Old and new Korean wars

Abstract

As I write this we have come off one week when it looked as if we might have another war in Korea, and the next week when peace broke out between Washington and Pyongyang as a result of Jimmy Carter's meetings with Kim Il Sung. This pattern of crisis followed by relaxation has lasted at least since the spring of 1993, when North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. During the entire period most Americans and especially our print and television media have demonstrated that they have no understanding of the terrible destructiveness of the Korean War—and therefore they easily conjure up a new one. Indeed, talk of a new war in Korea is casual and almost routine in the United States.     

Cold War brotherhood contested: KATUSAs,slicky boys,American G.I.s,and the Status of Forces Agreement in post-armistice South Korea, 1954–1966

ABSTRACT

As the largest contingent of Americans in postwar South Korea, the G.I. best represented the United States’ Cold War objectives. Their deployment was an emblem of hard power containment, but the G.I. also embodied soft power integration, and through both, G.I.s helped to promote Pax Americana. This article focuses on the militarized masculinity of these ambassadors of America and their people-to-people diplomacy in South Korea between 1954 and 1966. These American G.I.s constructed their militarized masculinity vis-à-vis the Korean male Other, their “lesser” counterparts – the hapless houseboy, the inferior partner soldier, and the menacing slicky boy. At the same time, this liberal imperialism did not go uncontested. Violent imaginaries of the American G.I. from the borderlands were used by Koreans to demand a new bilateral framework – the Status of Forces Agreement in 1966 – to replace the outmoded wartime extraterritorial jurisdiction wielded by the American military after cessation of hostilities on the Korean peninsula in 1953. The militarized masculinity practiced in everyday encounters, thus, became the basis of a critique of American liberal imperialism in one of the United States closest Cold War “brother” nations.     

The Strained Alliance: Peking,Pyongyang, Moscow and thePolitics of the Korean Civil War

Abstract

The burden of many conventional interpretations of the Korean War is that the conflict represented a test of strength between the Soviet and American Cold War antagonists which helped establish the ground rules for limited war in the nuclear age. The great virtue of Simmons' book is that it confronts us with the obvious but hitherto elusive truth that the Korean Civil War (as it is correctly called here) originated in Korean political issues. Simmons paints Korean features onto the Soviet-American Cold War mask. His book's second significant contribution is in its probing beneath the surface unity of the communist camp in the early 1950s to suggest that serious conflicts of interest arose between Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang in the course of the war.     

Trends in North Korean foreign policy

North Korea’s foreign policy track record in the post-cold war era is mixed. Most notable setbacks are the diplomatic normalization between the Soviet Union (now Russia) and South Korea; the reversal of its UN policy that paved the way for the simultaneous admission of the two Korean states to the world organization; and the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea. On the credit side of Pyongyang’s diplomatic ledger are changes in its relations with Tokyo and Washington. While tangible results have yet to materialize, particularly in North Korea-Japan relations, the groundwork has nonetheless been laid for significant improvement. North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons development program has played a major role in the unfolding of its relations with the United States. Conceptually, North Korean foreign policy can be explained in terms of its quest for three interrelated goals: security, legitimacy, and development. In the post-cold war era security appears to have emerged as the most important of the three goals. North Korea is at a crossroads. The choices it makes in foreign policy will determine not only the direction of its domestic policy but, ultimately, the survival of the regime itself. The external players in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and Vienna (the IAEA) have varying degrees of leverage over Pyongyang’s policy as well.     

Economic Interdependence and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The Impact of North Korean Special Economic Zones

Abstract

Given North Korea’s desire to maintain nuclear weapons—and barring its unexpected collapse—how can the US and its allies establish and maintain a peaceful Northeast Asia? Current US policy alternatives do not offer an effective means for removing North Korean nuclear weapons without creating many more serious problems that jeopardize a stable future for Northeast Asia. However, by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) through North Korea’s special economic zones, the United States and other nations can engage North Koreans at all levels of society and build a future environment of cooperation and stability. Such a long-term engagement policy will prove more successful than isolation, sanctions, or military force, and will bolster regional actors’ efforts to develop additional stability-inducing policies.     

Introduction to the supplement

Abstract

Today the American press focuses on what might be called the domestic consequences of United States policy toward Korea. We read about the troop withdrawal issue, the unfolding Korea Lobby scandal, and, perhaps, Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) activities within the U.S. The following supplement, however, reminds us of the far worse consequences of American and Korean policies for those who remain within Korea. It was the U.S. CIA which helped to set up the KCIA, thereby providing to the diffuse authoritarianism of the Rhee regime period (1948–1960) an organizational weapon which has kept Park in power through sixteen years of Korean dissent and upheaval: it is the south Korean people who continue to suffer the consequences. It was the Johnson and Nixon administrations which sanctioned what amounted to bribery, first to get the south Koreans to commit troops in the Vietnam War, and then to keep them there as Nixon and Kissinger prolonged the war. It was the Nixon administration which kept a conspicuous silence when Park in 1972 ripped up the old constitution, did away with even the fiction of procedural democracy, and instituted a frankly authoritarian regime.     

Introduction

Abstract

“The only thing that convinces people like Kim II Sung is the threat of force and extinction,” blasted U.S. senator John McCain as the nuclear crisis in Korea neared the flashpoint in early June 1994. His words rang out as the multilateral tension surrounding North Korea's nuclear program escalated after more than a year of rapid policy vacillations and fluctuating rhetoric. The United States threatened to seek sanctions in the U.N. Security Council, and North Korea vowed to treat any international aggression as an act of war. What is remarkable about McCain's war yearnings, however, is not their aberrance in the otherwise cool-headed world of international diplomacy, but their similarity to imperial declarations toward North Korea since the battles of the Korean War. It is a sentiment routinely echoed by the mainstream Western press.     

LIMITED WAR,UNLIMITED TARGETS

In the early days of the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) had a policy of precision bombing military targets only. Policy-makers in Washington, D.C., formulated this policy to ensure the protection of Korean civilians and to increase the effectiveness of their air operations. Senior USAF officers in Korea, however, were unhappy about the limitations placed on them by Washington. In their strategic air operations against targets in North Korea USAF officers followed Washington's precision bombing policy, but they insisted that USAF bombers be permitted to use incendiary bombs against population centers in North Korea. China's entry into the war in November 1950 led to a drastic change in the precision bombing policy. On 5 November 1950, when the UN forces began suffering defeat after defeat in battles with the new enemy, General Douglas MacArthur designated cities and villages in North Korea as “main bombing targets” and permitted the use of incendiary bombs, which had been used in attacks against Japanese cities during World War II. From that point until the end of the war, the USAF regarded North Korean cities and villages as their crucial targets as political and military occasion demanded.     

Statement on peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula

Abstract

We who have been praying and working for peace and the reunification of Korea would like to express our deep concerns about the rising tensions surrounding the north Korean nuclear controversy and the potentially imminent war on the Korean peninsula. We still remember vividly the nightmare of the Korean War beginning 25 June 1950, and we have endured tremendously painful experiences for the last half century because of the division of our country. We would like to express our positions to the governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United States, and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as we firmly believe that the shortest route to reunification is through the reconciliation and solidarity of the Korean people:     

The North Korea Problem: Perspectives on the Nuclear Debate,Economic Reforms and Beyond

ABSTRACT

Despite a plethora of research on North Korea, understanding and managing the challenges posed by the country have long been complicated with no simple solution to put an end to this decades-long security and economic predicament on the Korean Peninsula. With the potential for international conflict, attention must be given to the converging messages emerging from the scholarly works reviewed in this article: Glyn Ford, Talking to North Korea: Ending the Nuclear Standoff, Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War and William Overholt’s collection North Korea: Peace? Nuclear War? These works speak to the need to: take seriously the risk of nuclear war; consider the connectedness of the North’s decades-long security and economic reform dilemmas; and to acknowledge that the mistrust that is deeply rooted on all sides must be mitigated to bring peace. These books are published at a critical juncture of increased tensions following a highly publicised but remarkably short-lived effort at a breakthrough on the Korean nuclear issue, Pyongyang’s rapidly evolving security posture and its perennial domestic challenges. Each of these volumes provides valuable insights on these challenges for North Korea and internationally.     

浅析奥巴马政府的对朝政策

在应对处理朝鲜半岛危机中,美国一直扮演着一个关键的角色。奥巴马上台后,朝鲜半岛危机出现了急剧的变化,这也让人们对奥巴马政府的对朝政策更加关注。实际上,在2009年春美国国务卿希拉里访问亚洲后,奥巴马政府的对朝政策就产生了很大的变化。朝鲜半岛不断升级的紧张局势,使得美国有机会重振其世界领袖的雄风,重新确立美日韩在东亚的铁三角同盟关系,并通过不断的联合军事演习对朝鲜施加了除军事动武以外的巨大压力,同时也侧面敲击和缓解了中国力量在亚太地区伸展的势头。奥巴马的外交理念是做一个实际的理想主义者和一个有理想的现实主义者,其对朝政策的核心策略就是软的更软,硬的更硬,以硬逼软。     

Managing Small Allies Amidst Patron–Adversary Rapprochement: A Tale of Two Koreas

ABSTRACT

What explains variation in how a patron manages its existing alliance with a client state when improving relations with an adversary? I theorize that the patron’s alliance management strategy is influenced by the client’s degree of bargaining power over its patron. Bargaining power derives from the availability of an outside option. Using archival and interview evidence, I show variation in alliance bargaining dynamics during US–China rapprochement. While the United States was dismissive toward South Korea, China was highly placating toward North Korea, making concessions and providing compensation. However, China became more dismissive during Sino-South Korean normalization, when North Korea’s bargaining power decreased. The findings have important policy implications for understanding how a patron could simultaneously manage alliance and adversary relationships.     

Japan’s search for influence in the Korean peninsula after the Cold War: Aspirations and constraints

This article examines Japan’s search for a more active international role in the Korean peninsula after the Cold War. It argues that Japanese foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula after the Cold War has continued to exhibit a reactive posture due to several important constraints. The United States has remained an important factor in shaping the Japanese foreign policy agenda in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, the Japanese domestic political environment, despite the dramatic political realignment after 1993, has continued to favor a nonmilitary Japanese role in world affairs. Finally, the lingering Korean mistrust toward Japan has hampered Japan’s bid to increase its political profile. Consequently, these constraints ensure that Japan’s independent role in the Korean peninsula will be rather limited in the foreseeable future.     

South Korea's search for an independent foreign policy

South Korea's independent foreign policy should be understood as a growing self-reliant attitude in the process of managing foreign affairs, and not as a strict policy target that must be achieved within a single term of a specific government. In theory, an instrumental approach, rather than an ideological adherence, toward the alliance system with the US is relevant for South Korea. Most importantly of all, the Korean dream of independent foreign policy will be hard to realize until Koreans abandon the dependent mind-set in terms of national security and foreign policy.     

America's Korea,Korea's Vietnam

Atrocities committed by American soldiers against Vietnamese civilians during the Vietnam War have once again become an issue of public debate in the United States, yet similar actions by South Korean troops fighting America's war in Vietnam remain virtually unknown in the West. The Republic of Korea (ROK) dispatched more than 300,000 combat troops to Vietnam between 1965 and 1973, but after decades of enforced silence by successive authoritarian governments, Koreans have only recently begun to grapple with the ambiguous legacy of the Vietnam War for South Korea. In the spring and summer of 2000, testimonies in the South Korean media by Korean veterans of the Vietnam War revealed for the first time detailed, extensive accounts of Korean atrocities against Vietnamese civilians. These revelations, and the controversy they triggered within South Korea, bring into bold relief the role of Koreans in America's Vietnam War and the role of the Vietnam War in the political and economic development of South Korea.     

论日本的朝鲜半岛政策与日韩邦交正常化

“二战”后日本总的朝鲜半岛政策就是“两个朝鲜”政策。以此为前提,在不同的历史时期,日本根。据国际、国内形势的变化,采取了不同的具体对韩政策。20世纪60年代以前,处于战后复兴阶段的日本,为自身的国家利益考虑,在对朝鲜半岛殖民统治的认识、韩国对日请求权、日韩渔业纷争、在日朝鲜人等问题上对韩采取了强硬政策。之后,随着日本经济的高速增长和美国东亚政策的调整,日本从现实的国家利益及配合美国的东亚战略的角度出发,搁置日韩在殖民统治认识问题上的争议,迅速着手解决影响当代日韩关系发展的最大障碍——韩国对日请求权问题和日韩渔业纷争问题,实现了日韩邦交正常化。     

Sino-South Korean economic cooperation: An analysis of domestic and foreign entanglements

One of the most explicit manifestations of post-Mao China’s pragmatic foreign policy has been the significant shift in Beijing’s position vis-à-vis Seoul from a “non-policy” todefacto economic diplomacy. Despite the extent of cooperative endeavors, Sino-South Korean economic relations have been circumscribed by various domestic and external factors. While a further intensification of the cooperative relationship is projected for the second decade of Sino-South Korean economic diplomacy, the actual materialization of such prospects depends on how China and South Korea are going to maintain economic complementarity. More importantly, it also depends on when and how China is going to accommodate politically its economic relations with South Korea by resolving the issue of “two Koreas,” thus maximizing the potential benefits from its ties with Seoul and simultaneously minimizing the negative effects from the entanglements of various domestic and foreign factors.     

Cash or Combat? America’s Asian Alliances During the War in Afghanistan

Abstract

A basic trade-off in military cooperation exists: States must respond to the dominant ally’s demands and act as a reliable partner while simultaneously making a decision that is acceptable to domestic audiences. We argue that compensatory burden-sharing strategies are imperfect but dependable solutions to manage foreign policy decisions at the domestic and alliance levels. Our theoretical expectations are tested using the US-Japan and US-Republic of Korea alliances and, in particular, the contribution of each country to the war in Afghanistan. We find that foreign aid commitments to third parties are made as a form of compensation when alliance expectations are substantial, but the secondary ally's ability to contribute militarily is highly constrained. Foreign aid has therefore served as an alliance management tool.     

The Korean War: An International History,by William Stueck

Abstract

William Stueck's The Korean War: An International History will be required reading for all scholars of the war for some time to come. Intensively researched, the book is a readable, but detailed account of Korean War diplomacy accompanied by nearly twenty pages of bibliography.     

Fighting the Korean War in pacifist Japan: Korean and Japanese leftist solidarity and American Cold War containment

Where does “pacifist” Japan fit within the history of the Korean War? Was Japan simply the beneficiary of the wartime boom – a case best exemplified by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s characterization of the Korean War as “a gift of the gods”? When North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and launched a full-scale attack against South Korea, the U.S. occupation in Japan quickly transformed the pacifist nation into the indispensable rear base of United Nations military intervention in the Korean War. The Japanese Communist Party and leftist groups organized by zainichi Koreans (Korean residents in Japan) launched an antiwar movement to stop Japan from producing and sending arms to UN forces in Korea. The U.S. occupation responded with determined efforts to contain every antiwar voice emerging from the streets of the pacifist country. By examining the political dynamics of zainichi Korean and Japanese leftist solidarity and U.S. countermeasures, this article shows how the Korean War was fought in pacifist Japan. It also illuminates how the practice of Cold War containment was mutually linked on the ground between occupied Japan and South Korea.