Andreas Wenger and Reto Wollenmann,eds. Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat

This article examines the transformation of the Chechen conflict from a predominately nationalist to jihadist struggle, and compares the similar changes that took place in the Kashmiri insurgency. Using global jihadist strategy and ideology, and the accompanying influence of Al Qaida, both conflicts are shown to have taken on a new ideology and to have expanded beyond previous areas of operation. In both instances, the political leadership wrapped themselves in the mantle of political Islam (Islamism) as ensuing violence led to rapid socioeconomic transformation and social breakdown, thus allowing foreign jihadists to exert power and take up/divert the cause. In the past few years, two main groups originating in Chechnya and Kashmir have taken on Western targets and become more indoctrinated in Al Qaida's global jihadist ideology: the Caucasus Emirate (CE) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The opportunist franchising strategy of Al Qaida could come to play a role in the future of both groups, especially if the CE is able to coalesce into a more unified front. More importantly, the global jihadist attributes of the CE must begin to garner the same attention in the Western world as that of LeT.     

Contemplating Peace between India and Pakistan

India-Pakistan relations are at an inflection point with India’s dramatic revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy and its desired objective to transform the nature of the Kashmir conflict from a “bilateral” (involving Pakistan) to a “unilateral” status (excluding Pakistan). Pakistan, on the other hand, has embarked on a diplomatic offensive making the case against India’s majoritarian politics in Kashmir as detrimental not only to the Kashmiris but also to the strategic stability between the two rivals. This article reasons that India’s and Pakistan’s dominant zero-sum strategies—premised on winning while ensuring the other’s loss—are least likely to come to fruition. Given the present nature of ties, the way forward is for the two states to engage in a minimalist framework where mutual interests, as opposed to dominant positions, are put forth as a basis for engagement. Second, engagement more than agreement should be the short- to medium-term goal. Finally, any talk during this time on freezing the Kashmir conflict is least likely to bring any long-term dividends for peace and stability between the two regional adversaries.     

US policy and the Kashmir dispute: prospects for resolution

Washington refuses to chart a roadmap for peace in Kashmir. Although the chances for resolving the dispute are low, the probability of failure should not inhibit the US government from pursuing a more proactive role in resolving the conflict. The United States is the “sole pole” in a unipolar international system; regarding the world's thorniest disputes, it either leads or bears the brunt of its own passivity. Leadership requires more than devising policies that are guaranteed to work; it also involves taking risks on bold initiatives that may fail, but whose unlikely success would produce greater stability in global affairs. This article examines the admittedly slim prospects for settling the Kashmir dispute and the role Washington might play in such a process. It argues that only one conflict-resolution option seems even remotely viable: a phased conversion of the existing Kashmiri Line of Control into an internationally recognized Indo-Pakistani border.     

Pakistan's endgame in Kashmir

Although Pakistani leaders often describe the dispute over Kashmir as the “core issue” between India and Pakistan, Pakistani policy is driven by a deeper fear of India and about Pakistan's national identity. Pakistan's approach to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute has been characterized by a series of tactical moves, lacking a coherent strategy or a planned end game. Only a sustained peace process can address the multiple factors that give rise to Indian and Pakistani suspicions about each other's intentions and Pakistani tactics designed to prolong the conflict in the hope of eventually altering the status quo. Pakistan does not have a clearly thought out endgame in Kashmir and attending to its insecurities could be one of way of ensuring the emergence of a realistic endgame without violence.     

Great Britain and Kashmir, 1947–49

In 1953, a book on Jammu and Kashmir titled The Grim Saga (Dasgupta & Co. Ltd.) came out in Calcutta, India. Its author, S. N. Shivpuri, lamented “the triple tragedy of Kashmir–local, subcontinental and international.” Almost five decades since then, a great deal has been written about the local and subcontinental tragedy(s) in Kashmir. This article instead turns its gaze towards the international aspects that accompanied the evolution of the first India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir from 1947–49, which sowed the seeds of the enduring dispute between the two countries. Focusing on the British policy towards Kashmir during this period, it contends that the impact of three wider, over-lapping contexts of international geopolitics, namely, British fears about unrest in the north-west of Indian subcontinent along the border with Afghanistan, British involvement in the Middle East, and British plans against the former Soviet Union, affected the official interpretation of British interest in Kashmir. These contexts, in turn, were created by the two themes of decolonization in South Asia and the Cold War in that pivotal year of 1947.     

Religion as a Factor in Ethnic Conflict: Kashmir and Indian Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

Ethnic conflicts with a strong religious component do not have merely domestic or foreign causes and consequences. As a result, internationalization of ethnic conflict has become an important subject of inquiry both in terms of pure research and policy-oriented studies. This article presents a case study of Indian-Pakistani relations over Kashmir, used to evaluate the role of religion and the explanatory power of the approach presented here. The aim of the study is to apply a foreign policy approach that simultaneously incorporates domestic and external factors in an analysis of how and in what ways religious elements of the Kashmir question affect India's foreign policy. The approach, an application of “systemism,” contributes to current developments in the realist school of international relations through its emphasis on the need to look at both international and state levels in combination. Earlier applications of realism, as both neotraditional and structural realism clearly demonstrate, tend to remain restricted to one level or the other. In this approach, a religious dynamic can have a domestic source yet be effectively examined in terms of international ramifications.     

The Use of Force—Stability and Instability: India,Pakistan, and China

This article evaluates the source of instability and stability in the India-Pakistan dyad and the Sino-Indian dyad. Challenging the dominant thesis that “means determine ends,” the article posits that the use of force by Pakistan renders the India-Pakistan relationship unstable, whereas the Sino-Indian relationship is significantly more stable because of the absence of force. The difference in the state of stability in both dyads is because the weaker state, Pakistan in its conflict with India has failed to accept the verdict of its military defeats. This failure to internalize irreversible military outcomes makes Pakistan particularly susceptible to employing forcible solutions to settle its dispute with India over Kashmir. The reality reverses in the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, in that India has implicitly accepted its military loss against China in 1962 and charted a diplomatic pathway in resolving the boundary dispute.     

Britain and Kashmir, 1948: “The Arena of the UN”

The Jammu and Kashmir dispute of 1947–1949 between India and Pakistan became the first inter-state conflict to be discussed at the United Nations Security Council. This analysis looks at the views of the government and the delegation of Great Britain, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, on Kashmir through the year of 1948. It argues that the British attitude was determined more by Imperial and Commonwealth strategic and ideological imperatives in South and Central Asia and the Middle East and less by the merits of the cases of the disputants. Operating within the twin backdrop of decolonisation and the Cold War, the British official mind juggled Kashmir's accession to India, India's complaint of aggression against Pakistan, and Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir with an eye to their own hopes and fears in a region that it understood as the key vantage on Communism and Islam.     

Why has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict

The India-Pakistan conflict is one of the most enduring rivalries of the post-World War era. Thus far, it has witnessed four wars and a number of serious interstate crises. The literature on enduring rivalries suggests that the India-Pakistan dyad contains factors such as unsettled territorial issues, political incompatibility, irreconcilable positions on national identity, and the absence of significant economic and trade relations between the two states, all cause the rivalry to persist. In this article I present a crucial neglected structural factor that explains the endurance of the rivalry. I argue that the peculiar power asymmetry that has prevailed between the two antagonists for over half a century has made full termination of the rivalry difficult in the near-term. Truncated power asymmetry is a causal factor in this rivalry's persistence, as rivalries between a status quo power and a challenger state that are relatively equal in their capabilities at the local level are the most intractable and nearly impossible to resolve quickly. The duration of many other asymmetric rivalries can also be explained using a framework of global superiority versus local parity in power capabilities that exist between the antagonists.     

Kashmir and Tibet: comparing conflicts,states, and solutions

Five decades of conflicts in Kashmir and Tibet continue into the twenty-first century without clear signs of resolution. This article focuses on issues of collective rights, national identity, and state sovereignty in these two conflicts to ask what political recourses exist for Tibetans or citizens of Jammu and Kashmir in today's changing world. As citizens of differently organized states and subjects to dissimilar conflicts, what methods and types of conflict resolution might Tibetans and Kashmiris have shared access to? Both of these post-WWII conflicts have been framed and defined by the two core states involved, India and China. Analytically, therefore, this article draws on anthropological and political constructivist work on the state to suggest possible non-violent, community-oriented solutions to these conflicts.     

External Factors: Facilitating Military and Political Stability in South Asia

The Cambridge Review of International Affairs interview with George Perkovich, conducted in February, 2001, provides an in-depth and up to date perspective of regional stability in the Indian subcontinent. Although the Kashmir conflict and terrorism in the region are coming under increased international scrutiny, the role played by external players with varying economic and strategic interests in both countries in shaping Indo-Pak interactions is limited. Domestic and external influences on the region compete with one another, maintaining a stalemate in the region. Long-lasting subcontinental stability can occur only if India and Pakistan actively choose to reconcile their differing views on the pressing issues of Kashmir and terrorism therein. Widely considered an expert on Indo-Pak nuclear politics and prize-winning author of India's Nuclear Bomb , Dr Perkovich outlines his understanding of the nature of the South Asian stand-off, and the possible effects of international efforts for its peaceful resolution.     

Third-Party Intervention in Ethno-Religious Conflict: Role Theory,Pakistan, and War in Kashmir, 1965

ABSTRACT

Third-party intervention in ethno-religious conflict is an old phenomenon, although scholarly attention with a general range of application is generally new and uncommon. This study with attempt, through a systematic review of religion and other factors that can impact upon foreign policy role performance, to explain Pakistan's intervention in Kashmir, which led to full-scale war in 1965.

The article unfolds in six sections. The first provides an overview of thirf-party intervention in ethno-religious conflict. The second section introduces systemism a framework that brings together unit- and system-level factors. The theory of role analysis in foreign policy and its usefulness in explaining third-party, ethno-religious intervention is covered in the third section. Section four brings together systemism and role theory and eleborates linkages, with an emphasis on religion and other salient factors from the literature on foreign policy and intenational conflict. The fifth section presents the case study of Pakistan's intervention in India in 1965. Section six sums up the findings from the case study and offers a few observations about the contemporary situation in Kashmir.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.     

Confronting Islamist Insurgencies in Africa: The Case of the Islamic State in Mozambique

The proliferation of Salafi-jihadi insurgencies across Africa challenges the United States’ counterterrorism approach. From its inception, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique was driven by local and foreign dynamics, which have been complicated by additional external intervention in the conflict. Using the Cabo Delgado insurgency, we demonstrate how efforts to address its global dimensions, such as the group's affiliation with the Islamic State, can work against attempts to mitigate its local drivers. We conclude with recommendations for a more effective U.S. response that takes both the local and global dynamics into account. This article builds on our February 2021 report “Combating the Islamic State's Spread in Africa: Assessment and Recommendations for Mozambique,” published by the American Enterprise Institute.     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.     

Rape as terror: The case of Bosnia

When ethnic minority parties are excluded from government coalitions, are group attributes such as religion related to the groups’ use of political violence? We argue that extremist factions within minority groups make use of divergence in religion to mobilize support for violent action when the group is excluded from government. Thus, we posit that while religion per se is not a source of violence, extremist elements of ethnic minorities, whose religion differs from the majority, may use religious divergence to mobilize group members to perpetrate terrorism. Specifically we test the hypotheses that extremist factions of an excluded group will be more likely to carry out terrorist attacks when the group's members belong to a different religion as well as when they belong to a different denomination or sect of a religion than the majority. To test these propositions, we use data on ethnic minority party inclusion in government coalitions, ethnic minority group religion, and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by matching perpetrators with ethnic groups for all democracies, 1970–2004.     

The Institutionalization of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI)

A number of observers have expressed serious concerns that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), as it expands in the Sahel, may become strong enough to be a threat to Europe and carry on the global mission of Al-Qaeda as conceived by bin Laden. This fear seems unwarranted. Using institutional analysis to study the AQMI behavioral fluctuations over the last decade, this article argues that AQMI's need to find a compromise between external and internal legitimacy has constrained its behavior. The affiliation of the Algerian terrorists with Al-Qaeda was in many ways a marriage of convenience that created a number of internal contradictions. At the cognitive level, implicit Algerian nationalism to rid the country of its corrupt regime remains at odds with pan-Islamic views shared by Al-Qaeda's leadership. At the normative level, indiscriminate suicide bombing supported by Al-Qaeda is abhorrent to many Algerian terrorists, who construe their mandate in the spirit of the Algerian war of independence where it is their duty to protect civilians. These and other contradictions prevent AQMI from developing a coherent political agenda and thus it is less likely to engage in a long-term conflict against European societies.     

The Challenge of Talking about Terrorism: The EU and the Arab Debate on the Causes of Islamist Terrorism 1

The Arab “hegemonic debate” on the causes of Islamist terrorism nurtures (pan-) Arab, anti-Western sentiments and delegitimizes criticism of the political status quo. The European Union's emphasis on multilateral means of conflict resolution and trade promotion leads to official pronouncements that barely address the Arab world's domestic problems, instead referring to international tensions such as the Arab-Israeli conflict as a particular cause of Islamist terrorism and the need for cooperation with Arab governments. By failing to challenge the official narratives of authoritarian Arab regimes the EU obstructs interests in the democratization of the region and the delegitimization of Islamist violence.     

Security and development in the Caucasus

This article discusses the linkage between security and development in the Caucasus. In particular, it examines the degree to which developmental dysfunction has been a significant cause of conflict, the extent to which conflict has distorted the region's economic transition, and the role of development assistance in fostering conflict resolution. The article argues that the region's conflicts have had locally significant economic consequences and that they make it difficult for the region's states to cushion the effects of post‐communist economic transition. However, the collapse of command economies and the failure of governance have a stronger causal role in explaining the economic collapse and the halting quality of economic recovery. Turning to the role of development assistance in conflict resolution, aid agencies and donors have been reluctant to use development assistance as an instrument of conflict resolution. However, there has been some success in using micro‐level assistance to foster reconciliation between communities.