The United Nations and the right to self‐determination: A response to Mahalingam's reply

France has had a long history of struggle with various forms of terrorism and over the past decade has achieved particular success against Algerian Islamic terrorist groups – the GIA and GSPC – with close links to Al-Qaeda. This article reviews France's experience of terrorism since the end of the Second World War and details the evolving state responses to these challenges and the sophisticated anti-terrorist apparatus that now serves the French state. It then considers the role of France in the post-11 September ‘war on terrorism’ and argues that France remains in the front-line of the struggle against Al-Qaeda and that the French experience has much to contribute to the international war against Islamic terrorism.     

Six rather unexplored assumptions about al-Qaeda

For all of the prodigious output on the subject of al-Qaeda from scholars and policy-makers alike recently, a number of consequential assumptions about the group remain startlingly unexplored. This paper examines six such assumptions, revealing each one's foundational role in assertions and debates about al-Qaeda (and, in most cases, about terrorism more broadly) despite the relatively unexplored status of each. These six assumptions relate to: (1) the link between the causes or roots of al-Qaeda's violence and deep-rooted anti-Americanism; (2) the relationship between fighting ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ and fighting al-Qaeda globally; (3) the effect of eliminating individual terrorists; (4) the strategic versus social sources of terrorists' motivation; (5) the demonstrative effects of increased homeland security; and (6) the role of the internet in actual terrorist activity.     

The Palestinian intifada: An analysis of a popular uprising after seven months∗

This study challenges the conventional wisdom that the Internet is a reliable source of operational knowledge for terrorists, allowing them to train for terrorist attacks without access to real-world training camps and practical experience. The article distinguishes between abstract technical knowledge (what the Greeks called techne) and practical, experiential knowledge (mētis), investigating how each helps terrorists prepare for attacks. This distinction offers insight into how terrorists acquire the practical know-how they need to perform their activities as opposed to abstract know-what contained in bomb-making manuals. It also underscores the Internet's limitations as a source of operational knowledge for terrorists. While the Internet allows militants to share substantial techne, along with religious and ideological information, it is not particularly useful for disseminating the experiential and situational knowledge terrorists use to engage in acts of political violence. One likely reason why Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists have not made better use of the Internet's training potential to date is that its value as a source of operational knowledge of terrorism is limited.     

‘Energising’ EU–Algerian Relations

With Algeria still self-excluded from the ENP, unconvinced by the UfM and indeed now seriously questioning the added value of the Association Agreement, EU–Algerian relations could not be at a lower point. Interaction within the EMP has conspicuously failed to lead to a meaningful convergence of the dyad's interests, even if it has encouraged a process of familiarisation of sorts between actors on both sides. Although energy has traditionally been the area where EU–Algerian relations are strongest, reflecting their market-rooted interdependence, it remains frustratingly under-institutionalised at the bilateral level. The conclusion of a ‘strategic energy partnership’ could help overcome the extant sterility of EU–Algerian relations, capturing the specificity of their shared interests and focusing minds on tailored ‘enhanced bilateralism’.     

The role of ideology in terrorists’ target selection

Ideology plays a crucial role in terrorist's target selection; it supplies terrorists with an initial motive for action and provides a prism through which they view events and the actions of other people. Those people and institutions whom they deem guilty of having transgressed the tenets of the terrorists’ ideologically‐based moral framework are considered to be legitimate targets which the terrorists feel justified in attacking. As an extension of this, ideology also allows terrorists to justify their violence by displacing the responsibility onto either their victims or other actors, whom in ideological terms they hold responsible for the state of affairs which the terrorists claim led them to adopt violence. While it is not the only factor which determines whether a potential target is attacked, ideology provides an initial range of legitimate targets and a means by which terrorists seek to justify attacks, both to the outside world and to themselves.     

How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?

This article examines, compares, and contrasts the ways in which “global jihadis” have trained for terrorism in Western Europe. Before the invasion of Afghanistan, the terrorists received training in Al Qaeda paramilitary camps. After invasion, they had to find alternative training methods and arenas. It is widely assumed that the Internet has taken over the role of the Afghan camps. The current survey suggests that the Internet's role as a “virtual training camp” might be overstated. Although the Net has become an important tool for terrorists on many levels, they maintain an urge to obtain real-life, military-style training in jihadi combat zones. Despite difficulties and risks, many of today's terrorists attend terrorist training facilities in Pakistan or other places. The main characteristic of training practices after the invasion of Afghanistan seems to be that, from an organizational perspective, the push for training and preparation comes from “below” rather than from “above.”     

A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration

This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda continues to pose the most serious terrorist threat to the U.S. today. If the September 11, 2001 attacks have taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to plan and plot attacks. Al-Qaeda has acquired such a sanctuary in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and surrounding environs. Accordingly, the highest priority for the new American presidential administration must be to refocus our—and our allies'—attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now re-grouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadi allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives—along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized “bunches of guys” as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda's effective information operations. The U.S. thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats. This article first discusses the scope and details of the terrorist threat today and then proposes a counterterrorism strategy for the new presidential administration. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.     

Fanon,Camus and the global colour line: colonial difference and the rise of decolonial horizons

I focus here on the political stances of Frantz Fanon and Albert Camus regarding the Algerian War of Independence. By examining their reflections on this violent anticolonial struggle, I seek to highlight the role of colonial difference and of racial hierarchies in the constitution of global politics. Fanon's position relies on an ethos of decolonization and on an ethics of difference that—while specific to the Algerian context—also reverberated profoundly among other societies caught in the violence of imperial encounters. Camus' conciliatory approach, however, and his moral equalization of the violence perpetrated by both sides enunciate the inherent racial hierarchies underpinning liberal narratives. I argue that the limits inherent in Fanon's thought—but also its latent potentialities for decolonial thinking—become apparent when examined through the lens of the contemporary activism among North African migrants and their descendants in France. The emergence of self-proclaimed decolonial movements constitutes an attempt to enact a decolonial transnational citizenship, which contests the racial boundaries of French Republicanism. But it also signals a different vision of the universal—one that is entrenched in a terrain of historical specificity and which holds more promise in contesting the global colour line.     

Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists

The conventional wisdom is that terrorists tend to target democracies because they are uniquely vulnerable to coercion. Terrorists are able to coerce democracies into acceding to their policy demands because liberal countries suffer from two inherent counterterrorism constraints: (1) the commitment to civil liberties prevents democracies from adopting sufficiently harsh countermeasures to eradicate the terrorism threat, and (2) their low civilian cost tolerance limits their ability to withstand attacks on their civilian populations. This article tests both propositions of the conventional wisdom that (a) terrorists attack democracies over other regime types because (b) liberal constraints render democracies vulnerable to coercion. The data do not sustain either proposition: illiberal countries are the victims of a disproportionate number of terrorist incidents and fatalities, and liberal countries are substantially less likely to make policy concessions to terrorists, particularly on issues of maximal importance. A plausibility probe is then developed to explain why democracies have a superior track record against terrorists. The basic argument is that liberal countries are comparatively resistant to coercion—and hence inferior targets—because they are superior counterterrorists. Liberalism's commitment to civil liberties and low civilian cost tolerance are, in the aggregate, actually strategic assets that help democracies prevail in counterterrorist campaigns, thereby reducing the incentives for terrorists to target this regime type. These findings have important implications for how democracies can defend their liberal values and physical security in the age of terrorism.     

Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling: The Case of Aviation Security

In this article, we examine the relationship between hardening a target and the value that a terrorist group derives from attacking it. We use a simple expected value framework to compare how the expected value of attacking a hardened target varies between a violence-based approach, where terrorists are presumed to be maximizing the physical damage done to the target, and a signaling-based approach, where terrorists are presumed to be maximizing the symbolic value of their attack. We argue that, if it is proper to understand terrorist attacks as costly signals of terrorist strength or determination, hardening a target actually increases the expected value of attacking a target (relative to its value before hardening), even if the attack fails. We go on to examine the evolution of aviation security, and trace how al-Qaeda's views of airplanes and airports as targets have changed since 9/11. As aviation targets were hardened with increasingly onerous security measures, al-Qaeda began to see even attacks that did not result in detonation as successes, in large part because of what they signaled about al-Qaeda's abilities, and the ability of al-Qaeda to impose costs on the U.S. and other countries even in the absence of explosions.     

The subjective and objective violence of terrorism: analysing “British values” in newspaper coverage of the 2017 London Bridge attack

This article examines how ?i?ek’s analysis of “subjective” violence can be used to explore the ways in which media coverage of a terrorist attack is contoured and shaped by less noticeable forms of “objective” (symbolic and systemic) violence. Drawing upon newspaper coverage of the 2017 London Bridge attack, it is noted how examples of “subjective” violence were grounded in the externalisation of a clearly identifiable “other”, which symbolically framed the terrorists and the attack as tied to and representative of the UK Muslim community. Examples of “systematic” violence were most notable in the ideological edifice that underpinned this framing but also in the ways in which newspaper reports served to draw upon British values in the aftermath of the attack. This directed attention away from the contradictions within the UK, towards narratives that sought to “fix” these contradictions through eradicating the problem of “the other” and/or by violently protecting the British values “they” seek to undermine. As a consequence, newspaper coverage worked to uphold the illusion that “peace” could be achieved by eradicating terrorism through further forms of objective violence, including, internment without trial; the “ripping up” of human rights; and closer surveillance of Muslim communities. Indeed, it was this unacknowledged violence that worked to maintain British values in the press' coverage.     

Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology: Response to Commentaries

The Lehi, a fringe Jewish paramilitary group created in 1940, conducted a concerted terrorist campaign against the British authorities in Palestine during and after World War II, proclaiming that its activities were undertaken in the name of national liberation. Lehi was founded and led by Avraham Stern, also known as “Yair.” Scholar, intellectual, and poet, Stern developed a fundamental ideology of national and messianic Jewish terrorism, which became the ideological basis not only for the work of the Lehi, but also for later Jewish terrorist activism. The present article examines the intellectual foundations of Lehi terrorism and how its intellectual and ideological principles influenced Lehi's most controversial activities—internal terrorism and the execution of its own members. In conclusion, the author traces the impact of Stern's intellectual legacy on later generations of Jewish terrorists.     

Al-Qaeda's Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network

Al-Qaeda is commonly described as a highly flexible and adaptable non-state network, making it difficult for states to combat. Although these features are associated with networks in theory, they are not inherent to networks in practice, and rely largely on organisational learning. A network that fails to learn is not likely to adapt successfully. This paper explores the learning implications of al-Qaeda's transnational network structure, focusing on decentralisation and reduced hierarchical control following the loss of its Afghanistan base. Drawing from organisational theory research, the paper uses an exploration–exploitation framework to offer hypotheses about how learning is evolving. It suggests a wider space for exploration, rendering a dispersed, decentralised al-Qaeda more innovative, balanced by a weakened ability to exploit resources and expertise. Networked al-Qaeda militants are described as ‘innovative improvisers’ with high creative potential but low professionalism. By delving into the mechanisms of learning, the paper builds knowledge of what specific circumstances affect al-Qaeda's purported agility as an actor. Further research is recommended on how states might respond to innovative improvisers. Such research should extend beyond popular proposals for ‘networked’ national security to innovation and learning in their own right.     

Safety-Valve Elections and the Arab Spring: The Weakening (and Resurgence) of Morocco's Islamist Opposition Party

ABSTRACT

By strange coincidence, Greece's Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 N) met its end almost exactly a year after Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorists felled New York's twin towers, when the group's leader of operations, Dimitris Koufodinas, turned himself in to the police after months on the run, on September 5, 2002. The capture of Koufodinas and his group marked the demise of the last and most stubborn of a generation of ideological terrorists whose campaigns caused serious political and security problems in Western Europe for more than a quarter of a century. Drawing on the judicial investigation findings and the courtroom testimonies of the terrorists, this article attempts to tell the stories of the four most senior group members in order to understand what led them to act in the way they did and, more crucially, what kept them inside a terrorist organization with no prospects and community support for so long.     

Groupthink and Terrorist Radicalization

Why do groups adopt terrorism? Major theories of terrorist radicalization assume it to be a rational process whereby groups select terrorism as the policy most likely to advance their goals. Not all terrorism is rational, however, and these theories cannot explain cases when groups pursue terrorism despite it being self-defeating. We distinguish between rational and irrational terrorism, and explain the latter using social psychology's groupthink mechanism. Although terrorists are widely assumed to be vulnerable to groupthink, empirical work on the phenomenon has focused overwhelmingly on decision-making by national executives. We firmly establish the link between groupthink and terrorist radicalization by tracing groupthink's operation through the development of the Weather Underground, an American terrorist group that emerged in the late 1960s and conducted six years of bombings against the U.S. government. All of the antecedent conditions, symptoms, and decision-making defects predicted by groupthink are evident in the Weather Underground, providing valuable evidence of the dangers of irrational radicalization and offering lessons for its prevention.     

War on terror. Islam and the imperative of democracy

The war on terror, which began with the horrific terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon in the United States (US) on 11 September 2001, has now entered its second year. Much has been happening since. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a regime believed to have harboured Al-Qaeda, is now gone. The terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden is believed to have been disrupted and weakened. The despotic regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, believed by the US as a regime that supported terrorism and posed a threat to international security, has been toppled, and the country is now under American occupation. Despite such significant developments, however, a clear fact remains: terrorism has not been defeated, and in fact, is increasingly more dangerous and more active in perpetrating horrendous terrorist acts against humanity. As long as the world remains threatened by terrorism and terrorists, it seems that the war on terror will still go on indefinitely.¶This paper provides a reflection on the world since the war against terror initiated by the US, the predicaments of Southeast Asian Muslims in such a war on terror, and the imperative of democracy as an important element in a long-term strategy to counter terrorism.     

Affecting trust: Terrorism,internet and offensive information warfare

The national security consequences of the potential use of the Internet by terrorist organizations have attracted the interest of many academics and government and intelligence officials. The goal of this article is to provide a new explanatory angle concerning the possible targets of terrorists’ offensive information warfare (OIW) operations. It argues that these organizations may prove more valuable and effective to undermine on‐line activities of leading electronic commerce sites than to target elements of the critical national information infrastructure. These offensive actions, in fact, would directly impact one of the explanatory elements for the Internet's success: users’ perception of its trustworthiness. Before tackling its arguments, the article provides a definition of offensive information warfare. Then, it investigates how terrorist organizations would formulate their operational style concerning offensive information warfare. The stage is then set to define the central argument of the article by drawing from studies carried out in the areas of information security, international management and electronic commerce. The article concludes with a set of policy recommendations to counter these potential threats and thus make the Internet a safer communication instrument for economic, commercial and social development.     

Reply to pluchinsky and rapoport comments

The on-going Kashmir conflict has metamorphosed into a formidable insurgency that has attracted extremist groups fromPakistan and elements of Al-Qaeda. Given Al-Qaeda's modus operandi as an international network based on already existing domestic extremist groups, this article argues for the resolution of the India-Pakistan Kashmir conflict as an avenue for shrinking the constituency of both Kashmiri domestic extremist groups and, by extension, that of Al-Qaeda's. Feasible options for resolutions are analyzed and an alternative proposition is suggested. An unresolved, or inadequately resolved, conflict is expected to lead the Kashmiri insurgency on a trajectory directed at the Pakistani government, possibly leading to that country's fragmentation and the subsequent expansion of Al-Qaeda's operational base. It is thus argued that the resolution of the Kashmir conflict be viewed as an integral component of the broader U.S. ‘war on terrorism’ and should compromise of delicate American diplomatic involvement in the India-Pakistan dialogue over Kashmir.     

Is this Paper Dangerous? Balancing Secrecy and Openness in Counterterrorism

We analyze a seemingly simple question: When should government share private information that may be useful to terrorists? Policy makers' answer to this question has typically been “it is dangerous to share information that can potentially help terrorists.” Unfortunately, this incomplete response has motivated a detrimental increase in the amount of information government keeps private or labels “sensitive but unclassified.” We identify two distinct types of private information that are potentially useful to terrorists and identify the range of conditions under which sharing each can enhance counterterrorism efforts. Our results highlight the complex trade-offs policy makers face in deciding how much openness is right in a world where protecting the people from terrorists has become a central duty of government.     

Beating the water: The terrorist search for power,control and authority

Starting from Mao's well‐known metaphor of ‘water and fish’, this article examines the nature of power as it applies to terrorist groups. Terrorists are under constant pressure actively to increase their influence and control over their constituent communities. Our understandings of how terrorist groups can do this has generally suffered from being too limited and overly simplistic. Focusing on Northern Ireland, this article explores how terrorist groups can first identify and then access various sources of power which can be used to strengthen the group's position and authority. The article argues that there are identifiable strategies which can be exploited by current and future terrorists in virtually any setting. It is in the interest of those combating terrorism to study these principles closely if they wish to limit the power and durability of terrorist opponents.