local levels which have had the strongest impact thus far on openness to Chinese citizens. The analysis focuses on the reduction of the Party-state's control of economic activity as manifested in decreasing state monopoly and bureaucratic intervention in the sphere of economic activity, improved legal regulation, and increasing transparency of trade-related rules and rule-making. It argues that the varied depth and scope of the WTO's impact are attributable to differences in the congruence between the WTO principles and China's domestic political logic and the varying levels of effectiveness of external and internal pressure for change.     

Chinese Corporate Governance and Prospects for Reform

A critical element in China's current economic reform program is the creation of modern corporate governance structures in its corporations. Many of China's largest firms are caught between market incentives and political pressures, creating a situation ripe for managerial inefficiency. This article examines the financial and regulatory structures necessary for an efficient corporate governance system to function in China, and it assesses how these structures currently operate in the economy. The article identifies key failures in fostering modern corporate governance practices, which in turn jeopardize central elements of the government's reform program. The article includes a case study of the governance practices of PetroChina Company Ltd, the internationally listed subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation. The success or failure of the government's efforts to create proper governance mechanisms will carry important economic and political ramifications for China. Indeed, the successful implementation of corporate governance reforms may mark the final stages of China's evolution into a market economy.     

China's WTO Membership and the Non-Market Economy Status: discrimination and impediment to China's foreign trade

This article provides a Chinese perspective on the terms of China's WTO accession, highlighting the negative impact of some discriminatory conditions that China accepted in order to join the WTO on its foreign trade and global competitiveness in the last decade. The author uses the non-market economy status of China as a case study to support the argument that these discriminatory conditions imposed on China upon accession have not only impeded the healthy development of China's foreign trade, but also violated the ‘non-discrimination’ principle of the WTO.     

The Rise of Neoclassical Economics and China's WTO Agreement with the United States in 1999

Drawing on the historical institutionalists’ emphasis on the effects of ideas on policy making, this paper focuses on the importance of economic ideas and ideologies on China's trade policy making with regard to the signing of the WTO agreement with the United States in 1999. The paper argues that trade liberalization in China was a result of top Chinese leaders’ embrace of neoclassical economic ideas which conceive a small role for the state in the marketplace, mainly as the regulator of the macro-economic environment and as the enforcer of the rule of law, rather than as a major player in the marketplace. Top Chinese leaders’ socialization with neoclassical economic ideas enabled them to forge a political consensus to link state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms with speedy WTO accession and led to China's major concessions in WTO negotiations with the United States in 1999 which were inconceivable just a few years ago.     

China's Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States

During the past few decades, China's economic success has permitted it to pursue a greater role on the international stage. China is recognized both as a regional and aspiring global power. Nowhere is this more evident than within Southeast Asia, where China's more active diplomacy is reflected in growing trade relations, proposals for stronger security ties, and the signing of numerous cooperative agreements on issues as varied as environmental protection, drug trafficking, and public health. As a whole, the region has received China's activism with both enthusiasm and trepidation. China has expended significant effort to assuage the fears of its neighbors by adopting a foreign policy approach that is active, non-threatening, and generally aligned with the economic and security interests of the region. This positive diplomacy has clearly yielded some success, most notably in the trade realm, where China is rapidly emerging as an engine of regional economic growth and integration that may well challenge Japanese and American dominance in the next three to five years. In the security realm, China's diplomacy, while rhetorically appealing to regional actors, has yet to make significant inroads in a regional security structure dominated by the United States and its bilateral security relationships. Most significantly, however, if China is to emerge as a real leader within Southeast Asia, it will also need to assume more of the social and political burden that leadership entails. As China continues to advance itself as a regional leader, its policies on issues such as health, drugs, the environment and human rights will face additional scrutiny not only for their impact on the region but also for the more profound question they raise concerning the potential of China's moral leadership. For the United States, China's greater presence and activism suggest at the very least that it cannot remain complacent about the status quo that has governed political, economic and security relations for the past few decades. Shared leadership within Southeast Asia will likely include China in the near future, with all the potential benefits and challenges that such leadership will entail.     

China's Future Economic Regionalization

This paper investigates China's economic growth potentials and limitation up to 2020 and recommends a trend of economic regionalization. A sustainable growing economy is a necessity for China's future stability. The growth sustainability of the Chinese economy depends essentially on its continued commitments to institutional reform and economic deregulation. China's relaxation of government intervention in economic activities has led and will be leading China to decentralize its central governmental authority over economic planning and control. This will consequently stimulate the emergence of regional economies in Mainland China. In the next two decades, there will likely be 10 regional economies with relatively independent industrial structures emerging in Greater China (or the Chinese Economic Area of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and the Mainland) as a result of economic liberalization and decentralization.     

Emergence of the Greater China Circle Economies: Cooperation versus competition

The integration of the so-called greater China economies among Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is one part of the global trend of regionalism. The significance of integration in terms of foreign trade and foreign direct investment demonstrates not only rapid growth but also diversity, ever since Mainland China pursued her open door policy of economic reform in 1979. For instance, the combined volume of Hong Kong and Taiwan accounted for as much as 74.1% of Mainland China's capital utilization in 1993, which in turn contributed to the rapid economic growth of Mainland China over the last two decades. The membership of Mainland China and Taiwan to the WTO, as expected by the end of 2001, will facilitate a more official arrangement of intergovernmental coordination within these Triangle Economies. However, the government of Taiwan will continue to evaluate the cross-strait relations in the context of the nation's overall political and economic security as long as the government of Mainland China does not renounce the use of military force against Taiwan.     

The Privatization of Urban Housing in China and its Contribution to Financial System Development

The privatization of urban housing and the subsequent development of a mortgage market have played a major role in the development of China's financial system. This paper explores the history and development of China's urban housing market, its impact on the financial system, and the government's efforts to grapple with new issues that have surfaced alongside these reforms. This paper concludes that although housing privatization has helped strengthen the financial standing of state-owned enterprises, urban residents, and commercial banks alike, systematic weaknesses must be addressed in order to promote sustainable economic growth.     

The political economy of banking reforms in China, 1993–1997

The weakness of China's banking system poses a serious threat to the sustainability of the country's economic development. This article measures the extent of this weakness and analyzes its causes. It focuses especially on the structural changes in the banking sector, the economic crisis of 1992–1993, and the subsequent financial reforms implemented. The evidence gathered by the author shows that the banking reforms initiated since 1994 have produced mixed results. Although central bank autonomy and bank supervision have improved, political, economic, and institutional constraints have prevented the government from taking more decisive measures to re‐capitalize banks, restructure the debt of state‐owned enterprises, and increase competition in the banking sector quickly. Despite the apparent effectiveness of the short‐term measures taken to bolster public confidence in the banking system, China's banking reform will be a difficult and prolonged process.     

Reform ideology,political commitment and resource transfor: An alternative model for the explanation of China's economic reform∗

One of the most intriguing ironies of our era is the result of recent changes in the former communist world. Whereas the “democratizing” Russia and Eastern European countries are caught in repeated political as well as economic crises, the “unrepentant” authoritarian China and Vietnam are seeing their economies booming and more market‐oriented. Such an irony poses many important questions. One of the questions is how China has managed to get where it is. This paper represents an attempt to address this question. Firstly, it will briefly outline where economic reforms have brought China so far. Secondly, it will discuss two popular models used to explain China's economic performance. And finally, it will develop an alternative model that combines politics and economy in accounting for China's reform experience.     

External Contradictions of the Chinese Development Model: export-led growth and the dangers of global economic contraction

China's development model faces an external constraint that could cause an economic hard landing. China has become a global manufacturing powerhouse, and its size now renders its export-led growth strategy unsustainable. China relies on the US market, but the scale of its exports is contributing to the massive US trade deficit, creating financial fragility and undermining the US manufacturing sector. These developments could stall the US economy's expansion, in turn triggering a global recession that will embrace China. This is the external constraint. These considerations suggest that China should transition from export-led growth to domestic demand-led growth. This requires growing the economy's demand side as well as its supply-side. To avoid stalling the US economic expansion, which is critical to China's growth, China should significantly revalue its currency as part of a generalized East Asian upward currency revaluation. Longer term, China should raise wages and improve income distribution. Under export-led growth, higher wages undermine employment. Under domestic demand-led growth, they support it. The challenge is to raise wages in an efficient decentralized manner. History shows that this requires independent democratic trade unions. However, such unions are currently unacceptable to the Chinese political leadership. Creating a domestic demand-led growth regime therefore requires solving this political roadblock.     

Foreign banks in the People's Republic of China

Many foreign banks are attracted to the PRC economy, as a result of its continuing economic growth and financial liberalisations. This paper provides an empirical analysis of the factors contributing to this development and of the features of those foreign banks choosing to enter this market. In addition, a survey questionnaire permits an assessment of the attractions and weaknesses of the PRC banking market as perceived by foreign banks. It has been shown that large, financially sound foreign banks have helped to stimulate trade and investment in the PRC. However, China's restricted movement of capital and inadequate legal framework has reinforced the need for international banking services from Hong Kong.