Domestic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World

Policymakers use a fixed exchange rate regime to signal their commitment to low inflation and to exchange rate stability. Increasing economic integration and the rise of democratic institutions make it more difficult for policymakers to maintain the credibility of this commitment. We use binary probit (with a variety of corrections for autocorrelated and heteroscedastic disturbances) to test hypotheses relating democratic institutions to exchange rate regime choice on a sample of 76 developing countries over the period 1973–1994. The empirical analysis indicates that domestic political preferences—as measured by the structure of domestic political institutions and the fractionalization of the party system—influence exchange rate regime choice. We find that floating exchange rate regimes are more likely in democratic than in nondemocratic polities and that democratic politieswith majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to fix their exchange rates than those with systems of proportional representation.     

The choice of electoral systems in new democracies: a case study of South Korea in 1988

Most theories about electoral system choice are based on the experiences of Western European countries, many of which shifted from majority/plurality rule to proportional representation (PR) at the turn of the twentieth century. This article aims to explain the choice of the South Korean legislative electoral system in 1988 as an example of electoral institution choices in new democracies, which may be different from those in the Western European countries. Through analysing multiple steps leading to the choice of a single-member district plurality voting system, this article suggests three potentially generalizable findings. First, in new democracies, labour parties can only induce old parties to shift to a proportional representation system if they have mobilized the working class prior to democratization. Secondly, parties in the developing world at times face unusual systems that are neither majoritarian nor fully PR. Under such unusual systems, party size would not be a reliable predictor for the party's preference over electoral institutions. Finally, when parties choose a legislative electoral institution in a presidential system, parties tend to prefer an institution that helps them in the subsequent presidential election even though the institution might harm them in the upcoming legislative election.     

Explaining violence after recent elections in Ethiopia and Kenya

A comparison of recent contested elections in Kenya and Ethiopia points to divergences in the forms of political violence. While both countries saw the use of excessive force by members of the security services, Kenya experienced more widespread and deadly inter-ethnic violence than Ethiopia. This article considers these two countries in light of competing explanations for inter-ethnic violence, and concludes that variation in the extent of constitutional reforms is critical in influencing citizens’ responses to close electoral contests. In Kenya, there has been a lack of meaningful constitutional and institutional reform since the introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. By contrast, Ethiopia has seen extensive and substantive constitutional reform in a similar period, but without a negotiated pact among political elites. In both cases, electoral procedures have heightened the stakes of politics and therefore led to significant and escalating political violence, but in unforeseen ways. The important electoral issue of regionalism or devolution in both countries is also briefly considered here. The violence surrounding the elections raises concerns about how to sustain citizen engagement with elections and other democratization activities when these fail to meet voter expectations over several electoral cycles.     

When do electoral institutions trigger electoral misconduct?

Drawing on two complementary mechanisms, this article explores the question of whether electoral institutions and conditions of electoral competition create incentives to promote electoral misconduct in young or developing democracies. The first mechanism explains how majoritarian institutions like disproportional electoral systems are more likely to trigger electoral fraud than consensus electoral institutions like proportional representation. However, for this mechanism to be activated, the incumbent must feel effectively threatened by the opposition. To better understand the way this mechanism works, the electoral history of the country also needs to be taken into consideration. Democracies which have a historical record of running clean elections are less likely to experience fraud than countries with a history of electoral misconduct. I test these theoretical claims using a dataset that contains relevant information for 323 parliamentary elections in 59 new or developing democracies in the period between 1960 and 2006. The empirical analysis shows a strong and robust empirical support for the two mechanisms.     

Determinants of Domestic Terrorism: An Examination of Ethnic Polarization and Economic Development

ABSTRACT

Many scholars have sought to explain why countries with ethnically heterogeneous populations experience higher levels of political violence, but these studies have produced mixed findings. Unlike most studies that use ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices to examine this relationship, we argue that ethnic polarization is a more appropriate measure to assess the role of ethnicity as a causal factor of domestic terrorism. This paper hypothesizes that high ethnic polarization influences the incidence of domestic terrorism, particularly when intervening economic factors are present. To test three hypotheses, we use negative binomial regression to model data from the Global Terrorism Dataset, World Bank, and the Reynal-Querol (RQ) ethnic polarization index of 116 countries between 1970 and 2012. Our findings show that terrorism is more likely to emerge in societies with high ethnic polarization and economic malaise.     

Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts,Causes, and Consequences

What are the causes of electoral violence? And how does electoral violence influence conflict resolution and democracy? This article argues for a conceptualization of electoral violence as a specific sub-category of political violence, determined mainly by its timing and target. The enabling conditions and triggering factors can be identified in three main areas: 1) the nature of politics in conflict societies, 2) the nature of competitive elections, and 3) the incentives created by the electoral institutions. These clusters of factors are important for understanding electoral violence both between different societies and across elections in a specific country.     

Preventive action and conflict mitigation in Nigeria’s 2015 elections

Prior to the 2015 Nigerian general elections, there were concerns that the fierce political contest would lead to electoral violence in the country. However, the elections were conducted peacefully, with fewer disputes and election-related deaths than previous elections. This study accounts for the fall in the level of electoral violence in Nigeria and discusses the lessons that Nigeria’s experience presents. It argues that the avoidance of destructive electoral disputes in Nigeria was the result of preventive action taken by the country’s electoral commission, civil society groups, and development partners. The specific preventive actions taken include innovations in election administration aimed at enhancing electoral transparency and credibility, election security measures such as early warning and peace messaging, and preventive diplomacy urging the main candidates and the political elite to embrace peace. The key lesson that can be drawn from Nigeria’s experience is that a well thought out conflict prevention strategy should be an integral part of electoral governance, especially in countries with a high risk of electoral violence.     

Does ethnic voting harm democracy?

A large literature argues that ethnic voting is detrimental to democracy. Ethnic voting may have at least three effects: (1) it can reduce uncertainty over electoral results; (2) it may increase the winner-take-all character of elections; and (3) it can lead to a process of ethnic outbidding. However, few studies have tested the effect of ethnic voting on democracy using large-N quantitative analysis. Previous tests instead look at whether ethnic fractionalization hinders democracy. Yet, ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to the politicization of ethnicity, and it is only when ethnicity is activated as a vehicle of political mobilization that it can destabilize democracy. This article tests the effect of ethnic voting in 58 democracies worldwide between 1992 and 2015. On balance, the evidence suggests that democracies with high ethnic voting levels tend to see the quality of their democracy reduce over time relative to those with less ethnic voting. Ethnic and religious fractionalization, however, have little effect.     

族性视野中多民族国家族际政治问题比较研究——基于尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构的经验观察

族性是影响多民族国家安全及其族际政治走向的关键变量。它既能促进族际政治整合、维护国家安全、有助于民族国家建构,也能导致族际政治冲突、危及国家安全、阻碍民族国家建构。以"族性"为分析视角,通过对尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构历程的梳理及其族际政治问题的比较,其共性特征包括:族际政治问题的分析单位是多民族国家;族际政治问题虽然发生在现实中的多民族国家,却往往带有深刻的历史根源;政治与文化边界的重叠是族际政治问题产生的逻辑起点;国内不同民族群体无法得到平等公正对待是导致族际政治问题的核心因素;军事专政和腐败会增加族际政治问题的风险和国家安全的不确定性。解决多民族国家族际政治问题、确保国家安全的关键在于如何让一个在历史上和观念中都不曾存在的国家民族能够超越族性分界而被成功建构。结合两国国情提出应对策略:寻找重叠共识,建构文化多元、政治一体的国族共同体;借鉴差异政治和差别公民权利思想,探寻积极回应不同民族群体正当利益诉求、实现各族人民成果共享、利益均沾的政治制度、体制和机制;消除军人在政治生活中的影响,惩治腐败;探索包容促进多语言、多宗教和谐相处的民族政策。     

Coup,riot, war: How political institutions and ethnic politics shape alternative forms of political violence

This article explores how different types of governance systems shape different forms of political violence. We identify four governance types by combining the “institutional” dimension of coalition size represented by a minimum winning coalition (MWC) and the “ethno-political” dimension represented by the size of ethnic groups participating in the governing coalition. This study hypothesizes that (a) an exclusive system (small MWC; narrow-based ethnic coalition) is likely to engender civil war, (b) an oversized system (small MWC; broad-based ethnic coalition) is likely to generate a coup, and (c) an undersized system (large MWC; narrow-based ethnic coalition) is likely to stimulate riots or protests. Statistical analyses confirm all three hypotheses, implying that opposition groups choose alternative forms of conflict that maximize their chances of accessing power under different governance configurations. The article concludes by identifying three possible paths toward inclusive governance and suggesting that institutional reform before ethnic inclusion makes a transition toward inclusive governance far less dangerous.     

The Impact of Military Interventions on the Integration of Muslim Immigrants in Western Countries, 1990–2013

While there is an indication that some democratic institutions and public policies have been effective in integrating ethnic minorities, social classes and immigrants in Western countries, recent studies show that they have not succeeded equally in incorporating Muslim immigrants. This difference begs the question of what particular circumstances are required for Muslim integration in the West. This article uses the level of violence between Muslim immigrants and host societies as an indication of their social cohesion or lack thereof. Conducting a quantitative analysis of 16 Western countries for the period 1990–2013, we find that militarised interstate disputes between Western states and predominantly Muslim countries substantially increase the likelihood of violence between Muslim immigrants and the respective host societies. Multicultural policies and consensual political systems mitigate these adverse effects. This study demonstrates a continued utility of democratic institutions and public policies towards promoting social cohesion, especially when the host states are engaged in military action in Muslim countries.     

Electoral Violence in Africa Revisited

This article addresses the still unsettled question of the incidence of violent election periods in Africa. It uses two new datasets, which report episodes of social conflict in the region for 1990–2011, and elections worldwide from 1960 to 2010. When combined, these data suggest that onsets of electoral violence peak around major election days in Africa as a whole, but with wide national variability in the volume of new episodes. Depending on the time span and type of social conflict, from one-quarter to three-quarters of the elections for national leadership have been without incident. The article also investigates the timing of electoral violence and the extent to which there is an experience curve effect, whereby subsequent elections have fewer onsets of social conflict. The data indicate that two-thirds to three-quarters of elections are free of onsets of social conflict, but that the proportion does not change much with experience. Overall, there appear to be reasonable grounds for optimism about peaceful elections in many African countries.     

Limits of ethnofederalism and local political autonomy arrangements: Continuing violence in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts of Assam

This article analyzes the continuing interethnic and anti-state violence in Assam, India after the creation of the semi-autonomous Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD) in 2003. We argue that this institutional arrangement, as an “innovative” model of ethnofederalism and political autonomy, has been unsuccessful in effectively preventing continued violence. We identify several dynamics resulting from the creation of the BTAD that contribute to its ineffectiveness, including the emergence of parochial and militarized Bodo ruling cliques, competitive radicalization between Bodo political elites competing in insular electoral constituencies, the inability to co-opt and integrate factionalized Bodo militants, reinvigorated non-Bodo activism and communalism, and the increased politicization of land. The extreme and multi-faceted “ethnic” diversity found in India’s Northeast, and its aggressive political expression at the local level, differentiates this region from other parts of India where ethnofederalism has been comparatively more successful for conflict mitigation. Thus, the prospects for successful ethnofederalism are area-specific.     

Centripetalism and Electoral Moderation in Established Democracies

Centripetal approaches to ethnic conflict management seek to promote inter-ethnic accommodation and moderation by making politicians dependent on the electoral support of groups other than their own base. There is an ongoing debate about the utility of such approaches, including which kinds of electoral systems can best promote moderate and centrist politics in deeply divided societies. Neglected in this debate, however, has been the experience of ethnically diverse established democracies utilizing centripetal electoral models. This article examines historical evidence from Australia, and recent natural experiments with subnational electoral reform in the United States, which lend support to centripetal claims that preferential, “ranked choice” or “instant runoff” voting can encourage electoral moderation and address political polarization.     

Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements

This study examines partition's success in ending old and preventing new ethnic conflicts. Opponents of partition often claim that partition only invites (further) conflict by its inability to divide existing multiethnic countries in ways satisfying to all concerned ethnic groups. In contrast, proponents of partition argue that partition is the only ethnic conflict solution that provides ethnic separation, an element that is key if conflict prevention is of concern. By separating the belligerent groups, partition provides safety and a decrease in the need for interaction between groups that do not get along. When domestic and international violence is considered, partition's consequences largely depend on the timing of partition. In cases of partitions resulting from ethnic secessionist conflicts, there is a widespread continuation of serious domestic conflict but its frequency does decrease significantly, to a level that can be considered "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of violently partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict in more than one-third of the cases. In cases of peaceful (i.e., preventative) ethnic partitions, domestic conflict starts up in about half of the cases, but despite the significant increase in its frequency, the frequency remains "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of peacefully partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict almost completely. Accordingly, peaceful ethnic partitions produce dyads that are significantly less likely to engage in militarized conflicts and wars than dyads emerging from violent ethnic partitions. Contrary to some expectations, partitions do not create overwhelmingly nondemocratic countries; however, in cases of violent ethnic secessions, democratic institutions do not exhibit significant pacifying effect on subsequent domestic conflict. Important caveats notwithstanding, the overall results indicate that peaceful ethnic partitions have conflict management potential.     

Party Systems and Democratization: A Comparative Study of the Third Word

This study examines the development of democracy in the Third World in the 1990s. All Third World countries that had at least one competitive election in the 1990s are included. The development of democracy is the dependent variable: did the countries mature into liberal democracy, remain electoral democracies or relapse into authoritarianism? The independent variables measure three dimensions of party systems: fragmentation, one-party dominance, and stability. Presidentialism/parliamentarism and majoritarianism/proportionalism are controlled for as intervening variables. Overall, the results indicate that party system characteristics are of limited explanatory value. However, in certain contexts they seem to play a role. In countries with majoritarian electoral systems, both one-party dominance and a high degree of party system fragmentation are detrimental to the development of democracy. In parliamentary systems, there is a negative association between the development of democracy and the degree of party system fragmentation.     

Modernization,ethnic fractionalization,and democracy

In recent years, a number of studies have examined the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and democracy – so far with inconclusive results. We argue that the lacking robustness of existing findings is due to a theoretical and empirical misspecification of how ethnic fractionalization may influence the level of democracy. Ethnic fractionalization does have an impact on the regime form because it moderates the well-established positive effect of modernization on democracy. In other words, at low levels of ethnic fractionalization, modernization has a strong positive effect on democratization, but with increasing levels of ethnic fractionalization, the positive effect of modernization decreases. This relationship is documented empirically by using data on 167 countries since 1972.     

The Impact of Peace Journalism Training on Journalists’ Reportage of the 2015 Elections in Nigeria: An Action Research Case Study

During the run-up to the 2015 general elections in nigeria, there was widespread trepidation within and outside the nation that the increasing cases of electoral violence and political intimidation ravaging the country would snowball into full-blown violence, and possibly plunge it into civil war. this fear was largely instigated by the 2011 election, which was marred by pre- and post-election violence. Human rights Watch (2011) estimated that the violence led to over 800 deaths in three days of rioting which engulfed parts of northern nigeria. since the First republic elections in the early 1960s, the nigerian media have been very involved in the political process. the diverse nature of the media makes its ideological inclination easy to decipher, because of reportage that is often tilted along ethnic and religious lines. using data obtained through participatory action research involving 40 purposively selected participant journalists, this article proposes an alternative method of news reportage using the peace-journalism model. developed by lynch and mcGoldrick (2005), the model encourages journalists to report social issues in ways that create opportunities for society to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict, using insights from conflict analysis and transformation to update concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting. it also provides a new route map which traces the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their reportage.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

Bosnia on the Border? Republican Violence in Northern Ireland During the 1920s and 1970s

Unionist politicians have argued that Republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/Unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing Republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that Republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.