Linguistic Objectivity in Norm Sentences: Alternatives in Literal Meaning

Assuming that legal science, specifically with regard to interpretation, has to provide the tools to reduce the uncertainty of legal solutions arising from the use of natural languages by legal orders, it becomes a central matter to identify, in this limited domain, the spectrum of semantic variation (and its boundaries) that language brings to the definition of a norm expressed by a norm sentence. It is in this framework that the present paper, analyzing norm sentences as a specific kind of speech act, examines the relation of the legal order to natural language rules, the limits of linguistic uncertainty, and alternatives of meaning as distinct possibilities of norms covered by the text (that are, because of this, still within what literal meaning is). Considering interpretation just as the linguistic decoding process, the reverse of the process of creating norm sentences, the paper also argues that subjects not connected with the relation between norm sentences and norms (mainly, normative defeasibility) are analytically distinct and should be removed from the field of language.     

Deontic Logic as Logic of Legal Norms: Two Main Sources of Problems

Abstract .
The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "legal norm" is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "systemic legal validity" is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal validity.     

Defeating the Inference from General to Particular Norms*

Abstract. The author argues that in order to maintain, with the later Kelsen, that particular norms are not deducible from general norms, it is unnecessary to deny (1) that norms are propositional, (2) that norms have truth value, (3) that there are normative facts, or (4) that norms fall within the compass of logic. It is claimed that general norms, like many generalizations in science, are not, typically, unrestricted universal generalizations, but generalizations of a different kind, which have sometimes been called normic generalizations. Normic generalizations may have truth value and describe facts; and there is no obvious reason for thinking that they fall outside the compass of logic. Yet they do not deductively imply the instances which fall under them. Exceptions to a generalization of this sort need not constitute falsifying instances; in some cases, at least, they serve rather to qualify the scope or power of the generalization. The logic of such generalizations is thus not deductive. Granting that general norms are typically of this kind, we may accept Kelsen's conclusion about the non-deducibility of particular from general norms without accepting the grounds upon which he accounted for this fact.     

Normative Systems,Permission and Deontic Logic*

Abstract. The authors concentrate on the analysis of the concept of permission. After a general account of differing concepts of permission both with regard to different legal theories and to different legal ideologies, they argue in favour of a “radical” imperativism which leaves no place for permissive norms. Thus, in contrast with the logic of normative language (LNL) purported by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the authors figure out a system of deontic logic - supplemented by devices of the possible world semantics - according to which a normative system (N) is conceived as a set of logical consequences of a certain finite set of basic obligations and no room is left either for the concept of weak permission or for the concept of strong permission. Finally the authors raise some criticisms concerning the view maintained by Alchourron and Bulygin on strong permission.*     

A Philosophical Approach to Norm Logic

The author outlines his views on the essence of philosophical logic. There are two means of philosophical argumentation: intuition and analysis of the problem situation under examination. Logical intuition can be replaced by improved intuition based on new intellectual constructions. Then the author explains—in opposition to von Wright—the main philosophical traits of his conception of norm logic. The structure of the information processing determining action justifies the application of dichotomous semantics in action theory and in practical philosophy. The theory of action and institutions is based on three anthropological features of man: our capacity of acting, our being a zoon politikon , and our capacity to form institutions. These features determine our ontology, our semantics and the logics of practical thinking. The action-theoretical approach leads to a formal and finalistic theory of action in which action is not only analysed as an element of the norm content, but as the essential basis of the whole field of practical philosophy. In the frame of this action theory a conception of freedom of will is provided which does not contrast with determinism. The formalism of action is applied in two different problem situations: in action deliberation and in motive interpretation. Jørgensen's dilemma is discussed and overcome by the introduction of a generalised notion of inference. Deontic logic is confronted with the idea of a genuine logic of norms. The main principles of norm logic are discussed and a normative conditional is introduced. Von Wright's conception of a genuine norm logic is confronted with the present author's conception. The author shows that norm-logical skepticism would be detrimental to analytical jurisprudence.     

The Syntax of Principles: Genericity as a Logical Distinction between Rules and Principles

Much has been said about the logical difference between rules and principles, yet few authors have focused on the distinct logical connectives linking the normative conditions of both norms. I intend to demonstrate that principles, unlike rules, are norms whose antecedents are linguistically formulated in a generic fashion, and thus logically described as inclusive disjunctions. This core feature incorporates the relevance criteria of normative antecedents into the world of principles and also explains their aptitude to conflict with opposing norms, namely that their consequents are fulfilled to varying extents more frequently than those of rules. I conclude that the property of genericity should be predicated to the norm antecedent of principles, more precisely to the hypothetical action. This is of paramount importance to explain, in terms of logical implication and exclusion, the expansibility of competing principles, in contrast with the exclusive character of conflicting rules.     

The Meanings of the Logical Constants in Deontic Logic

If deontic logic is to cast light on any of the normative sciences, such as legal reasoning, then certain problems regarding its logical constants must be faced. Recent studies in the area of deontic logic have tended to assume that it is our responses to the "paradoxes" of deontic implication which are fundamental to resolving problems with the use of deontic logic to investigate various branches of normative reasoning. In this paper I wish to show that the paradoxes are of secondary importance; that they are merely by-products of the central issue, namely the ability of certain syntactic forms to embody natural language structures used in reasoning about norms. An investigation of modal syntax is proffered as the best starting-point from which to tackle the questions that still dog the legitimacy of deontic logic. Part I provides some philosophical background to the discussion of deontic logical constants. Part II addresses in greater detail issues concerning the representation of normative concepts; and Part III offers a few remarks on the general issue of deontic logic's fruitfulness as an analytical tool.     

Practical Logic and the Analysis of Legal Language*

Abstract. One of the theses of the present work is that, at the strictly logical and methodological level, practical logic has neither made, nor can it make any contribution to the philosophy of law, since none of the three branches of practical logic that have been taken into account, namely, the logic of norms, deontic logic and legal logic, seems to be theoretically possible. The contribution of practical logic to the analysis of legal language is assessed in terms of both the instruments of analysis elaborated by practical logic, the artificial languages, and the results obtained in two capital subjects, the negations of norms and the permissions.     

论行政程序正当性的宪法规范基础--以规范实证分析为视角

一国的宪法是支撑行政程序正当性的规范基础.从世界范围看,作为支撑行政程序正当性的宪法规范主要有三种表述即"正当法律程序"、"法律(定)程序"和"法律规定".我国现行宪法虽然没有直接为行政程序正当性提供规范依据,但是我们可以从"主体参与"和"法治国家"的宪法规范表述中,获得行政程序正当性在宪法规范上的逻辑起点.     

On the Nature of Norms

This paper deals with the question of how norms are to be conceived of in order to understand their role as guidelines for human action within various normative orders, particularly in the context of law on the one hand and conventional morality on the other. After some brief remarks on the history of the term “norm,” the author outlines the most significant general features of actually existing social norms, including legal and conventional norms, from which he arrives at two basic requirements on an appropriate conception of such norms: the actuality and the normativity requirements. On this basis, he enters into a critical discussion of Kelsen's highly influential view of norms, arguing that this view is doomed to failure. In the last part of the paper, the author scrutinizes the more promising “practice theory of norms” by H.L.A. Hart, which, in his view, also suffers from some shortcomings, but may be modified in a way that leads to a conception of social norms providing us with a plausible explication of their actual existence and their normative force.     

Eating Peas with One’s Fingers: A Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms

This paper proposes a semiotic theory of norms—what I term normative semiotics. The paper’s central contention is that social norms are a language. Moreover, it is a language that we instinctively learn to speak. Normative behaviour is a mode of communication, the intelligibility of which allows us to establish cooperative relationships with others. Normative behaviour communicates an actor’s potential as a cooperative partner. Compliance with a norm is an act of communication: compliance signals cooperativeness; noncompliance signals uncooperativeness. An evolutionary model is proposed to explain how this comes about: evolution has generated an instinctual proficiency in working with these signals much like a language—a proficiency that manifests in an emotional context. We see these social rules as possessing a certain ‘rightness’ in normative terms. This adaptive trait is what we call internalization. Internalization enhances the individual’s ability to speak this code. Because these signals communicate who is and who is not a reliable co-operator, sending and receiving cooperation signals is crucial to individual survival. Individuals who internalized the entire process and thus became more adept at speaking the language were at an advantage. Law seeks to shape the language of norms by maintaining the collective standards of society; as such, understanding how and why this normative language emerges is critical to understanding a core function of law.     

The Creation of Normative Facts

In Kelsen's formalist and reductionisttheory of law, the concepts of `authority' and`competence' may be explained exclusively in termsof those norms on which the validity of other legalnorms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describesthe nature of these norms in different ways; at leastthree different conceptions can be distinguished. Arational reconstruction of the most plausible of theseconceptions will understand sentences expressing such`norms of competence' either to state truthconditions for normative sentences of a lower level orto state criteria for an act to be a legal act. Inboth functions, norms of competence regulate thecreation of normative facts.     

伪证罪：一个规范的语境分析

刑法规范表达的妥当性是刑事司法活动在不逾越刑法基本原则的前提下实现刑法调控社会功能的制度性保障 ;由此 ,规范语言的意义应当始终指向该规范的价值目标。但是 ,我国现行刑法第 30 5条关于“伪证罪”的规范性描述却在一定程度上消解了伪证罪立法的价值 ,这种由表达缺陷导致的价值损耗虽具有个案性质 ,我们却不难从中洞见某种普遍的立法意义。规范语言是规范价值的载体 ,法律之文本意义与规范意义的统一是“司法合法”的保证 :所以 ,这种统一不但应当成为法律的形式化特征 ,而且也是法律规范的实质性要求