Legality Policies and Theories of Legality: From Bananas to Radbruch's Formula*

Abstract. In this paper I shall take an inferential approach to legality (legal validity), and consider how the legality of a norm can be inferred, and what can be inferred from it. In particular, I shall analyse legality policies, namely, conditionals conferring the quality of legality upon norms having certain properties, and I shall examine to what extent such conditionals need to be positivistic, so that legality is only dependant on social facts. Finally, I shall consider how legality is transmitted from norm to norm and whether the ultimate legality policies (the rules of recognition) of a legal system need to be constituted by social facts.     

Old Habits Are Hard to Change: A Case Study of Israeli Real Estate Contracts

This article presents a case study on the persistent dollarization norm in the Israeli real estate market. For many years Israeli real estate contracts have been denominated in American dollars. This contracting norm has remained surprisingly stable despite tremendous changes in the structure of the Israeli foreign currency market that severed the connection between the dollar and local inflation and added significant risks to exchange rates. Using an array of theoretical tools, I explain this puzzling phenomenon and demonstrate the centrality of social norms to the design of high‐stakes contracts. Finally, I explore the interaction between social norms and the law and highlight the potential obstacles to regulating contracting norms.     

Sources,Recognition and the Unity of the Legal System

A critical analysis of Kelsen’s theory leads to a broad concept of custom, which covers diverse types of customary norms, where the always required conviction of legal bindingness depends on different types of factual and normative reasons. In it we should include a strict concept of custom or legal usage, derogating custom, custom of general international law, custom that establishes an unwritten constitution, custom that establishes a new written constitution, judicial custom which creates a rule of precedent and custom newly expressed in the judicial application of customary rules. The basic norm could be formulated as a constitutive norm: ‘If the norms created through the first historical constitution are effective, then the first historical constitution (and all the norms derived from it) are valid.’ It is thus a customary constitutive rule that recognizes the first historical constitution as valid law. Norms which establish sources of law are constitutive rules, they can be customary norms or legislated norms, but if they are legislated, they have their validity recognized by, directly or indirectly, a constitutive customary norm. By using a broad concept of custom as a conventional practice, Hart implies that general recognition of a customary rule, together with the practice that accompanies it, are sufficient conditions of validity. A doctrine of recognition that is arrived at by means of criticism and a rational reconstruction of the doctrines of Kelsen and Hart regains the essential theses of the traditional recognition theory of Bierling and Engisch.

     

Economic crisis and morale

The functioning of welfare states and tax systems is fostered by social norms to obey the rules of the system. Morale can change and react to new incentives. In particular, a deep economic crisis with increasing unemployment and reduced prospects for market income may have a norm eroding effect. This study explores the link between economic crisis and morale. Our theoretical reasoning is based on an economic approach to the evolution of norms, according to which norms are influenced by self-interest. A distinction is made between two dimensions of citizens’ morale: benefit and tax morale. Our econometric evidence based on data from the World Value Survey suggests that a sharp hike in unemployment reduces the morale standards along both dimensions. The crisis impact on benefit morale is conditional on the existence of generous benefit schemes.     

著作权法之激励理论研究——以经济学、社会福利理论与后现代主义为视角

激励理论是认识著作权法精神的一个重要哲学层面。激励理论可以从经济学层面加以理解。著作权法使用市场的经济酬报来激励新作品的创作和传播,即著作权法通过赋予作者或其他著作权人对被创作出来的作品的专有权,为作者提供市场经济上的回报,这将激励他们创作新的作品。激励理论也可以从社会福利理论和后现代主义的视野认识。     

论目的意思独立的事实行为

住所设立与废止、物的表见成分认定、从物的认定以及无因管理均包含了明显的意思要素,但法律效果由法律规定而非由该无需表示的意思而设,与法律行为与准法律行为的特性不符,在定位上属于事实行为。鉴于该意思要素在事实行为规范要件中独立存在,它们属于目的意思独立的事实行为,有其独特规律,但与代理规范以及其他事实行为规范存有关联。     

Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines

This article contributes to the current debate about why people follow the law even when they are not subject to legal sanctions, as when there are no police and little danger of a lawsuit. Most recent scholarship in this area takes the form of norms theories, suggesting that social norms rather than laws shape behavior and that deviations from the norm are punished by either social or internal sanctions. Robert Sugden, however, proposes that order may develop "spontaneously" in the many areas of life where abiding by the rules minimizes the risk of costly confrontations with others and is thus in the interest of all parties. When this is true, the threat of little or no sanctions plays no role in regulating behavior. This article tests Sugden's theory against a simple property system, that of the California gold mines, in which individual miners held small claims subject to strict work requirements. The evidence of eyewitnesses shows that the stability of the regime did not depend on norms, but on the reasonable prediction that other claim holders would themselves stand up for their rights under the local mining code. Disputes about the rules and their application were submitted to arbitrators, whose decisions were accepted by the parties and did not need to be enforced. The California experience thus provides an example of a stable property regime for which game theory has a more satisfying explanation than do any of the norms theories.     

赌咒发誓作为“另类规范”之存在意义

有一些不被主流意识认同的“另类规范”,它们存在于某一社会共同体中,能有效调整人与人之间、人与社会之间的关系,但在国家层面上并不得到认同。赌咒发誓就是这样的“另类规范”。作为超验性经验的赌咒发誓一般存在于同一文化背景的社会中,起源于自我意识并与人性相通,自成独立的惩戒系统。它在社会中实际解决纠纷的作用不可低估,因为任何社会不可能只有正式的社会规范,特别是一个健康和谐的社会。     

“It’s All About Something We Call Wasta”: A Motivated Moralization Approach to Favoritism in the Jordanian Workplace

There has been a limited focus on the construal of justice judgments in contexts where norms are potentially conflicting, despite the relevance of norms in justice research. The present study aimed to close this gap by looking at the case of favoritism in Jordan where such conflicting norms are highly salient. A qualitative approach was chosen to facilitate ample exploration of the contextual complexities of the study’s setting. The main data basis were 22 problem-centered interviews conducted with managers and employees in Jordanian non-profit organizations. Data collection and analysis were guided by grounded theory methodology. The resulting theoretical framework of motivated moralization demonstrated that people flexibly construed favoritism as either unjust or justifiable to pursue a number of goals. Instead of relying on a single norm or standard, people strategically adopted the norms that were best suited to substantiate or legitimize a desired position. The norm conflict surrounding favoritism in Jordan facilitated this process by providing a selection of fitting norms for appropriation.     

An Empowerment Theory of Legal Norms*

Abstract. Traditionally legal theorists, whenever engaged in controversy, have agreed on one point: legal norms are par excellence rules which impose obligations. The author examines this assumption, which from another perspective (that of constitutional law, for instance) appears less obvious. In fact, constitutional rules are commoniy empowering norms, norms which do not create duties but powers. To this objection many theorists would reply that empowering rules are incomplete and that they are to be understood as parts of duty-creating rules. A different position from this traditional stance is that defended in Kelsen's later writings, according to which the fundamental type of norm is the empowering norm. The author discusses Kelsen's three theories on the “ideal form” or structure of the legal norm, with special attention to the third of these, the empowerment theory.     

Aggressive reactions to social injustice by individuals and groups as a function of social norms,gender, and anonymity

Two conflicting approaches to the study of group aggression are compared: the deindividuation theory of Zimbardo (1970) and the emergent norm theory of Turner and Killian (1972). To test these two conflicting hypotheses, the frustration-aggression theory of Brown (1986) is used which assumes that individuals and groups, male or female, will react with angry aggression when important social justice norms are violated. It was hypothesized (i) that groups will be more aggressive than single individuals; (ii) males will be more aggressive than females; and (iii) that more aggression will occur when people can be easily identified than when they remain anonymous to each other. These hypotheses received some support. Unexpected interactions between these variables are discussed in some detail. Generally, more support is found for the emergent norm theory than for deindividuation theory.     

Norm Propositions Defended

Abstract .
The author replies to some semantic and epistemic criticisms of the concept of norm proposition. The author's contention is that though some, many, or most norm formulations are uncertain or indefinite with respect to their validity or interpretations, insofar as at least some norms with definite content definitely belong to the legal order, the concept of norm proposition can be maintained to be sound. Three such cases are singled out. Finally the author argues for a consensus theory of legal order focusing on the concept of valid norm conceived either as a norm accepted or as a norm to be accepted by the legal community.*     

Global principles for sustainable biofuel production and trade

This article examines international attempts to regulate the production of and trade in biofuels by establishing criteria and indicators and certification schemes. It focuses on the norms underlying the criteria and the community constructed on the basis of them. The theoretical approach here rests on a discussion of these norms and on their constitutive role. This role creates a community and gives an institutional basis for the global public domain. Accordingly, different norms create the network on which environmental governance is based. It is assumed that commonly accepted criteria form a common norm. The article analyses eleven criteria and indicator systems and compares the criteria adopted. Eight were created for biofuels and bioenergy and three are used in forest certification. Comparison reveals that the criterion aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is used in Northern systems, whereas commonly accepted environmental criteria are biodiversity and minimization of pollution. The web of norms on which biofuel production and trade is based comprises environmental norms together with the general norm of sovereignty and the norms of the market economy.

Morality, social norms and the rule of law as transaction cost-saving devices: the case of ancient Athens

The importance of the institutional framework for economic development is widely accepted today and it is duly stressed in the economic literature. The protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts and an efficient legal system are the pillars of the contemporary rule of law. However, formal institutions cannot function without being internalized by the citizens and without the strong backing of social norms. Morality and social norms are the major elements of the informal institutional structure, the social capital, which is also critical for social welfare and economic development. In this paper we will discuss both the formal and the informal institutional framework of Ancient Athens, which was a free market society with economic problems similar to contemporary market societies. Athenians developed a highly sophisticated legal framework for the protection of private property, the enforcement of contracts and the efficient resolution of disputes. Such an institutional framework functioned effectively, cultivating trust and protecting the security of transactions. This entire system however was based on social norms such as reciprocity, the value of reputation and widely accepted business ethics. Conformity to social norms as well as moral behavior was fostered by social sanction mechanisms (such as stigma) and moral education. The Athenian example is a further proof of the importance of morality and social norms as transaction cost-saving devices even in quite sophisticated legal systems. Their absence or decline leads inevitably to the need for more regulation and litigation and to a growing preference for clear-cut rules instead of discretionary standards. Athenian law was pioneering in the development of rules and institutional mechanisms suitable for the reduction of transaction costs, many of them surviving in the most complex contemporary legal systems.     

行政许可标准的冲突及解决

行政许可标准,是对行政许可的法定条件、程序的解释和细化,在学理上属于许可的裁量基准,在功能上构成了许可获得的限制性条件,在形式上表现为一个自上而下的"阶梯式"规范体系。在相对集中行政许可视角下,市场准入过程往往是多个单一许可组成的复合许可过程,由此产生了不同部门间实体和程序标准的冲突现象。其发生的内在机理是行政权及许可背后的部门利益与家长主义规制,外在形式则表现为复数机关参与的异位规范间的冲突,性质上多属经验冲突而非逻辑冲突。由此,解决的路径在于:一是现行行政服务中心基础上不断修正的行政协调模式;二是具有共性效力之协调技术的提炼;三是通过基准制定和公布义务的规则治理。     

When sanctions convey moral norms

Sanctions not only have the instrumental function of deterring people from undesired behavior but they also have the ability to convey moral norms. As such, they may create a moral motivation not to engage in the sanctioned behavior. This is desirable as this makes the success of a sanctioning system depend less on quality of enforcement. However, sanctions may not always succeed in conveying moral norms. In this paper, three conditions are highlighted that, in the psychology literature, have been empirically proven to influence whether a sanction succeeds to evoke moral norms. First, a sanction should not be regarded as a way to make up for the negative consequences of a transgression a sanction. So, they should be communicated in a retributive way rather than in a compensatory way. Second, as punishments communicate an obligatory rule and rewards communicate a voluntary rule, punishments are a better way to incur moral norms than rewards. Third, severe sanctions more strongly convey a moral norm than mild ones as long as these severe sanctions are not unreasonably severe, are installed by trustworthy authorities and in a fair way. The value of the moral expressive function of sanctions, as well as its drawbacks, are discussed.     

理性、情感与社会规范——村民投票行为的三维解释

村民的投票行为是理性、情感与社会规范共同支配和控制的结果。村民是否参与投票,最终是根据成本收益的比较分析做出的决策;没有情感的推动,村民不会去参与投票;基于农村宗族、社会关系、道德等因素形成的社会规范也影响着村民的投票行为。因此,从理性、情感和社会规范三方面客观分析村民的投票行为并做出相应的制度规范,将有利于农村基层民主政治建设的有效运行。