Terrorist Skin,Peace-Party Mask: The Political Communication Strategy of Sinn Féin and the PIRA

The article analyses the political communication strategy adopted by Sinn Féin in order to legitimize the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) terrorist campaign during their transition from violence into mainstream politics. Their endeavours to portray a triumphant republican movement in spite of the huge gap between strategic aims and achievements are examined. The political and social rehabilitation of violent Republicanism, and how their leaders have evolved from pariahs to celebrities, is also assessed. The role of the media and political elites, as well as the political discourse of the PIRA and Sinn Féin, is analysed in order to examine how the republican movement has tried to rewrite its past in an attempt to gain political and social legitimacy. Consequently, the myths reproduced by republicans to disguise their failures as historical compromises, reproducing a more benign interpretation of history which distorts the causes and consequences of terrorism, are critically assessed. The article will focus on the struggle for the legitimacy of the terrorist campaign and the propaganda system which, in the words of Garret FitzGerald (Irish Prime Minister between 1981 and 1987), has managed to turn the republican movement into the “peace party” despite murdering thousands of human beings.     

Narco-Territoriality and Shadow Powers in a Peruvian Cocaine Frontier

ABSTRACT

Whereas cocaine kingpins are often portrayed as key protagonists and perpetrators of violence in Latin America, in Peru’s Upper Huallaga they are also important powerholders who have formed dynamic systems of governance by dominating socio-economic resources and legitimating their narco-territoriality through arrangements with a variety of “shadow powers.” Although potentially violent armed actors, whether insurgents or the police and military, often abound in these “dangerous places,” in the post-conflict Upper Huallaga most of these groups aimed to gain more power and control by forming coalitions with the local powerholders. Drawing upon the narratives of drug barons, traffickers and producers, insurgents, and state officers, this article seeks to focus on an aspect that is largely overlooked in other analyses: the intricate relationship between contested narco-territoriality, weakening local governance networks, and “new” outbreaks of violence.     

Flipping the Switch: Combat,State Building,and Junior Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan

Contemporary us counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan requires junior leaders to engage in both combat and state-building activities. This study aims to explain the fundamental challenge in merging these. I argue that difficulty lies in separating insurgents from civilians, and translating doctrine from senior to junior officers. Junior officers consistently develop a similar ad hoc decision-making tool— role-switching—to simplify complex situations to a binary of “hostile or not.” They understand themselves to fill only two roles, the violent “on” role and the non-violent “off” role and develop several tools to minimize the difficulty of role-switching, help their subordinates switch, and signal switching to local populations. Ultimately, however, problems with role-switching—role stickiness, inappropriate switching, and role bias—can in some cases encourage indiscriminate and excessive violence, pointing to the fundamental failures of using military forces as a one-size-fits-all solution to state-building projects abroad.     

Too many enemies: Mobilization,marginalization, and political violence

Over the past decades, a pattern has emerged across the Islamic world of secular actors struggling to build sustainable social movements while Islamists show a higher success rate in doing so—a dynamic often accompanied by high levels of violence and little space for dialogue between actors from across the political spectrum. In this article, we illustrate the utility of social movement theory (SMT) in explaining the ability of some movements to mobilize en masse, while others become marginalized. Furthermore, we suggest that SMT is useful in understanding the processes that produce socio-political dynamics conducive to violent rather than non-violent tactics. Through a case study of Bangladesh, where in 2013 the secular Shahbag mobilization was derailed by a massive Islamist counter-mobilization, this article shows how movements not only capitalize on, but actually contribute to, shifts in cultural discourse through political maneuvering and long-term socialization. By anchoring their ideology in pre-existing religio-cultural imagery, Islamists have been successful in casting themselves as “authentic” defenders of Islam and their secular opponents as “atheists.” In such a socio-political context, the space for dialogue among the various political actors is severely limited and the impetus to employ violent tactics strong.     

Parties,Party Systems and Democracy in the European Union

Since the late 1980s, research on political Islam has been much in vogue in Europe and the US. This phenomenon is typically viewed as an expression of religion rather than of politics. Precisely because of the assumed “religious” underpinnings of political Islam, most Western attempts to engage with Islamists often remain trapped in an attempt to test their “democratic credentials”. By focussing on what Islamists think about democracy, many studies have ignored the political, social and economic contexts in which Islamists operate. Accounting for the political underpinning of Islamist movements can both help understand their political evolution and open up fruitful avenues for comparative analysis. For this reason, attention is turned to Europe to seek best practices of external engagement with domestic opposition movements in authoritarian contexts, such as Western engagement with opposition actors in Franco's Spain, Kuchma's Ukraine and Shevardnadze's Georgia.     

Irish newspaper coverage of NGOs,legitimacy and accountability: what relevance for NGOs?

Based on a quantitative content analysis of Irish Times newspaper articles, this study investigates how Irish relief and development NGOs were linked with the concepts of legitimacy and accountability in newspaper coverage between 1994 and 2009. Key findings included that NGO accountability received more coverage than NGO legitimacy, and “principal-agent” approaches to NGO accountability received more coverage than “stakeholder” approaches. Employing the media theories of agenda-setting and priming, one can infer that Irish Times readers might be more likely to evaluate Irish NGOs in terms of accountability than legitimacy and to consider NGO accountability in principal-agent rather than stakeholder terms.     

Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency

This essay describes terrorism as a mode of warfare and examines its unique characteristics, by comparing this method of struggle to other forms of violent conflict. It further emphasizes the role of terrorism as a strategy of insurgence and delineates the main strategic ideas by which terrorists have hoped to achieve their political objectives. The study evaluates terrorists’ success in obtaining political goals and the conditions which affect their ability to materialize their objectives.

The author concludes that the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by circumstances rather than by choice, and that whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes.     

Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy,Political Networks,and Counterterrorism

Studies of counterterrorism have argued for the importance of bolstering, or “mobilizing,” moderates in the confrontation with violent extremists. Yet the literature has not elucidated when states seek to mobilize moderates and marginalize extremists, how they do so, or when they prove successful. The received wisdom is that states should cultivate and strengthen moderate allies by reaching out to them. This approach, however, fails to grasp the political challenges confronting potential moderates, whose priority is to build and retain legitimacy within their political community. Inspired by network approaches, we maintain that moderates can more easily emerge when their political interactions with the authorities are relatively sparse. We further argue that the state's strategies, including crucially its rhetorical moves, can bolster the moderates' local legitimacy. At times, this will entail not reaching out to moderates but isolating them. Before moderates can be mobilized, they must be made, and the state's criticism, more than its love, may do much to help moderate political forces emerge. This article explains why mobilizing moderates is critical, when it is difficult, and how authorities can nevertheless play a productive role in moderates' emergence. We establish our theoretical framework's plausibility by examining two cases—India's ultimately triumphant campaign against Sikh extremists and Spain's gradual marginalization of Basque extremists. We then suggest what lessons these campaigns against ethnonational terrorism hold for the so-called War on Terror.     

The Cold War and Counter-Insurgency

Due to the American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, theories surrounding counter-insurgency, or COIN, have aroused intense debate in political, military, and academic circles in the United States, Britain, and other Western countries. This article shows that current thinking about how to fight and defeat insurgent movements is based primarily on Cold War-era theories and conflicts. It traces the evolution in COIN thinking both before and during the Cold War—incorporating Western and Eastern bloc experiences of war against insurgents from Malaya to Afghanistan—but also illustrates the conceptual difficulties of applying doctrines based on the historical record of this era. The article concludes by arguing that theories derived from the experiences of states involved in COIN campaigns from 1945 to 1991 still retain utility, but that there are significant differences between Cold War insurgencies and current conflicts associated with the “war on terror”/“long war” which affect the applicability of doctrines based on historical analysis and the works of Thompson, Kitson, Galula, and other “classic” theorists.     

The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning its Status as a “Quintessential” Homegrown Jihadist Network

Despite the Dutch Hofstadgroup's status in the literature as a prime example of a homegrown Salafi-Jihadist terrorist network, the authors, using newly available primary sources, argue that this classification is to a large extent unwarranted. The lack of a rudimentary organizational structure, the existence of divergent views on the legitimacy and desirability of political violence, and the absence of collective action in pursuit of a violent goal rule out labeling the Hofstadgroup as a terrorist organization or network for the largest part of its 2002–2005 existence. A smaller subgroup of extremists did begin developing into a proto-terrorist inner circle from late 2003 onwards. In 2004, this extremist core brought forth the murderer of filmmaker Theo van Gogh. But it was only in 2005, when the remnants of the inner circle tried to resuscitate the Hofstadgroup in the wake of the arrests that had followed Van Gogh's death, that these individual actions were replaced by the communal efforts necessary to warrant the “jihadist network” label often ascribed to the Hofstadgroup. Arguably the most archetypical aspect of the Hofstadgroup case is its ability to illustrate the deleterious effects of the ongoing scarcity of primary sources-based research on terrorism.     

Internal Report Submitted to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

Dissident Irish Republicans have increased their violent activities in recent years. These “spoilers” reject the 1998 Good Friday Agreement power-sharing deal between Unionist and Nationalist traditions in Northern Ireland. Instead dissident IRAs vow to maintain an armed campaign against Britain's sovereign claim to Northern Ireland and have killed British soldiers, police officers, and civilians in recent years. These groups have small political organisations with which they are associated. The assumption across the political spectrum is that, whereas Sinn Fein enjoyed significant electoral backing when linked to the now vanished Provisional IRA, contemporary violent Republican ultras and their political associates are utterly bereft of sympathy. Drawing upon new data from the Economic and Social Research Council 2010 Northern Ireland election survey, the first academic study to ask the electorate its views of dissident Republicans, this article examines whether there are any clusters of sympathy for these irreconcilables and their modus operandi. The piece assesses whether there are any demographic, structural, ideological, religious, or party trends indicating Republican dissident sympathies. It also assesses the extent to which dissidents are seen as a threat and examines whether this perception is shared evenly across Northern Ireland's two main communities.     

Elections and “sons of the soil” conflict dynamics in Africa and Asia

Recent research reveals that nearly one-third of ethnic civil wars since 1945 have been “sons of the soil” (SoS) conflicts that pit indigenous populations against internal migrants. Despite important differences across SoS conflicts, many share a common trait as they often escalate during elections. While scholars have examined the causal mechanisms behind electoral violence, the relationship between elections and SoS conflicts has been overlooked. By examining a wide range of cases, the article breaks with previous research that privileges in-depth case studies of SoS conflicts with high levels of violence. Using insights from recent fieldwork in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Indonesia, the article sheds light on the causal dynamics that link elections and diverging levels of SoS conflict. In so doing, it illustrates how the severing of patronage networks and the shifting balance of power towards migrants create fertile contexts for political elites to instrumentalize local grievances. Elections are thus more likely to produce violent SoS conflicts when elites (at both the national and local levels) are able to mobilize supporters by playing upon these grievances, often through the politicization of citizenship and/or the ethnicization of the local sphere.     

Two Complementary Settings of Peace-making Diplomacy: Political-Elite Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy

In terms of the question, “how to create an effective peace-making process in the Israeli–Palestinian case,” this article argues that the answer is a multidimensional approach to peace-making diplomacy that contains two main settings: political-elite diplomacy and public diplomacy. Political-elite diplomacy suggests various modes of peace-making interactions between political-elites. Public diplomacy provides instruments to involve the people in the peace-making struggle, prepares them for a change, and presses the leadership to reach agreements. The analysis suggests establishing an institution for the operation of public diplomacy—a major Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating congress. The congress is a democratic peace-making institution that invites representatives of the opposing societies to discuss, debate, and negotiate solutions to their struggle. The article also presents the concepts of political-elite diplomacy and public diplomacy as competitive settings that should be regarded as complementary. It includes lessons from the “Minds of Peace Experiment”—a small-scale Israeli–Palestinian public negotiating congress—which has been conducted in different places around the world.     

BORROKA—The Legitimation of Street Violence in the Political Discourse of Radical Basque Nationalists

The present article analyzes the discourse employed by the left-wing nationalist movement in Spain's Basque Country to legitimize the use of street violence for political ends. I distinguish four “faces” of legitimation (“ex ante” vs. “ex post,” “for us” vs. “for others”) and argue that in a situation of radicalization of politically inspired (terrorist) violence, the discourse developed to justify violent action is principally meant for the organization's own following, and less to communicate with the outside world. Basque militants claimed that their strategy of political and military radicalization in the 1990s had been responsible for recent political successes of their movement.     

Just the Two of Us? Civil Conflicts,Pro-State Militants,and the Violence Premium

Quantitative literature discussing violence in civil conflicts tends towards a typical model of engagement between governments and revolutionaries. Whilst recent work has shown the significant impact of multiple anti-government groups, a further feature remains understudied—the role of pro-state militants. This article theorizes a “violence premium” when such groups arise, which leads to all connected groups devoting greater energy to conflict than they would in isolation. Employing duration analysis and data from The Troubles in Northern Ireland, where Republicans act as revolutionary insurgents, Loyalists as pro-state militants, and the British Army as government forces, the violence premium is empirically confirmed. Both Loyalists and Republicans deviate from their underlying strategies to attack more frequently when violence by their rivals increases, with Republicans and the British Army engaging in the same way. An extended analysis, accounting for the status of the victim, shows that the violence premium resulting from interaction between Loyalists and Republicans targeted only the civilian population of Northern Ireland, elucidating the sectarian component of The Troubles. These results show that including all conflict parties and considering how they are linked are important features in studies that aim to determine the net level of violence in civil conflicts.     

Entering Through the Sport’s Door? Kosovo’s Sport Diplomatic Endeavours Towards International Recognition

ABSTRACT

In December 2014, the International Olympic Committee [IOC] granted full membership to Kosovo. For the young state, which had declared its independence only in 2008, this decision meant that it could take part in the upcoming 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. This analysis illustrates the significance of Kosovo’s full IOC membership. Arguing that IOC membership can be identified as both the “end” and “beginning” of Kosovo’s diplomatic endeavour towards international recognition, the role of sport within this process is illuminated. It mirrors the strategic value of representative sport for a nation-building process as well as its particular significance for public diplomacy in Kosovo. Kosovar political elites shifted their focus towards sport because “traditional” diplomatic efforts, despite being successful to a certain extent, could not break the seemingly cemented status quo considering its United Nations [UN] status. Inclusion in the “Olympic family” represents more than just a symbolic victory for Kosovar diplomacy. The Kosovar nation-building and -branding process, emblematised through the “soft power” of representative sport, could be increasingly used to create symbolic pressure on states that have not yet recognised Kosovo; its ultimate diplomatic goal remains to enter the UN, even if it has to be through “sport’s door.”     

Defected and loyal? A case study of counter-defection mechanisms inside Chechen paramilitaries

Can former insurgents in the service of counterinsurgent paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections of individuals who have already “betrayed” once? Drawing on a unique set of primary data, this article examines the effective counter-defection practices of Chechnya’s pro-Moscow paramilitaries toward prospective defectors from among ex-insurgents. It explores three interwoven mechanisms employed with various intensities to avert “double defections” at the peak of the locally fought counterinsurgency in Chechnya from 2000 to 2005. These mechanisms are: a) extrajudicial executions of recidivists and their relatives, b) initiation violence targeting insurgents’ relatives, and c) disclosure of the identities of defected insurgents who were responsible for killing insurgents in combat to the families of slain insurgents.     

Terrorism in an Era of Unconventional Warfare

Academic studies of terrorism and mass political violence have developed largely independently of one another. Insurgents, in contrast, have tended to incorporate terrorism tactics along with other types of unconventional warfare in their repertoire of action. This tendency has become more apparent among insurgents engaging in armed confrontations in the twenty-first century. In order to take account of this development, scholars and others interested in contemporary warfare need to incorporate terrorism studies within the broader subject of insurgencies and “small wars”—political violence, in other words.     

非正式政治力量:吉尔吉斯斯坦“革命”反对派的动员基础

吉尔吉斯斯坦自独立以来已发生了三次“革命”,广义来讲,这三次“革命”均属于“颜色革命”的范畴。但吉尔吉斯斯坦反对派在进行政治动员时,往往尚不具备其他“颜色革命”反对派发起政治动员的一系列“常见”条件(如发达的社交网络、强有力的政党、较高水平的青年组织等)。而在相关条件并不充分的情况下,反对派依托何种力量实现高效的政治动员成为一个值得研究的重要问题。为解答这一问题,吉尔吉斯斯坦反对派所掌握的三种非正式政治力量--个人政治关系网络、部族认同与部族群体、传统政治习俗成为本篇文章重点考察的因素。在三次“革命”中,这三类非正式政治力量帮助反对派实现了募集资金、召集支持者、获取舆论支持、削弱政府合法性、策反政府高层官员等一系列政治目标,成为反对派进行政治动员的主要依托。运用非正式政治力量,吉尔吉斯斯坦反对派得以在其他相关条件尚不充分的情况下,于短时间内实现有效的政治动员,并最终达到了推翻现存政权的目的。     

The Urban Environment and its Influences on Insurgent Campaigns

For a long time, insurgency was a rural affair. The growing modernization of the modern world, however, shifts conflicts to the cities and requires us to explore the logics of armed struggle in urban environments. This article explores how the urban environment shapes armed conflicts, and argues that insurgents face severe practical constraints when acting in the cities. The urban environment offers the insurgents alternative ways of financing and of operating while close state control impedes them in pursuing a classic strategy of insurgency. Although state control cannot prevent attacks as such, it particularly hampers insurgents in relating to the population and organizing opposition. However, without massive and active support, armed struggle will remain sectarian and, thus, fail to achieve major political changes. This article argues that urban insurgents face a paradoxical relationship with society. While urban insurgents become independent of social support on an operational level, they depend more than ever on spontaneous massive and active social support on a strategic level.