WTO体制内国内法的可诉性问题

在一般国际法理论与实践中,国内法本身可以单独构成国际争端解决程序的诉因。WTO体制内国内法可诉的法律依据是GATT1994第23条、DSU第3.8条以及《WTO协定》第16.4条。在WTO争端解决实践中,专家组和上诉机构的裁决呈现出一个重要的趋势:在美国“301条款”案前,遵循GATT1947时期专家组所确立的“裁量性立法与强制性立法之区分”的习惯性做法;在美国“301条款”案后,不再严格遵循这一习惯性做法。WTO体制内国内法之可诉性问题目前尚没有一个统一、明确的答案。     

Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US - Gambling: A Critique

‘Before the game begins players should agree on a dictionaryto use in case of a challenge.’ (from the Official Rulesof SCRABBLE®)

Treaty interpretation in WTO law continues to represent a topicof highly theoretical and practical importance. The Panel’sand the Appellate Body’s reports in the recent US –Gambling dispute have critically turned on ascertaining themeaning of the United States’ GATS Schedule and ArticleXVI GATS on the basis of the public international law rulesof treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties. The paper’s principal aim is toreview the interpretative approach followed in particular bythe Appellate Body in reaching its decision in US – Gambling.Its main argument is that, although the Appellate Body appearsto be trying to emancipate itself from a rigorous textual approach,it has not yet embraced a holistic approach to treaty interpretation,one in which the treaty interpreter looks thoroughly at allthe relevant elements of the general rule on treaty interpretationpursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.     

RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITH NATURAL RESOURCES TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA — RARE EARTHS

This article intends to shed light on key legal issues that emerged from the recently released WTO Appellate Body’s adjudication over China — Rare Earths dispute, exploring possible policy options for China to reach its environmental goals on natural resources in a WTO-consistent manner. The article first spotlights positive variations in the Appellate Body’s interpretative approach regarding the applicability of GATT general exceptions to defend the violation of WTO-Plus commitments under China’s Accession Protocol; second, given the fact that the Appellate Body, pursuant to the elements inscribed in GATT Article XX(g), confirmed the Panel’s objective assessment based on the design and structure of the challenged measures of GATT, this paper provides reflections and recommendations on China’s domestic environmental legislation. The third part probes into the interface between the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the WTO legal regime, with an attempt to offer thought-provoking ideas on how to reconcile potential conflicts between the two.     

Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy

Abstract: In a series of rulings, beginning with the notorious Shrimp/Turtle dispute, the high court of the WTO, the so‐called Appellate Body, has ruled that it, as well as the panels of first instance, may, on a discretionary basis, accept and consider amicus curiae briefs from, inter alia, non‐governmental organisations and private individuals. This has been highly controversial and subject to wide and intense criticism by trade diplomats who are the political representatives of WTO Member states in Geneva; the officials have reacted with anger and hostility to the notion that governments are not exclusive gatekeepers of access to the WTO dispute settlement tribunals. This article shows that the decision that amicus briefs are admissible at the discretion of the adjudicator has a sound basis in the legal framework for WTO dispute settlement, as well as conforming to trends in the practice of international courts and tribunals more generally. The article examines various ‘due process’ issues concerning the modalities for acceptance and consideration of amicus briefs and how they have been so far dealt with by the Appellate Body, as well as how they are handled in certain proposals for reform of the legal framework of WTO dispute settlement, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).     

WTO争端胜诉方"申请授权报复"的程序问题研究——"世贸组织争端解决规则与程序的谅解"第21.5条和第22.6条之间的顺序问题

WTO争端解决机制(Dispute Settlement Mechanism)是乌拉圭回合谈判的一个重要成果,而WTO争端解决机制比起GATT时代的争端解决程序的优越性主要在于它对执行裁决的监督上。体现在"WTO争端解决程序与规则的谅解"(DSU)中,就在于第21条"履行措施的合法性审查"和第22条"申请授权报复"的规定。这两条规定在WTO司法实践中已经成为WTO法执行的砥柱规则,使多边贸易体系解决纠纷的法律体系功能更为强大。但是,WTO的立法和任何立法一样,在具有前瞻性、预测性的同时,不可避免地具有一些滞后性,甚至在立法的当时受各种利益因素的制约,在立法上留有一些空白。针对DSU第21条和第22条规定的内在冲突,从分析WTO以往发生的案例入手,综合WTO专家小组对此问题的解释,结合各国提出的建议,对此问题进行论述。     

'Good Faith' in the WTO Jurisprudence - Necessary Balancing Element or an Open Door to Judicial Activism?

The purpose of the article is two-fold: first, it seeks to clarifyand structure those contexts in which the principle of goodfaith has entered the WTO jurisprudence; and second, it presentsan analysis of the potential effects and risks accompanyingthis entrance, such as the allegation of judicial activism onthe part of the panels or the Appellate Body and the viabilityof a distinction between violation and non-violation cases.It attempts to define the framework within which a suitableconcept for the application of good faith must be found andexplores the conclusion that thus far the Appellate Body hasapplied good faith with the necessary caution. However, it cautionsthe necessity of avoiding an overbroad use of the concept andmandates the requirement for the judicial bodies to articulatemore clearly the content attributed to the concept in a particularcase and the legal consequences thereof than it has done thusfar. Finally this article urges the judicial bodies to avoidthe idea of an abstract obligation of good faith that adds somethingto the obligation under the WTO Agreements. This would accordwith the traditional international law understanding of whatthe application of the good faith principle implies.     

Completing the Analysis in WTO Appeals: The Practice and its Limitations

Since its creation in 1995, the Appellate Body of the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) has gradually constructed a consistentapproach to completing panels’ analysis where the circumstancespermit. The need for this practice stems from the limitationof WTO appeals to issues of law and the absence of remand inWTO disputes. The Appellate Body can be seen to complete a panel’sanalysis in two different scenarios: to deal with a claim thatthe panel failed to address; or to apply a different legal interpretationto the facts of the case, where the Appellate Body has reversedor modified the panel’s legal interpretation. In decidingwhether to complete a panel’s analysis, the AppellateBody appears to consider three criteria: the existence of uncontestedfacts to resolve the matter, the connection between the legalissues to be addressed in completing the analysis and thoseconsidered by the panel, and the due process rights of the partiesto the dispute. Where these criteria are not satisfied, theAppellate Body is unable to complete the analysis, and the disputemay go unresolved. This is an increasing problem, highlightingthe need for WTO Members to agree on a suitable remand mechanism.     

Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date

The generally positive record of Members in complying with adverserulings by panels, the Appellate Body or both has been an importantfactor in the success of the WTO dispute settlement system todate. In approximately 90 percent of the adopted reports, oneor more violations of WTO obligations have been found by panelsand/or the Appellate Body. In virtually all of these cases theWTO Member found to be in violation has indicated its intentionto bring itself into compliance and the record indicates thatin most cases has already done so. It is noticeable, if notunsurprising, that compliance has been more rapid where theWTO violations can be corrected through administrative actionas opposed to legislative action. A closer review of the compliancerecord of the United States and the European Communities, whichtogether have been the object of approximately half of all adverseWTO rulings, shows that these Members have generally succeededin bringing themselves into compliance with such rulings, althoughboth Members have experienced some residual compliance difficultiesin a small number of cases. As a final note, the overall positiverecord of Members in complying with adverse WTO rulings is reflectedin, and confirmed by, the low number of cases where Membershave sought and received authorization to impose retaliatorymeasures.     

The Legal Basis for Using Principles in WTO Disputes

This article argues that the use of principles in WTO disputeresolution is both necessary and desirable. However, Panelsand the Appellate Body (WTO Tribunals) have often ignored principlesor not clearly identified the legal basis for their use. Thisarticle establishes a framework for the use of principles (inparticular principles of WTO law, principles of customary internationallaw, and general principles of law) in WTO dispute settlement.Broadly, WTO Tribunals can use principles drawn from these categoriesto interpret WTO provisions, based on Article 3.2 of the DSU,and Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. This follows most directlyfrom a teleological approach to interpretation, but principlesalso feature under subjective and textual approaches to interpretation.WTO Tribunals may also use certain principles in a non-interpretativemanner. Indeed, this may be necessary, particularly to addressprocedural issues. Precisely how a principle may be used dependson its type, content and status.     

WTO争端解决中的案例法方法

判例法这一用语在不同的语境下具有不同的含义。判例法是普通法法律制度中的一种传统,该传统是经由长期的司法实践形成的,而非来自于立法的强制性要求。严格意义上,判例法的突出特点是遵循先例,案件相同裁决相同。在一般意义上,判例法具有指导作用。在WTO争端解决中,无论是上诉机构的观点,还是上诉机构和专家组的实际做法,都体现出明显的案例法的指导作用的特点。与普通法制度不同的是,WTO的案例都是依据WTO规则的解释形成的,并非独立于WTO协定的法律渊源。     

King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision

Although the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a powerful vehiclefor promoting economic development, the Uruguay Round has beenperceived by developing country WTO members as an unequal bargain.Especially with respect to agriculture, the Uruguay Round yieldedonly limited concessions. In September 2003, Doha Round effortsstalled at Cancún when developing countries coalescedto oppose a proposal that insufficiently liberalized trade inagriculture. In March 2005, the Dispute Settlement Body adopteda panel decision upholding Brazil’s legal challenge ofUS subsidies to cotton producers. The US Cotton Subsidies decisionrepresents a dramatic victory for Brazil and other developingcountry WTO members. The timing of the decision, coincidingwith ongoing Doha Round agriculture negotiations, ensures thatit will influence any outcome of the Round. This article examinesthe US Cotton Subsidies decision, describes the subsidy programsat issue in the dispute, reviews applicable WTO rules, and outlinesthe major findings of the panel and Appellate Body. The articleconcludes that Brazil’s victory in US Cotton Subsidiesmay represent a broader shift within the WTO away from a systemdominated by the US and EC toward a system that increasinglyis influenced by emerging market economies.     

WTO规则下单边贸易保护措施实施的条件——关贸总协定第二十条第二款之适用

随着全球生态环境问题的兴起和可持续发展战略的提出,经济、社会和生态环境的协调发展逐渐为人们所重视.虽然主张贸易自由化的WTO仍强调,应站在传统贸易优先的立场上,通过国际协作,禁止缔约方采取单边贸易措施的方法以达到全球环境保护的目的,但上诉机构对虾-海龟案的最终裁决表明,单边环境措施可以同贸易规则相调和.本文试图通过WTO上诉机构关于金枪鱼案、汽油案和虾-海龟案裁决,以及对<欧盟捕猎夹法规>的比较分析,讨论关贸总协定第二十条第二款之适用.     

Catch Me if You Can: An Analysis of "Measures Taken to Comply" under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding

The objective of the compliance procedure is to ensure promptcompliance with the Dispute Settlement Body's (DSB) recommendationsand rulings through an expeditious procedure. In their assignment,the compliance panels are faced with competing considerationsof, on the one hand, ensuring Members the right of a "reasonableperiod of time" for implementing the DSB's recommendations andrulings and, on the other, ensuring prompt compliance. Compliancepanels have to pay due respect to the fact that an Article 21.5proceeding is not a new proceeding, which limits the scope ofwhich claims may be raised in those proceedings and restrictsthe determination of which measures are "measures taken to comply".In order to achieve those overall aims, compliance panels andthe Appellate Body have accepted that claims other than thoseraised in the original proceedings may be presented in complianceproceedings. Due process principles form an integral part ofthe Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The delicate taskof the panels and Appellate Body is to determine which claims,not raised in the original proceedings, are admissible in anArticle 21.5 proceeding. Compliance panels and the AppellateBody have established several limitations in order to limitthe ambit of potential claims and measures that may fall withinan expeditious Article 21.5 proceeding. However, the embracedapproach to determining which new claims, not raised in theoriginal proceedings, are to be considered in Article 21.5 proceedingsand which measures fall within the realm of measures taken tocomply bears the common characteristics of being subject toan extensive interpretation of Article 21.5 of the DSU.     

The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement

This article analyses in detail the fact that there has beenalmost no dissent in World Trade Organization (WTO) disputesettlement reports. Only a handful of articles have noted thisphenomenon, even in passing. The article first examines theempirical data with respect to dissenting and concurring opinionsat both the panel and Appellate Body levels. Fewer than 5% ofpanel reports and 2% of Appellate Body reports contain separateopinions of any kind. Second, it shows that the WTO is in factactively discouraging dissents and discusses why this mightbe the case. The article argues that dissents are valuable ingeneral and assesses whether more dissents would be a positivefor the WTO. It then reviews the few dissents that have beenpublished and demonstrates that 50% of the arguments raisedin dissents at the panel level were adopted in whole or in parton appeal by the Appellate Body, thus illustrating dissentscan and do make a difference. The article concludes that keepingthe lid on dissents may ultimately erode the strength of thedispute settlement system and hinder the ability of the WTOMembers to make appropriate changes to the Agreements.     

上诉机构停摆后的WTO争端解决

世界贸易组织(WTO)上诉机构的停摆虽然对WTO产生了巨大的影响,但并不意味着其争端解决机制的终结。我们不应该扔掉整个皇冠,即使它上面的宝石出现了裂缝。通过对上诉机构停止运作后将主导WTO争端解决机制的若干方案及其利弊的考察分析可见,WTO上诉机构的停摆对于目前及未来发生的贸易争端将意味着,WTO争端解决尤其是如何处理专家组报告将从一揽子、统一适用的模式进入到多元化、碎片化的模式。当前,在贸易保护主义、单边主义抬头,“逆全球化”浪潮时隐时现,多边贸易体制处于风雨飘摇之际,如何继续保证WTO规则的一致性和捍卫以规则为基础的多边贸易体制,将是摆在WTO成员面前的迫切课题。中国需要与其他成员一起,通过必要的革新和改进,致力于为上诉机构重新恢复运转寻求永久且迅速的解决方案。     

The WTO's Environmental Progress

The linkage between trade and the environment stands out asan important challenge in global economic governance. Over thepast decade, the WTO devoted considerable attention to thisissue and included it on the agenda of the Doha Round. In parallel,the jurisprudence on trade and the environment has experiencedsignificant advances. This study provides an overview of themain institutional changes at the WTO and of the developmentsin the jurisprudence most relevant to the interaction betweenthe environment and trade. Specifically, this study focuseson General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXand takes note of many positive (and a few negative) featuresof the key Appellate Body decisions.     

自由贸易体制下的“绿色能源空间”——以加拿大可再生能源发电设施补贴案为视角

上诉机构通过加拿大可再生能源发电设施案的处理,认为成员方旨在"创建"可再生能源市场的财政资助措施并不构成补贴,但干预如超出所需并"扭曲"市场,则可能构成补贴。上诉机构"创建市场"和"扭曲市场"的二分论虽然在一定程度上保留了成员方资助可再生能源市场的政策空间,但也存在较大的不确定性。在WTO涵盖协定下拓宽绿色能源空间,宜对SCM协定进行修订,将成员方财政资助可再生能源产业的措施列为"不可诉补贴"予以豁免。     

设立投资仲裁上诉机制的路径选择

目前,各国就投资仲裁上诉机制改革提交给联合国国际贸易法委员会第三工作组的建议主要有两种模式,分别是设立多边投资法院上诉机制和设立常设多边上诉机制。相对于多边投资法院,常设多边上诉机制更具有正当性与可行性。常设多边上诉机制对仲裁裁决一致性、可预测性和正确性的保障依托于具体规则的建立。一方面,上诉机制的审查范围应涵盖法律适用和事实认定错误以及程序性错误,以确保全面实现上诉机制的纠错功能;另一方面,应将事实认定上的错误限于“明显错误”,以提高仲裁效率。虽然遵循先例尚未成为国际仲裁实践的一般性原则,不能要求常设多边上诉机构在仲裁裁决中遵循既往裁决以提高裁决的一致性、连贯性和可预测性,但是WTO司法实践中发展形成的事实上的遵循先例也可以被常设多边上诉机制所借鉴。     

Precaution, Scientific Development and Scientific Uncertainty under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body has noted that the precautionary principle will be relevant to the interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in various ways, although the Appellate Body has declined to determine the status of the precautionary principle for international law or to find that it has been written into the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body's awareness of precaution, the dynamics of scientific research and the nature of scientific uncertainty is to be welcomed. This awareness is helpful in dealing with new and emerging issues, such as the question of when a risk assessment relied upon by a WTO member becomes outdated by virtue of subsequent scientific developments. If maintained, an overly rigid approach to risk assessment, with a tight temporal focus, will inadequately acknowledge the natural processes of flux in the development of scientific knowledge.     

Independence Under Fire: Extra-legal Pressures and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement

This study uses detailed quantitative analyses of the completehistory of rulings made by the Panels and the Appellate Bodyof the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism during its first tenyears of operation, to assess the robustness of theories regardingthe decision-making of these institutions. Regression analysesare used to test for correlation between the success of Complainantsin dispute settlement and a variety of factors, representingthe hypothesized capacity of states to influence Panels andthe Appellate Body through dimensions of political and economicpower, the impact of the relative practical capacities of statesin dispute settlement proceedings, and the formation of coalitionsof states in support of a particular Complainant or Respondent.The results of the regression analyses – that few significantcorrelations exist between the independent variables and thedispute outcomes – provide evidence that the judicialinstitutions of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism are independentfrom Member State influence. The one reliable correlation foundin these analyses demonstrates that a Complainant state doeshave substantial advantage in Panel proceedings if it has previouslyparticipated in more disputes than the Respondent.