Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.     

Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

What explains the outcome of interstate negotiations in international organizations (IOs)? While existing research highlights member states’ power, preference intensity, and the IO’s institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in IOs: Through issue linkage members of an IO leverage privileged positions in other IOs to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes. Specifically, European Union members are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Inside the UNSC EU members can promote security interests of other European countries, and they can use their influence to secure side-payments from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating new EU budget data, and it shows that EU members obtain 1.7 billion Euro in additional net receipts during a two-year UNSC term, on average. Thus, bargaining processes in the EU and the UN are intricately linked.     

Studying small states in international security affairs: a quantitative analysis

Todays’ international security architecture composed of international security treaties and international security norms has been established and formalized by negotiations. Owing to the great importance of international security negotiations for international security practices, this paper sheds light on negotiation activities. A study of 100 different international security negotiations shows that states vary considerably with respect to their negotiation activity. Some countries voice positions very often, while others remain completely silent. This is puzzling, as active negotiation participation is an expression of state sovereignty and a means to influence the shape of the international security architecture. The article distinguishes between capacity and incentives as driving forces of state activity in international security negotiations. The analysis reveals that, next to political and financial capacities, states that place high priority on military matters are more active, while smaller and poorer states are more likely to shelter under the security umbrella of larger counterparts.     

The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation

This article addresses the influence wielded by the formal leaders of international cooperation—those state or supranational representatives that chair and direct negotiations in the major decision bodies of multilateral organizations and conferences. This is a topic that so far has received limited systematic attention by IR theorists, who have tended to treat bargaining parties as functionally and formally equivalent, leaving little theoretical space for formal leadership. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, I introduce a theory that develops a coherent argument for the delegation of authority to the chairmanship, the power resources of negotiation chairs, and the influence of formal leaders over outcomes. I assess the explanatory power of this theory through evidence on formal leadership in three alternative organizational settings: the European Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations environmental conferences. I find in favor of the chairmanship as a source of independent influence in international cooperation. Formal leaders perform functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation that make it more likely for negotiations to succeed, and possess privileged resources that may enable them to steer negotiations toward the agreements they most prefer.     

The Rotten Carrot: US-Turkish Bargaining Failure over Iraq in 2003 and the Pitfalls of Social Embeddedness

Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited as to why certain side-payment negotiations succeed, while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. But in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust, ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. The US-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 is used to illustrate and test this theory.     

Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions,Institutional Design,and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations

Multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization have stalled. This has contributed to a steep rise in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). At the same time, negotiations for PTAs have not always proven quick and painless: While some treaties are sealed within a few months or days only, other agreements are preceded by protracted bargaining processes in trade and trade-related issue areas. In this article, we provide a theoretical explanation for this empirical variation. More specifically, we argue that PTA negotiations take longer the greater the distance between the prospective partners’ initial bargaining positions. Moreover, we contend that negotiation processes become more protracted the higher the relative ambition of the prospective PTA. Due to the limited links to the domestic political arena in autocracies, we expect this latter effect to play out for groups of democratic bargaining partners only. We test these two hypotheses for 198 preferential trade negotiations using novel measures for bargaining templates and the ambition of PTA clauses. In our two-stage survival models, we find support for our argument. In line with qualitative evidence from recent preferential trade initiatives, our models indicate that services, investment and intellectual property rights are particularly sticky agenda items for democratic leaders at the international bargaining table.     

How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations1

This article argues that NGOs can “tip the balance” in favor of particular outcomes at international environmental negotiations by leveraging a combination of facilitative negotiating power and discreet bargaining assets. It uses the international climate change negotiations to illustrate how NGOs employ their facilitative power and bargaining assets, which stem from NGOs’ transnational character, ability to increase the transparency of negotiations, and claims to legitimacy.     

How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations1

This article argues that NGOs can “tip the balance” in favor of particular outcomes at international environmental negotiations by leveraging a combination of facilitative negotiating power and discreet bargaining assets. It uses the international climate change negotiations to illustrate how NGOs employ their facilitative power and bargaining assets, which stem from NGOs' transnational character, ability to increase the transparency of negotiations, and claims to legitimacy.     

生物多样性议题安全建构的碎片化

1992年,《生物多样性公约》与《联合国气候变化框架公约》《联合国防治荒漠化公约》一并成为全球环境治理与合作的重要制度性框架文件。目前,生物多样性的国际合作程度、社会认知深度、治理行动速度等都明显逊色。生物多样性治理的迫切程度不亚于其他的全球性环境议题,但其议题安全化的分散性却不利于建构整体性的安全认知。生物多样性议题安全建构的碎片化体现在生态、治理目标、谈判、国家及其他行为体四个层面。生态层面是指生物多样性的安全认知;治理目标层面是指全球生物多样性治理的"爱知目标"与安全的联系;谈判层面包括资金机制、资源动员、遗传资源获取和惠益分享、保护区以及主流化等议题;各缔约方及其他行为体层面不仅在各项议题上表达各自关切,同时也将生物多样性问题建构为粮食安全、水安全、公共卫生安全、经济安全等多元安全关注。生物多样性议题安全建构的碎片化导致了该问题虽然在话语上进入了安全领域,但是缺乏共同的安全认知,难以提供简明和清晰的治理目标和路径,不利于推动全球有效治理。     

Small states in multilateral negotiations. What have we learned?

There are many small states in the international system, which have considerably fewer capacities than their bigger counterpart. The study of multilateral negotiations in the European Union (EU), conferences taking place under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN), negotiations on the set up of an International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as the compliance bargaining in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) reveals that small states can sometimes be very influential—despite their size. Small states tend to be most likely to punch above their weight if the negotiations take place in an institutionalised arena with majority-based decision-making rules in which each state has one vote or in contexts in which decisions are made unanimously, if they are selective in negotiations and concentrate their capacities on the most important issues, engage in capacity-building activities to maximise their ideational resources, if they make use of institutional opportunity structures such as chairing meetings and engaging in agenda-setting, and if they individually or collectively apply persuasion strategies from early on.     

Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms

Why do states create enforceable international human rights norms that empower third parties to prevent and sanction domestic human rights abuses? Recent theories suggest that international institutions are shaped not only by power and interests but also by the content of arguments during intensive communication and argumentation processes. Moving beyond the simple notion that "communication matters," I argue that states are likely to be persuaded by arguments that draw on widespread taken-for-granted norms, in particular, prohibitions on bodily harm, the importance of precedent in decision making, and the link between cooperation and progress. This model extends previous theories by specifying mechanisms and scope conditions for international change through persuasion. I illustrate the argument by examining the convention against torture, a costly international institution that allows domestic courts to prosecute crimes that occur in the territory of other states (universal jurisdiction). Because of its enforcement mechanisms, the torture convention poses a difficult case for theories explaining international institutions. If persuasion models can explain even costly institutions, they should be more widely considered as explanations for all kinds of international institutions.     

Power and agency in the human security framework

The concept of human security is arguably a progressive move away from the narrow conceptions of military and territorial security that have traditionally dominated international relations. The human security framework is argued to have the potential to empower and emancipate individuals by putting them at the centre of policy, analysis and debate and addressing the problems they face in their daily lives. In this paper I will argue that the human security framework cannot live up to its promises to empower the citizens of poor and developing countries. Whilst the human security framework problematizes the relationship between the state and its citizens, the framework replaces this relationship with relationships with other states or international agencies that lack accountability, effectively further disempowering citizens in weak or unstable states. The human security framework serves to reinforce international power inequalities and renders criteria for intervention by powerful states and international institutions less transparent and less accountable.     

Navigating differences: transatlantic negotiations over Galileo

The European global navigation satellite system, Galileo, entered its development phase in 2002 and is scheduled to become operational in 2012. Since its inception, Galileo has been yet another contentious issue in transatlantic negotiations. American concerns spanned economic and security-related issues, but, despite considerable tensions, a comprehensive agreement was entered into in 2004. This paper analyses the roots of the transatlantic dispute, as well as the negotiations that led to its resolution. It points out the vital and wide-ranging lessons that may be gleaned from this case. The European Commission has become a notable actor in the security realm via dual-use items such as Galileo. Technological progress has, in itself, become a bargaining instrument whereas time-honoured negotiation tactics have failed. Galileo sheds light on the ongoing recalibration of the transatlantic partnership in which autonomy has become a powerful motivation for European policy-makers. Constructive engagement, triggered by shared interests, only occurred when parties accepted each other as equals.     

Why “Conservative,” Not Liberal,Internationalism?

There is no broad literature defining conservative internationalism as there is for liberal internationalism and realism. Yet conservative internationalism differs from liberal internationalism and realism in four important ways. First, it seeks a world of limited government or separate sovereign nations not big international institutions. Second, it believes that national security is a function of ideological differences not just relative power or diplomatic misunderstandings. The democratic peace is a much safer world for America than the balance of power or United Nations. Third, it recognizes the need to use force during negotiations, not just after negotiations fail, because authoritarian states will not take negotiations seriously if they can achieve their objectives outside negotiations. And fourth, it advances democracy conservatively by prioritizing regions where strong democracies exist nearby (today Ukraine and Korea) and by using military leverage to reach timely compromises that weaken authoritarian states.     

Small states and compliance bargaining in the WTO: an analysis of the Antigua–US Gambling Services Case

In recent years, studies have challenged the conventional power-based literature to show that a deficiency in resources does not limit a small state's bargaining leverage in international negotiations. However, few studies examine small state influence during compliance bargaining, the post-agreement bargaining to ensure that all signatories comply with the terms of an agreement. Using an interview with a key advisor to the small twin-island state of Antigua and Barbuda during compliance bargaining with the United States (US), and World Trade Organization (WTO) documents, this article examines how a small state can successfully attain bargaining leverage and win against a behemoth state. In this case, Antigua successfully challenged the US ban on cross-border internet gambling and betting services. The article argues that the strategies and tactics that Antigua used within the WTO dispute settlement framework contributed to the country's bargaining leverage and enabled it to punch above its weight.     

Bargaining When the Future of an Industry Is at Stake: Lessons from UAW–Ford Collective Bargaining Negotiations

The 2007 American automobile industry labor negotiations involved fundamental challenges for labor and management, including a historic shift of responsibility in the management of retiree health care, a need for new approaches to core employment security issues, identification of ways to create new unionized jobs in the industry, and a joint commitment to the competitive viability of U.S. operations. Less visible, but no less important in the United Auto Workers–Ford case, has been unprecedented levels of information sharing and unique innovations in the bargaining process designed to enable problem solving even when tough issues were on the table. More than 300 people were directly involved in the negotiations, serving at the main table and on twenty‐four subcommittees. This case study covers the context for the negotiations, key events leading up to the bargaining, a unique process of “bargaining over how to bargain,” the actual negotiation process, and the results achieved. Implications are generalizable to the broader concept of pattern bargaining and many other types of negotiations when transformation is on the table.     

Beyond soft balancing: small states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations

The role of small states has been largely neglected in research on the process and outcome of multilateral negotiations. Even though these states may be active in the agenda-setting processes or display a specific engagement in certain thematic aspects of negotiations, in the end game the outcome of negotiations has been perceived to be dependent on the bargaining between major powers. However, small states also have strategies at their disposal to compensate for these weaknesses. Two principal ones come to mind, prioritization or niche diplomacy, and coalition-building to join forces with like-minded states in order to draw on their resources, expertise and manpower. In the article, we compare two cases of small state coalitions in multilateral negotiations, namely the Like Minded (LM) group in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in United Nations climate negotiations. While the two coalitions resort to similar strategies, they have not been comparably successful. We will show that the ability to translate discursive power into measurable effects on outcomes ultimately depends on the institutional setting of the negotiations and the nature of the issue that coalitions are tackling.     

Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining

The "audience cost" literature argues that highly-resolved leaders can use public threats to credibly signal their resolve in incomplete-information crisis bargaining, thereby overcoming informational asymmetries that lead to war. If democracies are better able to generate audience costs, then audience costs help explain the democratic peace. We use a game-theoretic model to show how public commitments can be used coercively as a source of bargaining leverage, even in a complete-information setting in which they have no signaling role. When both sides use public commitments for bargaining leverage, war becomes an equilibrium outcome. The results provide a rationale for secret negotiations as well as hypotheses about when leaders will claim that the disputed good is indivisible, recognized as a rationalist explanation for war. Claims of indivisibility may just be bargaining tactics to get the other side to make big concessions, and compromise is still possible in equilibrium.     

Democratic sanctions meet black knight support: revisiting the Belarusian case

Democracy promotion through economic sanctions has become commonplace. Previous studies argue that an important challenge to the effectiveness of democratic sanctions is the contravening support of black knights. However, these studies underestimate conflicting interests between the target and its black knight. In this paper, I propose a bargaining model for understanding how targets obtain support from black knights. The target’s main source of bargaining power is its threat to defect from the black knight and obtain support from an international rival. However, the credibility of this threat decreases with democratic sanctions because they hinder cooperation with a likely source of support, namely the sender. Therefore, targets take steps towards democracy to improve their bargaining position relative to the black knight. To probe my argument, I conduct a deep single case study of EU sanctions against Belarus between 2004 and 2016 with Russia as a black knight. Sanctions should have no effect in this paradigmatic case of black knight support. Yet, there is substantial evidence that democratic sanctions have increased the cost of electoral fraud and state repression in Belarus. This indicates that the conflicting interests of targets and their black knights provide windows of opportunity for democracy promotion.     

The impact of international conflict and detente on bargaining in arms control negotiations: An experimental analysis

This paper reports on a laboratory experiment which investigated the impact of conflict and cooperation in a hypothetical international environment on the bargaining processes and outcomes of a simulated arms control negotiation. A method called Bargaining Process Analysis was employed for measuring the content of bargaining behaviors in this experiment where free verbal interactions were permitted.

The results suggested that a heightening of international tensions tended to increase the perceptions of mutual hostility among negotiators, to increase the employment of “hard‐line” bargaining strategies such as threats and retractions, to increase the proportion of negative relative to positive affect and disagreements relative to agreements. These changes in bargaining behavior, in turn, detracted from the ability of negotiators to identify a solution to the bargaining problem and from the level of agreement attained. Conversely, increased cooperation in the international environment had no consistent, strong effects on either the bargaining process or outcomes of negotiations.