NATO and the war on terror: The organizational challenges of the post 9/11 world

This paper deals with NATO’s ability to contribute to the war on terrorism. The paper highlights the difficulties that the organization has encountered in dealing with a threat that is entirely different from the one that the organization was created to deal with. The paper discusses NATO’s new policies, al Qaeda’s transformation since 9/11, and the nature of terrorism. The paper suggests that although NATO has drafted a number of new antiterrorist policies they are all premised on the idea of fighting a war against terrorism as if terrorism were a well defined military enemy. We conclude by arguing that the organizational behavior demonstrated by NATO is consistent with what Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow predict in their organizational process model and that many of the difficulties encountered by NATO in the war against terrorism are due to the nature of the organization. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Southeast Asia as the ‘second front’ in the war against terrorism: evaluating the threat and responses

Following the seminal events of 11 September 2001, and especially since 12 October 2002, southeast Asia has come into focus as the so-called ‘second front’ in the war against international terrorism. However, the threat of terrorism to southeast Asia emanating from radical Islam predated these events. An emerging security concern in recent years has been the rise of extreme Islamic groups. In addition, there exist Islamic separatist/guerilla groups within the region which envision separate Islamic states, and which have been actively engaged in long-running insurgencies against the central governments in the region. In evaluating the nature of the threat emanating from militant Islamic terrorism, there is a need for better typologies to explain the complexity of home-grown Muslim militant groups, and the emergence of transnational linkages both among them and with international Islamic terrorism. These complexities, coupled with the presence of fundamental grievances which long predated 11 September 2001, point to the necessity for a more broad-based strategy that takes into account the presence of fundamental grievances. But the varied nature of these grievances, and the difficulties that have been encountered in meeting the challenges posed by militant Islam, mean that the war against terrorism will be long drawn-out. Containment, not victory, will be the most realistic outcome.     

Was Idi Amin's Government a Terrorist Regime?

What does state terrorism look like? How do we distinguish it from other forms of mass state violence, such as repression or genocide? Based on the developing literature on state terrorism, this study presents three expectations that violence perpetrated by the state should meet if it is to be classified as state terrorism: these are (a) that the violence is perpetrated by agents of the state, (b) that the violence is visible, and (c) that state terrorism focused against a state's own citizens will be carried out by an autocratic, personalistic regime. Drawing substantially on a series of primary sources, this study demonstrates that Idi Amin's regime in Uganda from 1971 to 1979 did engage in state terrorism against its own citizens.     

俄罗斯与美国反恐战略之比较

在当今世界,俄罗斯和美国是遭受恐怖主义威胁最为严重的两个大国,反恐战略在俄罗斯和美国国家安全战略中都是不可或缺的组成部分。俄美两国在反恐战略的形成、恐怖主义威胁判断、反恐目标、军事反恐战略实践和国际反恐合作等方面有相同之处,也存在显著差别。随着俄美领导人的更换,两国反恐战略都在调整,并且选择了不同的战略取向。反恐是俄美两国合作的重要领域,但俄美反恐战略的分歧可能导致双方之间爆发摩擦乃至冲突。     

The United Nations and the right to self‐determination: A response to Mahalingam's reply

France has had a long history of struggle with various forms of terrorism and over the past decade has achieved particular success against Algerian Islamic terrorist groups – the GIA and GSPC – with close links to Al-Qaeda. This article reviews France's experience of terrorism since the end of the Second World War and details the evolving state responses to these challenges and the sophisticated anti-terrorist apparatus that now serves the French state. It then considers the role of France in the post-11 September ‘war on terrorism’ and argues that France remains in the front-line of the struggle against Al-Qaeda and that the French experience has much to contribute to the international war against Islamic terrorism.     

Epistemological failures: everyday terrorism in the West

This article attempts to problematise the disparate levels of attention paid to similar violences globally, whereby violence against women in the developing world is seen as a security concern to the West, and yet violence against women in the West is minimised or ignored. It will do this, first, by demonstrating that everyday violences, better known as everyday terrorism, in the West are subjugated knowledges within Terrorism Studies. To demonstrate this, Half the Sky, Sex and World Peace and The Better Angels of Our Nature serve as exemplar texts that reflect Western exceptionalism and non-Western savagery, particularly within Muslim societies, and deflect from everyday terrorism within the West. This reifies the West as an exceptional saviour and the non-West as a problematic savage. This article looks to flip that reification on its head by recognising that everyday terrorism happens everywhere and is not bound to non-Western identities.     

Editors’ introduction: neoliberalism and/as terror

The articles in this special issue are drawn from papers presented at a conference entitled “Neoliberalism and/as Terror”, held at the Nottingham Conference Centre at Nottingham Trent University by the Critical Terrorism Studies BISA Working Group (CSTWG) on 15–16 September 2014. The conference was supported by both a BISA workshop grant and supplementary funds from Nottingham Trent University’s Politics and International Relations Department and the Critical Studies on Terrorism journal. Papers presented at the conference aimed to extend research into the diverse linkages between neoliberalism and terrorism, including but extending beyond the contextualisation of pre-emptive counterterrorism technologies and privatised securities within relevant economic and ideological contexts. Thus, the conference sought also to stimulate research into the ways that neoliberalism could itself be understood as terrorism, asking – amongst other questions – whether populations are themselves terrorised by neoliberal policy. The articles presented in this special issue reflect the conference aims in bringing together research on the neoliberalisation of counterterrorism and on the terror of neoliberalism.     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.     

Three prejudices against terrorism

This article criticises three assumptions regarding terrorism and the agents who carry it out: (1) terrorists are always indiscriminate in their targeting; (2) terrorism is never effective in combating oppression; and (3) terrorists never participate in fair negotiations, as they merely wish to switch places with their oppressors. By criticising these three prejudices against terrorism, the article does not attempt to justify or excuse terrorism generally nor in the specific case of Sri Lanka which is examined. Instead, it creates the necessary room for such justifications or excuses to be critically appraised by dismantling some popular myths surrounding terrorism.     

“New Terrorism” = Higher Brutality? An Empirical Test of the “Brutalization Thesis”

This article focuses on the so-called “brutalization” of terrorism. The brutalization thesis as part of the larger theoretical concept of “new terrorism” argues that “new terrorism” is more brutal than “old terrorism.” Many scholars claim that the 9/11 attacks mark the beginning of a new era of terrorism that has lifted international as well as domestic terrorism to a new level of violent brutality. Others argue that this process had already started in the early 1990s. After discussing possible ways to operationalize a brutalization of terrorism, for example focusing on suicide bombings or terrorist attacks against soft targets, this article tests the empirical credibility of the brutalization thesis regarding both potential starting points. Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only three out of nine indicators increased significantly during the 1990s, partially backing the idea of a general brutalization, whereas increasing numbers of suicide attacks and beheadings after 9/11 support the notion of a qualitative change in terrorism and its brutality connected with the idea of maximizing media and public attention. Yet, these developments are regionally limited and the brutality of this “new terrorism” exceeds the levels known from the zenith of “old terrorism” in the 1970s and 1980s in only a few cases.     

Women defining terrorism: ethnonationalist,state, and machista terrorism

This article explores definitions of terrorism according to various women in the Basque regions of Spain and France. We ask how women in social movements and government institutions define terrorism, how terrorism influences them, and whether they are viewed as victims of violence and/or as political agents who challenge terrorism. We discuss three definitions of terrorism: ethnonationalist terrorism of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), state terrorism against ETA operatives and supporters, and terrorismo machista (or intimate terrorism seen as gender violence). The article uncovers multiple women’s lived experiences related to terrorism, and by problematising agency and definitions of terrorism, it challenges the binary in international relations of women as either victims or violent perpetrators of terrorism and it establishes terrorismo machista as political violence closely related to other forms of political violence. We conclude that women are important political agents regarding multiple types of terrorism.     

Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Integrated Approach and Future Research Agenda

In this commentary, we make the case that the analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism must be based on an integrated theory that links both issues together. Terrorist groups’ ultimate goals must be distinguished from their strategic goals and the strategic logic by which they employ terror and select targets to further their ultimate goals. The strategic logic of terrorism is thus key to understanding patterns of terrorism and the counter-reaction by governments against it. We make the case for a unified approach and suggest major areas for future research.     

Challenging the State: Effect of Minority Discrimination,Economic Globalization,and Political Openness on Domestic Terrorism

Discrimination against minority groups is a robust predictor of domestic terrorism. However, economic and political openness might further facilitate mobilization of such aggrieved sections of a larger population. This study relates economic and political openness to minority discrimination in explaining vulnerability to domestic terrorism. Terrorism is a rational choice when a minority’s deprivation of public good provisions increases, while global economic integration and limited political openness facilitate rebel mobilization. Using data on 172 countries, I find strong support that countries discriminating against minority groups are more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks when their economic and political systems open up.     

Bermuda triangle: comparing official definitions of terrorist activity

Terror has been officially defined by many states and international actors. Although these definitions differ from each other to a certain extent, the basic divergence appears in the definition of the terrorist, since it reveals who is considered an ‘enemy’ by those actors. The difference between the definitions and lists elaborated by the United States and by the European Union on ‘terrorism, terrorist, and terror organization’ indicates their respective perceptions of the enemy as well as their differing global policies on terrorism. In Turkey, a country marked by a 20 year long struggle against terrorism, the definition of these concepts is mostly limited to domestic politics. The objective of this paper is to compare and contrast the official definitions of terror, terrorist, and terrorist organization by these three actors, including their respective international positions on terrorism.     

Disregard for Security: The Human Rights Movement and 9/11

ABSTRACT

International human rights NGOs have warned that human rights have been threatened since September 11. However, the matter is complicated since what is involved is in reality a relationship between two concepts: human rights and security against terrorism. This article demonstrates that there is a tendency for international human rights NGOs to brush aside questions on security against terrorism. NGOs have stipulated that human rights values should be superior, or they have maintained, but failed to show, that there is no goal conflict between security and human rights—even that human rights fulfil a considerable instrumental function with respect to freedom from terrorism.     

Latin American terrorism and the Soviet connection revisited

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of scholars and journalists argued that the USSR was sponsoring terrorism as a means of low‐intensity conflict against the non‐communist world. This view was endorsed by the Reagan administration. This article assesses what substance there is behind such charges as they relate to Latin America. Its main argument is that sponsorship of terrorists has usually occurred as a byproduct of Soviet support of armed revolution as a tactic rather than for terrorism as such. Soviet willingness to assist armed struggle has varied over the last three decades. The article concludes that, given the current priorities of Soviet Latin American policy, Moscow's sponsorship of armed struggle, including terrorism, is decreasing and will almost certainly continue do so.     

Risk,responsibility and roles redefined: is counterterrorism a corporate responsibility?

This article discusses the role of the private company in the fight against terrorism. It argues that the private company has become politically important to counterterrorism efforts, but the economic logic guiding the risk thinking of private companies is hardly compatible with the aim of providing national security. By examining whether and in what manner the risk of terrorism is considered a corporate responsibility, the article seeks to answer whether and how the political role ascribed to the company finds any resonance in the risk practice of private companies. The article approaches this question by examining how Danish food and infrastructural companies conceptualize the relationship between terrorism risks and corporate responsibility. It demonstrates that a distinction between safety and security discursively facilitates an exclusion of national security concerns from the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and thereby works to deresponsibilitize the company in the fight against terrorism.     

跨境恐怖主义的威胁评估及其治理——以孟中印缅经济走廊沿线为例

跨境恐怖主义是影响孟中印缅经济走廊机制化建设的一个关键因素。哥本哈根学派提出的"地区安全复合体"理论,可以被借鉴地运用到孟中印缅经济走廊的跨境恐怖主义威胁评估中。通过考察孟中印缅经济走廊跨境恐怖主义的活动强度,可以发现中缅边境的跨境恐怖主义风险相对较低,孟印边境的跨境恐怖主义风险很高,缅孟、印缅边境的跨境恐怖主义风险则处于中等状态。以双边合作为基础,尽快建立和完善多方参与的安全合作机制,特别是加快推动"一带一路"倡议的建设成果在孟中印缅经济走廊区域落地生根,将有助于本区域跨境恐怖主义问题的最终解决。     

Groupthink and Terrorist Radicalization

Why do groups adopt terrorism? Major theories of terrorist radicalization assume it to be a rational process whereby groups select terrorism as the policy most likely to advance their goals. Not all terrorism is rational, however, and these theories cannot explain cases when groups pursue terrorism despite it being self-defeating. We distinguish between rational and irrational terrorism, and explain the latter using social psychology's groupthink mechanism. Although terrorists are widely assumed to be vulnerable to groupthink, empirical work on the phenomenon has focused overwhelmingly on decision-making by national executives. We firmly establish the link between groupthink and terrorist radicalization by tracing groupthink's operation through the development of the Weather Underground, an American terrorist group that emerged in the late 1960s and conducted six years of bombings against the U.S. government. All of the antecedent conditions, symptoms, and decision-making defects predicted by groupthink are evident in the Weather Underground, providing valuable evidence of the dangers of irrational radicalization and offering lessons for its prevention.     

Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism

The costs of terrorism very often come mostly from the fear and consequent reaction (or overreaction) it characteristically inspires (qualities stoked by the terrorism industry), not from its direct effects which are usually comparatively limited. Therefore, policies designed to deal with terrorism should focus more on reducing fear and anxiety as inexpensively as possible than on objectively reducing the rather limited dangers terrorism is likely actually to pose. Doing nothing (or at least refraining from overreacting) after a terrorist attack is not necessarily unacceptable, and, despite U. S. overreaction, the campaign against terror is generally going rather well because, no matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably on war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states to cooperate to deal with a common problem.