The Construction of Power in the Strategic Narratives of the BRICS

Rising powers, collectively joined in informal diplomatic groups such as the BRICS, aim to influence the meaning of the international order by means of “strategic narratives.” Together, the BRICS develop strategic narratives that support their aspiration for a fairer and more democratic multipolar world order and which produce a positive perception of the group. This paper evaluates how BRICS’s system and identity narratives combine geostrategic, economic and solidarity narratives. Narrative tension emerges due to their embeddedness in contradicting power constructions, namely a geostrategic perspective and a multipolar perspective. The synchronisation of these three narratives is undermined when there is a fall in perceived power, economic recession or a lack of accountability and transparency practices. Strategic narrative analysis helps to think about and analyze power in global politics.     

The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax Americana

The ongoing reallocation of wealth and power from the West to the “rising rest” promises to produce a new pecking order over the course of the next few decades. Although there is a well-developed body of knowledge on the material dimensions of power transitions, existing scholarship provides a much more embryonic intellectual foundation on the normative dimensions of international change. Transitions in the international distribution of power produce not only novel hierarchies, but also novel brands of international order that rest on the social and ideological proclivities of newly powerful states in the system. This article explores the normative dimensions of hegemony by examining the geopolitical, socioeconomic, cultural, and commercial logics that inform different orders. The normative foundations of hegemony are studied across four great powers: the Ottoman Empire, Imperial China, Great Britain, and the United States. The cases reveal that as great powers rise, they as a matter of course seek to push outward to their expanding spheres of influence the norms that provide order within their own polities. Accordingly, today's emerging powers will not embrace the existing international order erected during the West's watch. On the contrary, China and other rising powers will seek to fashion alternative orders based on their own cultural, ideological, and socioeconomic trajectories. If the next international system is to be characterized by a rules-based order rather than competitive anarchy, it will require a new normative consensus that rests on toleration of ideological and political diversity.     

Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War

While realism has recently been subjected to intense examination with regard to its theoretical coherence, liberalism—often thought to be the bookend to realism—has so far escaped such scrutiny. Liberalism is generally defined in one of two ways, each faulty. The first definition is in terms of the dependent variable as any argument that expects growing cooperation and progress in international affairs, understood as increased peace and prosperity, seizing for liberalism any independent variable found important for potentially promoting international cooperation. Second, liberalism is defined in terms of the units of analysis as any argument that disaggregates the state into smaller units. This equates liberalism with an entire level of analysis. This strategy of appropriation is inappropriate. Approaches to international relations need a core logic in order to justify the inclusion of particular independent variables or the use of a particular level of analysis. Since so many other paradigms also lay claim to those same entities, we are left wondering if anybody is not a liberal. Appropriation leads us to miss crucial distinctions between alternative explanations of the same outcomes, such as the “liberal” phenomena of the democratic peace and the transformative effects of international organizations.     

哈萨克斯坦参与全球治理的举措、动力及前景

自1991年独立以来,哈萨克斯坦不但成功巩固了国家主权,在政治、经济、社会发展等领域取得了举世瞩目的成就,而且在外交领域赢得了国际社会的高度赞誉,使哈萨克斯坦成为全球治理舞台中最为活跃的中亚国家。在参与全球治理进程中,哈萨克斯坦将自己定位为“有实力的重要地区大国”,奉行以巩固主权独立和维护国家利益为中心的“全方位务实平衡”外交战略,通过建立睦邻友好信任带的“近邻外交”和以伙伴关系为基础的“远邻外交”,拉近与世界各大国及周边国家的外交关系,在国际和地区热点问题上扮演着“沟通者”和“调停者”角色,积极推动中亚地区内部的一体化进程,广泛参与全球与地区性国际组织,在核不扩散和文明对话等领域提出了各种有影响力的倡议,力图将本国的利益和世界的利益融为一体,为哈萨克斯坦的发展赢得了很大的机遇和空间,使哈萨克斯坦在国际社会中的能见度不断提升。作为中亚国家经济发展最为成功、外交最为活跃、国际影响力最为显著的国家,哈萨克斯坦参与全球治理的实践经验值得发展中国家学习借鉴。     

Toward a Theory of Weakness Politics: Does Weakness Rule the World?

This article argues that the debate on “new wars” and “post-Westphalian” wars and conflicts misses a crucial dimension, that of the importance of weakness in the relations between states as well as between states and non-state entities. Most analyses of war examine power relationships between states as if power were an essential determinant of success or failure in war. Recent wars, however, show that weakness can in fact become a strength, that inequality is not so much a problem as an advantage. The author suggests the need to rename and re-problematise “new wars” as “new international conflicts” (NICs), for otherwise we miss the fundamental reasons why “powers” are often defeated, or at least held at bay by the “weakness” of their adversaries. Suggestions will also be made about how to potentially resolve such unequal conflicts and wars.     

Small enough to fail: the structural irrelevance of the small state as cause of its elimination and proliferation since Westphalia

Since the Peace of Westphalia, few great powers have “died”, while the “death rate” and proliferation of small states has been dramatic at times. What causes these fluctuations? In this paper, I claim that the dominant reason for the extinction, emergence and proliferation of the small state over the last three and a half centuries is to be found at the system level. Ultimately, small state survival is determined by the particular set-up of the state system. I advance this argument from the perspective of international relations theory, integrating the relevant scholarship of the English School and realism, especially structural realism. The latter’s systemic perspective provides the basis for arguing that small states are structurally irrelevant. It is this feature of the small state, its irrelevance with regard to the power-based structure of the state system, which has caused the small state to “struggle for existence” in the past, and which has allowed small states to proliferate during the bipolar Cold War.     

The Great Financial Crisis Catalyzes Great Transformations and Adjustments

Under the shadow of the financial crisis, the year 2009 presented numerous signs that the world is polarizing in terms of power balances, strategic readjustments by the world powers, and relations between these world powers. Meanwhile, despite intense competition, new advances may be perceived in the peaceful and incremental evolution of the international system, in terms of mechanisms, concepts and the realignment of forces. The transformation of the world order and the acceleration of a systematic evolution will inevitably result in power vacuums and disorder. Together with the growing negative effects of the financial crisis, this will further complicate the international security situation. As an emerging center for this great transformation, Asia serves as a symbol of turbulence, realignment and uncertainty in the areas of international strategy and security. Interaction between China and the rest of the world is taking place across all sectors, at all levels, and with growing intensity, all amid great risks.     

Managing great powers in the post-Cold War world: old rules new game? The case of the global war on terror

This article investigates the impact of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) on the primary institution of great power management. To this end, it first identifies a misalignment between the new post-Cold War social reality and the capacity of some traditional norms of great power management to mediate this reality. Having established and described this environment of normative uncertainty, I then probe how the GWoT propels the consolidation of new identities and norms of great power management in interstate society. I argue that since the beginning of the GWoT the primary institution of great power management has institutionalized new norms to address transnational violence within its processes. At the same time, as hard balancing amongst great powers is becoming increasingly obsolete, two distinct social structures have been constructed with the GWoT: one that privileges an inequitable social structure of friends/rivals amongst states; and another that shapes a social structure of enemies with regard to terrorist–state relations. In this process, the capacity of managing transnational violence globally has increasingly become one of the central constitutive elements of being a great power. I conclude by demonstrating how the GWoT has acted as a subtle ‘bargaining bid’ in the process of organizing the current social meaning of polarity and great power management amongst states. State practices under the GWoT have delineated, in a clearer form, underlying expectations about the pattern of interactions between the superpower and great powers. Consequently, the GWoT has exerted a symbolic and psychological impact over international society by institutionalizing not only a specific meaning of unipolarity but also further raising the threshold of what is acceptable behaviour on the part of the superpower within an interstate social structure of friends/rivals.     

“But the UN Said So …”: International Organisations as Discursive Authorities

Many scholars take it as given that international governmental and non-governmental actors play a decisive role in international politics as regulative, moral or epistemic authorities. Hence, a denationalised “multi-centric world” (James Rosenau) is said to be emerging, although empirical evidence for this is incomplete at best. Building on a variety of communication theoretical approaches, I argue for a clear-cut differentiation between authority and the power of the better argument. Moreover, I claim that, by looking at the way actors select and refer to the statements of others (“authority talk”), we can research the reproduction of authority as a specific type of relational power exercised by a variety of political actors, including governments, international agencies and non-state actors. The usefulness of this kind of analytical framework for researching an emerging “world authority structure” (John Boli) is illustrated, using speeches and news pieces on the humanitarian crisis in Sudan/Darfur. Results suggest that the common perception of an existing “non-governmental order” in humanitarian politics is highly exaggerated. Instead, what we see is a high degree of “UN-isation” of debate and a pivotal role of national governments that are widely acknowledged as authoritative sources of meaning.     

Normative Power and the Liberal Peace: A Rejoinder to John O'Brennan

This rejoinder to John O'Brennan reasserts the case that the EU enlargement process has a depoliticising effect, which weakens the connections between Western Balkan states and their societies. It suggests that O'Brennan's response is more apologia than analysis; evading issues raised by asymmetrical relations of power between the EU and Western Balkans states. Here the EU is idealised, with the ascribed status of a “normative actor” projecting power merely through “soft power” mechanisms. The points raised in rejoinder seek to clarify that the more “muscular” use of conditionality and direct management of policy reforms inevitably limit the possibilities for public and political debate and consensus-making. Moreover, they distance political elites from their societies. In particular, the use of political conditionality is highlighted, to demonstrate that whether “hard” powers of imposition or “soft” powers of conditionality are used matters less to those on the receiving end of external imposition than to the EU itself, which has attempted to distance itself from its use of executive powers in the region.     

International Relations as Juridical Life: Rethinking ‘the International’ in International Theory

This article advances an account of “the international” in which “juridical life” is taken as the dominant ethic and ultimately the force of “the international” within the discipline of international relations. It evaluates the foundational myths of international politics in terms of its capacity to exercise juridical power, in the service of the state as a geopolitical entity. It examines the ethics of doing “the international” and how rationalities of the international are contained within legalist rationalities of international politics. Drawing upon the ideas of Giorgio Agamben, it proposes an alternative conceptualisation of international life in which the juridical is dispossessed of its political rationality. Such an outlook allows for the reframing of international politics at a critical distance from geopolitical orthodoxies within international theory and opens up new possibilities for ethics in international politics.     

A Means of First Resort: Explaining “Hot Pursuit” in International Relations

This article provides a new theory of hot pursuit—the use of military force by a state against a nonstate actor across borders—in international relations. Drawing from the literature on civil-military relations, I argue that attitudes on limited use of force in peripheral areas will vary between civilian and military, with the latter preferring to treat hot pursuit as a policing operation, whereas the former will treat it as a military one. The logic of my argument is that militaries are oriented structurally and culturally to fight conventionally and against state near-peer adversaries. Threats emanating from nonstate actors, while at times perceived to be existential, require “pin-prick”-style targeted airstrikes, raids by commando forces, or policing operations along a state's periphery. I draw on an original dataset of “hot pursuit” (1975–2009) I collected and examine two recent case studies: India's hot pursuit of ethnic militants into Myanmar and Turkey's pursuit of Kurdish militants into Iraq and Syria.     

Institutions,the Illegal Drug Trade,and Participant Strategies: What Corrupt or Pariah States Have In Common with Liberal Democracy and the Rule of Law

Institutions generate incentives that guide behavior, but many analysts and policymakers underestimate the power of institutions to affect behavior by ignoring how distinct strategies work to generate similar outcomes in different institutional contexts. This article uses the illegal trade in psychoactive substances to illustrate how outcomes (the size of the illegal drug market) across very distinct political institutions can be the same because individuals adopt different strategies in their pursuit of the same behavior: to participate in the illegal drug trade. The illegal trade in psychoactive substances represents an understudied and poorly studied issue in international relations. Arguments that focus on the deviant characteristics of governments in the developing world and organized crime to explain the trade are misleading for empirical and methodological reasons. I propose a general argument about the proliferation of the illegal drug trade that accounts for its success in countries struggling with poverty, corruption, terrorism, and pariah leaders, as well as in rich, stable democracies in which the rule of law “reigns.” The article takes factors that are often seen as distinct in explaining the drug trade (e.g., civil rights in liberal democracies and corruption in developing countries) and demonstrates that their explanatory logic represents variations on the same causal variable: the ability to conceal oneself. My insight is that the strategies used to achieve concealment vary by the institutional context in which participants find themselves.     

探索中美关系新范式及全球安全治理

特朗普执政以来,美国对华战略定位出现全方位负面趋向,由“接触”向“规锁”的转型不断加深。作为当今国际体系中的新兴大国与霸权国家,两国关系正在形成战略竞争日益突出的新态势。中美经贸摩擦的出现和深化表明,经贸合作作为两国关系的传统“压舱石”,在单独应对战略竞争“新态势”方面所能发挥的作用有限。为有效阻止“新态势”向全面对抗与冲突方向演变,中美亟须重新定位、处理和管控彼此关系的“新范式”。包括全球安全治理在内的全球治理架构为中美战略博弈与权势平衡提供了相对稳定的制度体系。通过明确战略竞争边界、构建对话协调平台,有效借助第三方力量等,中美的理性博弈、积极合作能够得到有效推动,并直接带来全球安全治理在观念、制度、模式等方面的变革。这不仅符合两国根本利益和国际社会的普遍愿望,也是全球治理健全发展的需要。但确立“新范式”有待解决的一大问题是,经贸合作作为两国关系“压舱石”的作用已经不稳,需要探索新的“压舱石”,全球安全治理合作在此方面的作用是不够的。未来中美关系的首要特点是战略竞争,新的“压舱石”可以通过权力博弈建立某种相对稳定的机制架构,最终以大国权势平衡的方式来打造。     

The rise of “diminished multilateralism”: East Asian and European forum shopping in global governance

The article argues that the “principled multilateralism” of the immediate post-Cold War period is increasingly giving way to what may be called a “diminished multilateralism.” Newly emerging global and regional powers such as the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other rising powers in the Global South are increasingly questioning the legitimacy of the existing international architecture which they regard as a vehicle of the USA and Western countries to conserve their international influence in an era of rapid change. In the process, international institutions have increasingly become arenas of power rivalries which take the form of contests over access and membership, decision-making rules and normative order. The result is an increasing paralysis of these institutions and their inability to solve global problems. One aspect of these institutional power struggles is “forum shopping.” The article shows that East Asia and Europe have both become active players in forum shopping. Three conditions facilitated forum shopping: major crises and external shocks; sentiments of frustrated entitlement in connection with exclusive and discriminatory international institutions, and extra- and intra-regional power shifts.     

全球化中的奥运会和中国外交的新任务

在全球化和信息化的背景下,国际关系的内涵和外延正在发生重大变化.以北京奥运会为聚焦点的国际互动显示了当代国际关系的新特点:新兴大国的中国同西方传统大国在价值观方面进行了新一轮的碰撞、竞争和磨合.形势的发展对中国外交提出了诸如新兴大国和国际体系间的关系、国家行为体和非国家行为体的有序互动、国际政治和全球治理、中国国际战略和内外统筹的有机协调等新任务.     

The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana

In this article I show that the unipolar era already is drawing to a close. Three main drivers explain the impending end of the Pax Americana. First, the rise of new great powers—especially China—is transforming the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity. Second, the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic over-extension, or as Paul Kennedy dubbed it, imperial overstretch. Third, the United States' relative economic power is declining, and mounting US fiscal problems and the dollar's increasingly problematic role as the international financial system's reserve currency are undermining US hegemony. After examining how these trends undermine the argument for ‘unipolar stability’, I conclude by arguing that over the next two decades the Pax Americana's end presages dramatic changes in international politics.     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.     

Russia's quest for multipolarity: A response to US foreign policy in the post‐cold war era

A good deal of attention has recently been focused on whether and how new ‘poles’ will rise to challenge American hegemony. This article examines the conscious effort by Russian policymakers and commentators to foster a multipolar world designed to resist American domination of the international system. In particular, three policies are examined: the formation of a Slavic Union with Belarus; the developing de facto alliance with China; and the ‘democratization’ of international politics. In light of Moscow's policies, I conclude that American foreign policy has become counterproductive by sparking balancing behavior on the part of other great powers.     

Editor's note

This article examines the argument that the ability of a government to generate “audience costs”—to create a situation, that is, in which it would pay a domestic political price for backing down—plays a key role in determining how international crises run their course. It does this by looking at a dozen great power crises to see how well various aspects of the audience costs argument hold up in the light of the historical evidence. The audience costs mechanism, it turns out, does not play a major role in any of those crises—a conclusion which, the author claims, has certain important methodological implications.