Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadist Organizations

ABSTRACT

Why do Indonesian Muslims join Islamist extremist groups? This article explores four pathways to entry into Indonesian militant groups: study sessions, local conflict, kinship, and schools. It argues that within all four of these pathways, social bonds and relationships are the common thread in encouraging entry as well as in fostering commitment. Specifically, these relationships contribute to the formation and eventual consolidation of one’s identity as a member of the jihadi group through regular participation in activities, attending meetings, narrowing the circle of friends to those within the group, and participating in increasingly risky and possibly violent activities together. Drawing on original fieldwork including 49 interviews with current and former members of Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahidin KOMPAK, Darul Islam, Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh, Indonesia’s pro-ISIS network, and other jihadist groups as well as 57 depositions and court documents, this article explores the development and evolution of these pathways and how relational ties play a role in each.     

The Nefarious Helping Hand: Anti-Corruption Campaigns,Social Service Provision,and Terrorism1

This article offers a novel contribution to the terrorism literature by using mathematical modeling and case studies to demonstrate how terrorist and extremist groups can utilize social service provision activities and anti-corruption campaigns instead of violent activities to gain support.The basic argument of the model is that terrorist groups will try to gain support by promising that they will be better distributors of resources than the current regime once they gain power and by promising that they will be less corrupt. However, because all organizations can freely make these promises, their words are cheap talk, and the general population should ignore them. To overcome this problem, organizations must offer a costly signal. Provision of social goods and implementation of explicit anti-corruption campaigns before taking power serves as such a signal. As the United States government and its allies widen their “war on terrorism,” they must consider the ramifications of social service provision and anti-corruption activities, which are common, effective, and potentially useful for increasing the probability of group success.     

Rape as terror: The case of Bosnia

When ethnic minority parties are excluded from government coalitions, are group attributes such as religion related to the groups’ use of political violence? We argue that extremist factions within minority groups make use of divergence in religion to mobilize support for violent action when the group is excluded from government. Thus, we posit that while religion per se is not a source of violence, extremist elements of ethnic minorities, whose religion differs from the majority, may use religious divergence to mobilize group members to perpetrate terrorism. Specifically we test the hypotheses that extremist factions of an excluded group will be more likely to carry out terrorist attacks when the group's members belong to a different religion as well as when they belong to a different denomination or sect of a religion than the majority. To test these propositions, we use data on ethnic minority party inclusion in government coalitions, ethnic minority group religion, and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by matching perpetrators with ethnic groups for all democracies, 1970–2004.     

First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds? USAID's Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa

The United States government has adopted new approaches to counter violent extremist organizations around the world. “Soft security” and development programs include focused educational training for groups vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, norm messaging through local radio programming, and job creation in rural communities. This article evaluates the effectiveness of one set of these multi-vectored, community-level programs through data from 200 respondents in two similar, neighboring towns in northern Mali, Africa. The data show that residents in Timbuktu who were exposed to the programming for up to five years displayed measurably altered civic behavior and listening patterns in comparison with their counterparts in the control town of Diré, which had no programming (controlling for potential covariates including age, ethnicity, and political and socioeconomic conditions). However, there was little measurable difference between the groups in terms of their cultural identities and attitudes towards the West. While this study is unable to definitively prove a causal connection between programming and behavioral outcomes, it nonetheless strongly suggests that the process of “winning hearts and minds” can be effective at certain levels but may require extended time and dedicated resources to generate higher-level results.     

Suspect Communities—Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam,Berlin, and London

Throughout Europe, authorities have set up new policy measures and programs to curb homegrown violent extremists. This article describes local policy responses to violent Islamic extremism—and/or the mere threat of it—in the neighborhoods Oost in Amsterdam, Moabit and Soldiner Kiez in Berlin, and Tower Hamlets in London. Based on locally conducted fieldwork, the study compares and contrasts these neighborhoods’ approaches and aims to make a first assessment of their effects. A major finding for all three cities is that authorities target the entire local Muslim community rather than a few select individuals. This can lead to the construction of suspect communities, an approach with possible paradoxical effects on targeting actual violent extremists. Suspect communities subsequently create stigmatization, exclusion, and possibly marginalization, which not only has negative consequences for involved groups, but may well produce a breeding ground for future violence. However, the author did not find that engagement with Islamic organizations or individuals was used to directly change the nature of local Muslim communities. Orthodox and non-violent extremist organizations and individuals in all three cities were potential partners for engagement, which probably lowers the chance of stigmatizing the suspect communities.     

Laying a Foundation for the Criminological Examination of Right-Wing,Left-Wing,and Al Qaeda-Inspired Extremism in the United States

Despite several overlaps between crime and terrorism, criminological examinations of terrorism to date have been limited. To fill this gap in the research, we examine several individual and contextual socio-demographic characteristics of a diverse sample of extremists operating in the United States who have committed violent crimes. In addition, we provide a comparative analysis to explain and understand differences between extremists who have committed violent crimes while active in either far-Right, far-Left (including environmental and animal rights extremists), or Al Qaeda and affiliated movements. To assess the impact of external factors on the nature of domestic extremist violence, we also comparatively examine these three types of domestic extremists before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. We find several similarities across domestic extremists but many important suspect- and county-level differences as well. We end the paper with suggestions for future research that could extend the criminological study of terrorism.     

Reply to pluchinsky and rapoport comments

The on-going Kashmir conflict has metamorphosed into a formidable insurgency that has attracted extremist groups fromPakistan and elements of Al-Qaeda. Given Al-Qaeda's modus operandi as an international network based on already existing domestic extremist groups, this article argues for the resolution of the India-Pakistan Kashmir conflict as an avenue for shrinking the constituency of both Kashmiri domestic extremist groups and, by extension, that of Al-Qaeda's. Feasible options for resolutions are analyzed and an alternative proposition is suggested. An unresolved, or inadequately resolved, conflict is expected to lead the Kashmiri insurgency on a trajectory directed at the Pakistani government, possibly leading to that country's fragmentation and the subsequent expansion of Al-Qaeda's operational base. It is thus argued that the resolution of the Kashmir conflict be viewed as an integral component of the broader U.S. ‘war on terrorism’ and should compromise of delicate American diplomatic involvement in the India-Pakistan dialogue over Kashmir.     

Challenges of Protecting India From Terrorism

The secular, pluralistic, ethnically diverse, and vibrant democracy that India has nurtured ever since its independence in 1947 has become the envy of many radical and extremist ideologies and religions that seek to bring in order through tools of fourth generation warfare like Jihad and “Proxy War.” Typical examples of such conflicts facing India are the ones being waged against her by Jehadi organizations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other proxy factions supported by the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence Agency. Despite a few pro-active measures instituted by the government of India after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, there is no clear counter-terrorism policy that has been articulated either in the form of a doctrine or white paper. If India has to dispel the image of being a “soft state,” it is imperative that the government clearly spells out its stand on terrorism.     

Fragmentation,Conflict, and Competition: Islamist Anti-civilian Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa

ABSTRACT

In spite of the shared high profile of recent Islamist attacks on civilians in sub-Saharan Africa, patterns of anti-civilian violence differ across and within violent Islamist groups, and the countries in which they are active. This research seeks to explain this variation by situating Islamist violence within the sub-national spaces in which such groups operate, and the wider conflict environment in which they choose to use, or limit the use of, anti-civilian violence. Drawing on data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset, the research finds that violent Islamist groups are more likely to target civilians where they are the most active conflict agent, even when other conflict agents are active in the same spaces; but less likely to do so when they are relatively weak and in competition with other non-state armed groups. Anti-civilian violence is thus deployed strategically by violent Islamist groups, while its function as a signalling or retributive policing tool depends on the relative strength of groups in relation to actors in the wider conflict arena.     

Surveying American State Police Agencies About Terrorism Threats,Terrorism Sources,and Terrorism Definitions

This study presents American state police agencies' perceptions about three significant terrorism and public safety issues. First, we asked about the threat posed by specified extremist groups nationally and to their state. We asked about the number of such groups and their supporters, and the number of activities each group participates in during a typical year in their state. We also asked about the number of criminal incidents each group commits and the number of their supporters arrested in a typical year. Second, we asked the agencies to rate the usefulness of fifteen specified terrorism sources. Third, we queried the agencies about their views of eight terrorism definitions. These data were collected by surveying the fifty state police agencies in the United States. We discovered widespread concern about the criminal activities of various extremist groups, with a particular concern about the threat of Islamic jihadists. Interestingly, although the top rated threat was Islamic jihadists, the respondents indicated that other types of groups were much more criminally active. Further, respondents indicated that various open and non-open sources were valuable terrorism sources. Finally, most respondents reacted more favorably to official terrorism definitions—especially the FBI's—as opposed to academic definitions. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of our findings and we outline directions for future research.     

The Emerging Threat? South Africa's Extreme Right

In the run-up to South Africa's first non-racial election in 1994, extremist right-wing organizations, and their sympathizers in the state security forces, posed a real danger to the country's future democratic order. After 1994, violent, right-wing extremist activities virtually dissipated. However, during a single night in late 2002, eight bomb blasts rocked Soweto, South Africa's largest black township. An unknown organization, Boeremag (Boer force/power), claimed responsibility for the bombings. Some two dozen alleged Boeremag members, including serving military officers, were subsequently arrested and charged with terrorism-related offenses. The Boeremag makes an interesting case study of how the extreme white right in South Africa mixes politics and religion, and seeks to exploit popular grievances to garner support for the creation of a secessionist Afrikaner state. The South African white right does not have the resources, capacity, or support to successfully execute a coup d'état. The Boeremag serves as a reminder, however, that the extreme right can create instability and destruction on a significant scale in South Africa.     

Why Violence Abates: Imposed and Elective Declines in Terrorist Attacks

Previous scholarship on variations in violence within a given terrorist organization has primarily focused on factors that lead to the inception or destruction of that organization. However, violence varies substantially even during the “prime” of an organization's life. This article aims to understand why violence varies in the short term within many organizations, and places a special focus on declines in violence. Specifically, I argue that terrorists face countervailing incentives in terms of how much violence to use, and that when declines in violent activity do occur, they can be divided into two types: a) elective declines, which are usually temporary and used for organizational or reputational recovery; and b) imposed declines, which are dictated by changes in the relative capability of an organization, and are more likely to be permanent. The causal pathways to each type of decline are discussed, and a plausibility probe, consisting of case studies of three terrorist organizations, is then developed to substantiate this theory. The findings have notable implications for counterterrorism policy, as they illustrate not only when and why terrorists choose to curtail violent attacks, but also the conditions that determine whether declines in violence are temporary or permanent.     

EU cooperation on terrorism prevention and violent radicalization: frustrated ambitions or new forms of EU security governance?

This article questions the effectiveness of EU efforts to prevent terrorism and violent radicalization as well as the future prospects of such efforts. Driven by the pressure of attacks, member states have agreed on a comprehensive strategy to prevent radicalization and recruitment into terrorism, but simultaneously the strategy traces the limits of EU authority in member states in this regard. Meanwhile, the European Commission has focused on indirect measures, such as research support, for counter radicalization. However, over time, both flexible cooperation among a subset of member states and new EU initiatives have generated only few or biased policy outputs. The Stockholm Programme renewed the ambition to prevent terrorism at an early stage and underlined the EU's role in evaluation and knowledge exchange. This article questions the resulting proposal to create a network of local or subnational actors for best practice exchange. The article argues that preventive counterterrorism relies on contentious scientific evidence and that authoritative evaluations remain tied to national policy-making. Finally, the EU Commission cannot mobilize sufficient resources to ensure that ‘frontline’ organizations, such as police services, implement new practices. Taken together, this limits the potential for depoliticizing multilevel governance approaches to terrorism prevention. The conclusions of this article raise further research questions on the use of knowledge and complex governance patterns in EU internal security.     

Deradicalisation,disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremists in conflict-affected contexts: a systematic literature review

ABSTRACT

This article identifies, assesses and synthesises existing literature on deradicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) in conflict-affected states through a systematic literature review. While existing research has methodological shortcomings and determining the outcomes of DDRR programmes is challenging, 12 common themes surfaced in the synthesis. According to the studies selected, varying experiences of the individuals in violent extremist organisations, including form of engagement, role in the organisation and experiences of insecurity and disillusion, may affect DDRR processes. Capacity and resource constrains may pose challenges to DDRR programming in conflict-affected contexts, but engaging former extremists, their families and communities at large mitigates the issues characteristic for conflict-affected contexts and contributes to wider peace-building objectives.     

Why Fight?: Examining Self-Interested Versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion

Why do individuals participate in weak-against-strong resistance, terror, or insurgency? Drawing on rational choice theory, many claim that individuals join insurgent organizations for self-interested reasons, seeking status, money, protection, or rewards in the afterlife. Another line of research, largely ethnographic and social-network based, suggests that prospective fighters are driven by social identity—they join out of an allegiance to communal values, norms of reciprocity, and an orientation toward process rather than outcome. This article tests these two lines of argument against each other by directly linking values orientations in a refugee camp to professed willingness to participate in resistance or rebellion in two different contexts. Professed willingness to participate in resistance, and especially in violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. The strength of correlation grows—negatively for self-enhancement and positively for communal orientations—as anticipated sacrifice increases. Results are discussed.     

Pathways into Terrorism: Understanding Entry into and Support for Terrorism in Asia

ABSTRACT

How do individuals join Islamist extremist groups? Why do individuals support such groups? What factors contribute to a decision to join? What are the pathways into Islamist extremist groups? Drawing on examples from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines, the articles in this special issue address these critically important questions drawing on original fieldwork, new datasets and large scale national survey research. These articles explore the experiences and perceptions of men and women, South and Southeast Asians, living in majority Muslim and non-Muslim nations. Collectively, they illustrate the importance of social bonds&kinship ties, friendship, teacher-student ties and online relationships in creating a powerful sense of community that fosters a sense of belonging and eventual commitment. The goal of this special issue is to highlight the contributions that Asian cases can make to the often Middle Eastern and European-centric discourses on radicalization, joining and support for militancy.     

The Effects of Oil Production and Ethnic Representation on Violent Conflict in Nigeria: A Mixed-Methods Approach

A large qualitative literature on violent conflict in Nigeria has identified the importance of oil production and ethnicity as salient factors in understanding violence, especially in the oil-rich Niger Delta. This resonates with the broader literature on natural resources, ethnic exclusion, and conflict. This article advances existing research by providing the first highly disaggregated statistical analysis of oil, ethnicity, and violence for Nigerian Local Government Areas (LGAs). We test whether oil production in a weak state environment, and local groups’ access to governmental power, affect the level of violence in Nigeria. We employ unique disaggregated data on violent conflict events, proprietary data on oil production, and newly collected information on local ethnic groups’ access to the federal government for 774 LGAs. We find strong evidence that LGAs with oil infrastructure experience significantly more violence than others, while access to the federal government significantly reduces violence. We complement these findings with a qualitative investigation of violent conflicts in Nigeria.     

Radicalisation and Higher Education: Students’ Understanding and Experiences

ABSTRACT

Since 2015 universities have been placed under a legal duty of “due regard to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”¹ This reflects the belief in UK counter-terrorism policy that radicalisation exists and can be countered. Advice to universities is largely silent on how this duty applies to teaching. Yet many degree programmes generate lectures and seminar discussions where views of an allegedly radicalised nature could be aired. This article presents focus group research which elicits students’ understanding of radicalisation, and provides insights into their experience of debating contentious issues such as identity, community cohesion, and the causes of terrorism. We argue that students’ understanding of radicalisation is conflated with extremism and we explore students’ anxiety about debating these issues and reliance on educators to create the right environment for such discussions. Finally, the data presented here challenges some of the assumptions underpinning contemporary counter-radicalisation policy in the domain of higher education, which are premised on ideas of active grooming. We argue that this does not accord with students’ own experiences, as they regard themselves as discerning, critical thinkers rather than inherently vulnerable to manipulation by those espousing violent extremist views.     

A Bloodless Guerrilla Warfare: Why U.S. White Leftists Renounced Violence Against People During the 1970s

Between 1968 and the late 1970s, a significant number of U.S. white leftist groups escalated their protest to armed struggle. After experimenting briefly with violence, they opted for low-intensity armed propaganda that targeted property and avoided hurting people. By contrast, European leftist groups and anti-colonial organizations in the U.S. made extensive use of antipersonnel violence. Why did U.S. leftists eschew attacks against civilians? Scholarship does not explain this case, as it focuses either on the internal dynamics of a single group or on structural variables. Conversely, this article addresses this question through a historical reconstruction and a multilevel analysis. The research identifies the critique and ensuing de-solidarization by the radical milieu as the main factor accounting for the restraint of violence. This article demonstrates that the radical milieu censored and isolated armed groups as soon as they escalated and began to endanger human lives. Therefore, in order to safeguard the solidarity pact with their constituencies, violent fringes moderated their repertoires of action. This article employs primary sources and original interviews with militants to support this claim and to assess the relevance of three concurrent factors: the trauma generated by the “townhouse incident,” the deterrence by law enforcement, and the militants’ socio-economic background.     

Globalization,Democratization and the Far Right: Turkey's Nationalist Action Party in Critical Perspective

Ultra-nationalist political parties of the far right have been an endemic feature of European politics in recent years. This article investigates the rise of the Nationalist Action Party (the MHP) in Turkey, a party that has a number of characteristics in common with its European counterparts. The objective of the article is to illustrate a paradox. These types of parties tend to display a considerable degree of adaptability and exhibit a tendency to move in a more moderate direction. They shed some of their violent and extremist leanings in the process as they try to transform themselves from closed communities or networks to mass parties of national standing. This apparent moderation should not disguise, however, the key underlying weakness of such parties, namely their limited commitment to the core values of liberal democracy and political pluralism. Indeed, such parties can continue to play an important negative role in terms of their ability to block the process of democratic deepening in nascent democratic regimes.