Attorney General v. X

In this case in which a 14-year-old girl said she had become pregnant after being raped by her friend's father, the Attorney General of Ireland had enjoined the girl and her parents from traveling to England for an abortion. A psychologist had testified that in her present state of mind, the girl was suicidal. The Supreme Court of Ireland held that the right to life supersedes all other rights, including the right to travel. However, if there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother which can only be avoided by termination of the pregnancy, then an abortion is permissible. The Court determined that the girl's risk of suicide satisfied this condition, and therefore the girl was allowed to terminate her pregnancy.     

Roe v. Wade and the history of abortion regulation

In "Roe," the Supreme Court found that the privacy right in the 14th amendment's view of "personal liberty" encompasses a woman's right to choose an abortion. The Court found that "abortion is a fundamental right." These conclusions are mistaken. The Court's analysis of "the history of abortion regulation" had a lot of errors and did not consider the state of technology in which abortion evolved. Sir Edward Coke, a 16th and 17th century jurist, said that abortion was a "great misprison." Quickening, the point at which a woman feels life, was used to determine fetal viability. State courts, therefore, viewed "abortion after quickening as common law crime." By the end of 1868, 30 to the then 37 states had passed laws restricting abortion. The Supreme Court said that the 19th century laws were passed to guard the mother's health "against the dangers of unsafe operation." In the 15 months before "Roe," 5 state courts said that their abortion laws were constitutional. They said that this was "intended to protect the lives of unborn children." Therefore, the Court's belief that "the state courts focused on the State's interest in protecting "the health of the mother" was unexplainable. The Court said that in many states the woman couldn't "be prosecuted for self-abortion." 17 states did "incriminate the woman's participation in her own abortion," but the Court did not note this. The Court's premise about the greater hazards of late abortions is mistaken. The states were concerned, in the late 19th century, about whether the attempted abortion caused the death of a child. The "right to an abortion" can only be seen as "fundamental" if it is "implicit" in the "ordered liberty" concept or "deeply rooted" in US tradition and history. "Roe" struck down the abortion laws of all 50 states and should be overturned.     

Abortion on demand in a post-Wade context: must the state pay the bills?

The legal issues involved with the application of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973) are reveiwed, particularly the question of whether an indigent pregnant woman now has the right to abortion on demand at public expense. The 2 decisions, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, established that a woman, in consultation with her physician, must be free to choose to terminate her pregnancy, at least in the first trimester. State laws are permitted only to regulate abortion procedures in the second trimester and may only regulate or proscribe abortion itself after the fetus becomes viable. The Court did not rule that indigents had a corollary right to the implementation of abortion, and thus free abortions do not appear to be constitutionally required. However, depending on the type of Medicaid coverage in which the individual state is participating, the medically indigent may receive Medicaid benefits for abortions, at least in the first trimester. Since Medicaid is voluntary for the state, it could drop out of the program entirely or the Congress could specifically exclude abortions from Medicaid coverage. Both actions appear unlikely, however, and abortions for medical reasons clearly seem to fall under Medicaid's purpose. Consequently, despite the Wade and Bolton decisions, the right to abortion is limited by the ability of indigents to pay for it. In the light of the serious complications of illegal abortion, it is concluded that legislators should insure the availability of legal abortions. Such a move would not in itself encourage abortions but would properly extend the right to abortion to all citizens.     

The federal government and academic texts as barriers to informed consent

Informed patient consent for medical treatment is required by both law and medical ethics. Yet, both federal agencies and academicians are participating in the suppression of information about the heightened risk of breast cancer posed by oral contraceptives and induced abortion. There is historical precedent in the long-delayed acknowledgement of the smoking/lung cancer link. By law, a patient has the right to be fully informed of the nature of her medical condition and any proposed course of therapy. It is assumed that a patient will be given the complete and true scientific basis of her diagnosis and treatment, to ensure that her well-being and her autonomy in decision-making are protected. Informed consent is the process by which a patient can participate in choices about medical treatment. It originates from the legal and ethical right of the patient to direct what is done to her body, and from the ethical duty of the physician to involve the patient in her medical care. Our federal government has become a barrier to informed consent concerning oral contraceptive drugs and induced abortion.     

Morgentaler v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of Canada.

In Morgentaler v. R., the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the abortion provisions in the Criminal Code. In a five to two split, a majority of the Supreme Court judges found that section 251 offended a pregnant woman's constitutionally protected right not to be deprived of her "life, liberty, and security of the person." Sheilah Martin reviews the three majority judgments and focuses on the decision written by Madame Justice Wilson. She believes that Madame Justice Wilson's opinion merits special attention in several regards: her conclusions on the constitutional rights of pregnant women; her recognition and validation of women's perspectives on abortion; and her approach to balancing women's interests in reproductive self-determination against the state's interest in regulating reproduction. Sheilah Martin concludes that this decision will reverberate far into the future. Even though it fails to establish clear guidelines concerning governmental power to control access to abortion, its principles outline the legal framework in which future litigation will occur, and it will limit and shape the terms of any ensuing political debate. In addition, Madame Justice Wilson's judgment holds great promise for those looking to the Court to promote the rights of women and other historically disadvantaged groups.     

"Braxton Hick's" or the birth of a new era? Tracing the development of Ireland's abortion laws in respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence

In Ireland, Article 40.3.3 degrees of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish Constitution) guarantees the right to life of the unborn child and the equal right to life of the mother. Abortion in Ireland is permissible only where there is a real and substantial risk to the mother's own life. Since Ireland became a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950,2 there have been concerns that it could result in Ireland being compelled to introduce a right to abortion. This article commences with a review of the extant law on abortion in Ireland, tracing the Constitutional protection afforded to the unborn child. The article will discuss the impact of the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence in regard to access to abortion and to information on abortion services in Ireland in an effort to ascertain if it really has resulted in a radical change to Irish abortion laws. As such, it will also be necessary to examine the more recent decisions of the ECtHR such as Tysiac v. Poland, and A, B, and C v. Ireland, to determine both the approach of the ECtHR to access to abortion in general and also to consider if it has resulted in a liberalisation of abortion law in Ireland.     

价值体系中的堕胎规制——生命权与自我决定权、国家利益的宪法考量

堕胎的规制模式大致可分为国家放任模式、国家许可模式和有限制的国家放任模式。这些模式的背后都有着自身的一些独特考量,模式的选取与其社会传统、对胎儿是否为人、宪法权利是否具有积极性、国家是否负有某种保护义务等诸多因素的认知密切相关。目前我国基本上是放任孕妇堕胎。然而,宪法却要求国家履行其对生命的保护义务。鉴于法律应该在社会现实和价值诉求之间寻求合理的互动和对话,我国应该在保护胎儿的生命、孕妇的自我决定权以及国家利益之间进行更为适当的权衡,对我国所施行的堕胎规制模式做出适当的调整。     

Back to the future of abortion law: Roe's rejection of America's history and traditions

In Roe v. Wade much of Justice Blackmun's judgment was devoted to the history of abortion in Anglo-American law. He concluded that a constitutional right to abortion was consistent with that history. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 281 American historians signed an amicus brief which claimed that Roe was consistent with the nation's history and traditions. This article respectfully questions Justice Blackmun's conclusion and the historians' claim.     

Washington v. Glucksberg was tragically wrong

Properly focused, there were two questions before the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg. First, in light of all of the other non-textual rights protected by the Supreme Court under the "liberty" of the Due Process Clause, is the right to assisted death a fundamental right? Second, if so, is the prohibition of assisted death necessary to achieve a compelling interest? Presented in this way, it is clear that the Court erred in Washington v. Glucksberg. The right of a terminally ill person to end his or her life is an essential aspect of autonomy, comparable to aspects of autonomy that the Court has protected in decisions concerning family autonomy, reproductive autonomy, and autonomy to engage in sexual activity. Moreover, the government's general interest in protecting life and preventing suicide has far less force when applied to a terminally ill patient. The tragedy of Washington v. Glucksberg is that every day across the country, terminally ill patients are being forced to suffer longer and being denied an essential aspect of their autonomy and personhood.     

Abortion laws and medical developments: a medico-legal anomaly in Queensland

In October 2010 the District Court sitting in Cairns, Queensland, found Tegan Leach not guilty of attempting to procure her own abortion and Sergie Brennan not guilty of supplying Leach with the drugs Mifepristone and Misoprostol to procure an abortion. Brennan obtained the drugs from his sister in the Ukraine through the regular postal system. R v Brennan and Leach was the first case in Queensland's history where a woman was charged with procuring her own abortion. The drugs are accepted by the medical profession worldwide for medical abortions. A prosecution witness gave evidence that Mifepristone is not harmful or injurious to the health of a woman and it is listed as an essential medicine by the World Health Organisation and approved for use by the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration. The jury found the defendants not guilty because they were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the combination of the drugs Mifepristone and Misoprostol was a "noxious" substance under the Criminal Code (Old). This article concludes that there is no regulatory miracle which will stop the traffic of Mifepristone and Misoprostol into Australia and therefore an intelligent regulatory response is required which would make it unnecessary for women to seek Mifepristone and Misoprostol from overseas networks and the internet. Among other things, this would include the repeal of confusing, inappropriate and ineffective abortion laws.     

Roe v. Wade is constitutionally unprincipled and logically incoherent: a brief in support of judicial restraint

This "amicus curiae" brief was submitted by the Center for Judicial Studies and 56 members of Congress. They were concerned that "Roe" expands powers that belong to Congress and the states into the realm of federal government. Part I of the brief dealt with Missouri's claim that the laws that were at issue in "Webster" were permitted under "Roe" and shouldn't have been made invalid by lower courts. Most of the brief was in Part II. The thrust of it was that "Roe" was not based on any principle and is incoherent internally; "Roe" said that a privacy right existed under the US constitution. However, "Roe" didn't define this right of personal privacy. "Roe" cited a "line of decisions" to prove this point. However, none of the cases that "Roe" cited pretended to be based on the "right to privacy." They dealt with other issues. "Botsford" was said to be the beginning of the constitutional privacy right. It dealt with a "common law rule of evidence," not a right that was in the constitution. Therefore, it did not define the privacy right. "The process by which "Roe" moved from privacy to abortion was unfounded by judicial fiat." "Roe" said that it was protected by "the compelling interest standard," but did not give a reason why this was so. In "Roe," the woman';s interest in getting an abortion was analyzed in medical terms. But when talking about the State's interest in protecting potential human life, medical considerations were not controlling. Part III of the brief asked that "Roe" be overturned because it said that "a privacy right to abortion" was "devoid of any linkage to the text or history of the constitution." "Roe" should be abandoned because its "inadequacies" are "basic".     

TOO DUMB TO KNOW BETTER

Throughout history, three traits have commonly been stressed as characteristic of the bad woman: her irresolution. her promiscuity, and her responsibility for the downfull of others. These traits were amplified by a series of studies of “cacogenic” families which appeared between 1874 and 1926. The family studies offered seemingly scientific proof that the bad woman was the source of many social problems and an important criminal type in her own right. The process by which the family studies helped remodel the image of the bad woman is examined as are effects of that remodeling on institutionalization policy. The development of this new image of the bad woman is explained, in part, by the fact that the family studies were financed by wealthy eugenists; these sponsors stood to gain from the increased social control which, the family studies showed, was required by the cacogenic woman and her progeny.     

Brief for bioethicists for privacy as amicus curiae supporting appellees

Amicus, an ad hoc group of philosophers, theologians, attorneys, and physicians, believe that adults should consult their doctor when making personal decisions. The doctor-patient relationship would be protected under the Constitution. In "Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court said that a state law which forbid married couples from using contraceptives was unconstitutional; that the couples should have a right to privacy. In "Roe," the Supreme Court recognized that a patient and her doctor should have privacy. In "Doe v. Bolton," the Supreme Court found that the State of Georgia was violating the patients' and physician's freedom. In "Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth," the Supreme Court said that a general informed consent provision was alright because it did not take away the abortion decision. The post- Roe state laws were ways to control doctors and patients so that a particular philosophical view could be imposed. The major question in Webster is whether personal decisions should be made by doctors and patients or the state. Both parties must agree to the decision. Section 188.205 of the Missouri law was before the Court in Webster. This section makes it illegal for public funds to be used to encourage a woman to have an abortion that wasn't necessary to save her life. There are medical conditions for which abortion is reasonable - Tay-Sachs disease, for instance. The child usually dies by 3 years of age. Without genetic screening, many at-risk couples would abort all pregnancies. 95% of all prenatal screenings are negative. State medical treatment decisions are arbitrary and impersonal. Having control over important personal decisions is necessary for freedom.     

Food Security and the Right to Food in the Discourse of the United Nations

Abstract: The definition of food security now most commonly used, that of the 1996 World Food Summit, bears considerable resemblance to the definition of the right to food. Yet a right-to-food based approach to food security is distinct from other approaches to reducing hunger and malnutrition and complements food security considerations with dignity, rights acknowledgment, transparency, accountability, and empowerment concerns. It is based on an a priori commitment to the value of human dignity and makes the individual an agent of change in a way that enables him or her to hold governments accountable and to seek redress for violations of his or her rights. A right-to-food approach is not based on vague and replaceable policy goals subject to periodic redefinition, but on existing, comparatively specific and continuously becoming more precise obligations undertaken by governments. Therefore, the right to food cannot only be regarded as a means to achieve food security, but must be seen as a wider, more encompassing, and distinct objective in itself. Realizing the right to food should, furthermore, be part and parcel of rights-based approaches to development that aim to implement all human rights obligations which States have committed themselves to under human rights law.     

Human rights dynamics of abortion law reform

The legal approach to abortion is evolving from criminal prohibition towards accommodation as a life-preserving and health-preserving option, particularly in light of data on maternal mortality and morbidity. Modern momentum for liberalization comes from international adoption of the concept of reproductive health, and wider recognition that the resort to safe and dignified healthcare is a major human right. Respect for women's reproductive self-determination legitimizes abortion as a choice when family planning services have failed, been inaccessible, or been denied by rape. Recognition of women's rights of equal citizenship with men requires that their choices for self-determination be legally respected, not criminalized.     

Criminal liability of physicians: an encroachment on the abortion right?

The Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v. Wade established that decision of first trimester abortion is left to the physician, exercising his best medical judgment, in consultation with the patient. During this period the state may not regulate abortion determination since there is no compelling state interest; therefore a physician performing abortion will be precluded from civil or criminal liability. In second trimester abortion the state has a compelling interest in the health of the mother and may regulate the procedure to protect maternal health; although a previable fetus may be able to survive the abortion, Roe v. Danforth definitively places the woman's right to an abortion above the life of the fetus during the previable stage; therefore the state cannot seek to safeguard the life or health of the fetus during the abortion. Third trimester abortion implies a viable fetus; thus, a compelling state interest in the potential life arises and the state may regulate and proscribe abortion except when necessary for the life and health of the mother. The determination of when viability has been achieved is a matter of judgment resting with the physician who has the choice of techniques and operating procedures which may or may not be fatal to the unborn. It is a question of either termination of pregnancy or destruction of the fetus. In this last case the legal responsibility placed upon the physician is very serious, and involving a risk of civil and criminal liability. Uncertainties as to the boundaries of legal abortion and the threat of criminal liability can only result in a reluctance among physicians to perform second and third trimester abortions, which is against the fundamental right to abortion guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court will have to elaborate upon the scope of the abortion right, whether it encompasses fetal destruction or only termination of pregnancy, because it directly affects the extent and quality of maternal and fetal care that must be rendered by a physician. If only termination of pregnancy is included the Court must resolve whether the woman's health interests predominate, or whether the physician can be required to enhance fetal survival. Physicians have a right to know the full extent of legal ramifications and implications of legally induced abortion.     

Abortion in Northern Ireland: Has the Rubicon Been Crossed?

On 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court delivered their long anticipated ruling on whether the abortion laws in Northern Ireland are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the case was dismissed on procedural grounds, a majority of the court held that, obiter, the current Northern Irish law was incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life, protected by Article 8 ECHR, “insofar as it prohibits abortion in cases of rape, incest and fatal foetal abnormality”. This Supreme Court decision, seen alongside the May 2018 Irish referendum liberalising abortion, and the 5 June 2018 Parliamentary debate seeking to liberalise abortion laws in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, places renewed focus upon the abortion laws of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, which suggests that the ‘halfway house’ of the Abortion Act 1967 Act finally be close to being reformed to hand the decision of abortion to women themselves.     

Legal abortion: the impending obsolescence of the trimester framework

Women who wish to terminate a pregnancy, and physicians willing to perform abortions, are subject to increasing harassment from groups which challenge the constitutional abortion right upheld by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. Their vulnerability, in fact, parallels the vulnerability of the abortion right. This Article analyzes the inherent weakness and impending obsolescence of the trimester framework established in Roe. Present medical evidence of maternal health risks and fetal viability demonstrates that the trimester framework is inconsistent with current medical knowledge, and will likely be rendered obsolete by developments in medical technology. The Article suggests that adoption of an alternative constitutional basis for legal abortion is necessary to preserve the abortion right, and explores the utility of two arguments grounded in the equal protection doctrine. Finally, it discusses means of preserving legal abortion within the confines of the trimester framework established in Roe v. Wade.     

Woman's Right to Know Act: a legislative history

This article provides a comprehensive legislative history of North Carolina's Woman's Right to Know Act of 2011. The Act requires informed consent and a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period for abortion, thus protecting a woman's right to make an informed choice. Informed consent provisions and mandatory waiting periods give individuals making decisions the information and time necessary to make informed choices. The Act further provides that an ultrasound be performed and explained no less than four hours and no more than seventy-two hours before the abortion. The article first provides a brief overview of sources of legislative history recognized in North Carolina. It then details the history of the Woman's Right to Know Act, from the first informed consent bill introduced in 1981, to the passage of the 201l law, and to the federal court case that followed. Finally it provides specific objections that were raised against the bill and responses to each. Legislators considering similar legislation need to be aware of the opposition they inevitably will encounter when passing such a bill. The author expects that this history and the ultimate success of North Carolina will encourage other states' legislators and lawyers and give them the tools to make their case effectively.     

Patriarchy,Abortion, and the Criminal System: Policing Female Bodies

This paper argues for a broader consideration of the issue of abortion—one that stresses the centrality of the denial of reproductive rights in the patriarchal policing of women’s bodies and their sexuality. Globally, the estimates of abortion-related deaths in 2014 ranged from 22,500 to 44,000, and countless women are injured or left infertile by seeking illegal abortions. We briefly review international trends regarding abortion politics and then analyze closely women’s access to abortion in two countries: the United States and Bangladesh. Representing two very different contexts of the developed and the developing world, respectively, we contend that abortion services are being constrained by misogynistic politics that deny women control over their bodies. Finally, the paper reviews recent international efforts to establish abortion rights as part of a broader landscape of human rights. Notably, while there are some efforts in the global north to recriminalize both contraception and abortion, these practices have been characterized by a recent United Nation’s report as the deliberate denial of medically available and necessary services and hence a form of “torture.”