The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the way in which it works can be seen as a microcosm of how a multilingual, multicultural supranationalisation process and legal order can be constructed—the Court is a microcosm of the EU as a whole and in particular of EU law. The multilingual jurisprudence produced by the CJEU is necessarily shaped by the dynamics within that institution and by the ‘cultural compromises’ at play in the production process. The resultant texts, which make up that jurisprudence, are hybrid in nature and inherently approximate. On the one hand, that approximation can lead to discrepancies between language versions of the Court’s case law and thus jeopardise the uniform application of EU law. On the other hand, that approximation and hybridity define EU law as a distinct, supranational legal order. This paper analyses the operation of the CJEU and considers whether a linguistic cultural compromise exists within that institution which exercises a formative influence on the character of its ‘output’—i.e. its jurisprudence—and what that may mean for our understanding of the development of EU law.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.     

Fundamental rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat

This article takes stock of the emerging scholarship on the European Court of Justice's 2008 Kadi decision and seeks to make sense of the court's apparent evasiveness towards international law. The article argues that Kadi is best understood as an act of civil disobedience prompted by the UN Security Council's misapplication of foundational principles of the international order. In turn, the court's forceful articulation of the stakes in this case signals a prioritisation of basic rights within the supranational constitutional architectonic. In this respect, the ‘domestic’ constitutional implications of Kadi are just as far reaching as its consequences for the EU's status as an actor under international law.     

Positive Obligations and the International Criminal Tribunals’ Law of Detention: Funding Family Visits and the ICC Presidency’s Ngudjolo Decision

This article addresses the issue of whether the international criminal tribunals are under an obligation to fund family visits for indigent detainees. It examines the concept of positive obligations and its relation to the detention situation and describes the practice of funding family visits as it has developed at the International Criminal Court. It further analyses relevant developments in the Court’s case law. It argues that the Court is indeed obliged to fund family visits. In this regard, the mere recognition of a detainee’s right to family visits in the tribunals’ legal frameworks andin international soft-law penological standards can be said to inadequately reflect the particularities of international detention.

     

Capital Punishment in the Era of Globalization: A Partial Test of the Marshall Hypothesis Among College Students

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall’s hypothesis—that knowledge about the death penalty would reduce support for it—has been measured in terms of the public’s receptivity to key arguments for abolition including racial discrimination, lack of deterrent effect, and innocence. The effect of the international contextual argument, however, has gone virtually untested, despite the argument’s increased popularity. This preliminary study examines the impact of the international contextual argument against the death penalty on the opinion of 216 adult American students at a public university in California. The results of this study suggest that student support for the death penalty was decreased by exposure to international contextual information. The research presented in this paper is intended to encourage further investigation into the possibility that American public opinion may be significantly affected by international context.     

A Court as the Process of Signification: Legal Semiotics of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in 1996 was a landmark case because, for the first time in history, the legal aspect of nuclear weapons was addressed. The decision has evoked controversies regarding the Court’s conclusion, the legal status of international humanitarian law in relation to nuclear weapons, and a newly introduced concept of state survival. While much legal scholarship discusses and criticizes the legal significance of the opinion, there has not been enough scholarship examining the Court’s specific choice of words and concepts that sustain its wider ideological and political position in the opinion. The paper argues that the Court’s vague and controversial logic is attributed to its confrontation with two international orders/codes: the legal order (or international law) and the political order (or state practice). The paper engages in legal semiotics as methodology to decode legal text and discover a deep structure that sustains networks of codes, according to which text is interpreted. Through the semiotic examination of three sets of key concepts (1) “permitted” and “prohibited,” (2) “threat of use” and “possession of the weapon,” and (3) “state survival,” the paper shows the ICJ’s confrontation with two orders/codes and eventual prioritization of the political order over the international legal order. The analysis of the opinion based on legal semiotics indicates an intimate and inseparable relationship between state practice and international law, which must be disentangled for the sake of the rule of law.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

Opinion Construction in the Roberts Court

The Supreme Court's main output is the decision on the merits. Little is known, however, about how such decisions are constructed. This article is one of the first to look at the way Supreme Court opinions are constructed by examining the impact of the core linguistic resources at the Court's disposal. It does so in a novel manner by measuring the Court's reliance on wording from parties’ merits filings, amicus briefs, and lower‐court opinions between the 2005 and 2014 terms. To accomplish this goal, the article compares language in over 13,000 documents in the Court's docket during this period with their respective majority opinions. The article then looks at the relative impact of parties’ briefs and filings, amicus curiae briefs, and lower‐court opinions on the Court's majority opinion language. This article provides both macro– and microlevel analyses by locating the relative effects of these linguistic resources on the Court's overall opinion language as well as by breaking these findings down by individual justice. In the aggregate, this article finds that, of the three resources analyzed, the Court tends to use language from parties’ merits briefs most frequently, then wording from lower‐court opinions, and the least from amicus briefs, but that differences in case level factors shift the relative utility of each of these three resources.     

Beyond a “Victims’ Right”: Truth-Finding Power and Procedure at the ICC

The drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court were presented with a unique opportunity to shape the future of victim participation in international criminal legal proceedings. They were also faced with a critical dilemma – how can the International Criminal Court promote the interests of victims while simultaneously protecting the accused’s fair trial rights? In many respects the final draft of the Rome Statute left the task of defining the parameters of these potentially competing interests to the Court. As a result, a body of case-law has emerged, highlighting textual ambiguities in the Rome Statute and giving rise to novel developments in sphere of victim participation. Amongst the most prominent of these developments is the recognition of the right of victims to introduce evidence at trial. However, viewing this procedure simply as a fixture of the International Criminal Court’s regime of victim participation masks its true significance and potential. This article explores the idea that the Court’s approach to the evidentiary procedure regulating victim participation has given birth to quasi-investigative powers that have the potential to dramatically reconfigure the future of international criminal litigation.     

从霸权经济到国际经济机制——全球化背景下超国家干预经济模式的理性选择

全球化背景下,世界各国面临超国家干预经济的客观现实。超国家干预经济有霸权干预经济和国际经济机制干预两种模式。前者是传统的超国家干预模式,曾经促进过国际经济秩序的稳定和发展,但在理论和实践中均存在诸多弊端,如今已不符合国际经济发展的需要,逐渐为国际社会所抛弃;后者作为新的超国家干预经济手段,符合经济全球化发展的趋势,已被国际社会所广泛认同和接纳,理应作为未来超国家干预经济的模式。但国际经济机制干预模式仍存在诸多缺陷,应当完善其多元化设计,并推进其实现从自由化到社会化的转型,最终建立和谐世界经济环境。     

国际刑事法院的司法能动主义:实践、反思及限制

国际刑事法院对《罗马规约》近年来的解释中呈现出司法能动主义的趋势,即背离约文的字面含义和立法者的原意,扩张国际刑事法院管辖下犯罪的定义和可受理案件的范围。国际刑法的混合性质、先前国际刑事法庭的司法能动主义政策以及《罗马规约》适用法条款和解释规则的不确定性都是导致国际刑事法院司法能动主义的原因。作为非经授权的司法立法行为,国际刑事法院的司法能动主义不但违背国家主权原则和罪刑法定主义,而且损害了国际社会通过其追究国际犯罪的信心。构建对其司法能动主义进行规制的关键在于厘清和协调《维也纳条约法公约》中的解释规则、罪刑法定原则下的严格解释以及存疑有利于被告解释方法三者在《罗马规约》解释中的适用范围及适用关系。     

Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of international legal regimes

Tensions and occasional overt defiance of international courts suggest that compliance with international regimes is not a self-evident choice for domestic judges. I develop a formal theory of domestic judicial defiance in which domestic and supranational judges vie for jurisprudential authority in a non-hierarchical setting. The model emphasises the role of domestic non-compliance costs and power asymmetries in determining the conduct of domestic and international judges. I argue that the EU represents a special case of a particularly effective international regime. Weak domestic courts have little to gain from an escalated conflict with the European court of Justice. But even domestic judicial superpowers like the German Federal Constitutional Court have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation with European judges. The analysis also yields new insights into concepts, such as “judicial dialogue” and “constitutional pluralism” that have featured prominently in the legal literature, and suggests new hypotheses for empirical research.     

Emerging from the Chrysalis: Union Citizenship Must Escape its Nationality-Based Shortcomings

The European Union is at the core of a supranational citizenship project. This supranational project resulted in a crystallised form of citizenship in 1992, although it has been subject to constant revision by the ECJ since then. Nonetheless, the basis on which this novel form of citizenship is predicated is the traditional national paradigm of citizenship, with all its inherent sensitivities and inhibitions replicated on the international stage. It will be suggested that this nation-centric focus is ultimately the single biggest failing of European Union citizenship and its greatest limitation. The very nature of the supranational entity is exclusionary, to the detriment of over a million individuals. This paper will address which sectors of the broader European society are most affected by European citizenship’s exclusive properties and will explore the Union’s obligations and its responsibility to include marginalised groups, particularly the stateless, refugees, and third country nationals on an equal footing with Member State nationals. The extent of the statelessness problem will form the main portion of the discussion with a view to considering the challenges these at risk individuals face on a daily basis and how they can be incorporated in the most effective way within the Union framework: such incorporation will, of necessity, also mandate an examination of surrounding human rights issues, all the more pressing in light of the post-Lisbon Union commitment to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. The stateless are not the only marginalised group found in Union territory: third country nationals who do not benefit from Directive 2003/109 nonetheless make a considerable contribution without receiving the same rights and freedoms as those serendipitous enough to call themselves ‘long-term residents’. The human rights and democratic bases of the Union appear to be undermined by the restrictive approach to inclusion that has, to date, been taken when addressing non-nationals’ incorporation under the citizenship umbrella. This paper aims to assess the shortcomings of the European Citizenship project by highlighting the effects of its exclusivity and the limitations of its notion of inclusivity. Rather than establishing a single supranational form of citizenship the Union has, instead, succeeded in developing a multi-tiered and hierarchical construct, far removed from the notion of ‘a broader community of peoples’. It will culminate in a proposal for a significantly modified vision of Union citizenship which would seek to overcome the current version’s apparent limitations, elevating the standing of the at risk groups in such a way that their contribution to Union life is fully, and deservedly, recognised.     

International Economic Criminal Law

This inquiry explores the question of transnational companies’ criminal liability for international crimes, reviewing the current state of research in the field of international economic criminal law, a discipline that hitherto has received only scant analysis. Following some preliminary conceptual remarks (I.), the forms of corporate participation in such crimes (II.) and the supranational and national practice since Nuremberg are presented. This practice reveals a clear trend towards corporate liability, albeit represented by leading company staff. For this reason, and because legal persons (companies) ultimately act through natural persons (their staff), their liability (IV.) cannot be convincingly established on a purely collective basis – in the sense of a pure organisation model (IV. 4.1.) – but only on the basis of the attribution model, namely as a derivative corporate liability based upon supervisory or organisational culpability (IV.4.2.). The attribution model’s individual approach – or, to use procedural terms, the individualistic “trigger” for the prosecution of companies – finally brings us to the well-known forms of criminal participation (V.), with liability for complicity in particular coming into question. All in all, the essay concludes (VI.), we should not expect too much of (international) criminal corporate liability. Here, as in many other areas, criminal law can only have a (limited) preventive effect as part of a holistic approach.     

Our Democracy,Our Identity,Our Anxiety

The Brexit referendum result has given focus to and amplified a series of anxieties: the successful campaign gave visibility to anxiety about immigration and loss of sovereignty, while also creating anxiety about illiberal populism. This anxiety about national identity, current and prospective (both from supporters of Brexit and its opponents), about Brexit, as caused by anxiety and cause of anxiety, has provoked a debate even about the merits of democracy, if ‘the voice and will of the people’ disrupts the traditional constitutional assumptions regarding checks and balances and becomes despotic. Reference to the tradition of anxiety about democracy, exemplified by Kierkegaard and Kant, establishes a context here for a discussion of the Brexit political debate in terms derived from Lyotard’s investigation of, on the one hand, an appeal to mythic narrative to stabilise a claim of identity, and, on the other hand, narratives of emancipation embodied in a future-oriented deliberative process, which can be analysed in terms of seven different types of language game at play. Particular reference to the image of ‘triggering’ used in the Supreme Court’s judgments in the (R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5) case in relation to Article 50 and the UK’s exit from the EU is made to illustrate the significance of figures of speech within discourse. The conclusion draws on Lyotard’s distinction between a litigation and a differend in order to better understand the politics of Brexit.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Managing a New ‘Partnership’

Defence allegations about the malpractice of intermediaries in the Lubanga Case have revealed the ICC’s dependence upon intermediaries. Yet, surprisingly, the role of intermediaries has received relatively little attention in the academic literature. Since 2009, the Registry has been developing a court-wide set of guidelines to manage the Court’s relationship with intermediaries, which, if adopted, will substitute a large measure of standardisation over the disparate policies and practices currently in place across the various ICC organs and units. The Victims Rights Working Group and the Open Society Justice Initiative in conjunction with the International Refugee Rights Initiative are prominent amongst civil society actors that are playing a key role in advocating for the protection of, and support for, intermediaries through guidelines. This article examines the emerging position of intermediaries in international criminal law. It argues that adopting guidelines will inculcate a semi-institutionalised status for intermediaries, which both reflects, and contributes to, ‘professionalization’ in international criminal law. However, ‘professionalization’ is problematic to the extent to which it creates obstacles for the involvement of counter-hegemonic voices in international criminal law. Moreover, whatever gains guidelines may bestow on the Court and intermediaries, it is unclear how they can or will mesh with the emerging judicial response to intermediaries at the ICC. Ultimately, the increased regulation of intermediaries is likely to have a profound impact on relations between the different ICC organs; and it is set to be a touchstone for civil society–ICC relations more generally.     

Limitation of presidential terms in Zambia: annotating the judicial interpretation

On 7 December 2018, the Constitutional Court of Zambia delivered a judgment which has sparked controversy in the political arena. The judgement concerns the question of whether Zambia’s incumbent President, Edgar Lungu, is eligible for re-election as President in the general elections slated for 2021. The aim of this article is twofold: (1) to explore the rationale for the limitation of presidential terms in Zambia and (2) to annotate the Court’s judgment in light of that rationale. To achieve this aim, the analysis draws on various sources of literature and legal authorities bearing upon the subject. The analysis reveals that the limitation of presidential terms enjoys strong support among Zambians, and that this is justified by the need to facilitate alternation in the office of President to avert the emergency of autocracy which is associated with excessive concentration of power in the executive. As concerns the judgement at issue, the analysis finds that the Court implicitly declared Lungu eligible to contest the 2021 presidential election thereby allowing him a possibility to be re-elected to the office of President for a third term which, it is argued, undermines the law as understood in its context.     

Anti‐suit Injunctions and the Doctrine of Comity

Hin‐Pro International Logistics Limited v CSAV is an important case in the areas of anti‐suit injunctions, contractual interpretation and private international law. Despite the ambiguities surrounding the jurisdiction clause contained in the bills of lading, the Court of Appeal construed the jurisdiction clause as ‘exclusive’ in the context of a ‘contractual background’, and affirmed the continuation of the anti‐suit injunction granted by the Commercial Court. It is argued that the approach of applying the common law principles of contractual interpretation to a bill of lading is questionable. The approach used to apply English private international law is problematic in a number of ways. There are legitimate reasons for concern that the doctrine of comity in English private international law may become undermined as a result.     

State Withdrawal Notifications from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: South Africa,Burundi and the Gambia

In 2016 three African states namely South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia submitted written notifications of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Article 127 of the Rome Statute. Although the African Union welcomed and fully supported the three withdrawal notifications and considered them as ‘pioneer implementers’ of its ‘Withdrawal Strategy’, The Gambia and South Africa withdrew their notifications of withdrawal. Some other states – Kenya, Namibia and Uganda – have made threats to submit withdrawal notifications. This article examines four issues arising out of the said withdrawal notifications. First, why did the three states submit withdrawal notifications from the Rome Statute? Second, what is the impact of the three states’ withdrawal notifications? Third, is the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (or the yet-to-be-established African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights) a suitable African regional ‘alternative’ to the ICC? Finally, what steps might be taken to avoid, or at least minimise, further withdrawals in the future and to avoid impunity of perpetrators of international crimes in states that have withdrawn from the Rome Statute?